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The sheer scale of the transformation in Eastern Germany was unprecedented. 
It encompassed unforeseen levels of political, social, economic and cultural 
change within the space of a few months. And yet, this unique period is 
understudied in remarkable ways. This thesis contributes to the existing 
literature on transformation and democratisation processes by providing a 
detailed study of local transformation practices in Erfurt and Eisenach from 
1989 to 1991. 
Concentrating on the communal level, it examines the interrelationship 
between protest, consumption, politics and economic restructuring, and how 
these changes are reflected in social practices. It highlights the agency of local 
actors by illustrating the pressure under which eastern Germans worked and 
the ways in which they dealt with both successes and losses. For introducing 
and developing democratic practices in times of social, political and economic 
instability is an incredible challenge. From the grassroots perspective, this thesis 
highlights previously underappreciated forms of input and proactivity, as well 
as the immense constraints faced by actors on the ground. 
Running throughout the thesis, however, is also the story of citizens trying to 
find and use their voice; actively renegotiating roles and structures, 
determining new forms of communication and tone, defending their interests 
and values, creating meanings and making sense of the past. As well as relating 
to wider questions of recent German politics and history, this thesis 
demonstrates how times of political and social uncertainty can lead to practices 
of social and financial marginalisation that significantly redefine citizens’ 
political agency. 
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Figure 1: Author's own photograph, Erfurt, 21 December 2017. 
  




Travelling into Erfurt, the first thing that catches the eye, even before 
embarking the train, are the words WILLY BRANDT ANS FENSTER.1 Placed 
atop the former Interhotel opposite Erfurt’s central station, the lettering invites 
locals, visitors and passers-through to recall the day of the West German 
chancellor’s diplomatic visit to the GDR in March 1970. Willy Brandt, come to 
the window. The name of the SPD politician that introduced Ostpolitik and 
enacted change through rapprochement is familiar across the country. The fact that 
the first meeting to ease relations between the two German states took place in 
the current Thuringian capital is less well-known.2 
Still, WILLY BRANDT ANS FENSTER are not the words of a high-profile 
politician but rather those of the crowds that gathered to see him, pushing past 
the barriers and policemen to fill the space adjoining the station and the hotel. 
The capital letters, installed by the artist David Mannstein in 2009, physically 
shout out across the square.3 They are the repeated cries of GDR citizens that 
called out long enough to get a reaction. But they also reference a third party: 
the East German government. By facing the crowds that day, Brandt risked 
causing a scene that could humiliate the Socialist Unity Party and dash his 
hopes of better relations to the East. The modern artwork, symbolically placed 
up high on the roof, uses four words to demonstrate the link between the top 
 
1 See Figure 1. 
2 For a detailed account of events, see Jan Schönfelder & Rainer Erices, Willy Brandt in Erfurt. Das erste 
deutsch-deutsche Gipfeltreffen 1970 (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2010). 
3 Hanno Müller, ‘Der Denkmalstreit von Erfurt’, Thüringer Allgemeine (21 September 2015) 
<http://www.thueringer-allgemeine.de/web/zgt/leben/detail/-/specific/Der-Denkmalstreit-von-
Erfurt-513584068> (accessed 25 November 2017).  
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and bottom of society, the East and West of the country, and the ability of 
ordinary citizens to influence politics from below. 
This thesis looks at how social practices of making oneself heard shaped 
the historical changes in East Germany. In so doing, it not only offers new 
insights into the period from 1989 onwards, but also relates to wider political 
questions around social practices and political rights. How did East German 
citizens go about changing their society, and how did they experience the 
intense transformation of political, social and cultural life that has since taken 
place? What role did vocal protest and crowd gatherings play in the process? 
And how was political expression shaped by feelings of fear, regret, anger and 
grief during this emotional period? 
In March 1990, twenty years after Brandt’s appearance, councils in East 
Germany were preparing for new parliamentary elections, free and fair for the 
first time in forty years. The result would see a win for the conservative 
Alliance for Germany, the introduction of the free market system, and a 
currency union with the Federal Republic of Germany. East German districts 
were restructured into federal states, and by the end of the year, the former 
German Democratic Republic had joined the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Delegates got to work on implementing new procedures and structures, 
restoring the buildings and improving the infrastructure. Within just a few 
months, the political, social, economic and cultural landscape of the GDR had 
changed altogether.  
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Brandt’s state visit and his emphatic reception in 1970 has since been 
likened to the autumn demonstrations of 1989.4 These historical events are 
comparable on an audible level, for they both present moments in which ‘the 
silenced populace heard itself again for the first time and in so doing gained self 
confidence’.5 Clearly, then, the dynamic of being silent or making oneself heard 
has the power to shape political and social processes, and by instilling 
confidence also influences understandings of the self, identities and cultures. 
The practice of asserting oneself publicly is therefore key to understanding the 
changes that took place in East Germany and its impact on the current day.  
And yet, the memorial at Erfurt’s main train station does not tell the 
story of the autumn revolution, Reunification, or Helmut Kohl’s visit to Erfurt 
as part of the Allianz’s campaign for the first free parliamentary elections. 
Instead, it recalls a moment half-way through the lifetime of the GDR. It is a 
reminder that citizens in Eastern Germany have their own history and their 
own experiences, formed over a period of almost forty years, that continue to 
shape contemporary Germany. Why did the citizens of Erfurt specifically 
choose to remember a moment in GDR history and how did eastern feelings of 
difference develop during the transformation period? Were East Germans able 
to assert their own wishes and plans during the unification process, or did the 
‘Ost’ citizens essentially lose their voices during the transformation? 
 
4 Michael Sontheimer, 'Willy Brandt in Erfurt. Politik aus dem Hotelfenster‘, Spiegel Online (12 March 2010) 
<http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/willy-brandt-in-erfurt-politik-aus-dem-hotelfenster-a-948767.html> 
(accessed 25 November 2017).  
5 ‘Das zum Schweigen gebrachte Volk hörte sich auf diese Weise erstmals wieder selbst und gewann so 
Selbstbewusstsein‘, Gerhard Paul, 'In einem stillen Land. Soundscape DDR‘, in Gerhard Paul & Ralph 
Schock (Eds.), Sound der Zeit. Geräusche, Töne, Stimmen. 1889 bis heute (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014), p.470. 
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Of course, the memorial also highlights the unique relationship between 
East and West Germany. Valérie Lozac’h argues that the situation in East 
Germany from 1989 onwards is no ‘exception’, but is comparable to that in 
other eastern European states, on the basis that the new structures still needed 
to be decided and implemented locally.6 However, the close linguistic, historical 
and cultural relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
provided East Germans with the option ‘to vote with their feet’, certainly sets it 
apart from its neighbours and considerably impacted the pace and scope of the 
changes.7 In part, this took the shape of substantial financial and material 
backing of the restructuring process, the arrival of West German ‘aid workers’,8 
and an exchange of ideas and practices. What role did this play during this 
period, and to what extent did the relationship with West Germany and its 
citizens influence the transformation process in the East?  
Due to the speed and scope of the developments that took place in 
Eastern Germany from 1989 onwards, this period is a unique social and political 
case study that remains understudied by historians. By examining this process 
at a grassroots level, this thesis tries to understand how the ensuing social, 
political and economic changes manifested themselves in the daily lives of local 
 
6 ‘Sonderfall’, Valérie Lozac’h, 'Das Erbe der Vergangenheit als Strategie. Die „Alten“ und der 
Verwaltungsumbau in den ostdeutschen Kommunen‘ in Sandrine Kott & Emmanuel Droit (Eds.), Die 
ostdeutsche Gesellschaft. Eine transnationale Perspektive (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2006), pp. 215-216. 
7 Włodzimierz Borodziej (et al.), 'Introduction‘, in Joachim von Puttkammer, Włodzimierz Borodziej & 
Stanislaw Holubec (Eds.), From Revolution to Uncertainty. The Year 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe (New 
York: Routledge, 2020), p. 6. 
8 'Aufbauhelfer‘, Joachim Linck, Wie ein Landtag laufen lernte. Erinnerungen eines westdeutschen Aufbauhelfers 
in Thüringen (Weimar: Böhlau, 2010). Although this term is used more retrospectively, by western actors, 
the term ‘Hilfe’ (help) was used regularly in sources from 1989 onwards, by eastern and western actors, to 
refer to the involvement of western actors in political and communal work. The translation I have chosen 
is the widely accepted translation for this term in all its given contexts. All translations in this thesis are 
my own, but for clarity, I will always include the original language in the footnote. 
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citizens and looks for new insights into how people adapt and assert 
themselves during periods of swift change. In so doing, it provides a micro-
historical case study of transformation processes and practices that relates to 
wider questions of recent German politics and history; namely, the extent to 
which eastern citizens shaped the proceedings in their local communities, how 
this process was influenced by previous historical and cultural experiences, and 
to what extent it was determined ‘top-down’ by the Federal Republic. 
 
Current state of research 
While the early release of state government documents has meant that research 
on the history of East Germany has been abundant, with historians focussing on 
the social and cultural aspects of life in the GDR and the structures of Stasi 
surveillance,9 the period post-1990 has received comparatively little academic 
attention. And yet, even just the first six ‘intense, emotional’ months of changes 
in the GDR were strong enough to cause ‘psychological chaos’ amongst 
younger citizens, thus signalling a widespread and sudden social shift that 
clearly begs further investigation.10 As voters, especially in the East, have 
swung to the left and the right in recent years, academics have now begun 
 
9 To name but a few, see Sigrid Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft: zum Paradox von Stabilität und 
Revolution in der DDR 1945 – 1989 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993); Alf Lüdtke & Peter Becker (Ed.), Akten. 
Eingaben. Schaufenster. Die DDR und ihre Texte (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997); Konrad Jarausch (Ed.), 
Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a socio-cultural history of the GDR (New York: Berghahn, 1999); Thomas 
Lindenberger, Volkspolizei: Herrschaftspraxis und öffentliche Ordnung im SED-Staat 1952-1968 (Weimar: 
Böhlau, 2003), Jens Gieseke, Die Stasi: 1945-1990 (München: Pantheon, 2011), Katharina Lenski, Geheime 
Kommunikationsräume? Die Staatssicherheit an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena (Frankfurt: Campus, 
2015).  
10 Anna Saunders, Honecker’s Children. Youth and patriotism in East(ern) Germany, 1979-2002 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 119, p. 136. 
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asking what they may have missed, arguing for a reinvestigation of 1989, from 
a perspective that addresses the ‘many contradictory elements’.11  
 Arguably, early research on the collapse of the GDR state focussed too 
heavily on the reunification of Eastern Germany as a joyous and successful 
occasion, thereby overshadowing the social tensions and other emotions that 
also define this period.12 On the flipside, others foregrounded the way in which 
the western model was imposed on the GDR, even characterising it as a 
colonisation of the East.13 Many academics felt that such depictions undermined 
the agency of eastern actors in this period and subsequently delivered studies 
on the role and importance of eastern actors and initiatives; for example, the 
Neues Forum in promoting new forms of political debate,14 the round tables of 
the GDR in resolving conflict and preparing the elections,15 the final GDR 
government on preparing accession to the Federal Republic,16 and the GDR 
administration in changing their style of reporting.17  
These accounts recognise the valuable efforts made by different actors to 
develop an ‘open civic society’ and enable the transformation, but also capture 
the complexities and difficulties of implementing structural changes.18 Indeed, 
later research demonstrates that the political system of the Federal Republic of 
 
11 Paul Betts, '1989 at Thirty: A Recast Legacy', Past and Present, 244 (2019), p. 274. 
12 Betts, ‘1989 at Thirty’, p. 274. 
13 See Paul Cooke, Representing East Germany since unification: from colonization to nostalgia (Oxford: Berg, 
2005). 
14 See Irena Kukutz, Chronik der Bürgerbewegung Neues Forum 1989-1990 (Berlin: BasisDruck, 2009). 
15 See Francesca Weil, Verhandelte Demokratisierung. Die Runden Tische der Bezirke 1989/90 in der DDR 
(Göttingen: V&R, 2011) and Thoralf Barth, Die Zentrale des Umbruchs von 1989/90. Meinungen über den 
Runden Tisch der DDR (Berlin: Weißensee Verlag, 2009). 
16 See Ed Stuhler, Die Letzten Monate der DDR. Die Regierung de Maizière und ihr Weg zur deutschen Einheit 
(Berlin: Christoph Links, 2010). 
17 See Tytus Jaskułowski, Nachrichten aus einem Land, das DOCH existierte. Lageberichte aus den Bezirken für 
die letzte DDR – Regierung 1990. (Berlin: Osteuropa Zentrum, 2012). 
18 In particular, Stuhler, Die Letzten Monate der DDR, p. 223. 
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Germany was not simply copied but needed to be adapted and integrated, 
therefore relying heavily on the knowledge and commitment of former 
citizens.19 In her analysis of the town administration in Eisenhüttenstadt, 
Valérie Lozac’h even demonstrates how certain western models were outright 
rejected by the council in favour of own approaches.20 Although this may not be 
representative for the whole of eastern Germany, it indicates that more 
historical research is needed on this period. 
Questions remain about how the transformation worked in practice and 
was mediated in different realms of society, and about the time that followed 
Reunification. How were the political practices that shaped the changes in the 
GDR in 1989 carried through into the early 1990s? To what extent were political 
actors and citizens able to maintain agency in the face of new developing 
political and social dynamics? How was parliamentary democracy 
implemented, and did these new structures allow local actors to enact the 
desired changes in their communities? What role did the relationship to 
colleagues in Western Germany play in this process, and how did this change 
over the course of the transformation process? 
As the thirtieth anniversary of German reunification approaches, and 
more state sources become available, more research is now turning to the 
period after 1989, with a special emphasis on bridging the gap between life and 
society in the GDR until 1989 and in unified Germany from 1990 onwards. At 
the Centre for Contemporary History in Potsdam, projects looking for 
 
19 Lozac’h, ‘Das Erbe der Vergangenheit‘, pp. 215-216. 
20 Ibid. 
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continuities across the transformation period have focussed on the long-term 
effects of system change in housing policy, consumption, personal 
relationships, education and political culture.21 By beginning well before 1990, 
these studies try to show how practices that existed in the GDR or in some cases 
even under National Socialism continued or adapted over the transformation 
period, and to what extent the new system was accepted by citizens.22 
Research on the institutional level of the economic transformation, in 
particular in relation to the Treuhand Trust and their role in the transformation 
process, has also begun to address an issue which has long been a sore topic in 
Eastern Germany.23 Marcus Böick’s recent book presents an insightful look into 
the internal structures and practices of the trust, based on interviews with the 
members of staff.24 However, the majority of remaining literature on this 
process is written by journalists or by Treuhand actors themselves.25 In order to 
understand why the company is vilified in the public memory, historical 
studies will need to incorporate further sources that show how the trust acted 
and interacted with society, and why its name still evokes such strong emotions 
 
21 See, for example, Kerstin Brückweh & Clemens Villinger, ‘Sich nicht die Butter vom Brot nehmen lassen: 
ein Forschungsbericht zur Konsumgeschichte zwischen Alltag, Arbeit, Kapitalismus und Globalisierung‘, 
Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 57 (2017), pp. 463-495; Anja Schröter, Ostdeutsche Ehen vor Gericht: 
Scheidungspraxis im Umbruch 1980-2000 (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2018). 
22 Kerstin Brückweh, 'Wissen über die Transformation. Wohnraum und Eigentum in der langen 
Geschichte der »Wende«’, Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, Online-Ausgabe, 16 
(2019), <https://zeithistorische-forschungen.de/1-2019/5677> (accessed 10 March 2020). 
23 See Marcus Böick, Die Treuhand: Idee – Praxis – Erfahrung: 1990-1994 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018) and the 
ongoing project at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin: 'Im Laboratorium der Marktwirtschaft. 
Zur Geschichte der Treuhandanstalt 1989/90 bis 1994‘, <https://www.ifz-
muenchen.de/aktuelles/themen/geschichte-der-treuhandanstalt/> (accessed 12 January 2020].  
24 See Böick, Die Treuhand. 
25 See Norbert Pötzl, DER TREUHAND KOMPLEX. Legenden. Fakten. Emotionen. (Hamburg:  Kursbuch 
Kulturstiftung gGmbH, 2019), Dietmar Grosser, Hanno Müller & Paul-Josef Raue (Ed.), Treuhand in 
Thüringen. Wie Thüringen nach der Wende ausverkauft wurde (Essen: Klartext, 2013), Dirk Laabs, Der deutsche 
Goldrausch: die wahre Geschichte der Treuhand (Munich: Pantheon, 2012), Birgit Breuel, Treuhand intern: 
Tagebuch (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1993). 
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in the East. The new project at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin on 
the history of the Treuhandanstalt will use company documents and 
correspondence, which will hopefully shed more light on the communication 
between the trust and individual companies and communities across eastern 
Germany.  
The challenge for new research on this topic is to look closer at how 
different developments and actors were interlinked. For example, recent studies 
on the workers’ protests of 1993 in, for example, Ilmenau, have described how 
chosen forms of protest were shaped by the growing uncertainty and job 
insecurity in the early nineties, causing many workers to opt for more 
restrained forms of protest than the famous strikes in the potassium mines of 
Bischofferode.26 The new attention given to the strong protest culture in eastern 
Germany around the closure of firms and industries from 1992 onwards has 
highlighted the omission of these later large-scale demonstrations from popular 
historical narratives on protest culture, which generally end with the 
demonstrations of 1989.27 Furthermore, work on the trade unions in the 
transformation process provides another angle by looking at the role and 
possibilities of other main lobbying actors.28 
However, many of these studies focus solely on the written word, 
excluding oral sources and records that often contradict or expand on what we 
 
26 For more on the protests in Ilmenau, see Till Goßmann, ‘Proteste gegen die Treuhandanstalt am Beispiel 
der Aktivitäten zum Erhalt der Ilmenauer Glaswerke 1993–1994’, Arbeit – Bewegung – Geschichte: Zeitschrift 
für Historische Studien, 19/1 (2020), n.p.  
27 See Detlev Brunner (et al.), Gewerkschaften im deutschen Einheitsprozess. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen in Zeiten 
der Transformation (Bielefeld: transcript, 2018). 
28 See Roland Issen, ‘Möglichkeiten und Grenzen für Gewerkschaften im Verwaltungsrat der 
Treuhandanstalt’ in Detlev Brunner (et al.), Gewerkschaften im deutschen Einheitsprozess. Möglichkeiten und 
Grenzen in Zeiten der Transformation (Bielefeld: transcript, 2018), pp. 131-150. 
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find on the page. Exceptions include Axel Doßman’s work on the chanting 
voices during the demonstrations of 1989 and the ways in which acoustics and 
rhythm influenced the choice of slogans that in turn shaped the political 
debate.29 Back in 1995, David Bathrick raised the need for intertextuality and a 
‘paradigm based on competing voices within a “semiotics of culture”’, that 
looks at the ‘complex interplay between institutions of power and the various 
modes of expression within the socialist public sphere’.30 Such discourse 
analyses have since shed light on practices of critical subversion during GDR 
times, but are yet to be applied thoroughly to the transformation period and the 
variety of available linguistic sources, in particular audiovisual ones, available 
for this period. A focus on different actions and modes of expression during the 
unification process could help to identify the range of self-determination 
options available to ordinary citizens within the changing system. 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on the transformation 
process by providing a detailed study of local political, cultural and social 
transformation practices at a communal level. This takes us away from the 
larger revolutionary cities and top-level politics and instead brings the analysis 
to the centre of the newly unified Germany. The study highlights the agency of 
local actors by illustrating the pressure under which they were working and the 
ways in which they dealt with both successes and losses. It does not look at 
fields in isolation, but rather demonstrates how protest, consumption, politics 
 
29 See Axel Doßmann, ‘Wir sind das Volk! Von der Stimmgewalt im Herbst 1989 – und von Volker‘, in 
Gerhard Paul, 'In einem stillen Land. Soundscape DDR‘, in Gerhard Paul & Ralph Schock (Eds.), Sound der 
Zeit. Geräusche, Töne, Stimmen. 1889 bis heute (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014), p. 504. 
30 David Bathrick, The Powers of Speech. The Politics of Culture in the GDR (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1995), p. 14. 
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and economic restructuring went hand-in-hand, and how these changes were 
reflected in social practices. It recounts stories told and discussions had by those 
who experienced the events firsthand, and thereby tries to amplify the voices of 
local actors within the historical debate. Although the thesis looks across the 
bridge of 1989 to 1991, the short timeframe chosen helps to capture the pace and 
scale of the changes, and the significance of events that would set the course for 
the developments ahead.  
Theoretical and methodological approach 
The transformation in the German Democratic Republic and in its neighbouring 
countries was not brought about by a violent revolution, but by ‘self-conscious 
use of basic civil rights and liberties, such as the right to protest and freedom of 
expression’.31 By using their voice in public, then, citizens in East Germany 
were able to bring about significant political and social change. This, however, 
did not simply result in a change in government or political reforms, or the 
gradual system change seen in neighbouring eastern countries such as Poland. 
Rather, East Germany adopted and implemented an entirely new social, 
political and economic system within the space of a year.  
Due to the close linguistic, cultural and historical ties to the Federal 
Republic, this process was enacted within the short space of eleven months, 
making it a historically unique example of the ways in which citizens deal with 
monumental social, economic and political change. How, then, should we 
 
31 ‘die selbstbewusste Inanspruchnahme grundlegender Freiheitsrechte wie Versammlung- oder 
Vereinigungsfreiheit‘, Hans Michael Kloth, Vom „Zettelfalten“ zum freien Wählen. Die Demokratisierung der 
DDR 1989/90 und die „Wahlfrage“ (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2000), p. 45. 
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approach this period to truly understand how citizens experience and enact 
system change and the extent to which they are able to maintain political 
agency during this process? How do they influence and structure the 
proceedings in their communities, and what can a specific focus on East 
Germany teach us about periods of political transformation and social change?
 In the political sciences, the transformation process in Eastern Germany 
is often examined alongside developments in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia 
as a case study for the ‘third wave of democratisation’ of the late twentieth 
century.32 Central to this is the establishment of democratic institutions, 
freedom of expression and the right to vote.33 Similarly, the historians Francesca 
Weil and Michael Richter speak of a double democratisation of the GDR, with 
the internal process later being replaced by imported structures from the 
Federal Republic.34  
However, whilst the establishment of new institutions and elections was 
clearly significant, the political process in East Germany was never set in stone. 
It responded to the changing mood of the citizenry, and continued, even after 
the main structures were in place. Moreover, the political events were 
accompanied by and intertwined with changes on a social and economic level. 
Even thirty years later, doubts remain about whether unification is complete, 
pointing towards an ongoing, dynamic and unfinished process. This thesis 
therefore proposes to look at this period from the perspective of the actors on a 
 
32 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 208. 
33 Jean Grugel & Matthew Louis Bishop, Democratization. A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), p. 91. 
34 Michael Richter, ‘Die doppelte Demokratisierung - eine ostdeutsche Besonderheit der Transition’, 
Totalitarismus und Demokratie, 3/1 (2006), p. 79, and Weil, Verhandelte Demokratisierung, p. 230. 
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grassroots level, examining the options available to citizens in their everyday 
lives, and the extent to which they were able to control the changes going on 
around them. 
Combining approaches from social and political theory, Nick Couldry 
argues that ‘the offer of effective voice is crucial to the legitimacy of modern 
democracies’,35 as citizens need to recognise that their voices matter and are 
taken into account. Voice is therefore the most concrete expression of 
citizenship, and democracies as a form of social cooperation should give ample 
opportunity and space for articulation.36 Central to this is the aspect that voice 
‘needs to be acknowledged’.37 Voice is therefore a socially grounded form of 
reflexive agency based on mutual recognition, which depends as much on 
language as on status.38 This status is achieved by becoming visible ‘in the sense 
of being regarded as relevant’ by others.39 Not all language or speech is 
therefore automatically voice, and equally, its form can also be silent or found 
in social actions and practices. Alongside spoken or written words, linguistic 
means of expression include ‘actions, rituals, symbols, images’.40 These, 
together, form the emotional regimes underlying all political systems.41  
 
35 Nick Couldry, Why Voice Matters. Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism (London: Sage, 2010), p. 1. 
36 Terry Flew, ‘The citizen’s voice: Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty and its contribution to media 
citizenship debates’, Media, Culture & Society, 31/6 (2009), p. 980. 
37 Couldry, Why Voice Matters, p. 1. 
38 Couldry, Why Voice Matters, pp. 7-8. 
39 Ibid., p.107. 
40 ‘Handlungen, Rituale, symbole, Bilder’, Ute Frevert, 'Vertrauen. Historische Annäherungen an eine 
Gefühlshaltung‘, in Claudia Benthien, Anne Fleig & Ingrid Kasten (Eds.), Emotionalität. Zur Geschichte der 
Gefühle (Köln: Böhlau, 2000), p. 181. 
41 Jan Plamper, Geschichte und Gefühl. Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte (München: Siedler, 2012), pp. 304-
305. 
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From initial euphoria to supposed disappointment, emotions have long 
been used to describe this period and to shape historical narratives, and yet 
their integral purpose in this context has never come under closer scrutiny. By 
focusing carefully on the role and expression of various emotions over the 
course of the transformation, this thesis demonstrates how they interact with 
and influence other social dynamics as a cultural and linguistic form of 
expression. In so doing, it sheds light on a unique aspect of East German 
communicative culture. 
In this thesis, I therefore examine the ways in which citizens exercised 
their voice during this fast-moving period, whilst also referring to the ongoing 
social, economic, political and cultural transformation of daily life. Although 
many different developments are acknowledged, they are not presented as 
completed or entirely separate events, but rather as dynamic, overlapping and 
ongoing processes that are constantly remediated by different actors in society. 
As the world of everyday life ‘is the scene and also the object of our actions and 
interactions’, it is only on this level, then, that we can really study the 
interaction of subjects and objects, and begin to understand the meanings 
behind social actions.42 
In order to gain insights into this period ofEast German history, this 
thesis therefore focuses on the experiences of local actors and examines the way 
in which these informed their decisions and interactions in everyday life during 
the transformation period. Using the concept of voice as central form of political 
 
42 Alfred Schütz, quoted in Andy Lock & Tom Strong, Social Constructionism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 2010), p. 33. 
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participation, a special focus will be laid on issues that provoked strong debate 
and divided opinions to see how this gave rise to new ideas and practices. 
Conflicts are moments in which different emotional regimes clash with one 
another, giving insight into the underlying emotional culture.43 By looking in 
detail at these areas of disagreement in all their complexity, this study looks for 
insights into how voice is exercised in times of turmoil and how this shapes 
democratic social practices.  
In so doing, it presents the history of everyday life, or 
‘Alltagsgeschichte’, during the transformation in Eastern Germany, using a 
range of sources and a level of detail that brings to life how larger structures are 
experienced, managed and shaped at a local level. Alltagsgeschichte is a 
‘grassroots approach to history’ that developed from social theory, 
anthropology and post-structuralism and examines the ways in which ordinary 
people acted with a sense of agency to shape and determine their everyday 
lives.44 Central to this is Alf Lüdtke’s concept of Eigensinn, which denotes ‘how 
everyday citizens assert their own subjectivity and make meaning in their own 
immediate social worlds’.45  
Much like language and discourse, history is also a ‘site of difference’, 
which ‘offers contexts of deconstruction’ and a space for ‘defamiliarizing our 
ideas and assumptions’.46 By studying interaction between actors at a local level 
 
43 Plamper, Geschichte und Gefühl, p. 319. 
44 Sara Jones, ‘(Extra)Ordinary Life. The Rhetoric of Representing the Socialist Everyday After Unification’, 
German Politics and Society, 114/33 (2015), p. 129. 
45 Katherine Pence & Paul Betts (Ed.), Socialist Modern. East German Everyday Culture and Politics (Ann 
Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2008), p. 5. 
46 Geoff Eley, ‘No Need to Choose: Cultural History and the History of Society’, in Belinda Davis (et al.), 
Alltag, Erfahrung, Eigensinn. Historisch anthropoligische Erkundungen (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 
2008), p. 63. 
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and pointing towards the complex or even contradicting elements, the history 
of everyday life therefore questions ordered accounts of history, sheds light on 
the ways in which different parts of society are connected, and demonstrates 
how actors in all parts of society can influence, and are in turn shaped by, larger 
processes. The key is to look not at daily life, ‘macroeconomic structures or 
internal state politics’ in isolation, but rather at the ‘relationship between (GDR) 
state-level politics and the culture of everyday life’.47  
 In her anthropological study of the border village of Kella in the early 
1990s, Daphne Berdahl demonstrated that political transformations have 
markedly social aspects that intersect with politics, economy and identity, and 
that there is a lot to be learnt from the ways in which people experience and 
deal with political change in everyday life.48 Nevertheless, historical studies of 
the period post-1990 have generally adopted approaches that do not consider 
the personal experiences of those that experienced the transformation first-
hand.49 And yet, Thomas Lindenberger raises the need to respect the 
experiences of East Germans and not simply equate their lives with political 
repression, in order to ensure that former GDR citizens can integrate their 
memories into the collective memory of a united Germany.50 Similarly, the 
 
47 Pence & Betts (Ed.), Socialist Modern, p. 21, p. 10. 
48 Daphne Berdahl, Where the World Ended: Re-Unification and Identity in the German Borderland (New York: 
University of California Press, 1999). 
49 See for example Jan Schönfelder, Kirche, Kerzen, Kommunisten : die demokratische 
Revolution in Neustadt an der Orla 1989/90 (Weimar: Hain, 2006). 
50 Thomas Lindenberger, ‘Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Das Alltagsleben der DDR und sein 
Platz in der Erinnerungskultur des vereinten Deutschlands’, Politik und Zeitgechichte (2000), 
<http://www.bpb.de/apuz/25409/herrschaft-und-eigen-sinn-in-der-diktatur> (accessed 24 October 
2016). 
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commission on the memorialisation of the GDR argued that Alltagsgeschichte is 
needed ‘in order to adequately encompass the self-perception of former GDR 
citizens and their children‘.51 
This approach has been applied thoroughly to the history of the German 
Democratic Republic. For example, Thomas Lindenberger’s study of the way in 
which an Abschnittsbevollmächtigter (GDR community policeman) mediated his 
immediate social environment, based largely on oral history interviews, 
demonstrated that even those at the bottom of society were able to articulate 
their own interests and needs, however only so long as they avoided conflict 
with senior figures.52 Sandrine Kott, on the other hand, uses archival materials 
around work brigades to investigate how those GDR citizens that struggled to 
adhere to the social expectations and rules of working in a socialist state were 
driven to the fringes of society.53 Both papers, although based on very different 
sources, describe how ordinary people were able to use agency and Eigensinn to 
determine their everyday lives. 
In so doing, the history of everyday life combines ‘structures of power 
and domination and social practice and experience’ to focus on the agency not 
only of those in powerful positions but also of ‘die Vielen’ (the many).54 
Although these can be difficult to grasp and are therefore often left out, it is 
after all the masses that, in GDR times and otherwise, ‘sustained the state “by 
 
51 Jones, ‘(Extra)Ordinary Life’, p. 120. 
52 Lindenberger, ‘Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur‘. 
53 Sandrine Kott, ‘Die „Arbeiterklasse an der Macht“: Die Geschichte der DDR aus der Randperspektive‘ in 
Belinda Davis (et al.), Alltag, Erfahrung, Eigensinn. Historisch-anthropoligische Erkundungen (Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus Verlag, 2008), pp. 458-473. 
54 Thomas Lindenberger, 'Everyday History: New Approaches to the History of the Post-War Germanies’, 
in Christoph Kleßmann (Ed.), The Divided Past. Rewriting Post-War German History (Oxford: Berg, 2001), p. 
45. 
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widespread societal participation in its structures and functioning”’.55 By 
applying this approach to the period post-1989 in Eastern Germany, it becomes 
possible to examine how local actors shaped the transformation process and 
developed new ideas and practices, but to also determine the extent to which 
they were constrained in their actions by political and social structures, or other 
influences. Writing the history of Eastern Germany and its transformation 
therefore means accepting the contradictions, indulging in the complexities, 
and exploring what they can tell us about the larger picture. 
Geographical Focus and Source Base 
With a view to providing ‘thick descriptions’56 of everyday life at a micro-
historical level, this thesis focuses on two Thuringian towns; the former GDR 
district capital and later state capital Erfurt; and the smaller nearby district 
town of Eisenach. Erfurt, as the district capital, was already an important 
political and administrative hub in the GDR before it gained further 
prominence as the state capital in 1990. In 1989, it was home to around 220 000 
citizens, with a longstanding microelectronics and shoe production industry, 
infamously making around twenty-thousand Jesuslatschen sandals a day.57 
Politically, Erfurt’s first secretary in the 1980s was a known Socialist Unity Party 
‘hardliner’, having already demolished parts of the city’s historic quarter by 
1989 to advance the SED building programme.58 
 
55 Jonathan Grix, The Role of the Masses in the Collapse of East Germany (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 23. 
56 See Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’, in Clifford Geertz, 
The Interpretation of Cultures: selected essays (New York: Perseus, 1973). 
57 Antje Bauer, Erfurt. Bilder und Geschichte(n) (Arnstadt: Kirschlager, 2017), p. 133. 
58 Steffen Raßloff, Friedliche Revolution und Landesgründung in Thüringen 1989/90 (Erfurt: Landeszentrale für 
politische Bildung Thüringen, 2014), p. 26, p. 29. 
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Nearby Eisenach - formerly a small industrial town at the fringes of the 
GDR – was catapulted back into the heart of Germany with the opening of the 
border. Its lasting historical significance as the birth town of the composer 
Johann Sebastian Bach and the home of the Wartburg castle, where Martin 
Luther translated the New Testament and where official ceremonies for the 
Reformation have since been held, made it a place of pilgrimage and a symbolic 
axis of German national identity. With approximately 48 000 citizens in 1989, it 
was dwarfed by Erfurt and yet constituted an important administrative and 
industrial centre for its surrounding communities. 
The state of Thuringia, with its former capital Weimar, was a stronghold 
of the National Socialist party and the site of one of the first and largest NS 
concentration camps. It is therefore a place of significant political and historical 
interest regarding not only how citizens practise politics, but also how they 
experience system change and develop or adapt political practices, including 
those of inclusion and exclusion. Nevertheless, historical accounts of 1989 have 
chosen to focus primarily on other eastern provinces and the cities of Berlin and 
Leipzig, due to the greater size of the cities and number of participants and 
demonstrations. As time passes, there is also a strong need to undertake more 
detailed studies of towns and cities outside of Leipzig, Berlin and Rostock 
before memories of the events there fade.59  
This thesis does so in capturing a broad mixture of textual and 
audiovisual sources, including original interviews, that are woven together to a 
 
59 Wolfgang Schuller, Die deutsche Revolution 1989 (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2009), p. 15. 
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rich soundscape of this period. Examples from the two towns and their 
neighbouring villages are chosen and presented based primarily on their 
historical significance and the insights they offer in relation to larger 
developments. By focussing on one larger and one smaller town, links and 
networks in the region start to become clear, as well as continuities and 
differences. However, the thesis does not claim representativeness or attempt to 
compare, but rather presents detailed depictions of sometimes unique and very 
specific local situations, that nevertheless show up structural patterns 
connected to wider societal issues. 
Although Erfurt and Eisenach were not at the forefront of the events of 
1989, with demonstrations starting much later than those in the larger cities, 
they nevertheless played their part in setting an example to other communities; 
citizens of Erfurt were among the first to occupy their Stasi Headquarters, and 
Eisenach was home to the first Runder Tisch in the GDR.60 As such, they present 
a strong case for studying the initiative and organisation of citizens in smaller 
communities. What is more, the geographical location of Thuringia at the 
border to Hesse, Bavaria and Lower-Saxony made it a first port of call for many 
western actors and organisations once travel restrictions had been lifted in 1989. 
These border towns and cities therefore provide ideal case studies for the 
transformation process, as they suddenly found themselves at the heart of the 
newly unified Germany. 
 
60 Marina Moritz & Horst Moritz, Ein besonderes Jahr. THÜRINGEN: MAI 1989 / MAI 1990 (Erfurt: Museum 
für Thüringer Volkskunde Erfurt, 2009), p. 25. 
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Both Erfurt and Eisenach had longstanding historical links with their 
western partner towns – Erfurt with Mainz and Eisenach with Marburg –, 
which were recognised in a twinning exchange that began in the late 1980s and 
set the foundations for political, economic and social links between actors from 
East and West during the transformation process. In this sense, the two towns 
provide an ideal case study for East-Western relations during the 
transformation period. Whilst training and instruction for the new political 
actors often took place in the district capital of Erfurt, the relationships to their 
western partner towns and contacts made across the border would often prove 
more significant and influential. 
While the two towns share many links and throw up similarities, they 
also differed significantly. For example, although both towns introduced 
mayors from the Christian Democratic Union in 1990, Eisenach’s former mayor 
was a member of the Liberal party, whilst Erfurt’s former mayoress was a 
staunch representative of the Socialist Unity Party. The citizenry therefore went 
into the transformation period with different relationships to their former 
political leaders in the 1980s, which could potentially influence the power of the 
SED/PDS in the 1990 elections. Furthermore, the difference in size and 
geographical location could – in theory – alter the degree of its impact. As we 
will see, however, the towns often faced similar strategic, political and 
structural problems, despite their differences. And yet, their size did impact the 
towns differently, for whilst Eisenach experienced a strong influx of visitors 
from the West after the opening of the border and was much more reliant on 
one single manufacturer, Erfurt’s economy was more diverse. 
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Finally, a focus on the provinces can help to shed light on the extent to 
which the events in the larger cities were exceptional or part of a wider 
phenomenon.61  Many actors at the local level, especially within the political 
parties, were engaged in interregional committees spanning East and West 
Germany, and yet the political structures at the time meant that critical 
decisions during this period were largely taken by representatives in local 
communities. Only by looking at the work of local actors can we truly 
understand how change is implemented in practice.  
The transformation process in these towns has been well-documented 
and a range of textual and audiovisual sources are available in the local 
archives.  These include pamphlets from citizens groups, political organisations, 
and town and city council members, copies of speeches and records of 
meetings, photographs, films and audio recordings of events and discussions, 
as well as articles from the local press, highlighting the issues most important to 
the local community. The local archives also house collections from local figures 
who were active in their towns and who have donated their documents to the 
archive for research, providing insights into daily communication during this 
period and events deemed important by the actors themselves. The records 
available in the town archives do not always match up equally or allow for 
direct comparison, but they nevertheless show up important patterns, often 
supporting and complementing one another.  
 
61 See Schönfelder, Kirche, Kerzen, Kommunisten. 
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To add another perspective, documents from the local archives are 
contrasted with materials from the Stasi Records Agency (BStU), as well as state 
government documents from 1990 to 1994, which provide insight into 
proceedings at a regional level and demonstrate how individual actions 
affected larger developments. The thesis also incorporates documents from 
three political party archives; the Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis (Alliance 90/The 
Greens), the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (Social Democratic Party), the Archiv 
für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (Christian Democratic Union), and from the 
library of the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (The Left), to understand how political 
actors at a local and sometimes national level organised themselves and tried to 
enact changes on behalf of their constituents. The last chapter, with its case 
study of the car plant in Eisenach, relies heavily on materials now housed in 
one of the only remaining factory buildings and managed by the foundation 
Automobile Welt Eisenach.  
Finally, recollections and insights from oral history interviews with 
political and social actors in Erfurt and Eisenach are woven into the analysis. 
These provide personal insights into the motivations of local people and the 
challenges that they faced. Although other micro-historical studies on this 
period have purposefully neglected to include eyewitness testimonies due to 
doubts about their credibility, this is missing an important point; the aim of an 
oral history interview is to consider the subjective experiences of local citizens 
and to take note of what they tell us. For the life stories relayed ‘are complex 
and revealing narrative performances which can offer an insight into both 
identity formation and the relationship between that and larger historical 
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forces’.62 These narratives therefore need to be analysed as such ‘in order to 
gain insight into the meaning, as opposed to the content of the interview’.63This 
thesis builds on an established tradition of oral history research in Germany, by 
providing a new collection of twenty-four unstructured, qualitative interviews 
with local actors about their experiences of the early transformation process, 
seventeen of which are cited in this study.64  Interview partners were found 
through personal and professional recommendation, for which I am very 
grateful. Although an asserted effort was made to speak to a wide variety of 
citizens of different occupations, genders and political convictions, the focus on 
active political actors nonetheless means that the majority were in employment 
in the early 1990s, although this did not necessarily last much past 1993.  
Many of the interviewees were in their early thirties when they took on 
new duties at a local level, as new political parties and organisations sought 
fresh faces that were unburdened by the past to instill new trust. However, I 
also had the opportunity to speak to older citizens who had already worked in 
high positions in the former state system when the structures broke down. 
Despite the high number of females in the workplace in East Germany, the 
majority of new positions were nevertheless taken over by men, meaning that 
this study is still weighted towards a male perspective in that respect. 
Nevertheless, the women interviewed for this study include politicians, 
activists, journalists, town council and adminisation staff, union 
 
62 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 33. 
63 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 16. 
64 For previous oral history projects in the GDR, see Lutz Niethammer (et al.), Die volkseigene Erfahrung: 
eine Archäologie des Lebens in der Industrieprovinz der DDR; 30 biographische Eröffnungen (Berlin: Rowohlt, 
1991). 
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representatives, election helpers, and health workers, who each in their own 
way took political action within their community. 
Interview partners were given an overview of the project’s historical 
timeframe, and possible topics of interest, and were invited to share their own 
impressions from this time, to talk of their experiences and to give insights into 
issues they deemed to be important. This resulted in a plethora of different 
exchanges in a range of settings, with each person beginning from their own 
personal starting-point and setting their own focus, thereby demonstrating how 
diverse and personal experiences of this period are. 
Whereas many oral historians have focused on questioning constructed 
biographical narratives and delving into that which is not said,65 the approach 
taken for this study has much rather been to listen and take note of that which 
is mentioned, in order to gain a greater understanding. This has not only led to 
interesting and enlightening anecdotes, as interview partners had the space and 
time to explain, but also made it possible to compare these with impressions 
from the archives, to reflect and to gain new insights on what might be 
important, how this plays a part, or what may have been missed.  Overall, 
listening provided a chance for others, their voices and narratives to be heard 
and, where possible, for these to be incorporated into this work. Even though 
the interviews are not all directly quoted or referenced, each and every 
 
65 See Lutz Niethammer, ‘Fragen – Antworten – Fragen. Methodische Erfahrungen und Erwägungen zur 
Oral History‘ in Lutz Niethammer & Alexander von Plato (Ed.), „Wir kriegen jetzt andere Zeiten“. Auf der 
Suche nach der Erfahrung des Volkes in nachfaschistischen Ländern (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1985), pp. 392-445. 
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conversation made a considerable impact on my own understanding of this 
period and has therefore greatly contributed to this thesis. 
In this sense, oral history as a methodology celebrates subjectivity, 
inconsistencies and individual agency, and argues that this is important for 
understanding the discourses and structures that shape daily life.66 For a thesis 
based on the experiences made during the transformation process and the 
meanings that emerged out of these intersubjective experiences, it is an 
invaluable source that adds further contours to the issues surrounding the 
transformation process and often points to otherwise unconsidered topics. 
Overall, by taking an approach that combines a range of archival and oral 
sources from different groups, institutions and members of society, the thesis 
tries to capture the complexities of everyday life during this tumultuous time.  
Thesis outline 
The thesis is structured chronologically and split into five chapters, which 
follow the shifting forms of voice across different fields of communal life and 
examine the ways in which citizens asserted themselves against new political, 
structural and economic developments, took control of their communities and 
made sense of their lives.  In order to bridge the natural historiographical cut-
off-point of 1989/1990, the thesis begins in the early autumn of 1989, with the 
first chapter focussing on the debates and demonstrations that fuelled the 
changes at a local level. What happens to voice when freedoms of movement, 
assembly and expression are reinstated? On the basis of original transcripts, 
 
66 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 31. 
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sound and film recordings, this chapter explores how interactions between the 
state, citizens and members of the new political groups contributed to the 
breakdown of existing structures, and how control was consequently 
remediated between the new actors. How do citizens enact change, and how 
quickly do these dynamics shift? What does the instable situation mean for 
different groups in society and how does this influence power structures at the 
local level? The chapter considers the wider impact of dynamics such as the exit 
of East Germans from the GDR, how these events influenced proceedings in 
smaller communities, and what happens when structures disappear before new 
ones are introduced. 
The second chapter turns to the new elections in 1990 to see how the 
emotions of the autumn were channelled into new formal structures after the 
old ones had imploded. These elections were of great significance, not only 
because of their strong symbolism in voicing political opinion, but also due to 
the social and political challenges they presented, as citizens were forced to put 
aside their divisions and come together to organise four elections in the space of 
nine months. By looking at difficulties that emerged as new actors struggled to 
logistically organise the elections in time, power structures and dependencies 
between former and new state actors and citizens in times of change come to 
light. The ensuing administrative crisis not only points towards cracks in social 
cohesion but also demonstrates how these were in part mended and in other 
cases deepened through the implementation of new political practices. 
The third chapter runs parallel to the second; as conflicting 
communication styles emerge in public, how do members of the press, state and 
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public not only renegotiate forms of communication, but also their own roles 
within a new political, social and cultural system? How does this ongoing 
contest shape political structures and practices in the new political system? 
Through close analysis of the press and council meeting records from 1990 
onwards, the chapter illustrates how the public, journalists and councillors 
responded to one another and redefined the shape and tone of the public 
sphere.  
With the key decisions about the new political structures having been 
made, the fourth chapter turns to the sudden impact of the currency union in 
July 1990 and its immediate effects on East German workers and business to see 
how the new structures would withstand this first large test. It presents the 
currency union as the historical turning point of this period, and asks how the 
implementation of federal political, social and economic rules and standards 
three months before the formal unification of Germany was felt and 
appropriated at the local level. To what extent did the new economic structures 
impact on the ways in which citizens exercised their voices? Using examples 
from different fields of local industry, it demonstrates how the currency union 
swiftly devalued and marginalised eastern production, whilst also highlighting 
the agency and resilience of citizens who were determined to adapt their 
businesses, continue their work and find solutions.  
As the transformation was not only social and political but also 
economic, the final chapter presents a case study of the car manufacturing plant 
in Eisenach as an example of the longer-term consequences of the union with 
the Federal Republic of Germany. What happens to political and civic action 
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when the region’s largest employers are threatened? By focussing in detail on 
one large local company, it not only considers the wider ramifications of the 
closures of individual firms in Eastern Germany, but also emphasises the social 
aspects and personal experience of political, social and economic change. It asks 
how citizens and communal representatives responded to the new forms of 
competition and rising unemployment, and how they adjusted to new forms of 
social, political and economic power. A case-study of a Thuringian village that 
took on General Motors in order to protect their local environment, despite 
rising unemployment, demonstrates the scale of the challenges that local 
citizens faced, the extent to which they were able to maintain political agency, 
and how they prioritised issues during conflicting developments.  
The examples of communal conflicts in Eastern Germany between 1989 
and 1991 illustrate just how quickly the conditions on the ground changed, and 
how local actors were constantly forced to adapt to new situations and react to 
outside developments. Essentially, it demonstrates how difficult it was to 
introduce and develop democratic practices in times of social, political and 
economic instability, and how these dynamics were intertwined. Running 
throughout the thesis, however, is also the story of citizens trying to find and 
use their voice; actively renegotiating roles and structures, determining new 
forms of communication and tone, defending their interests and values, 
creating meanings and making sense of the past.  
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1. Finding Voice 
Exit and Voice 
On Sunday, fifth of June 1988, Wilhelm Kümpel finished playing the organ for 
the morning service in the Catholic cathedral in Erfurt and headed down the 
stairs.67 Most of the congregation had already gone home, save for one row of 
young parents with their children. Even after the vicar had explained that the 
service was now over, the families stayed seated, declaring the grand Dom in 
the centre of the city as officially occupied. Kümpel, who had already left by 
this point, was refused entry to the cathedral over the next two days, as the site 
was cordoned off by the Ministry for State Security under the premise of urgent 
building work.  
 The fourteen adults and seven children from Sömmerda had travelled to 
nearby Erfurt that weekend publicly to protest the unfair treatment of East 
German citizens wanting to leave the country.68 Over more than three years, 
their repeated applications to move West had all been declined; now they 
demanded to be driven over the border by bus from Erfurt. While the church 
staff and Caritas ensured that the families were provided with food and 
blankets, the GDR state deliberated how to best deal with this unexpected event 
without alerting the general public. A proposed forceful removal of the 
protesters was strongly rejected by the church; anyway, in the case of such a 
response, the families had already organised for friends to inform West German 
media and the United Nations. In the worst case, the occupiers threatened to 
 
67 Klaus Taubert, ‘Erfurter Dombesetzung. Als die Orgel schweigen musste’, Spiegel Online (01 July 2011), 
<http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/erfurter-dombesetzung-a-949234.html> (accessed 10 May 2018).  
68 Taubert, ‘Erfurter Dombesetzung’. 
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sound the Gloriosa, the medieval cathedral bell and largest of its kind in the 
world, which was usually reserved for special events and could be heard from 
far and wide.  
 What could therefore have been Erfurt’s loudest protest, turned out to be 
one of its most silent and secret. On Tuesday evening, after complicated 
negotiations with lawyers and politicians in Berlin, including the head of state 
Erich Honecker himself, the families were brought home separately by taxi, 
with permission to leave the country within the next ten to thirty days.69 One 
couple, however, was kept back and released much later, as assurance that the 
story would not reach the public. This succeeded, with all parties keeping quiet 
- the Catholic church included - so as not to allow these actions to set an 
example to others.  
For these families from Sömmerda were not the only ones wanting to exit 
the GDR; in April 1988, 111,348 GDR citizens were registered by the 
government as actively seeking to leave the country, a trend that had been 
growing uncontrollably since the 1970s.70 Unable to leave freely since the 
closure of the border and erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, East Germans 
sought other options, with some attempting to cross illegally, many applying 
formally to leave, and others choosing to stay abroad after a permitted visit to 
the West.71 Each attempt came with significant risks and consequences; even in 
the case of those applying to leave formally, many were subjected to intense 
 
69 Taubert, ‘Erfurter Dombesetzung’. 
70 Bernd Eisenfeld, ‘Ausreisen oder dableiben? Regulierungsstragtegien der Staats-sicherheit', Reihe B: 
Analysen und Berichte, 1/97 (Berlin: BStU, 1998).  <http://www.nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0292-
97839421304316> (accessed 03 June 2018), p. 110.  
71 Eisenfeld, ‘Ausreisen oder dableiben?’, p. 16. 
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state observation, leading five thousand applicants in 1987 alone to quit their 
jobs or take lower paid positions in private companies as a direct means of 
escaping or reducing societal control.72 Those that left, did so in the knowledge 
that it would most likely have social and professional repercussions for their 
nearest and dearest. 
The exponential number of applications to leave the GDR give a clear 
sign of the advanced dissatisfaction of the citizenry with their state. To explain 
declines in states by combining theories from politics and economics, Albert 
Hirschman identified the use of voice and exit as two ways in which citizens 
can put pressure on governments to enforce change. By exiting the country, the 
citizen 'sets in motion (…) forces that may induce recovery’, whereas voice is an 
attempt ‘to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of 
affairs’.73 In order to prevent decline, the state should provide channels of 
communication to enhance the use of voice, and then respond to the criticisms.  
The occupation of the cathedral in Erfurt is a combination of both exit 
and voice, and an example of the way in which twenty-one GDR citizens 
presented their government with an ultimatum, asserting their right to exit 
through protection of the church. It also highlights, however, the complicated 
situation in East Germany, where both voice and exit were severely limited and 
criminalised. Public protests other than the official ones, organised by and in 
support of the state, were not permitted. Consequently, critique through 
 
72 Ibid. 
73 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 30. 
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written petitions became a tolerated and highly-used medium of 
communicating with the state, although many of these written requests were 
simply rejected.  
Instead, the Socialist Unity Party in the GDR relied fully on a third 
concept, identified by Hirschman as a means of reducing exit and strengthening 
voice: the concept of loyalty.74 By, for example, raising its citizens in the 
doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, enforcing participation in socialist organisations 
such as the Free German Youth, and providing benefits to those who joined the 
SED or showed loyalty to the party, the state attempted to tie its citizens to a 
form of socialist identity. This should subsequently hinder them from choosing 
exit and make them more likely to use voice to engage constructively with the 
state and its politics. By removing exit, and criminalising any form of criticism 
that was deemed as against the state, the SED added another complication. For 
now, even those wanting to improve conditions and reform the state in ways 
other than those formally accepted, were excluded from the debate.  
In this sense, East Germany presents a particularly interesting case for 
studying the relationship between the state, its structures and its people. What 
happens, when citizens are not given the opportunity to choose between voice 
and exit, and loyalty is essentially forced? Furthermore, how do they respond 
when these options are reinstated, and can this suffice to resolve past conflicts 
and reverse the decline in the state and society? In September 1989, East 
Germany was faced with this very question, as exit suddenly became a viable 
 
74 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 77. 
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option through the opening of the border between Hungary and Austria.75 By 
the end of the month, twenty-five-thousand GDR citizens had taken this route 
westward, with hundreds more seeking refuge in the embassies in Prague and 
Warsaw, after border controls in Hungary were tightened.76 
 Exit, however, is not an option for everyone, especially when it means 
leaving a country, a home, friends and family. Hirschman recognises that it can 
be incredibly ‘unsettling to those who stay behind as there can be no “talking 
back” to those who have exited’.77 Still, for those who do remain, the 
effectiveness of using voice becomes stronger, as the government is forced to 
listen in order to maintain a balance in society. This chapter examines the 
developments in East Germany from the autumn of 1989 onwards in light of 
this new situation. By focusing on communal conflicts in the district of Erfurt, it 
traces the ways in which citizens and state responded to the options of using  
voice and exit to understand how the existing structures were shaken up and 




75 Andreas Fraude, Die Friedliche Revolution in der DDR im Herbst 1989 (Erfurt: Landeszentrale für politische 
Bildung Thüringen, 2014), p. 17. 
76 Fraude, Die Friedliche Revolution, pp. 17-18. 
77 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 126. 
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Using Voice 
The Power of the People Outside 
On Saturday morning, the twenty-eighth of October 1989, a thick mist was 
slowly lifting. Local citizens began gathering in the Thüringenhalle, the largest 
event location in the town of Erfurt, for the latest citizens’ forum. A notice had 
gone out in the local paper, Das Volk, inviting all citizens of Erfurt to a debate 
with the mayoress, albeit only one day in advance of the event, and in one brief 
sentence slotted in amongst other announcements.78 Officially, the debate was 
meant to facilitate a dialogue between the citizens and their town 
representatives, but it had also come about in response to a large demonstration 
that had taken place two days earlier. The city council wanted to ensure that 
there would be ‘no more action on the streets’ and ‘only in designated spaces’.79 
The walls of the Thüringenhalle were therefore meant to confine the public 
debate. Two events in the town hall the week before had failed due to a lack of 
space, hence this move now, to the largest events space in Erfurt. 
Approximately two thousand chairs are said to have been erected, with 
many, of course, taken by members of the Socialist Unity Party.80 Six 
microphones were set up along the aisle, at which queues of citizens were 
forming, all of whom wanted to make their voices heard.81  At the front, a stage 
had been constructed for the main speakers: The National Front, the Socialist 
Unity Party and Town Committee, the Free German Trade Union Federation, 
 
78 Schließt Euch an. Die Friedliche Revolution in Erfurt. Eine Dokumentation (Erfurt: Gesellschaft für 
Zeitgeschichte e.V., 2014), p. 164. 
79 ‘künftig keine Aktionen auf der Straße, sondern nur in geeigneten Räumen‘. Schließt Euch an, p. 164. 
80 Ibid., p. 165. 
81 Ibid., p. 167. 
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representatives of the bloc parties and the People’s Parliament, factory 
managers, as well as members of the newly-formed Democratic Awakening, 
New Forum, and the group Women for Change.82 The debate was meant to 
enable a real exchange on communal issues, to provide a chance to express 
ideas and worries, or to discuss problems. The central issue of conflict, 
however, was not a topic of local concern, but the very structure of the event 
itself.   
First to speak after the mayoress was a local artist, now acting as a 
representative for the platform Neues Forum. His first remarks already showed 
signs of exasperation, as he asked the audience to quieten down and desist with 
the cheering, ‘so that we can make some progress’.83 He deplored that the city 
council had not kept to the agreements reached at their joint meeting three days 
beforehand and pointed out that the space provided was far too small for this 
event, as ‘a thousand people’ were still waiting outside.84 Talk moved to the 
possibility of a second debate, to follow on afterwards, until the confirmation 
arrived that the debate was now being broadcast outside of the hall through 
loudspeakers.85 
 
82 These are my translations for the following organisations: Die Nationale Front, die Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschland, der Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, die Volkskammer, der Demokratische Aufbruch, 
das Neue Forum, Frauen für Veränderung. From here on, the groups and organisations will be referred to in 
the German original. 
83 ‘also wir wollen ja heute ein bißchen was erreichen‘, Stadtarchiv Erfurt (henceforth StA Erfurt), 1-
5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen-Bd.2, 'Transkript Thüringenhalle 28.10.89‘, 28 
October 1989. 
84 ‘tausend Menschen‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 2, 
'Transkript Thüringenhalle 28.10.89‘, 28 October 1989. 
85 Ibid. 
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The speaker was cut short, however, by calls for a debate, ‘not a lecture!’.86 
At this point, the local priest jumped in to clarify the planned procedure and 
calm tensions in the audience.  A key mediator between the town and the new 
political groups at previous events, he had refused to sit on the stage this time, 
on principal, as the agreement not to have a panel of speakers had been 
broken.87 Whereas the previous debates had given him hope of a true and open 
dialogue, he expressed ‘disgust’ at the way this event was now taking place.88 
Facing the unruly audience, he explained:  
It was agreed in the town hall on Thursday that (the speaker) would give a short 
introduction to today’s event. This is not simply a commentary; it has been agreed 
in advance, and so he is not to be interrupted. The mayoress has spoken. And 
after this introduction we will move on to the discussion, which should consist of 
short and precise statements.89 
 
The clarification managed to calm the audience long enough for the 
member of the Neues Forum to finish his talk. Afterwards, another speaker 
claimed there were actually only ‘about five-hundred people’ standing in front 
of the building, but that they could not possibly be let in, ‘for technical 
reasons’.90 The speaker requested that they therefore continue waiting outside 
of the building. His claim was however swiftly countered by another citizen, 
who asserted ‘as far as I can remember, the side aisles are regularly used as 
standing room at sports events, and so it should be structurally possible to let 
 
86 'keine Vorlesungen‘, ibid. 
87 Schließt Euch an, p. 165. 
88 'Ich bin jetzt empört, wie das jetzt hier losgeht‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und 
Aussprachen, Vol. 2, 'Transkript Thüringenhalle 28.10.89‘, 28 October 1989. 
89 ‘Herr […] ist, das ist die Absprache am Donnerstag im Rathaus gewesen, ist gebeten wurden, daß er 
heute als Einstieg eine kleine Einleitung bringt. Das ist nicht nur ein Diskussionsbeitrag, das ist 
abgesprochen wurden und darum kann man jetzt nicht ihn [sic] unterbrechen. Frau Oberbürgermeisterin 
hat gesprochen. Und nach diesem Einstieg soll es eine Diskussion geben und da sollen kurze präzise 
Beiträge kommen‘, ibid. 
90 ‘aus technischen Gründen‘, ibid. 
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more people in’.91 She joined others in insisting that the people waiting outside 
should be let in, ‘immediately’.92  
Time and again, speakers referred to the people waiting outside of the 
building, until one person alerted the room to the fact that ‘people are pushing 
against the door now!’.93  Out of fear that the situation could escalate, pressure 
was mounted to agree an exact time and place for the next event, in order ‘to 
regain control of the situation’.94 Citizens suggested holding the next event on 
the cathedral square, the largest open space in the city centre, ‘on Thursday’.95 
This idea was not new, however, as it had already been discussed during the 
town hall debate a few days earlier but was rejected in favour of using the 
Thüringenhalle.96 Members of Neues Forum had warned the council that the 
indoor space would also be much too small for the expected crowds, but the 
council had refused to budge on their decision.97  
Spontaneously, written messages from the citizens standing outside 
started being passed inside and read aloud. One citizen cited:  
Another point regarding the agenda. The discussions outside have concluded 
that this hall has a standing capacity of three-thousand-five-hundred people.98  
 
She pressed on, determinedly, despite interjections:  
 
91 ‘Soweit wie mir von früher bekannt ist, ist [sic] in diesen Räumen die Seitengänge üblicher Weise für 
Stehplätze bei Sportveranstaltungen genutzt wurden und die Statik müßte es hergeben‘, ibid. 
92 ‘sofort‘, ibid. 
93 ‘drücken die Menschen draußen vor der Tür‘, ibid. 
94 ‘können wir die Situation noch meistern‘, ibid. 
95 ‘Mir wurde vorgeschlagen Domplatz, Donnerstag‘, ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 1, 'Transkript Rathausdialog 
25.10.1989‘, 25 October 1989. 
98 ‘Nochmal zur Geschäftsordnung. Die Diskussionen draußen haben ergeben, daß dieser Saal eine 
Stehkapazität für 3 500 Menschen bietet‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und 
Aussprachen, Vol. 2, 'Transkript Thüringenhalle 28.10.89‘, 28 October 1989. 
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I am just reading out loud what has been passed on to us from outside, and I 
think the citizens outside have a right to be heard, at the very least. It’s 
impossible to keep up with the debate outside. It is very hard to understand 
what is being said, hence this request, and I want to at least be allowed to read 
it out. Surely, that should be possible.99 
 
Further speakers demanded that questions from the citizens waiting 
outside were to be given equal priority to those coming from people inside.100 
By using their opportunity at the microphone to state exactly how many written 
messages had been passed down, they ensured that the questions from outside 
were answered by the panel, and not ignored.101 Consequently, questions from 
the people outside on issues such as town administration, amnesty for riot 
police, and free elections were all read out.102 Amongst these questions was 
another urgent request regarding the procedure, from the people outside: ‘The 
panellists should introduce themselves’, for they cannot be seen outside.103 
‘Those answering questions should therefore identify themselves, please, so 
that those standing outside can truly follow the debate’.104  
And so it continued; as with the debates in the town hall the week before, 
it was the crowd that stood outside of the building which determined the 
procedure inside.105 Arguments against letting in more people were put into 
question and thereby undermined, ways of including those outside in the 
 
99 ‘Ich lese nur vor, was von draußen an uns herangetragen wird und ich denke die Bürger draußen haben 
das gleiche Recht ihre Meinung wenigstens zu äußern. Die Diskussion sei draußen nicht möglich. Es ist 
alles schwer zu verstehen, deswegen kommt noch einmal die Bitte und ich möchte sie wenigstens 




103 ‘Die Antwortenten möchten sich vorstellen‘, ibid. 
104 ‘Diejenigen also die antworten, bitte vorstellen, dass der Dialog auch wirklich verfolgt werden kann‘. 
Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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debate were spontaneously suggested and put into practice; such as by 
broadcasting the debate through loudspeakers and by bringing in hand-written 
questions to be read aloud. Even the format of the answers given was altered to 
facilitate the participation of those outside, with an insistence on introductions 
and transparency. Although the people outside were not let in, the continuous 
pressure from the audience to do so shaped the discussion and ensured that the 
focus remained on the excluded citizens. 
By questioning and circumventing the physical boundaries of the space, 
the citizens outside therefore deconstructed the walls of the Thüringenhalle and 
asserted their right to inclusion. In so doing, they countered attempts by 
members of the city council and Socialist Unity Party to limit participation by 
not putting up enough chairs and by restricting entry. In an effort by the state 
powers to determine the content of the discussion, local work brigades had 
been summoned to turn up early to the event, to ensure the audience would be 
made up of primarily of loyal state supporters.106 These are to have arrived 
around eight o’clock, filling the spaces in the hall and meaning that the doors 
were firmly closed at half past eight, at the time that they were officially meant 
to have opened.107 News of this had already spread by the time the event 
started and were addressed directly and publicly by the Neues Forum 
 
106 Ibid. 
107 Schließt Euch an, p. 164. 
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representative. ‘Is this true?’, he asked the audience.108 ‘If so, I ask all brigade 
members to stand up.  Let’s make this really simple.’109  
By verbalising what they felt were injustices and directly addressing 
them in public, citizens tried to illuminate the undemocratic structures 
underlining the event, but they did not stop at party membership.  For example, 
one citizen asked why those speaking up were all male, when there were plenty 
of women present. ‘I don’t want to listen a men’s debate’, she exclaimed. ‘I 
summon all women here to take part. And I think there should be a quota. I’m 
always at the back of the queue’.110 Another asked where the younger citizens 
were, focusing attention on the unrepresentative median age across the 
audience.111  
Next to come under criticism was the panel of speakers at the front of the 
room. Albeit already a large panel, citizens asked why members of other official 
organisations were missing. Requests came in for representatives of the Free 
German Trade Union Federation, the Freethinkers, the Union of Artists and 
Actors.112 Although some of these requests were for organisations closely 
affiliated with the state or even belonging to the Socialist Unity Party and could 
therefore be interpreted as attempts by SED-members to take ownership of the 
event, these comments nevertheless helped to bring the underlying structures 
to light, simply by verbalising them.  As an extension of this argument around 
 
108 ‘Entspricht dies der Tatsache?‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 
2, 'Transkript Thüringenhalle 28.10.89‘, 28 October 1989. 
109 ‘Wenn hier Kampfgruppenmitglieder sind, sollen sie doch aufstehen. Machen wir es doch ganz 
einfach’, ibid. 
110 ‘Ich habe keine Lust hier nur Männerdiskussionen zuzuhören. Ich rufe alle Frauen auf, hier mitzureden. 
Und ich bin für die Quotenregelung. Ich stehe immer hinten an’, ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid.. 
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representation, it was not only the makeup of the panel that came under fire, 
but the very existence of the panel itself. ‘I would have found it much nicer, if 
we had all sat down there together’, argued one panellist in favour of a non-
hierarchical set up, even though he acknowledged that this would have used up 
even more space, and possibly resulted in more people having to wait 
outside.113 ‘Still’, he said, ‘I’m convinced’.114 
In a series of photos taken that day, one striking image shows the 
panellists on the podium, but from behind, with their shadows and dark 
silhouettes set against the bright overhead lights (see Figure 2).115 Although the 
representatives of the state and new political groups are in the foreground, they 
are placed in darkness and their faces are hidden from view. Instead, the 
audience members sat behind are lit up and are also clearly recognisable in 
other close-up shots of the event.  Not only does the use of light in the photo 
series suggest a traditional contrast of good and bad, but with the focus on the 
audience as active, visible citizens, the agency and subjectivity of the town 
representatives is diminished.  
The carefully composed picture of the podium, that plays with the 
symmetrical shapes and lines of the ceiling panelling, shows a stand-off 
between the state and the citizens opposite them, but it also demonstrates that 
the people on the podium were clearly outnumbered. Even though the central 
aisle itself remains relatively wide and clear, the seats in the hall are all taken, 
 
113 ‘Ich finde das viel schöner, wenn wir alle da unten gesessen hätten‘, ibid. 
114 ‘Gut. Ich bin überzeugt’, ibid. 
115 Andreas Dornheim, Politischer Umbruch in Erfurt 1989/90 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1995), p. 121. 
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the balconies are brimming with people and the entrances are crowded.  In the 
photo, the state actors are forced to face the public, which is positioned above 
them in the frame, thus emphasising their collective power.  
 
Figure 2: Thüringer Allgemeine, photograph of the inside of the Thüringenhalle by Roland Obst, 28 October 1989. 
 
Figure 3: Stadtarchiv Erfurt, photograph of the outside of the Thüringenhalle by Christine Riesterer, 28 October 
1989. 
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In his photo book, the historian Andreas Dornheim places the image of 
the panellists and the audience directly opposite an image taken outside of the 
hall, where the crowds of excluded citizens gathered (see Figure 3).116 The shot, 
taken from below, shows citizens waiting in a strip across the centre of the 
frame, that directly mirrors the row of panellists in the photo on the opposite 
page. The inside and outside of the hall also mirror one another, as does the 
semi-hexagonal shape of the building. In so doing, the historian places the 
excluded citizens outside of the hall on an equal level to the panellists sat on the 
podium inside, once again playing with the hierarchies and power structures 
that came to be challenged on this day. In making them little more than an 
object in the frame of his photo, Dornheim has deconstructed the power of the 
state and new citizens’ groups, redistributing this to the citizens and thereby 
demonstrating how easily existing structures can be changed with a simple shift 
in focus. 
The ‘marathon’ debate in the Thüringenhalle lasted for four hours that 
day, until the heated discussion around the structure of the event forced the 
organisers to bring it to a close ‘with a happy song’.117 The surviving transcript 
of audio recordings may only cover a fraction of this, but it is a valuable source 
all the same, as it brings to light the ways in which citizens disrupted the order 
of the event by being present and by being vocal. As a written source, it is of 
course a subjective text, based on the selective choices of its author during the 
 
116 Andreas Dornheim, Politischer Umbruch in Erfurt 1989/90, p. 120. 
117 ‘mit einem fröhlichen Lied‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 2, 
'Streitbarer Dialog der Vielfalt. Zum Vier-Stunden-Gesprächs-Marathon in der Erfurter Thüringenhalle‘, 
Das Volk, n.d.  
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transcription process. Nevertheless, it speaks volumes in the way that it 
reproduces the spoken word and inadvertently indicates where the speaker is 
responding to interjections from the crowd. Although these interjections are 
initially left out of the transcript, they become visible through the responses, as 
can be seen in the following section: 
Thank you. I’ve had to wait quite a long time too. Forty years GDR, forty years. 
Oh, sorry. My name is (…). I consider myself a member of the citizen’s group 
Neues Forum. I’m a power plant engineer, I work at the IGA,118 as a technical 
manager. Is that enough? Okay, so forty years GDR…119 
 
The transcriber may have decided not to transcribe the voices coming from the 
audience, but their persistent calls for an introduction, including name and 
professional background, nevertheless become clear through the speaker’s text. 
We can only assume how these voices will have increasingly dominated the 
room, as the transcript later begins to include these interjections in the official 
record.120 Once again, the citizens had found a way to counter attempts to 
silence them; even the transcriber was eventually forced to include them in the 
record. 
The transcript thereby highlights that the crowd has a force of its own, 
and one to be reckoned with. Albeit made up of individual voices, the crowd 
provides a structure through which citizens can take joint action against larger 
actors. In so doing, the transcript demonstrates that the crowd in many ways 
 
118 The Internationale Gartenbauaustellung or International Garden Exhibition Centre of the GDR, located in 
Erfurt. 
119 ‘Danke schön. Ich habe auch schon eine ganze Weile gewartet. Vierzig Jahre DDR, vierzig Jahre. Ach 
so, Entschuldigung. Mein Name ist (…). Ich zähle mich der Bürgerinitiative Neues Forum zu-gehörig. 
Mein Beruf ist Ingenieur für Kraftwerkstechnik, ich arbeite auf der IGA, als Leiter in der Technik. Reicht 
ja? Also vierzig Jahre DDR (…)‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 2, 
'Transkript Thüringenhalle 28.10.89‘, 28 October 1989. 
120 Ibid. 
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also hindered the aims of the new political groups, by disturbing their attempts 
at a formal debate. For that reason, the crowd gathered at the Thüringenhalle 
that day cannot simply be equated with the new citizens’ groups, even though 
they may have supported them in certain aspects. It was also not fully made up 
of loyal but reformative SED members, as the local press implied, even though 
party members did also take part.121  
Rather, the crowd as a collective becomes an independent actor, separate 
to the state, the representatives of the church and the new political groups, but 
nevertheless a diverse body. This is evident in the efforts made by the 
organisers to calm the crowd, to deal with their interjections and their presence 
outside of the hall. The event may have come about in part through the good 
intentions of the new citizens’ groups, but it was nonetheless orchestrated in 
cooperation with the state. This format, however, was outright rejected by the 
masses that day. By calling for inclusion, transparency and equality, the crowd 
took a stand, not against the new political groups per se, but against the 
continuation of a political culture based on hierarchical structures, division and 
exclusion.  
This act was by no means a one-off. Three days later, far more people 
than planned turned up to the forum on education in the Haus der Lehrer.122 
Despite announcements that this was only the first of many planned debates, 
and that the next one would take place the very next evening, the citizens 
 
121 StA Erfurt, 3800/26 Zeitungen, ‘Ein Aufregender Tag in Erfurt‘, Das Volk, 45/26, 13 November 1989. 
122 StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 7, 
‘Stadtverordnetenversammlung‘, 06 November 1989. 
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outside insisted on entering the building. As a result, the organisers were forced 
to split up the debating panel and form three separate groups. The Chairman of 
the Committee for National Education explained that this gave the organisers a 
‘severe disadvantage (…) as it meant our most able staff were now split over 
three rooms’.123  
The disruption was also not unique to Erfurt; in Sondershausen, sixty 
kilometres north of Erfurt, a planned debate in the cinema on the twenty-sixth 
of October had to be cancelled after just forty-five minutes, due to ‘loud, but 
solely verbal tumults’.124 In this case, the éclat erupted because Sondershausen 
did not have the technical equipment to broadcast the debate outside of the 
building, meaning that those waiting outside were fully excluded from the 
debate.125 By overwhelming the events with their numbers, the crowds were 
able either to disrupt the order of the event, influence the content, or halt it 
completely. Their presence was therefore not primarily a form of participation, 
but rather a way of rejecting and deconstructing the political structures. 
Hirschman warns that the effect of penalising the use of voice and exit 
long term means that ‘they will be engaged in only when deterioration has 
reached so advanced a stage that recovery is no longer either possible or 
desirable’.126 At this point, ‘voice and exit will be undertaken with such strength 
that their effect will be destructive rather than reformist’.127 Was this the case in 
 
123 ‘Diese Lösung erwies sich für meine Begriffe als ein sehr großer Nachteil (…), da wir unsere 
kompetenten Leute nun auf drei Räume verteilt hatten‘, ibid. 
124 ‘Abbruch der Veranstaltung nach lautstarken, aber nur verbalen Tumulten‘, Sabine Bräunicke (et al.), 
Die FRIEDLICHE REVOLUTION in Sondershausen (Erfurt: Thüringer Landesbeauftragter für Stasi-
Unterlagen, 2009), p. 8. 
125 Bräunicke (et al.), Die FRIEDLICHE REVOLUTION in Sondershausen, p. 8. 
126 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 121. 
127 Ibid. 
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the GDR in 1989? Was there any chance of reversing the decline of the state and 
restoring trust in the government to reform? How would the unpredictable 
force of the crowd develop? This chapter explores what happened when this 
momentum left the inner spaces and took to the streets. It also considers how 
state and people responded to these new dynamics and the sudden ability to 
use voice in public to express views and demand change.  
 
The Voices on the Square 
As proposed in the Thüringenhalle in late October, the next open debate between 
the state and citizens was indeed held on the cathedral square in central Erfurt, 
on Thursday, the second of November 1989. Attempts by the city council to 
block the use of this space by lifting the parking restrictions on the square had 
been unsuccessful.128 But their fears were justified, for here there were no walls 
to control the number of attendees, and no rows of seats to help maintain order. 
The only structure separating the council from their citizens was once again the 
podium, set up this time on the cathedral steps.  
Estimates suggest that forty-thousand citizens gathered down below that 
evening, holding banners and burning candles.129 The protest march that 
started after the weekly prayers for peace had led them from four churches, 
through the city and to the cathedral square.  Calls from the churches had 
focussed on maintaining a peaceful protest, and the activist that opened the 
debate beckoned those below to truly listen to the speakers, in an attempt to 
 
128 StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 7, 
'Stadtverordnetenversammlung‘, 06 November 1989. 
129 Schließt Euch an, p. 175. 
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‘realise a piece of democracy’ here and now. By the time the mayoress took to 
the microphone, however, the crowd was no longer willing to listen.  
The sound of the event at this point was closer to that of a football match, 
if at all comparable.  Chants of ‘Thüringenhalle’ demonstrate that the citizens 
had not forgotten the way in which they were excluded from the debate a few 
days beforehand and suggest that this event had now become symbolic of a 
clash between the city council and its constituents. ‘What was the deal with the 
Thüringenhalle?’ shouted one protester.130 Whistles and boos ensured that the 
mayoress was forced to raise her voice to the point where she was shouting her 
words out over the crowd. ‘I’m really asking myself, why aren’t you prepared 
to listen to me?’, she pleaded.131 ‘I was invited! I was invited’.132  
Her speech, which she adamantly continues with, was laced with empty 
phrases such as ‘dear citizens’, and ‘working together’, ‘for an improved 
socialism’, that had lost their meaning and were consequently met by sarcastic 
retorts from the crowds.133 ‘You don’t know what it means to work’, shouted 
one; ‘Too late!’, cried another.134 The local activist jumped in again and again to 
try to appease the crowd. ‘I find it a little too simple, to shout the speakers 
down’, she argued.135 But the crowd could not be convinced. Chants of ‘Lies!’, 
‘Shame!’ and ‘Step down!’ accompanied the remainder of the mayoress’s 
 
130 ‘Was war das mit der Thüringenhalle?‘, StA Erfurt, 6/7 Tonbandaufnahmen, ‘Die Wende in Erfurt 
1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger‘, Studio B, 2000. 
131 ‘Ich stelle wirklich die Frage, warum sind Sie nicht bereit, zuzuhören?‘, ibid. 
132 ‘Ich bin auf Einladung! Ich bin auf Einladung…‘, ibid. 
133 ‘liebe Bürger‘, ‘arbeiten (…) gemeinsam‘, ‘für einen besseren Sozialismus‘, ibid. 
134 ‘Du kennst das Arbeiten gar nicht‘. 'Warum nicht schon eher‘, ibid. 
135 ‘Und ich find es ein ganzes Stück zu einfach, mit Sprechchören hier Leute rauszuschreien‘, StA Erfurt, 
1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. .5, 'Dialog auf dem Domplatz am 02.11.1989‘, 
02 November 1989. 
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address.136 But the ‘Iron Lady’, as she was called by the crowd, persisted.137 ‘I 
am still standing here, in front of you!’ she called out at the end.138 
Some of you are screaming so loud, you are surely misguided. We will oppose 
this! Yes, we will! On Monday we will discuss and agree the latest issues in the 
council meeting!139 
The recording of her speech on the cathedral square reflects the 
communication breakdown between the state and citizens. Whilst the local 
governors considered it their duty to continue in their roles, the citizenry felt it 
demonstrated the state’s unwillingness to respect their wishes. Exasperated, the 
citizens were no longer prepared to show their representatives the respect of 
listening in return. The mayoress, who had agreed to begin holding regular 
meetings with representatives from select citizens’ groups, remained 
undeterred by the deafening boos from the crowds. She delivered her speech 
despite vocal opposition, and similarly, insisted on continuing in her role.  
This was not the first time that the mayoress had faced calls to resign. 
One week earlier at the forum in the town hall, a citizen, who identified himself 
as working at a military institution, had expressed his lack of confidence in her 
ability to introduce dialogue and reforms, after having failed to do so for so 
many years.140  After asking whether she doubted her own capabilities or had 
even considered giving up office, he argued that a democratic government 
 
136 ‘Lügen!‘, ‘Schäm dich!‘, ‘Abtreten!‘, StA Erfurt, 6/7 Tonbandaufnahmen, 'Die Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, 
Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger‘, Studio B, 2000. 
137 ‘Eiserne Lady‘, ibid. 
138 ‘Ich stehe immer noch da, vor Euch!‘, ibid. 
139 ‘Dass einige von Euch hier so laut schreien, und sicher nicht gut beraten sind (…) dagegen stellen wir 
uns! Das machen wir! Am Montag wird die Stadtverordnetenversammlung die neuen Fragen beraten und 
festlegen‘, ibid. 
140 StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 1, 'Transkript Rathausdialog 
25.10.1989‘, 25 October 1989.  
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would have stepped down of their own accord in response to such protests.141 
The mayoress insisted, however, that it was her responsibility to lead the 
changes in society and politics. Her understanding of her role was to represent 
her constituents long-term, and quitting would thus have been a form of 
abandonment. 
As one activist concluded at the demonstration on the third of 
November, ‘the officially-enforced dialogue has failed’.142 Although the state 
parties supported and part-organised the dialogue events, these were 
understood by the citizens as a masquerade of democracy, and not as a true 
exchange of ideas. The term dialogue in this context was therefore associated 
with an attempt by the Socialist Unity Party to take ownership of the 
democratisation process and was thus rejected by the crowds through 
purposeful disruption of the events. The activist summarised this by pointing 
out that ‘the people are already tired of dialogue’.143 He spoke slowly and 
clearly as he announced in a statement directed more at the town 
representatives than to the crowd to which he was speaking, ‘If the voice of the 
people in Erfurt says: “[…] out!”, please listen to them.’144 His message was a 
simple instruction to the SED from the Neues Forum, the self-described 




142 ‘Der amtlich verordnete Dialog hat sich nicht bewährt‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen 
und Aussprachen, Vol. 5, 'Dialog auf dem Domplatz am 02.11.1989‘, 02 November 1989. 
143 ‘die Menschen sind jetzt schon Dialogmüde‘, ibid. 
144 ‘wenn hier die Stimme des Volkes in Erfurt sagt: „[…] weg!“, bitte hört dies‘, ibid. 
145 ‘Sprachrohr‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 6, 'Dialog auf dem 
Domplatz am 03.11.1989‘, 03 November 1989. 
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In the city council meeting on Monday, the mayoress commented on the 
event on the cathedral square only so far as to express her hurt at being called 
by her nickname by the angry crowds. The abbreviation, which she had 
previously perceived ‘as a declaration of trust’ from her citizens, was now being 
used against her.146 Although she recognised the inherent loss of trust that this 
act reflected, she refused to accept it as defeat. Instead, she defiantly argued 
‘loss of confidence, sure, but shouldn’t the town mayor be given a chance to 
work through the (…) implications? I am prepared to do so!’.147  
Although she received praise from her colleagues, not everyone within 
her circle was willing to support her. A visitor at the council meeting regretted 
that the mayoress had not responded to the clear opposition and the many calls 
for resignation coming from her constituents: ‘That was the people speaking to 
you. The ones whistling and booing.’148 Although he agreed that a shouting 
match was ‘not the right way to hold a conversation’, he struggled to 
understand how she could outright ignore the public opinion and urged her to 
use the opportunity in the council meeting to respond to the situation, no 
matter what her opinion on the matter.149 After all, the public would expect to 
read about it in the press the next day, he warned.150 
 
146 ‘ein Stück Vertrauen dieser Stadt zu mir als ihren Oberbürgermeister‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 
Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 7, 'Stadtverordnetenversammlung‘, 06 November 1989. 
147 ‘Vertrauensverlust ja, aber gibt man auch dem Oberbürgermeister dieser Stadt eine Chance um das 
Erkannte gemeinsam auch heute hier dargelegte an Konsequenzen in der weiteren Arbeit aufzuarbeiten? 
Ich bin dazu bereit!‘, ibid. 
148 'Das ist das Volk gewesen, das da zu Ihnen gesprochen hat. Die gepfiffen haben und die gebuht haben‘, 
ibid. 
149 ‘Ich bin der Meinung, daß dies nicht die rechte Form ist, in einem Gespräch miteinander zu treten‘, ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
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Indeed, the Thüringische Landeszeitung’s report on the meeting 
highlighted the contrast between the need for democratic reforms, as 
articulated on the cathedral square, and the severe lack of changes in the 
council meeting: ‘everything here, save for a few changes, is business as 
usual’.151 The article deplored that the public’s loss of confidence in the 
government was not put to debate, and that there was no serious attempt to 
present a thorough analysis of the existing situation. Instead, it argued that the 
council was trying to jump this step and look to the future, ‘wearing the same 
clothes, but turned inside-out’.152   
The mayoress’ refusal to respond to the calls from the crowds only 
served to further highlight the communication gap between the state and its 
people, but it also revealed how unprepared the governors were to deal with 
the new situation. By refusing to listen and by shouting down politicians at the 
events, the crowds in the GDR illuminated the practices of their communal 
representatives and built up societal pressure from the press and from critics 
within the party itself. The supposed ‘dialogue’ was exposed to be one-way, 
now from both directions, and the inexperienced communal leaders lost their 
credibility as a result.  
One day later, on the ninth of November 1989, Günther Schabowski from 
the politburo in Berlin announced the new border regulations on live television, 
allowing all GDR citizens to travel west. On questioning, he stated that the new 
 
151 ‘hier ging, etwas modifiziert, alles so weiter wie bisher‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 08 November 1989, 
quoted in Schließt Euch an, p. 194. 
152 ‘im gewendeten Gewand‘, ibid. 
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rules applied with immediate effect.153  Although procedures had been set out 
for citizens to apply formally for visas, this was not clearly communicated at the 
press conference and the announcement was therefore left open to 
interpretation. In the Erfurt city council meeting three days earlier, delegates 
had discussed the introduction of the new travel law, which had been 
published in the press that day.154 Although welcoming the move, the district 
secretary warned that he strongly doubted that the police force ‘would be able 
to manage these tasks with their current structure’.155 
The news of the open border seemed so unlikely to some, that it was not 
announced at the large demonstration in Erfurt, which took place on the 
evening of the ninth of November.156 In Eisenach, those citizens that had heard 
the news on the television went to their local police station to check what was 
possible. One remembers the two policemen on duty around nine pm 
admitting, ‘we don’t know either, we have not had any information from 
Berlin’.157 By midnight, the policemen stepped out again to announce to the 
gathered crowds that they were free to travel to wherever they liked.158  
As in Berlin, it was not only the vague announcement itself that led the 
border to be opened that very night, but the presence of large groups of 
citizens, who demanded to be let through. That very night, citizens would pass 
 
153 Fraude, Die Friedliche Revolution in der DDR, p. 45. 
154 StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und Aussprachen, Vol. 7, 
'Stadtverordnetenversammlung‘, 06 November 1989. 
155 'Ich kann mir nicht vorstellen, daß sie diese Aufgaben in ihren derzeitigen Strukturen bewältigen kann‘, 
ibid. 
156 Schließt Euch an, p. 203. 
157 ‘Und da hat der gesagt, „das können wir auch nicht sagen, das wissen wir jetzt nicht“, irgendwie, 
„Berlin hat da noch nichts ausgerichtet“‘, Interview with Franzisca Friedrich, Erfurt, 16 March 2018. 
158 Ibid. 
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through all along the former hard border between the German Democratic 
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, often finding that their 
neighbours in the nearby western towns and villages were fast asleep. 159  
The next morning, long queues had formed in front of police stations and 
train stations in all towns and cities, where citizens waited to receive their 
official visas, despite the cold winter weather. Within three days, seventy-
thousand people in Erfurt had their passports stamped in order to be able to 
travel west.160 The option of exit was suddenly restored, without having to take 
the risk of travelling through another country. The manner in which it was 
announced, however, and the response in the smaller towns and cities, 
demonstrates how unprepared and overwhelmed the police and politicians 
were with how to manage this reinstated freedom.  
This turn of events was enough to lead the mayoress of Erfurt to 
eventually step down on the tenth of November.161  The first district secretary, 
who had refused to face the crowds on the cathedral square, followed suit one 
day later.162 Both members of the Socialist Unity Party were out of their depth; 
they had failed to meet the demands of the crowds at the local demonstrations 
or to know how to deal with the masses, and the newly announced travel 
regulations created a further dynamic that they were simply unequipped for. 
Although many later feared that the Socialist Unity Party would regain power 
due to their networks, financial assets and infrastructure, the turn of events also 
 
159 Ibid. 
160 Thüringer Landeszeitung, 15 November 1989, quoted in Schließt Euch an, p. 205. 
161 Ibid., p. 204. 
162 Ibid., p. 206. 
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signalised that they had lost control to such an extent, that it would be 
increasingly difficult to restore. 
In his monograph on the events of 1989 in neighbouring Czechoslovakia, 
James Krapfl traces a similar dynamic regarding the crowds’ power over 
political representatives, arguing that the parliament undertook reforms  
not because its members had suddenly embraced democratic principles; it did 
so because it was afraid of the new power that had arisen as a result of the 
successful constitution of a community independent of the Party.163 
 
There too, the local square had become the ‘seat of real power’ and the ‘sacred 
center of the new society ‘, from where legitimacy proceeded primarily through 
vocal acclamation.164  In the GDR, where the border to West Germany held such 
political and cultural significance, it would take the addition of mass exit to 
force the local government representatives to step down. Both events, however, 
were brought about primarily by crowd pressure and a growing fear of the 
masses. 
Hirschman predicted that the strength of both voice and exit at such an 
advanced stage would be so great as to have a destructive, as opposed to 
reformist character. What Hirschman neglects to explore however, is what 
happens to this force after it has dealt its initial blow? Would the use of voice in 
the GDR allow for reforms and new practices to be introduced, or would it 
simply continue to break down the political landscape, and how? The following 
 
163 James Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989–1992 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 154-155, my emphasis. 
164 Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face, p. 155. 
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sections will trace this momentum in the following months, as the existing state 
structures broke away. 
 
Controlling Voice 
The Peaceful Revolution? Crowd control in the GDR. 
Although the demonstrations in the GDR managed to avoid bloodshed, earning 
them the later title ‘peaceful revolution’, the fear that the events could turn 
violent was omnipresent, even after many peaceful demonstrations. With the 
Ministry for State Security and the People’s Police present at the 
demonstrations in Thuringia, protesters and organisers alike were fearful that 
the slightest disturbance could lead the state to intervene. What happens and 
how do various actors respond if and when the crowd gets out of control? 
In Erfurt, and across the GDR, the representatives from the churches and 
the new political groups used their roles as public speakers to remind the 
demonstrators to remain peaceful, calling out for ‘no violence!’. Protesters 
walked together, holding hands, or holding candles, as a sign of peaceful 
protest. A former youth worker at the protestant church in Erfurt explains, ‘If 
you’re carrying a candle that you have to shield to stop it from blowing out, 
then you can’t lash out.’165 The fear was therefore not just that the military 
would take action, but that the crowds themselves could become violent. 
Although many protesters wanted to demonstrate peacefully, a crowd is 
nevertheless a body of individuals acting on their own motivations. The 
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combination of police presence and large crowds had therefore created a highly 
volatile situation.  
 A common measure employed by members of the citizens groups and 
churches to keep a peaceful atmosphere was the use of song, especially towards 
the end of a protest. The debate in the Thüringenhalle is just one example, where 
‘a happy song’ was used to calm the crowds before they headed home.  
At the end of the large event on the cathedral square on the third of November, 
a member of the organisation Frauen für Veränderung called on the people 
gathered to ‘sing together the song of peacefulness; We Shall Overcome’.166 This 
song, which rose to fame in the 1960s and as part of the American civil rights 
movement, repeats ‘we are not afraid’ and ‘we shall live in peace’, thereby 
emphasising peaceful actions and making the link to other successful political 
movements.   
Three days later, song was once again used to break up the crowds in the 
Prediger Church in Erfurt, after the audience angrily expressed its discontent at 
the debate coming to a timely end.167 The organiser tried to explain that the 
panellists had agreed to two hours, but that these had now passed, and that the 
speakers would therefore have to head home.168 In the nearby Eichsfeld region, 
north-west of Erfurt, the patriotic and explicitly catholic ‘Eichsfelder Sang’ was 
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sung at demonstrations ‘as a hymn’.169  Song provided a way of channelling the 
boos and chants into a peaceful, non-threatening action, but it also united the 
masses behind alternative national and regional concepts.  
 In some cases, however, the protesters that had gathered for the events 
did not head straight home, but continued demonstrating, after the organisers 
with their peaceful words of guidance had already left. The former youth 
worker recalls chancing upon such a group, that headed through the city and 
straight to the headquarters of the Ministry for Security in Erfurt, chanting 
‘Stasi out!’.170  Placing their candles in a semi-circle around the entrance of the 
building, the protesters remained behind this line, shouting ‘no violence’ at the 
top of their lungs.171 The youth worker credits the candles in the doorway for 
ensuring that no one stepped forward to bang on the door, an action which may 
well have escalated the situation. 
 In Eisenach, protesters followed a similar route through their own town 
centre after the demonstration on Monday, sixth of November, laying candles 
down outside of the Stasi headquarters, the district council offices and the local 
police station. In this case, the burning candles caused actual damage to the 
door of the district council. The organiser of the Neues Forum in Eisenach later 
apologised to a member of the district council for the damage and asked 
whether the council would consider providing members of the Neues Forum 
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with identification badges. These would help to identify them as official 
organisers from the Neues Forum, responsible for ‘the preservation of public 
peace’.172 He explained that members of the Neues Forum had repeatedly been 
accused of working for the Stasi by demonstrators, and that this measure would 
help to maintain order and protect the town hall, the district council and the 
churches.173 The district council member subsequently confirmed in his report 
to the Ministry for State Security that this request had been approved.174  
This form of crowd control was not unique to Eisenach, however; 
identification labels stating ‘No violence! Artists of Erfurt’ were also put in 
place to identify the security personnel at the artist’s demonstration in Erfurt on 
the nineteenth of November 1989.175 An announcement in the local paper in 
advance of the event explained the significance of the new ID badges and 
confirmed that the event had been organised in cooperation with the police.176 
Over the course of the autumn, artists and actors in particular had played 
a large part in organising the demonstrations across the GDR, and in setting up 
the Neues Forum platform.177 Often having the courage and practice of speaking 
on stage, artists were used to dealing with crowds, unlike many other citizens. 
Their songs, poems and cabaret-style speeches interlaced the local politicians’ 
spots at the regular demonstrations in Erfurt, breaking up the seriousness with 
comical and yet critical verses about the privileges of the elite, which were full 
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of local references.178 Performers employed satire, paraphrasing Heinrich 
Heine’s Wintermärchen, for example, to create ‘an autumn tale’ for the GDR.179 
Others quoted Honoré de Balzac on the role of indecent people in society, 
highlighting how their lives were now anything but boring.180 The tongue-in-
cheek parodies capture the extreme nature of the ongoing changes in the GDR, 
which seemed so unlikely as to be unreal, and at the same time evidence a long-
standing tradition amongst performers and audience members of using hidden 
references and comparisons for critical commentaries. If not song, speakers at 
the demonstrations often also used rhymes to give good-tempered guidance.181 
Now, however, they too were worried about their own safety and the 
audience’s growing anger.  
During a live broadcast of the hessian television programme horizonte 
from an indoor location in Eisenach on the fourth of December 1989, a visiting 
cabaret group from Torgau presented a sketch entitled ‘About ship! The course 
change of the SED, or the sinking of the Titanic’, in which the Socialist Unity 
Party crew directs their ship straight into an iceberg, singing the national 
anthem as it sinks.182 The unique broadcast switches between the indoor 
programme for those watching from home, and recordings of the prayers in the 
Georgenkirche, and the demonstration on the streets; an invaluable audiovisual 
record of the demonstration in this small border town. On that evening in early 
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December, the crowd outside was already focussed on their next project. As one 
churchgoer phrased it, 'we were motivated by the SED giving up its deceptive 
practices, and what moves us now is the possibility of German unity’.183 The 
recently published paper ‘For our country’, penned by Stefan Heym and 
Christa Wolf, which spoke out for an independent GDR and was signed by 
thirty-one GDR activists and intellectuals,184 was strongly dismissed by a 
speaker inside the church, followed by rapturous applause from the 
audience.185    
Other speakers on the televised show included the West German 
theologian Dorothee Sölle, the local Eisenach writer and political activist 
Margot Friedrich, a young filmmaker from the GDR television, and the West 
German cabaret artist Mathias Beltz. At various points during his televised 
appearance, Beltz seemed perturbed by the volume of the demonstrators 
outside, eventually cutting his performance short with the words  
Now I’m really interested to know what they’re singing outside. Let’s 
put it this way, tonight, cabaret artist’s commentaries are a load of 
crap. Film outside, I can’t be bothered anymore.186  
Given one more chance to express his hopes for the new century ahead, he said, 
‘my only wish for the new year is for the chanting outside to be broadcast on 
live television’.187 
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 The unique recordings of this pivotal evening in Eisenach are exemplary 
in so many ways. Although clearly selected by the television crew, the film 
captures the variety of voices and spaces that made up the autumn events, from 
the select indoor spaces to the overfilled churches, the streets, and the squares. 
And it demonstrates the needs and wishes of the people in the smaller towns 
and cities away from the capital, who appeared to be moved less by the words 
of a few famous authors and more by the close presence of the inner-German 
border, and feelings of national belonging. Most of all, it is a clear audiovisual 
record of the ways in which crowds of people gathered outside frequently 
disturbed indoor events, and how their voices outdid those of others. Whilst the 
videos from inside the church showed people of all ages and genders, it was 
mainly adult men gathered outside afterwards. The video ends with their 
deafening chants: ‘Deutschland einig Vaterland’.188       
By early December, it was the crowds outside that set the tone and that 
clearly had the upper hand. The introduction of identification badges for 
demonstration organisers evidences a growing fear amongst members of 
governmental organisations and an increasing need amongst members of the 
new political groups to manage the large gatherings and to also protect 
themselves from potential public aggression. The state organisations were now 
dependent on the new political groups and church leaders to control the 
crowds, as mediators between state and people, but these in turn relied on the 
state to keep them safe. That both groups, supported by the press, now worked 
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together to maintain legitimacy and order demonstrates just how strong the 
force of the crowd had quickly become.  
 
Stasi raus! The Secret Police and the Citizens’ Guard 
With the border in Berlin now open and passable, and the people in the top 
political positions removed, the crowds in Erfurt and Eisenach focussed on 
bringing down the remainder of the political elite; the remaining members of 
the Socialist Unity Party and the staff at the Ministry for State Security.  
Responding to the crowd’s calls for State Security workers to be made to 
work in the factories, the district manager of the newly-renamed Ministry for 
National Security (NaSi), told the local paper that his staff had not only heard 
these chants, but had also received threats of violence from the public.189 
Although he claimed to understand why the fear that citizens felt towards state 
officials had now transformed into anger, he nevertheless blamed the 
government’s security strategy for creating a culture of mistrust.190  
The article, which claimed that the omnipresent Stasi was now a 
democratically-led department, also printed that it was ‘more like pure fantasy’ 
to suggest that the former Stasi had kept individual case files on GDR 
citizens.191 The greatest truth in the interview is however the answer to the 
question, what had happened to files on the Neues Forum: the district manager 
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explained ‘they’ve been destroyed’.192 As the crowds on the streets grew in 
numbers and state organisations sensed they were losing control, they were 
quick to destroy evidence that could later be used against them. 
Previously, the fear of an armed response had kept protestors from 
storming the Stasi offices, with good reason. For as they would discover, the 
Stasi-NaSi offices housed hoards of ammunition that could easily have been 
used against civil society. On the fourth of December 1989, however, whilst the 
Hessischer Rundfunk was preparing to film the protests in Eisenach, the citizens 
of Erfurt gathered the courage to go right up to the entrance of the NaSi 
headquarters and demand entry. Black clouds of smoke had been billowing out 
of the chimneys of their offices in Erfurt since the evening before; an unusual 
sight, as this building was known to have central heating. In the knowledge that 
this could only mean that the organisation was burning documents, four 
thousand flyers were printed overnight by members of the Neues Forum and 
distributed to local citizens, alerting them to the developments.193  
In the morning, on the initiative of members of the women’s 
organisations, citizens gathered together to take action, with some blocking the 
entrances and exits of the building with their cars, and others seeking the 
advice of a lawyer about how to legally halt the work of the ministry.194 By ten 
o’clock, three lawyers and the press had arrived and entered the building with a 
delegation of ten citizens, demanding to be given access to check all rooms. 
 
192 ‘Sie sind vernichtet’, ibid. 
193 Die Geschichte des Bürgerkomitees in Erfurt. Zeitzeugenberichte. Teil 2 (Erfurt: Gesellschaft für 
Zeitgeschichte e.V., 2010), p. 9. 
194 Andreas Dornheim & Stephan Schnitzler (Ed.), Thüringen 1989/90. Akteure des Umbruchs (Erfurt: 
Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Thüringen, 1995), p. 294. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 77 
Senior members of staff, however, are thought to have unashamedly tried to 
hinder the occupation by claiming not to have plans of the building and by 
refuting that there were any computers in the building.195 It was not until the 
message arrived that another two-hundred citizens had stormed the grounds 
from the back, that the major general backed down and citizens began 
searching the building.196  
Looking back on the event, a church worker who was present described 
the fear in the faces of the young guards, who simply stepped aside when told 
to by the crowd. ‘They could just as easily have been on our side’, he noted.197 
As the crowds gathered below, the major general had called his lawyer for 
advice on what to do and whether to shoot.198 A member of the Neues Forum 
credits the lawyer for preventing bloodshed that day, as he had instructed the 
major general to take all the weapons downstairs and let the people in. ‘This 
time, we’ve lost’, he said.199 Once again, it was the presence of large groups of 
citizens, simply demanding entry, but also using the cooperation of the press 
and lawyers, that overwhelmed the ministry.  
On discovering the extent of the surveillance equipment and the furnaces 
in which documents were being burnt, the citizens spontaneously formed a 
civic guard to secure the evidence. Although the new political groups would 
later consider destroying all the materials to prevent them from being reused by 
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the next political leaders, the immediate aim was to secure the files as evidence 
and prevent them from being transported abroad.200 In total, the civic guard is 
said to have consisted of up to three-thousand members, which will of course 
have included some secret informers.201  Together, they created inventories of 
all the rooms and took it in turns to keep watch over the entrances and exits, 
conducting identification checks to control who entered and left the building. 
Important rooms and cabinets were sealed off to prevent any tampering, and 
the other citizens provided the citizens’ guard with food and drink. 
On Erfurt’s example, citizens in towns and cities across the GDR also 
demanded entry to their local Stasi-NaSi buildings, equally discovering stores 
of files, alcohol and weaponry.202 In Thuringia, the district offices in Arnstadt, 
Eisenach, Gotha, Jena, Nordhausen, Saalfeld and Stadtroda were occupied the 
very same day.203  In Eisenach, a visiting film crew from West Germany 
recorded the clearing of the ministry’s offices a few days later for their 
documentary about the town. Outside, local activists from the civil guard 
recalled the demeanour of the NaSi staff on the day they collected their 
belongings. The boss was described to have been so physically and emotionally 
drained that he was shaking and had to be sent home.204 On questioning from 
the West-German journalists, why they thought he was so exhausted, an activist 
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explained: ‘Because that was his existence. It was his life’.205 And how did it 
make him feel, seeing him like that? Without a second to pause, he asserted: ‘I 
felt sorry for him’.206 The behaviour ‘was very varied’ however207; some staff 
came with their heads bowed, whilst the office secretary acted as normal, 
greeting everyone with a friendly ‘Hello!’ and a handshake.208 It was the 
younger, teenage workers who are said to have shown the least emotion, 
neither greeting anyone nor bowing their heads on arrival. ‘No one knows what 
is going on in their heads’ said the activist, with a hint of frustration.209  
Perceptions of what the ministry staff were thinking and how they acted 
seemed to play an important role in determining how the public reacted to 
them. Those that showed great emotion, even though they were in the top 
positions, gained the empathy of the activists, whereas those that lied or 
showed little emotion left the locals feeling shocked or confused. These 
reflections show a moral superiority on behalf of those citizens, who were 
willing to forgive the former MfS workers if they showed remorse through 
emotional responses. Amnesty was to be granted only to those who admitted 
wrong doings and a willingness ‘to break’ with the past and make amends.210 
 Not everyone, however, was as willing to empathise with the members 
of the former elite.  On Monday, the eleventh of December, following the 
weekly prayers for peace in Eisenach’s Georgenkirche, a conflict broke out at the 
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local SED holiday home. The centre at Wilhelmsthal, ten kilometres south of 
Eisenach, was frequently host to children on summer camps and party 
members on holiday with their families. But suddenly it had become a symbol 
for the privilege of the GDR’s elite, and a hot topic in the local debate on what 
should become of state-owned buildings and facilities.  
A call went out during the church sermon, which was now frequently 
used for local announcements, summoning the congregation to join a protest 
march to Wilhelmsthal that very evening, to view the grounds and assess its 
possible uses. The most popular suggestion, put forward by local doctors, was 
for the complex to be turned into a rehabilitation centre for their patients. The 
protest was therefore intended as a display of public demand for the property 
to be officially handed over to the health service.211 
 It is not clear, what exactly happened that evening in Wilhelmsthal, with 
three readers’ letters to the press each presenting a slightly different account. 
The first, from a local doctor and political activist, alleged that on arriving at the 
home, the peaceful protestors happened upon an angry mob, ‘raging and 
screaming’ for ‘the fat cats and red pigs’ to come out.212 This very nearly broke 
out into physical violence and was only kept under control thanks to the efforts 
of the peaceful protestors.213  
The second version contended that this was not a separate group at all, 
but that the conflict arose when only a small group from the protest march was 
 
211 StA Eisenach, 40.2-25 Nachlass Hasse; Wilhelmsthal / Runder Tisch, 'Die Rolle der Evangelischen 
Kirche bei der Wende‘, Eisenach, 13. March 1990. 
212 ‘mit Geschrei und mit Getobe‘, ‘die angeblichen Bonzen und die roten Schweine‘, ibid. 
213 Ibid. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 81 
allowed into the grounds, and the rest of the demonstrators were forced to wait 
outside.214 The local dentist went on to argue that the protest was peaceful, but 
should have been better-organised in advance, with the possibility for more 
people to attend the viewing.215 After all, with the prominence of this topic in 
the media, it was to be expected that exclusions could quickly lead to feelings of 
hate and mistrust.216  
The third letter condemned the violence at the ‘shameful event’, at which 
protesters are said to have kicked the property.217 This violence was reportedly 
part of a growing trend;  
over the past three to four weeks, word in Eisenach has it that the gatherings at 
the Monday prayers and the protest marches through the town centre thereafter 
are not very peaceful anymore at all. On the contrary; it has become a stomping 
ground for hooligans, who can no longer be considered harmless.218  
She therefore lay the blame on the leaders of the march for organising the 
inappropriate ‘Show-Demo’ amid the growing tensions and argued that this 
should have been handled in an objective manner by an official delegation.219  
 What appears certain, is that this event did not go as planned, and that 
the organisers were no longer in control of the situation. Furthermore, many 
witnesses saw the potential for an outbreak of serious violence. The guests at 
the holiday home that evening felt intimidated by the protesters on the grounds 
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and in the street, with one reporting a frightening confrontation with a crowd 
as she waited for the bus with her child.220 Five days later, the citizens’ 
committee met with the town council to discuss the incident, with calls to 
ensure that security officers for crowd control were to be present at all future 
events.221 The force of the crowd was out of control; now it was time to rein it in 
again. 
 
Power off the Streets 
From January 1990 onwards, the weekly demonstrations in Erfurt and Eisenach 
continued, but their numbers started waning as new structures progressed. 
Round tables had been established in both towns, where members of the new 
political groups and citizen’s movements gathered together to discuss 
communal issues and advise the town council, essentially influencing their 
decision-making as a form of democratic control until the next formal elections, 
which were now planned for March 1990. In Eisenach, where the mayor was a 
member of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany, the town councillors 
continued until March. In Erfurt, however, the city council was completely 
disbanded due to the huge dissatisfaction amongst the citizenry with their 
communal leaders in the SED, and an ‘interim parliament’ with representatives 
from all existing local political parties, movements and women’s groups was 
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formed instead.222 Through this cooperation between the council and the round 
tables, a form of ‘double rule’ or dyarchy took hold.223 
 With the formation of the round tables, the citizens’ committees, that had 
formed over the autumn and led the occupation of the Ministry for Security, 
were free to focus their efforts entirely on uncovering the extent of the 
surveillance culture in the GDR. The weekly demonstrations now became an 
opportunity to relay information to the citizens. On the eighteenth of January, a 
member of the Neues Forum updated the attendees on their plans for 
‘reconciling’ former Stasi/NaSi workers: 
Firstly, public naming of Stasi agents, including their titles! Secondly, 
immediate dismissal of Stasi/Nasi staff from sensitive areas of work, such as 
local committees, education, the postal service, telecommunications, news and 
taxi companies! We cannot stand by and watch as our children are taught by 
former members of the State Security!224 
 
The crowd, which had been cheering all along, broke out into loud applause 
and began chanting ‘Stasi out!’.225 Next, he relayed the organisation’s demand 
for no former MfS staff to be employed in these areas in future, and the need for 
everyone to be cross-checked by the citizens’ committee, with public disclosure 
of salary structures.226  
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unterrichten!‘, StA Erfurt, 6/7 Tonbandaufnahmen, 'Die Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine 
Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger‘, Studio B, 2000. 
225 ‘Stasi raus!‘, ibid. 
226 Ibid. 
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 Since occupying the NaSi headquarters, the members of the citizens’ 
committee had been working through the documents to uncover who had been 
working for the organisation in their region and what buildings and secret 
apartments were owned and used by the ministry.227 This was done in 
cooperation with the local citizens, who called and wrote in to the citizens’ 
committee, in many cases anonymously, to give clues and report their 
suspicions in regard to possible Stasi workers and property in their 
neighbourhood.228 Others begged for the help of the committee to prove their 
innocence after false allegations.229 Their reputation had been destroyed 
through unfounded accusations of collaboration, and they were now dependent 
on the work of the committee to prove the public otherwise. 
 A number of letters, however, also questioned the legitimacy of the 
committee in handling such sensitive data. Raising the issue of data security 
laws, they asked what control function had been put in place to select members 
of the citizens’ committee and demanded that the members at least be 
introduced to the public.230 Letters also came in to counter false accusations in 
the press, such as that the postal service, which had been found to have 
surveillance rooms and equipment, was continuing to spy on its customers, 
asking for evidence.231  
 
227 StA Erfurt, 5/783/G-3 Bürgerbewegung Sammlung, 'Informationen zu MfS-Objekten und 
konspirativen Wohnungen‘, 1990. 
228 Ibid. 
229 StA Erfurt, 5/783/G-5 Bürgerbewegung Sammlung, 'Rehabilitierungsgesuche von Bürgern‘, March 
1990. 
230 StA Erfurt, 5/783/G-4 Bürgerbewegung Sammlung, 'Bürgeranfrage hinsichtlich der Legitimation des 
Bürgerkomitees‘, Erfurt, 04 April 1990. 
231 StA Erfurt, 5/783/G-4 Bürgerbewegung Sammlung, 'Zurückweisung falscher Aussagen in der TLZ 
durch den Leiter der Postdirektion Erfurt‘, Schulze, Erfurt, 09 January 1990. 
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The discovery of the Stasi files had produced a multitude of issues 
around data protection, and the spontaneously-formed committee found itself 
needing to formalise its structures in order to continue its work. In the 
meantime, a culture of guilty until proven innocent established itself in the 
communities, companies and councils, as everything and everyone was put into 
question. Members of political groups and parties began requesting cross-
examinations for Stasi collaboration to ensure that no former secret informants 
were working in politics, as they prepared for the upcoming elections in March. 
As much as the exposure of Stasi structures in society was an attempt to create 
transparency and faith in the new system, it also shook the trust of the 
electorate in their communal leaders and government. 
At the public announcements on the cathedral square, however, the 
crowds vocally supported the work of the committee and the exposure of the 
ministry’s informants. At the end of January, Wolf Biermann, the influential 
East German singer who had been denaturalised in 1976 due to his critical 
songwriting, took to the stage to give his two cents on how best to deal with the 
former agents. ‘I’m not in a position to give you any uncle-like advice’, he 
joked,  
but I’m no sweet Jesus! I’m no pastor! I love my fellow humans!  
But I hate these people! They have done us too much harm.  
They have humiliated us!232  
 
232 ‘Natürlich war ich dreizehn Jahre weg, und ich bin nicht in der Lage, euch hier irgendwelche 
onkelhaften Ratschläge zu geben, wie es hier in der DDR weitergehen soll. Das weiß ich noch weniger als 
ihr, denn ihr lebt ja hier. Aber wenn ich hier eben höre das jemand dafür wirbt, dass die Stasi wieder 
eingebaut wird in das normale Menschenleben, dann will ich euch ganz offen sagen: ich bin kein 
Herzjesulein! Ich bin kein Pastor! Ich liebe auch die Menschen! Aber ich hasse diese Leute! Sie haben uns 
viel zu viel Leid angetan. Sie haben uns gedemütigt!‘, StA Erfurt, 6/7 Tonbandaufnahmen, 'Die Wende in 
Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger‘, Studio B, 2000. 
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He was interrupted by loud shouts from the audience. ‘No’, he replied,  
there won’t be a pogrom.  
 
But you have to speak the truth. And I for one am not going to agonize about 
how best to reintegrate them into normal society. I think these people are in big 
trouble now. And I’m glad they’re in trouble. They’ve earned it. They really 
have earned it, over many years.233  
 
 Speak of pogroms and hate was not new. Studies have found archival 
evidence of over eight-thousand-six-hundred racially-motivated hate crimes in 
the GDR, going back many decades.234 In 1975, citizens in Erfurt had violently 
rounded up a group of Algerian workers; attacks on contract-workers’ homes 
followed. Even before the opening of the border, hate speech in the city had 
been on the rise, and from November 1989 onwards, nationalist slogans were 
used with growing frequency at demonstrations across the GDR.235   
In early November, the district secretary had informed the city council in 
Erfurt of new offenses. At the Thüringenhalle event in October, he had publicly 
praised a local priest for his work against fascism; the church in which the 
clergyman worked was subsequently defaced with swastikas and phrases such 
as ‘Jews should be gassed’ and ‘Long live the SS’ .236 Although the local 
administration expressed their shock and disgust, and gave the police their full 
support in finding the culprits, the crime was treated as a singular issue, with 
 
233 'Nein, das gibt kein Pogrom. Man muss aber die Wahrheit sagen. Und ich würde mir jedenfalls nicht 
den Kopf darüber zerbrechen, wie man sie möglichst elegant wieder jetzt in das normale Menschenleben 
einfädelt. Ich denke, diese Leute sind jetzt in Schwierigkeiten. Ich gönne ihnen diese Schwierigkeiten. Die 
haben sie sich verdient. Ehrlich verdient, in langen Jahren‘, ibid. 
234 Steffi Lehmann, 'Rechtsextremismus in der DDR‘, in Sebastian Liebold (et al.), Demokratie in unruhigen 
Zeiten. Festschrift für Eckhard Jesse (Baden-Baden: Nomis, 2018), p. 104. 
235 Lehmann, 'Rechtsextremismus in der DDR‘, pp. 104-105. 
236 ‘Juden müssen vergast werden‘, 'Die SS lebe hoch‘, StA Erfurt, 1-5/255559 Protokolle von Dialogen und 
Aussprachen, Vol. 7, 'Stadtverordnetenversammlung‘, 06 November 1989. 
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no debate about the extent of the phenomenon or wider causes. Only a few 
minutes beforehand, the discussions had addressed the issue of the police being 
overburdened with the new travel regulations, raising the question of whether 
the force would truly have the time or capacity to thoroughly investigate new 
hate crimes. Hate speech was no by no means a new phenomenon, but with an 
overstretched police force, little resistance and new realms of expression, it was 
given the opportunity to flourish. 
In mid-February, just a few weeks after Biermann’s remarks, an activist 
from the local women’s group announced the end of the weekly 
demonstrations in Erfurt’s city centre.237 Although the space continued to be 
used for regular large events, the remainder of February and March was 
dedicated to the election campaign for the first, and last, free parliamentary 
elections in the GDR.  She argued that there may still be a lot of work to be 
done, but that there was no need any more for the weekly demonstrations, as 
the party had stepped down, and the Ministry for State Security was in the 
process of being dismantled.238 The crowd was calm as she made her speech. 
Every now and then they applauded politely. Whereas the local square had 
been filled with the voices of local politicians and communal representatives, 
artists and songwriters, doctors, church workers and members of various trade 
unions,239 the voices heard in the coming months would be mainly political 
campaigners from East and West. The revolution on the street had come to an 
 
237 StA Erfurt, 6/7 Tonbandaufnahmen, 'Die Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von 
Manfred Boettger‘, Studio B, 2000. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid. 
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Stasi in the Brickyard 
As the citizens’ committees unearthed more of the workings of the Ministry for 
Security, individual companies started scrutinising their own structures. In 
Eisenach, the local brickyard held a general meeting to discuss what should 
become of two members of staff who had been working for the Stasi. A West-
German camera team happened to be in town and was permitted to film. The 
former assistant director and driver were made to wait outside whilst their 
colleagues sat inside around tables of six, voting on their future.  The journalists 
described the atmosphere in the room as ‘menacingly hostile’, even though the 
company director had urged his workers that everyone deserves a second 
chance.240 Afterwards, several workers spoke up to give their verdict on the 
secret informants. Although willing to keep them, they insisted that the two 
should now do the dirtiest work in the company.  
They must prove to us, that they are really willing, that they are really willing, 
to help our country and our economy back on its feet. And I would really like to 
hear that they regret [what they have done].241 
 
 
240 ‘Die Stimmung im Saal ist drohend feindselig‘, StA Eisenach, 41.9/315 Filmaufnahmen, 'Das Ende der 
Geschichte. Fünf Tage in Eisenach – ein deutsches Tagebuch‘, Hessischer Rundfunk, 18 March 1990. 
241 ‘(…) auf jedem Fall sollen sie uns jetzt den Beweis bringen, dass sie wirklich gewillt sind, dass sie 
wirklich gewillt sind, unserem Land wieder und unserer Wirtschaft etwas mit auf die Beine zu helfen. 
Und ich hätte dann auch ganz gerne mal gehört, dass sie eigentlich bereuen, diese Tätigkeit jahrelang 
ausgeübt zu haben, gutes Geld eingesteckt zu haben, wo Bürger, die eine harte Arbeit machen mussten, 
eine dreckige Arbeit machen mussten, vielleicht die Hälfte verdient haben‘, ibid. 
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 The two workers, having entered the room, responded to the comments 
whilst sitting amongst their colleagues with their arms folded. ‘I have a heart 
too’, said the driver, before arguing that his skills would be better put to use in 
his former field.242 The assistant director asked for a probationary period, 
insisting that he would demonstrate through his actions that he was willing ‘to 
make a full break with my past’.243 Neither, however, later accepted the 
positions offered to them.  
 As before, the behaviour of the former Stasi workers and their ability to 
show remorse and regret played an important part in fellow citizens’ 
willingness to accept them back. Until they did so, they were physically 
excluded from many areas of collective life, an experience that the two Stasi 
informers reflected on in a second interview: ‘the best example being the 
general meeting’.244 This societal exclusion was their punishment, along with 
the supposedly life-long sentence to take on the hardest and most dangerous 
work in the company. The two men were expected to plead guilty, and then 
serve their time under their colleagues, in a realignment of power. It was a form 
of amnesty and punishment, rolled into one.  
 The two Stasi informants were clearly confused how it had come to this 
verdict, ‘despite having shown readiness [to change]’.245 Even though they 
claimed to have learnt a lot in the recent weeks, with the driver even admitting 
‘we were without a doubt the ones executing the party’s regime’, they 
 
242 ‘Ich habe auch nur ein Herz‘, ibid. 
243 ‘Ich will einen absoluten Schnitt machen mit meiner Vergangenheit‘, ibid. 
244 ‘das beste Beispiel war die Versammlung‘, ibid. 
245 ‘obwohl wir jetzt diese Bereitschaft zeigten‘, ibid. 
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nevertheless felt that they had been vilified.246 They raised what they 
considered to be ‘irrationality’ in the way that their colleagues decided to treat 
them, arguing that their unit was ‘a small part of a larger structure. Very, very 
small’, and that society as a whole carried a common responsibility.247 They 
appeared to have been hoping for a clean slate and a second chance; a kind of 
Destasification. 
 They were not the only ones in the room, however, to have felt that the 
decision reached was the wrong one. Another worker spoke to the journalists in 
his private apartment, arguing that the real criminals should be prosecuted, ‘but 
you cannot prosecute every single comrade’.248 Despite having done time in an 
MfS prison himself, he sympathised with the difficult situation that the two 
Stasi informers, ‘who first need to face the hate’, now found themselves in.249 
But he contended that they were still humans, and that it was therefore 
important to find a way to work with them, ‘whether we like it or not’.250 His 
girlfriend chipped in to say that ‘even if everyone says’ everyone who worked 
for the Stasi should be lynched, that was not the way forward.251 The new 
democracy needed to be learnt, but the brickyard worker warned that: 
It must not be the way I experienced it in the general meeting, that there is a 
new kind of fear. A new fear amongst those who now think differently. (…) 
Say, for example, my opinion, which is still a socialist-communist opinion. I 
 
246 ‘Unter dem Regime der Partei waren wir sicherlich die Ausführenden‘, ibid. 
247 ‘Unvernunft‘, ‘Ein kleines Stückchen vom Großen. Ein ganz ganz kleines‘, ibid. 
248 ‘Aber man darf nicht jeden einzelnen Genossen verurteilen‘, ibid. 
249 ‘die sich erstmal auch Haß stellen müssen‘, ibid. 
250 ‘Ob wir wollen oder nicht‘, ibid. 
251 ‘Wenn jetzt jeder meint, hier, weil der nur bei der Staatssicherheit oder wo gearbeitet hat, deswegen 
müsste man ihn am Baum aufhängen. Also das ist mit Sicherheit nicht der richtige Weg. Ich meine, wir 
haben das ja alle mitgemacht in der Vergangenheit und haben dieses System alle mitgeschaffen‘, ibid. 
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should not be afraid to voice that opinion.252 
 
‘Are you afraid?’, asked the journalist.253 ‘Yes’, he said, I am afraid’.254 
 The general meeting in the brickyard is an example of reconciliation on a 
communal level in the everyday of the GDR transformation. Sanya Romeike 
writes that the circumstances in the GDR in 1990 were ‘wholly different’ from 
that of Germany after 1945, as ‘the process of coping with the past was not 
guided or controlled “from outside,” but initiated by the East German people 
themselves’.255 The decision usually taken by the new government was being 
met by the citizens in small collectives in their places of work. Voting took place 
with a show of hands in front of colleagues, forms of punishment were 
suggested out loud, and those who thought differently dared not say so. 
Comments such as ‘the two men have both committed a certain sin, although 
we do not know the details’,256 demonstrate that under these specific 
circumstances, where evidence was not readily available, the jury relied on 
emotion to reach their verdict. What is more, the accused were excluded from 
parts of their own trial.  
 It is a process that would be defined as a ‘transition from below’ in the 
political sciences; an important part of establishing the new democratic order.257 
 
252 ‘Und da darf es auch jetzt nicht wieder sein, wie ich das auch in der Versammlung erlebt habe, dass es 
eine neue Angst gibt. Eine neue Angst der Jetzt-Andersdenkenden. (…) Also, sagen wir mal, meine 
Meinung, die immer noch eine Sozialistische, Kommunistische ist. Das ich jetzt nicht Angst haben brauch, 
meine Meinung zu äußern‘, ibid. 
253 ‘Haben Sie Angst?‘, ibid. 
254 ‘Ja, ich habe Angst‘, ibid. 
255 Romeike, Transitional Justice in Germany, p. 43. 
256 ‘Eine gewisse Sünde ist begangen worden, von beiden Herren, wo wir im Einzelnen nicht wissen, was 
das war‘, StA Eisenach, 41.9/315 Filmaufnahmen, 'Das Ende der Geschichte. Fünf Tage in Eisenach – ein 
deutsches Tagebuch‘, Hessischer Rundfunk, 18 March 1990. 
257 Brigitte Weiffen, ‘From Domestic to International Instruments for Dealing with a Violent Past: Causes, 
Concomitants and Consequences for Democratic Transitions’ in Aleida Assmann & Linda Shortt (Eds.), 
Memory and Political Change (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 92. 
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Here, justice lies with the victims of the previous regime and the perpetrators 
are consequently prosecuted and punished. This can ‘not only help to prevent 
future violations of human rights’, but ‘is also necessary to assert the 
supremacy of democratic norms and values and to encourage public belief in 
these’.258 However, this decision can also alienate wrongdoers and deepen 
cleavages in society.259 Granting amnesty, on the other hand, has generally been 
found to be more effective in stabilising new democracies.260 
 In this example from Eisenach, the consequences are clear, as neither of 
the two Stasi workers accepted the jobs offered to them as coal machinists, even 
though they were willing, in theory, to stay within the company. Taking on the 
new role would have meant accepting punishment, not from the government, 
but from their co-workers, and to continue to work alongside them in what 
would undoubtedly have been an unbearable atmosphere. Their only other 
option was to leave. In both cases, they were excluded from the society they 
were once a part of, and a culture of hate and fear was produced in the process.  
 
Conclusion 
When Albert Hirschman wrote his theory of voice and exit in 1970 as a way of 
gaining ‘a more complete understanding of social processes’,261 East and West 
Germany were just starting to consider new approaches towards closer 
cooperation between the two states. Travel westward from the GDR was only 
 
258 Weiffen, ‘From Domestic to International Instruments’, pp. 90-91. 
259 Ibid., p. 91. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 18. 
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possible under special circumstances, and public criticism of the state was a 
punishable offence. It would take another twenty years before the 
dissatisfaction of the citizens with their state structures reached breaking point, 
despite the lack of political channels. Forced to respond to the great numbers of 
citizens leaving the country, citizens and state actors started using voice in the 
public sphere.  
By October 1989, the citizens in the district of Erfurt were no longer 
willing to accept the practices of their government and decided to turn these 
back on themselves. By insisting on participating in the official ‘dialogue’ 
events, which were intended more as a performance of democratic practice than 
a true debate, the citizens were able to unveil the power structures and methods 
of exclusion that had defined the official political sphere for so long. When the 
communal leaders preached their plans for reform, the citizens refused to listen, 
drowning them out with a cloud of noise, and exposing the unwillingness of 
their representatives to listen to them in return. Although this breakdown in 
communication and subversion of power is documented especially well in 
Erfurt, records point to similar occurings in various towns across the region.  
The detailed transcripts in Erfurt therefore describe a much wider development 
in which citizens put existing structures into question and found innovative 
ways to enable participation in the political debate. 
 Through these demonstrations, the force of the crowd and its ability to 
take down structures through use of voice becomes very apparent. This force 
was able to generate positive change in removing unfair structures, but it also 
had a threatening aspect that divided the communities and created a new 
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enemy. By December 1989, the state and the new political organisations were 
struggling to maintain order, and to keep the balance between vocal political 
expression, intimidation and physical violence. As the peaceful effects of using 
song, candles and hand-holding waned, the parties relied on one another to 
establish a form of mediated crowd control. 
 From here on, governance was handed to the people until new formal 
structures were in place. Spontaneous groups formed to uncover past practices, 
expose the perpetrators and suggest ways of rehabilitation. This process was 
dominated by emotions, which were used to determine how guilty or 
remorseful former Stasi workers were, and public exposure and social 
punishment were the chosen form of sentencing. These practices were also 
scrutinised by the citizens, who questioned the democratic viability or 
fruitfulness of the exercise, but these criticisms were pushed into the private 
sphere, where they were expressed in anonymous letters or private interviews. 
The public sphere had been taken over again, with a new fear of expression 
evolving.  
So far, the autumn of 1989 has always been framed as democratic and 
revolutionary, with the widespread public protest being seen as the active 
response of a politically enlightened citizenry. And while the demand for 
change was no doubt tied to democratic ideals, the strong use of voice at this 
late stage raises the question whether the autumn revolution in 1989 was 
indeed the democratic process based on reform and discussion that it set out to 
be, or rather overwhelmingly an exercise in crowd power and control. For 
without the right channels or structures to support it, the force of the crowds 
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that gathered quickly took on a course of its own and became increasingly 
difficult to control. 
As the leaders in nearby Prague were similarly unable to control their 
citizens, ‘they explicitly encouraged citizens to act on their own initiative’, and 
to carry out reforms in their workplaces.262 However, whereas the citizens in 
Czechoslovakia were tasked with implementing the existing constitution,263 the 
purge in the GDR did not follow any agreed procedures, and was rather 
decided locally and at whim. This quickly created a volatile situation in which 
impulsive decisions could easily be enforced through majority approval. It begs 
the question of whether use of voice is per se democratic, or rather, as 
Hirschman argues, potentially a strong and destructive force. 
 By exploring the events in East Germany through Hirschman’s ideas on 
exit and voice, it becomes possible to see how the vigour of voice, when left 
unpractised, has the ability to derail and dismantle existing structures. It also 
sheds light on how larger developments like the departure of East German 
citizens and the opening of the border are interconnected with the voicing of 
opinion on a much smaller scale, and how these dynamics reinforce oneanother. 
Notably, a prolonged focus on voice and exit shows what Hirschman did not 
explore; how difficult it is to control freedom of speech and assembly over time, 
and how structures emerge and function out of urgent necessity.  
 
262 Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face, p. 155. 
263 Ibid. 
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In 1994, Erich Honecker would argue that the events in the GDR were 
simply put ‘a fight for power’.264 What appears clear, is that gaining, 
maintaining and using the power of voice to enact own wishes greatly overrode 
attempts at developing fair and inclusive structures and practices. For the ‘will 
of the people’ would continue to decide and divide even after new structures 
had been put into place. Just how difficult it would be to reconcile citizens and 
develop fair practices would become clear as new and old political actors 
braced to jointly organise the first free elections in the GDR. The next chapter 
explores how citizens dealt with the need to remediate this relationship and 
work around the new divisions after the experience of the autumn.   
 
264 Erich Honecker, Moabiter Notizen. Letztes schriftliches Zeugnis und Gesprächsprotokolle vom BRD-Besuch 
1987 aus dem persönlichen Besitz Erich Honeckers, Berlin 1994, p. 14, referenced in Martin Sabrow (Ed.), 1989 
und die Rolle der Gewalt (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012), p. 18. 
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2. Political Power 
Voice and Loyalty 
On the sixteenth of January 1990, the mayor of Erfurt penned a letter to the 
president of the East German parliament, asking for elections to be held as soon 
as possible.265 The new political parties and groups had refused to recognise the 
council representatives that had taken office after the falsified elections in May 
1989; this ‘tense situation’ was making it increasingly difficult for the city 
council to reach any decisions, even in cooperation with the round table.266 The 
city council had already written to the East German parliament on the sixth of 
November 1989 with a similar request to hold an election in order to help 
stabilise politics, create trust and stop the work force from leaving the 
country.267  
Two months on, the request had gained even more urgency, for the local 
CDU faction had officially withdrawn its support on the eleventh of January 
and gone into opposition. In the fear that other factions would follow suit, the 
mayor begged his superiors to hold a snap election.268 This, of course, was 
exactly what the CDU in Erfurt had intended. Their speaker told the press that 
the decision to leave the governing block had been taken due to the ‘continuing 
domination’ of the Socialist Unity Party in the city council.269 A row had 
 
265 StA Erfurt, 1-5/1000/69 Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt 1945-1990, ‘Brief vom 
Oberbürgermeister von Erfurt an den Präsidenten der Volkskammer‘, Erfurt, 16 January 1990. 
266 ‘angespannten Lage‘, ibid. 
267 StA Erfurt, 1-5/1000/68 Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt 1945-1990, ‘Brief an das 
Präsidium der Volkskammer der DDR‘, Stadtverordnetenversammlung der Stadt Erfurt, Erfurt, 06 
November 1989. 
268 StA Erfurt, 1-5/1000/69 Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt 1945-1990, ‘Brief vom 
Oberbürgermeister von Erfurt an den Präsidenten der Volkskammer‘, Erfurt, 16 January 1990. 
269 ‘noch immer (…) beherrscht werde‘, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Republik (henceforth ACDP), 
1/16/1-1 Presse-Archiv DDR Kommunalpolitik, 'CDU-Fraktion verließ Erfurter Stadtparlament‘, 
Deutsche Presse Agentur, 11 Januar 1990. 
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erupted after the council offered forty SED mandates to members of the new 
groups and political parties. The other groups rejected the offer, and the CDU 
faction labelled it an attempt to pacify the other actors and uphold a ‘fake 
democracy’.270   
On the twenty-eighth of January 1990, however, the decision was taken 
by the East German parliament to move the planned general election forward to 
March eighteenth.271 Although the governmental decision was officially based 
on an agreement between the PDS and the SPD, this too was forced through by 
the CDU. The former bloc party had threatened to leave the government if the 
SPD did not join them in the new ‘government of national responsibility’, 
thereby stripping the SPD of their oppositional role.272 Although this date gave 
the established parties a clear headstart, as the newer political parties had little 
time to prepare, the CDU and PDS were able to use the instability at regional 
and national level to push it through. The new political groups that emerged 
from the civic movement had refused to accept a long-term intermediary 
government made of established office holders, and yet the former political 
elites were able to use the uncertainty surrounding their own failure to regain 
control.  
Within only a few weeks, local actors needed to organise free and fair 
elections. Whereas the campaigning was left to the political parties and groups, 
the practical organisation of the elections was split between the election 
 
270 ‘Scheindemokratie’, ibid. 
271 Sebastian Richter, ‘Der Weg zur freien Volkskammerwahl am 18. März 1990‘, in Klaus Dietmar Henke 
(Ed.), Revolution und Vereinigung 1989/90. Als in Deutschland die Realität die Phantasie überholte (München: 
Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 2009), p. 333. 
272 ‘Regierung der nationalen Verantwortung‘, Richter, ‘Der Weg zur freien Volkskammerwahl’, p. 333. 
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commission, which managed the political parties and the cost of the election, 
and the local election offices, which were responsible for the organisation and 
logistics of the event.273 Furthermore, in Erfurt, an election investigation 
committee was formed to review the manipulation of the last communal 
elections that had taken place in 1989.274 Would this be enough to free the act of 
voting from its political associations in GDR times and to restore trust in the 
system and its political leaders? 
The last communal elections in May 1989 had caused a scandal that had 
quickly weakened trust in the government and put further pressure on the state 
to respond. As the elections in the GDR had only given the option to confirm 
the list of suggested candidates in the governing block, as opposed to selecting 
candidates, the act of voting had been more a display of loyalty, or ‘political 
declaration’,275  than an expression of choice. Party officials had therefore 
focussed on ensuring that as many people as possible went to vote, so that they 
could publish high numbers of attendance. As addressed in the first chapter, 
heightened loyalty can help to bind citizens to the system and, under normal 
circumstances, ‘makes exit less likely’.276 The Socialist Unity Party had indeed 
invested heavily in the elections as a ‘way of enhancing societal mobilisation 
 
273 StA Erfurt, 1-5/1000/70 Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt 1945-1990, ‘Protokoll der 4. 
Sitzung des Interimsparlaments vom 04.04.1990 in Erfurt / Anlage Information zum Stand der 
Vorbereitung der Kommunalwahlen am 6. Mai 1990‘, Erfurt, 04 April 1990. 
274 StA Erfurt, 1-5/1000/70 Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt 1945-1990, ‘Protokoll des 3. 
Interimsparlament am 21.03.1990 / Anlage Wahluntersuchungsausschuß der 
Stadtverordnetenversammlung Erfurt wegen Verdachts der Wahlfälschung im Mai 1989‘, Erfurt, 21 March 
1990. 
275 ‘Politikbekenntnis‘. Andrea Herz, Wahl und Wahlbetrug im Mai 1989. DDR-Kommunalwahlen im Thüringer 
Raum (Erfurt: Landesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR, 
April 2004), p. 11. 
276 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 77. 
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and integration’.277 However, in taking an active part in their society, loyalty 
amongst citizens also activates and increases the power of their voice.278  
Knowing this, citizens had used the threat of not going to vote to bargain 
with the state. The clergy in Erfurt, which had requested to put independent 
candidates up for the elections in 1989 and was refused on the grounds that 
candidates had to be a member of one of the political parties or organisations 
listed on the SED-led ‘unity list’, had consequently threatened not to vote at 
all.279 In Langula near Mühlhausen, the mayor had received an anonymous 
letter from one street, in which all the residents refused to vote until the issue 
with the water supply had been rectified.280 Another street of citizens in Gotha 
had declined to vote due to the state of the environment.281 Furthermore, the 
Ministry for Security suspected that some citizens, that had already applied to 
leave the country, were using their non-participation in the elections to force 
the state’s approval.282 
The head of the department at the microelectronics firm in Erfurt had 
also voiced his intent to cross out all the candidates due to the economic 
stagnation in the GDR and the failure to meet the demands of production and 
people. Further reasons reportedly given to refrain from voting included the 
election procedure, the stipulation of candidates, and various administrative 
 
277 ‘ein gesellschaftliches Mobilisierungs- und Integrationsmittel‘, Richter, ‘Der Weg zur freien 
Volkskammerwahl‘, p. 329. 
278 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 77 
279 Stasi-Unterlagen-Archiv Erfurt (henceforth BStU), Eft BdL 980 Büro der Leitung; Politisch-operative 
Arbeit; Kommunalwahlen 1989, ‘Information zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Durchführung der 
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rules that had ‘supposedly disenfranchised GDR citizens’ and contributed to 
‘the broken relationship between the state and its people’.283 The MfS Major 
concluded the report by recognising that  
The close assessment of these and other similar cases demonstrates that the 
failure of state and local organisations to keep their promises has led to the in 
part justified annoyance of the citizens and damaged the trust between state 
and people.284 
A few days after the 1989 communal elections in the GDR, the news 
reached the public that the citizens’ groups in Erfurt had recorded more no-
votes in a handful of polling centres than the official total published by the state 
for the whole town of Erfurt.285 Although few GDR citizens were surprised to 
hear that the result had been manipulated, the confirmation nevertheless 
undermined the legitimacy of the government. Citizens from other towns and 
districts began posting petitions questioning the election results.286 By 
statistically proving the election fraud, the citizens‘ groups had dealt a blow to 
the state so strong as to erode any remaining trust amongst the people and 
effectively triggering the revolution.  
One of the central demands at the autumn demonstrations in the district 
of Erfurt in 1989 was for free and fair elections. The failure of the government to 
respond to the wishes of the electorate had led some citizens to leave the 
country and others to take to the streets to voice their discontent, deepening 
 
283 ‘die scheinbare Entmündigung des DDR-Bürgers‘, ‘das gestörte Verhältnis zwischen Bevölkerung und 
Partei/Regierung‘, ibid. 
284 ‘Bei konkreter Bewertung dieser und anderer vorliegender Sachverhalte wird deutlich, daß bisher nicht 
realisierte Versprechungen staatlicher und örtlicher Organe zur teilweise berechtigten Verärgerung von 
Bürgern beitrugen und somit das Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen Bürger und Staatsorgan gestört wurde‘ 
(my emphasis), ibid. 
285 Schließt Euch an, p. 82. 
286 See, for example, ‘Eingabe von Friedrich Schulz an den Kreistag Rügen‘ in Katharina Kempken (Ed.), 
“Einspruch gegen die Gültigkeit der Wahl“ Die Kommunalwahlen in der DDR im Jahr 1989 (Berlin: Metropol, 
2015), p. 50. 
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existing divisions. But how would state and citizens in East Germany go about 
re-establishing trust in their structures and in one another? And what would 
the new form of voting in free and open elections mean for the power of voice 
in Eastern Germany? For the first time, citizens would have the opportunity to 
truly choose between candidates and therefore regain trust in the democratic 
system and their representation, but the act of voting would no longer have the 
primary function of expressing loyalty, and in return, the individual votes 
could potentially hold less political weight.  
Would the introduction of democratic elections suffice to give citizens 
the feeling of empowerment and to help them to develop a new level of trust in 
the system? Daniele Allen demonstrates that democracies function through 
trust and sacrifice, with some voters always bringing sacrifices for the 
majority.287 Minority voters need to have enough trust in their fellow citizens 
and in the governing structures to accept outcomes and deal with political 
loss.288 The ‘central feature of democratic politics’ is therefore ‘its commitment 
to preserving the allegiance of citizens, including electoral minorities, despite 
majority rule’.289 Subsequently, East Germany faced the task of reconciling 
members of the public so that they may accept the democratic decisions of the 
majority. How would these divisions play out in the heat of the upcoming 
election campaign? 
 
287 Danielle S. Allen, Talking to Strangers. Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. xvi, p. 47. 
288 Allen, Talking to Strangers’, p. 47. 
289 Ibid., p. xix. 
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Historical studies of the final election in the GDR have so far been 
written from a national perspective, focussing on the political campaigns of the 
individual parties, or often placing the first free election at the end of the story 
of the autumn revolution.290 Others present the organisation of the 
parliamentary election as one of the greatest tasks and achievements of the 
national round table of the GDR.291 In his detailed book on the central role of 
election law in the East German democratisation process, Hans Michael Kloth 
characterises the run-up to the parliamentary election as a ‘fight’ for ‘equal 
opportunity’, ‘publicity’, ‘material equipment’, ‘access to the GDR media’ and 
‘transparency’.292 But how were these issues fought out in the everyday, in East 
German communities, and how did citizens find workable solutions in the 
space of just a few weeks?  
 Although the political effects of moving the parliamentary election 
forward have been addressed,293 the question of how this feat was organised 
logistically at a local level has received no attention. And not only that; the year 
1990 would see East Germans face another three elections in the space of nine 
months, as a new communal, state and federal government needed to be 
appointed by the end of the year. Would the election marathon bring citizens 
 
290 See, for example, Markus Trömmer, Der verhaltene Gang in die deutsche Einheit. Das Verhältnis zwischen 
den Oppositionsgruppen und der (SED-)PDS im letzten Jahr der DDR (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002); 
Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Endspiel. Die Revolution von 1989 in der DDR (München: Beck, 2009); Rainer Eckert, 
Revolution in Potsdam. Eine Stadt zwischen Lethargie, Revolte und Freiheit (1989/1990) (Leipzig: Evangelische 
Verlagsgesellschaft GmbH, 2017). 
291 See Uwe Thaysen, Der Runde Tisch. Oder: Wo blieb das Volk? Der Weg der DDR in die Demokratie (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), Thoralf Barth, Die Zentrale des Umbruchs von 1989/90. Meinungen über den 
Runden Tisch der DDR (Berlin: Weißensee, 2009), Francesca Weil, Die Runden Tische in der DDR 1989/90 
(Erfurt: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Thüringen, 2014). 
292 ‘Der Kampf um Chancengleichheit (…), Öffentlichkeit (…), eine materielle „Erstausstattung“ (…), 
Zugang zu den DDR-Medien (…), Offenlegung‘. 
Kloth, Vom „Zettelfalten“ zum freien Wählen, p. 14. 
293 See Richter, ‘Der Weg zur freien Volkskammerwahl‘, p. 336. 
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together, restore trust in the system and one another, and help to form a new 
kind of loyalty to the state? This chapter looks at these events to examine how 
communal actors organised the elections whilst also managing social divisions, 
renegotiating citizenship and finding ways of dealing with political loss.  
 
Establishing Trust in Elections 
The same procedure as every year? 
The divisions of the autumn and the scandal around the Ministry for State 
Security had by no means created ideal circumstances for placing trust in fellow 
citizens. Against the backdrop of the elections in May 1989, new actors were 
needed to restore trust in the structures and procedures. One of the main aims 
of the local government was therefore to find ‘unbiased’ people, with no 
previous history of collaboration with the state, to run the new elections.294 
However, ‘new democracies do not start with new citizens: they take what they 
get’.295 How would local representatives try to create trust without being able to 
replace the entire administration? 
In Eisenach, it sufficed to simply put in place two new members of staff 
to oversee the district election office.  ‘As far as I can remember, hardly 
anything changed’, said one of the new election leaders, a mechanical designer 
who had taken part in the local citizens’ committee and the round table, looking 
back.  
 
294 ‘unbelastet‘, Interview with Ulrike Quentel, Eisenach, 17 January 2018. 
295 Anne Sa’adah, Germany’s Second Chance. Trust, Justice, and Democratization (London: Harvard University 
Press, 1998), p. 1. 
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It was the same old procedure, mayors, and route plans, (…) the same old 
machinery, the old technology. Just with the addition of a neutral person. It 
mirrors what I experienced in the district council, too. The whole organisation, 
structurally, continued as before. Except that we were put in place to ensure, to 
monitor, that everyone played by the proper rules, with no cheating.296  
 
The new leader in Eisenach was put in charge of the Elections Team, a 
group made up of various council workers that came together at the same time 
every year to organise the election and had done so over many years.297 It was 
their responsibility to plan the logistics, timetables and routes for the day, as 
well as arranging the printing and distribution of the ballot cards. Their 
experience and insights were invaluable for the new election leaders, who had 
received training at the central election office in Erfurt, but who had no 
previous experience in the organisation of elections and needed to learn on 
their feet. The new team leader in Eisenach recalls needing to get to terms with 
the terminology and procedures, such as what a voting register was, and how it 
worked.298 Fortunately, the former head of the local election team had patiently 
explained the procedures and communication networks. ‘If they had closed 
their desks and left …’ he says, looking back.299  Although the ending is left 
open, suggesting that the task would have been impossible, it is clear that the 
successful organisation of the elections depended heavily on the support and 
cooperation of the former election team.  
 
296 ‘Also nach meiner Erinnerung hat sich eigentlich fast nichts geändert, der ALTE Ablauf, die 
Bürgermeister, die Routenpläne, NUR dass eine Vertrauensperson mitkam. Also die alte Maschinerie, die 
alte Technologie blieb bestehen. Nur überall kam eine neutrale Person. Das spiegelte das wider, so wie ich 
mich auch in dem Rat des Kreises erlebt habe. Der ganze Apparat lief von der Struktur her so weiter. Nur 
wir waren eingesetzt, dafür zu sorgen, zu überwachen, dass es mit den ordentlichen, betrugsfreien 
Spielregeln läuft‘, Interview with Johannes Wallbrecht, Berlin, 09 February 2018. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid. 
299 ‘Wenn die ihre Schreibtische zugemacht hätten und gegangen wären‘, ibid. 
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Nevertheless, coming in to manage the old election team after the public 
response to the last election and the events of the autumn also posed some 
significant challenges. Even though their work had essentially been disgraced 
through the exposure of the electoral fraud in May 1989, the former election 
team was expected to continue working in the same role, but to new guidelines. 
Their years of experience were highly valuable, and yet the new management 
demonstrated that there was no full confidence in the administration’s ability to 
conduct a democratic election. The workers were therefore going to be 
scrutinised in their work and procedure throughout the event. ‘And the two of 
us (…) and the other youngsters overseeing the elections, we were the 
executors’, said the new election organiser, figuratively speaking.300  
The metaphor shows how negatively the presence of the new leaders 
could be perceived and how difficult the social relations were at this time. 
Power relations had shifted over the autumn, with the new actors now giving 
orders to the former elite. Not everyone was therefore willing to welcome or 
greet the new team leaders, as their arrival clearly signalised that things would 
no longer continue as before. Although the common aim was to democratise the 
elections, for some members of staff the changes nonetheless also meant an 
abrupt end to their careers, and in some respects their life stories. It also had the 
irony of both valuing the contribution and expertise of the former 
administration whilst at the same time devaluing their work.  
 
300 ‘Und wir beide (…) und die Jungspunde, die da noch so mit bei der Wahl rumsaßen, wir waren die 
Vollstrecker’, ibid. 
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Fortunately, the new heads of the district election office had the full 
support of the head of the district council, a longstanding figure of authority in 
the region who had experience of managing people and helped to mediate 
between old and new actors.301 All the same, managing the old team required a 
lot of tact and understanding. ‘After all, we were dealing with people, with 
their biographies’, said the new election leader, emphasising the need to 
consider the human level.302 In order to enable peaceful cooperation, there were 
a few unwritten rules. He explained that ‘we (…) never spoke backwards’, 
meaning that the focus was on the present, and the election of 1989 was not to 
be discussed.303 Utmost importance was therefore placed on completing the 
task that had been set. Nevertheless, the tense situation and the short window 
of time would mean that the new organisers would face additional 
interpersonal challenges as they also depended on other actors.  
For example, one of the main tasks assigned to the leader of the election 
team was to inform the public of the new voting procedure. Information events 
were organised in local inns and advice was printed in the local press.304 This 
included instructions on how to ensure you were registered to vote, how to 
mark your polling card and what the new layout of a polling centre would look 
like.305 Citizens were advised that there would be on average seven helpers 
present in each polling station, representing different political and communal 
groups. ‘This (…) is a precaution, so that no one will protest by saying the 
 
301 Ibid. 
302 ‘das waren doch Menschen, das waren ihre Biografien’, ibid. 
303 ‘Wir haben, ich jedenfalls, nie rückwärts gesprochen‘, ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Private Collection Johannes Wallbrecht (henceforth PCJW), ‘Organisationstalent ist gefragt vor den 
ersten freien Wahlen‘, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, n.d. est. March 1990.  
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election has not followed legal procedure’, the district election office leader in 
Eisenach told the press.306 In Erfurt, members of the local district round table 
also planned to strategically place ‘trustworthy persons’ in the polling stations, 
an offer which was gladly accepted by the election organisers.307  
Detailed advance information around these plans was intended to create 
transparency around the procedures and foster understanding and acceptance 
of the new regulations. In the regional capital, however, cooperation with the 
local press was not successful, with the election leaders warning at the 
beginning of March that the possibilities for informing the general public about 
election procedure via the press was not being used to its full potential.308  On 
the twelfth of March, just six days before the election, the district election leader 
called the press coverage ‘sparse’ and urged the members of the election 
committee to approach local journalists directly.309 With the press unwilling to 
act as a mouthpiece for state organisations, the election organisers would have 
to find other ways of reaching the public. 
For the desire to promote trust and transparency was not the only reason 
to ensure that citizens were well informed on election procedure. This time, 
 
306 ‘Mit dieser Mischung wollen wir von vornherein verhindern, daß Proteste kommen, die Wahl sei nicht 
legal durchgeführt worden‘, ibid. 
307 ‘Vertrauenspersonen’, Landesarchiv Thüringen – Hauptstaatsarchiv Weimar (henceforth LATh – HStA 
Weimar), 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises 4 - 
Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), 'Protokoll über die Sitzung der Wahlkommission am 
12.3.1990‘, Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 14 March 1990. 
308 LATh – HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 – Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), 'Protokoll über die Beratung mit den 
Stützpunktbeauftragten des Wahlbüros am 1.3.1990‘, Wahlbüro der Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises 
Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 14 March 1990.  
309 ‘spärlich‘, LATh – HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; 
Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises 4 – Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), 'Protokoll über 
die Sitzung der Wahlkommission am 12.3.1990‘, Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 
14 March 1990. 
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citizens would no longer be visited at work or at home and reminded to vote. 
Instead, they would need to take own initiative to ensure that they were 
registered to take part. Polling cards were sent out by post, but those citizens 
that did not receive a card were supposed to visit the town hall to check if they 
were listed on the register. This time, it would only be possible for GDR citizens 
to vote once each, and election organisers were to adhere strictly to the voting 
register to ensure votes were not duplicated. Many citizens had moved away, 
however, with some going to West Germany, and others leaving and then 
returning. Towards the end of February, the mayor of Erfurt reported that they 
were dealing with around five hundred changes to the voting register every 
single week.310 Establishing a record of voters under these circumstances was 
therefore an especially difficult task. 
During the election committee meeting in Erfurt, concerns were raised 
that GDR citizens that had moved away but had failed to give official notice of 
departure were still being issued with polling cards.311 The election committee 
accepted that those citizens living in West Germany, but whose main address 
was still in the GDR, were therefore likely to take part in the vote.312 A few 
weeks later, the news emerged that citizens that had moved away were 
planning coach trips to the GDR border region to be able to make use of their 
 
310 StA Erfurt, 1-5/1000 Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt 1945-1990, 'Protokoll der 1. 
Sitzung der örtlichen Volksvertretung vom 21.02.1990 der Stadt Erfurt, Anlage. Bericht des Rates zur Lage 
in der Stadt Erfurt‘, Erfurt, 21 February 1990. 
311 LATh – HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Protokoll über die Sitzung der 
Wahlkommission am 8.3.1990‘, Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 09 March 1990. 
312 Ibid. 
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right to vote.313 Others, that had already booked holidays abroad in March, 
called the elections offices to complain ‘in a multitude of ways’ that they would 
be unable to cast their vote due to the timing of their holiday.314 The leader of 
the district election team in Eisenach recalls one citizen in particular that was 
outraged at not being able to vote on the day of the election. ‘She wasn’t on the 
register’, he recalls.315 ‘She had simply missed the date, or not read it properly. 
But it just wasn’t possible [for her to vote]. It wasn’t possible’.316 With society in 
upheaval, it was increasingly difficult for election organisers to create a stable 
record of eligible voters, whilst also fostering understanding for the new 
regulations, trust in the election procedure and, at the same, navigating social 
divisions. 
 Other issues began piling up.  First, the venues, which had previously 
hosted the GDR elections, were no longer willing to provide their spaces for the 
upcoming elections. ‘We are currently having some difficulties with restaurants 
and youth clubs’, announced the mayor of Erfurt in late February, ‘which are, 
and we have to say this very clearly, firmly opposing the establishment of 
polling stations on their premises’.317 Finding other suitable venues at short 
notice and informing the local voters of its whereabouts would be tricky. 
 
313 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Fernschreiben von der 
Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Wahl 4 – Bezirk Erfurt an das Wahlbüro der DDR Berlin‘, Erfurt, 09 
March 1990. 
314 ‘auf unterschiedlichste Art‘, ibid. 
315 ‘Sie stand nicht im Wählerverzeichnis.‘ Interview with Johannes Wallbrecht, Berlin, 09 February 2018. 
316 ‘Sie hatte ja einfach das irgendwie verpasst oder nicht gelesen. Aber es ging eben nicht. Es ging eben 
nicht.’ Ibid. 
317 ‘Zur Zeit gibt es einige Schwierigkeiten mit Gaststätten und Jugendklubs, wir müssen das so deutlich 
sagen, die sich gegen die Einrichtung von Wahllokalen in ihren Einrichtungen sperren‘, StA Erfurt, 1-
5/1000 Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt 1945-1990, ‘Protokoll der 1. Sitzung der örtlichen 
Volksvertretung vom 21.02.1990 der Stadt Erfurt, Anlage. Bericht des Rates zur Lage in der Stadt Erfurt‘, 
Erfurt, 21 February 1990. 
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Undeterred, the council remained determined that they would manage to 
convince the establishments in time to let them hold the elections there.318 As 
the spaces were technically available, this task mainly required interpersonal 
skills to appease the venue management. 
 However, other challenges involved material shortages, that nevertheless 
relied on social connections and brought communal power structures to light. 
For whereas the towns in the GDR were not short of ballot boxes, voting booths 
were in desperately short supply.319 According to the Erfurt district council, 
there was only one voting booth available per polling station, which presented 
a problem, especially in the larger towns, now that citizens were to cast their 
vote in secret.320 Erfurt and other neighbouring towns began commissioning 
new voting booths to be built, which were to cost around five hundred GDR 
mark each.321 In Erfurt alone, one-hundred-and-eighty new booths would be 
needed for the upcoming elections, a financial cost that the local councils were, 
however, unwilling to cover.322 A few days later, it emerged that there was an 
additional shortage of material from which to build new voting booths.323 
Luckily, the material shortage was solved, and the local council eventually 




320 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Fernschrieben an das Ministerium für 
innere Angelegenheiten der DDR, Zentrales Wahlbüro, Berlin‘, Erfurt, 20 February 1990. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid. 
323 StA Erfurt, 1-5/1000 Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt 1945-1990, ‘Protokoll der 1. 
Sitzung der örtlichen Volksvertretung vom 21.02.1990 der Stadt Erfurt, Anlage. Bericht des Rates zur Lage 
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 Nevertheless, two weeks later, on the sixth of March, the shortage of 
voting booths was back on the agenda at the election team meeting.325 With 
twelve days to go until the election, election organisers discussed an offer from 
the Christian Democratic Union in Thüringen to support the material 
realisation of the elections with the possibility of supplying some of the needed 
voting booths.326 The ensuing discussion brought to light that many councils 
had already struck deals with colleagues in West Germany to borrow voting 
booths from their partner towns.327 Two days later the team met again, and one 
member of staff alerted others to the fact that it was acceptable for empty rooms 
to be used as voting booths.328 
But the successful organisation of the elections relied on more than just 
venues and voting booths. For, by the time of the election, each ward would 
need to have found enough volunteers to help man the polling stations and to 
form election committees.  On the twenty-first of February, the dean of the local 
protestant church wrote to his clergy to ready them for the challenge. ‘As we 
are all aware’, he wrote, ‘we are short of preparation time, and the organisation 
of the election committees will be especially difficult now that the National 
Front has gone’.329  Consequently, the local mayors had been asked to organise 
 
325 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Protokoll über die Sitzung der 
Wahlkommission am 6.3.1990‘, Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 07 March 1990.  
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid. 
328 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Protokoll über die Sitzung der 
Wahlkommission am 8.3.1990‘, Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 09 March 1990,  
329 ‘Es war uns allen klar, daß die Zeit der Vorbereitung viel zu kurz ist und damit die Organisation der 
Wahlausschüsse nach Wegfall der Nationalen Front sehr problematisch ist‘, Private Collection Christhard 
Wagner (henceforth PCCW), ‘Brief vom Superintendenten an alle Pastorinnen und Pfarrer der 
Superintendentur Eisenach‘, Eisenach, 21 February 1990. 
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the election committees, and the church ministers were instructed to contact 
their local mayors to hurry things along.330  
The mayors, however, were not willing to oblige. On the twenty-sixth of 
February, the election organisers in Eisenach wrote to the district election 
committee in Erfurt to explain that the local mayors had declined to take on the 
responsibility of organising the local election committees.331 At a meeting on the 
twenty-third of February, they had argued that electoral law stipulated that the 
organisation of the election committees was not within their remit, but rather 
fell to the election commission.332 Indeed, the new election law, passed on the 
twentieth of February 1990, stated only that the ‘the election board in the local 
constituency’ was tasked with establishing the committees.333 Consequently, the 
round table issued an urgent call for support in the daily press, summoning all 
citizens, political parties and organisations to come forward to help. 334 
Similar reports arrived in the central district office from the local election 
teams in Erfurt and Gotha, with almost half of the wards reporting problems in 
finding staff for the election committees, or no local initiative at all.335 On the 
 
330 Ibid. 
331 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Fernschreiben vom Rat des Kreises 
Eisenach Wahlstützpunkt an den Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt - Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt 
zum Thema Stand der Vorbereitung der Wahl im Kreis ‘, Eisenach, 26 February 1990. 
332 Ibid. 
333 ‘Die Wahlkommissionen der Wahlkreise bilden (…) die Wahlvorstände der Stimmbezirke‘, Ordnung 
zur Durchführung der Wahl zur Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Wahlordnung), 
20 February 1990 <https://deutsche-einheit-1990.de/wp-content/uploads/Gbl_DDR1990_I_9.pdf> 
(accessed 14 February 2020). 
334 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Fernschreiben vom Rat des Kreises 
Eisenach Wahlstützpunkt an denRat des Bezirkes Erfurt - Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt 
zum Thema Stand der Vorbereitung der Wahl im Kreis ‘, Eisenach, 26 February 1990. 
335 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Fernschreiben vom Rat des Kreises 
Gotha, Stützpunkt Gotha des Wahlkreises 4, an den Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, Sekretär der Wahlkommission 
des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt‘, n.d., early March 1990. 
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twenty-seventh of February, the electoral commission in Erfurt wrote to the 
head office in Berlin to explain that the lack of support from local mayors was a 
widespread problem, with many having withdrawn their support:  
It is no longer a given, that the mayors will be willing and prepared to help 
organise and run the elections, and to take responsibility for this, as their future 
employment and career prospects are completely uncertain, and they see little 
hope for the future.336 
 
As many of the smaller communities also had no political parties or 
organisations to fall back onto to take charge of organising the committees, 
there was no one to take responsibility for forming the committees in these 
communities.337  
On the ninth of March, one day after the official deadline, the election 
leader in Eisenach reported that enough individuals had been found for the 
election committees, although the committees themselves were not formally 
established.338 A last-minute telephone campaign had succeeded in recruiting 
enough helpers for the committees and polling stations.339 Their training was to 
take place just in time, from the twelfth to the fifteenth of March.340  On the 
thirteenth of March, just a few days before the election, the central office in 
 
336 ‘Die Bereitschaft vieler Bürgermeister, sich für die Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Wahl 
verantwortlich zu fühlen, ist nicht mehr gegeben, da sie für sich keine Perspektive sehen, ihre künftige 
Arbeit bzw. berufliche Entwicklung völlig ungeklärt ist‘, LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag 
und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. 
März 1990), ‘Fernschreiben Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt, an das Ministerium für innere Angelegenheiten, 
Wahlbüro der DDR Berlin‘, Erfurt, 27 February 1990. 
337 Ibid. 
338 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Fernschreiben vom Rat des Kreises 
Eisenach Wahlstützpunkt an die Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt‘, Eisenach, 09 March 
1990. 
339 Interview with Johannes Wallbrecht, Berlin, 09 February 2018. 
340 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Fernschreiben vom Rat des Kreises 
Eisenach Wahlstützpunkt an die Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt‘, Eisenach, 09 March 
1990. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 115 
Erfurt sent out a telegraph to the local election teams, advising them that for 
any committees that were still incomplete on election day, it would be possible 
to recruit members from the queue of first voters to arrive in the morning.341 
They added, however, ‘under no circumstances should citizens be placed under 
any obligation to take part in the election committees before the day of the 
election’, as this would not be not legal.342 
The task of organising the first free parliamentary elections in the GDR 
was therefore a delicate tight-rope walk between introducing new actors and 
democratic control of the procedure, and still relying on the expertise and 
manpower of the former actors and election organisers. Fortunately, numerous 
state actors agreed to provide advice and knowledge of structures to the new 
district leaders. But by withdrawing their support in, for example, finding 
helpers and members of the election committees, publishing information in the 
press, offering up premises in which to hold the election, or providing financial 
backing of the election preparations, some former actors made their presence 
felt and highlighted the dependence of the new actors on their good will and 
cooperation in order for the upcoming elections to take place.  
The actions of the former actors can be understood as a protest against 
the changes being introduced, but in many cases also as a response to the 
perceived devaluation of their role in society and their former contribution. It 
demonstrates an emotional rift between old and new actors, that takes place on 
 
341 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Probleme und Aufgaben in 
Auswertung der Beratung beim zentralen Wahlbüro‘, 13 March 1990. 
342 ‘Auf keinen Fall ist es rechtlich möglich, bereits vor dem Wahltag Bürger für eine Tätigkeit als Mitglied 
des Wahlvorstandes zu verpflichten‘, ibid. 
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a personal level, but with the potential to block the democratisation process. 
Although the former government and state had been discredited and new 
leaders had been put in place, the new order would only take effect if it was 
indeed accepted by the majority. As such, the former actors had made their 
voices and their experience heard, not by speaking out, but by withdrawing 
their support. In order to gain their cooperation, it would mean respecting their 
biographies and focussing on the task ahead as opposed to discussing the 
mistakes of the past. During our interview, the district election organiser told 
me that ‘democracy thrives on participation, not exclusion’.343 The successful 
organisation of the parliamentary elections in 1990 and the democratisation of 
the election procedure would therefore require not only new actors or 
democratic control, but emotional reconciliations and the coming together of all 
citizens around a common goal.    
 
The Western Voices 
 ‘Helmut! Helmut! Helmut!’, cried the masses on the cathedral square in Erfurt 
in late February.344 More than 130 000 citizens had made their way down to the 
square to greet the West German chancellor as part of the election campaign 
event for the Alliance for Germany.345 The electoral alliance was represented 
that day by Wolfgang Schnur, lawyer and founder of the Democratic 
Awakening, Hans Wilhelm Ebeling, vicar and founder of the DSU, Lothar de 
 
343 ‘Demokratie lebt vom Mitmachen und nicht vom Ausgrenzen oder sich Ausgrenzen’, Interview with 
Johannes Wallbrecht, Berlin, 09 February 2018. 
344 StA Erfurt, 6-7, 'Die Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger. CD 
Reihe 1-22‘. 
345 Ibid. 
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Maizière, lawyer and chairman of the East German CDU, and Martin Kirchner, 
secretary-general of the East German CDU.346 The flyer advertising the event 
had listed those members as an aside, however, with the star speaker being the 
Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Kohl.347 Citizens even climbed on rooves 
and lined the windows around the square to get a better view of the stage.348 
 The event was a signature moment in the political campaign for the 
parliamentary elections in 1990, awakening images of the protests on the 
cathedral square but far outweighing the numbers that had come to the autumn 
demonstrations. As in March 1970, the presence of the West German chancellor 
in Erfurt attracted large crowds who expressed their support in their numbers 
and by shouting out his name. How would the relationship between East and 
West Germans influence the elections and renewed attempts at establishing 
trust within the political campaign?  
As they waited for Kohl, Schnur, who would later be announced to have 
been a Stasi informant alongside Lothar de Maizière and Martin Kirchner, 
greeted the crowds, including ‘the whistlers, who have not yet learnt what a 
democracy is’.349 Not everyone in the audience had come to support the 
Alliance, with oppositional groups reportedly jeering and throwing eggs in the 
direction of the stage.350 Time and again the speaker would refer to the 
 
346 Ibid. 
347 StA Erfurt, 5/5 Parteien, ‘Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl kommt!‘. 
348 StA Erfurt, 5/5 Parteien, ‘Einheit Bald. Allianz für Deutschland. Zeitung der Allianz für Deutschland 
zur Volkskammerwahl am 18. März 1990‘. 
349 ‘auch die Pfeiffenden, die noch nicht gelernt haben, was Demokratie ist!‘, StA Erfurt, 6-7, ‘Die Wende in 
Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger. CD Reihe 1-22‘. 
350 ‘Es geschah…in Erfurt – Helmut Kohl und die Allianz für Deutschland starten in den Wahlkampf 1990‘, 
Deutschlandradio Kultur, Länderreport, 19 February 2010 <https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/es-
geschah-in-erfurt-pdf.media.e18b948e2561b018dd91e619968ed6a7.pdf> (accessed 04 February 2019). 
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whistling audience members in his speech, stylising them as examples of 
undemocratic behaviour.  
Yes, we will make space for the whistlers too, so that they may learn that we 
can deal with victories and defeats, [for] we are democrats and we will stay 
democrats!351  
  
Whistling in opposition was publicly denounced as an undemocratic act, whilst 
cheering the West German chancellor was praised as exemplary behaviour. 
'You are proof‘, Schnur told his supporters, 'that you are practising democracy, 
by cheering someone who deserves our utmost sympathy in a friendly 
manner‘.352  
 The whistlers themselves are hardly to be heard on the tape recording, 
however, save for being referenced in the speaker’s comments. Instead, large 
groups of audience members can be heard chanting 'Get the reds out!‘ to drown 
out the opposition.353 Every few minutes the speakers were interrupted as the 
audience started up a new chant to silence their opponents within the crowd. 
'Dear Erfurters‘, Schnur said in response to the chants,  
[the reds] are not really here anymore. The colours of the flag are what is 
important. The black-red-and-gold flag is going to be our flag for the whole of 
Germany!354 
 
And indeed, a sea of federal flags was already awaiting the West German 
Chancellor as he took to the microphone to hold his speech on the need for a 
 
351 ‘Ja, auch die Pfeiffenden werden bei uns einen Platz haben, damit sie dann lernen, dass wir mit Sieg 
und Niederlage umgehen können, wir sind Demokraten und bleiben Demokraten!‘, StA Erfurt, 6-7, 'Die 
Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger. CD Reihe 1-22‘. 
352 ‘Sie sind der Beweis dafür, dass Sie Demokratie üben, in dem Sie freundlich und jubeln einem 
Menschen, der eine hohe Sympathie verdient (…)‘, ibid. 
353 ‘Rote raus!‘ Ibid. 
354 ‘Liebe Erfurter, die sind doch schon gar nicht mehr da. Ihre Farben in den Fahnen wird das 
Entscheidende sein. Die Schwarz-Rot-Goldene Fahne wird unsere Fahne für ganz Deutschland sein‘, ibid. 
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unified Germany.355 The crowd broke out a new chant, with the fourth line of 
the GDR national anthem, ‘Germany, united, fatherland’, being shouted out 
across the square to highlight the citizens’ enduring desire for a united nation, 
and its embeddedness in East German collective identity.356 ‘We want one 
Germany and we are one Germany!’, said Kohl, as the chanting got louder.357 
Willy Brandt, Kohl announced during his speech, had proclaimed just 
one year earlier, that the unification of East and West Germany was ‘a grand 
delusion’.358 The unification question was now no longer just a political issue, 
but also a leading campaign pledge, claimed and promoted by the Alliance for 
Germany. Their campaign materials for the parliamentary elections urged 
voters to ‘think of our native land’ and ‘stand up for a unified, free and better 
fatherland’, emphasising national pride with the specially formatted statement  
‘G e r m a n y  i s  b e a u t i f u l’.359 Central to this was also the reestablishment 
of the German Länder, which Kohl highlighted by referring time and again to 
‘this Land Thuringia’ and the ‘dear citizens of the Thuringian Land’.360  
‘Thuringia – the green heart of Germany’, the Allianz für Deutschland 
campaign materials read, placing the once marginal region back in the centre of 
the map. 361  
 
355 ‘Es geschah…in Erfurt‘, Deutschlandradio Kultur. 
356 ‘Deutschland, einig, Vaterland‘, StA Erfurt, 6-7, 'Die Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine 
Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger. CD Reihe 1-22‘. 
357 ‘Wir wollen ein Deutschland und wir sind ein Deutschland‘, ibid. 
358 ‘die Lebenslüge‘, ibid. 
359 ‘denken Sie an unsere Heimat‘, ‘laßt uns für ein einiges, freies und besseres Vaterland eintreten‘,  
‘D e u t s c h l a n d  i s t  w u n d e r s c h ö n‘, StA Erfurt, 5/5, ‘Liebe Bürgerinnen! Liebe Bürger!‘, CDU 
Erfurt, Broschüre zur Volkskammerwahl am 18.3.1990. 
360 ‘dieses Land Thüringen‘, ‘liebe Mitbürgerinnen aus dem Thüringer Land‘, ‘Es geschah…in Erfurt‘, 
Deutschlandradio Kultur. 
361 ‘Thüringen – das grüne Herz Deutschlands‘, StA Erfurt, 5/5 Parteien, ‘Einheit Bald. Allianz für 
Deutschland. Zeitung der Allianz für Deutschland zur Volkskammerwahl am 18. März 1990‘. 
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Its name stands for many things of great importance in German history through 
to the present day. Thuringia, it stands for the places Wartburg and Weimar, for 
the poets Goethe and Schiller and the philosophers Fichte and Hegel. The 
people of Thuringia want to build on this former greatness and importance.362 
 
By using the concept of Thuringia, Kohl not only spoke to supporters of a 
unified Germany, but also circumvented the use of GDR terms and structures. 
This was integral to the political campaign, which firmly rejected the 
continuation of the GDR. By using smaller, regional references, the alliance 
chose not to recognise the GDR as an autonomous state or country and thereby 
also accorded themselves the right to disregard GDR regulations and 
procedures. Furthermore, by selecting positive associations of Thuringian 
history from the nineteenth century, the campaign appropriated history to its 
advantage, using symbols of greatness, power and national identity without 
differentiating between its many associations.  In his speech, Kohl highlighted 
the long history of ‘this old town of Erfurt’, ‘where Napoleon and Goethe 
met’.363 ‘I could give many examples of historical events’, he continued, ‘[but] 
here I don’t need to explain that we Germans are one nation’.364  
Every mention of German unity and the Thuringian Land got loud 
cheers, applause, shouts of approval and chants of ‘Helmut! Helmut! Helmut!’ 
from the crowd in Erfurt.365 The local press played on the monarchical status of 
 
362 ‘Sein Name steht für vieles, was in der deutschen Geschichte bis in die Gegenwart hinein hohe 
Bedeutung hat. Thüringen, das steht für die Orte Wartburg und Weimar, für die Dichter Goethe und 
Schiller und für die Philosophen Fichte und Hegel. An diese einstige Größe und Bedeutung wollen die 
Menschen in Thüringen wieder anknüpfen‘, ibid. 
363 ‘diese alte Stadt Erfurt‘, 'wo die Begegnung Napoleons mit Goethe statt fand‘, ‘Es geschah…in Erfurt‘, 
Deutschlandradio Kultur. 
364 ‘ich könnte viele Beispiele historischer Begebenheiten erzählen, hier muss man nicht begründen, dass 
wir Deutsche ein Volk sind‘, ibid. 
365 StA Erfurt, 6-7, 'Die Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger. CD 
Reihe 1-22‘. 
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the West German chancellor and the patriotic mindlessness of the crowds, 
parodying the ‘waving, flag-waving, cheering’ with the old phrase ‘The King is 
dead, long live the King’.366 The journalists from the new paper in Erfurt also 
mocked the willingness of their fellow citizens to worship yet another leader 
figure, ‘the (not yet our) chancellor will take care of it’,367 and to fall again for 
empty promises, ‘How many promises have the people been made over the last 
few years?’.368 The readiness of the masses to look once again to strong leaders 
after just having brought down the Socialist Unity Party led the journalists to 
give their article the headline ‘Woeful Democracy’ and to bemoan that ‘the big 
ideals of our October and November Revolution have been forgotten’.369 
However, the paper also warned that East Germans were being treated 
like ‘cheap, submissive and buyable potential voters for the next federal 
election’370 and that it was ‘worth remembering that the government of this 
country is still based in Berlin, not Bonn’.371 The central round table in the GDR 
had decided that speakers from West Germany were not permitted to campaign 
for the parliamentary elections in East Germany in 1990.372 Nonetheless, it was 
not only the Alliance for Germany that brought over western speakers, but 
indeed all political parties with western connections.  
 
366 ‘Winken, Fahnenschwenken, Hochrufe…’, ‘Der König ist tot, es lebe der König’. StA Erfurt – 5/5 
Parteien, 'Der totale Kohlstand‘, nez. neue erfurter zeitung, 22 February 1990. 
367 ‘der (noch nicht unser) Bundeskanzler wird schon dafür sorgen’, ibid. 
368 ‘Wieviel wurde den Menschen in den vielen Jahren schon versprochen?‘, ibid. 
369 ‘Elend der Demokratie‘, ‘Die großen Ideale unserer Oktober- und Novemberrevolution sind vergessen‘, 
StA Erfurt – 5/5 Parteien, 'Elend der Demokratie‘, nez. neue erfurter zeitung, 22 February 1990. 
370 ‘billiges, willenloses und käufliches Wählerpotential für die nächste Bundestagswahl‘, ibid. 
371 ‘Dabei sollte man sich trotzdem vor Augen halten, daß die Regierung dieses Landes noch in Berlin sitzt, 
nicht in Bonn‘, ibid. 
372 Moritz & Moritz, Ein besonderes Jahr, p. 168. 
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One week after Kohl, on the twenty-eighth of February 1990, the political 
alliance of liberal parties in the GDR; the German Forum Party, the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party of the GDR, invited Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chancellor of 
the Federal Republic, as well as Joseph Grünbeck from the FDP in Bavaria to 
speak on the cathedral square in Erfurt for their political Ash Wednesday 
event.373 The Green Party of the GDR welcomed Joschka Fischer of the West 
German Greens to tour across Thuringia in early March, with stops in Eisenach, 
Gotha, Weimar and Erfurt.374 His aim, he explained, was not to ‘drown out the 
market squares’, as other western politicians had done, but to have ‘an 
exchange of experiences at the local level’.375  
The regional Green Party office in Erfurt confirmed in their monthly 
report in February 1990 that the cooperation with the West German Greens had 
indeed been ‘highly collaborative’, and ‘not hierarchical as with the other 
parties’.376 The regional office in Erfurt had been cooperating closely with the 
Green Party in Hesse, which had provided them with typewriters and printers, 
paper, posters and brochures.377 These were then distributed from there to the 
district offices across the region. The party secretary, who would later be said to 
 
373 StA Erfurt, 6-7, ‘Die Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger. CD 
Reihe 1-22‘. 
374 Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis (henceforth AGG), C Thüringen I – LaVo/LGSt 3 Grüne Partei DDR; 
Kandidaten der Volkskammerwahl 1990, 'Deutschlandpolitische Erklärung der Grünen Partei Thüringen‘. 
375 ‘Ich bin nicht gekommen, um hier dröhnend über die Marktplätze zu ziehen, sondern mir kommt es auf 
Erfahrungsaustausch vor Ort an‘, AGG C Thüringen I – LaVo/LGSt 3 Grüne Partei DDR; Kandidaten der 
Volkskammerwahl 1990, 'Wahlkampf ohne Parolen – Der Grüne Joschka Fischer in Weimar und Erfurt‘, 
Thüringische Landeszeitung, 08 March 1990. 
376 ‘überaus partnerschaftlich‘, ‘im Gegensatz zu den anderen Parteien nicht hierarchisch‘, AGG, C 
Thüringen I – LaVo/LGSt 49 Ablage Post, gesichtet und erledigt durch den Landesvorstand, 
'Tätigkeitsbericht der Bezirksgeschäftsstelle Erfurt der Grünen Partei Thüringen bis Ende Februar 1990‘. 
377 Ibid. 
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have been working for the Ministry for State Security, explained in his report 
that two Green Party colleagues from Wiesbaden and Eschwege would now be 
coming two days a week to support them in organisation, as well as another 
colleague from Lorsch who would work with them throughout February and 
March to improve structures and boost publicity.378 The new election law 
passed that month however clearly stipulated that political parties were ‘not 
permitted to accept donations or further financial support from another state or 
outside of the area in which this law takes effect’.379 The second half of the 
sentence was a clear reference to the fluid concepts of the German state and the 
ambivalent national situation underlining the GDR elections. 
The regional secretary for the Thuringian CDU would later also be 
reported to have worked as a secret informant for the Ministry for State 
Security.380 Similarly, he had also quickly set up contacts in West Germany, 
especially to the CDU branch in Eisenach’s partner town of Marburg, but also in 
Wiesbaden.381 From these two towns, the Thuringian CDU received supplies of 
technology and literature to support their political activities.382 By the tenth of 
 
378 Ibid. 
379 ‘Eine Partei darf keine Schenkungen oder anderweitige wirtschaftliche Unterstützung von einem 
anderen Staat oder von außerhalb des Geltungsbereiches dieses Gesetzes annehmen‘, Gesetz über Parteien 
und andere politische Vereinigungen - Parteiengesetz, 21 February 1990 <https://deutsche-einheit-
1990.de/wp-content/uploads/Gbl_DDR1990_I_9.pdf> (accessed 14 February 2020). 
380 ACDP, 05-016-356 Landtagsfraktion Thüringen – Diverse Sachthemen, Stasi 1990-1996, ‘CDU 
Thüringen fürchtet Enthüllungen. Landesvorsitzender (…) zieht Konsequenz aus seiner Stasi-
Vergangenheit‘, Die Tagespost, 21 July 1990. 
381 ACDP, 03-051-146 Landesverband Thüringen  Generalsekretäre, Korrespondenz (alte Bundesländer) 
1990-1993, ‘Brief von Landesvorsitzender CDU Thüringen an Herrn Rechtsanwalt, Marburg‘, Erfurt, 30 
March 1990; ‘Brief von Landesvorsitzender CDU Thüringen an Herrn Rechtsanwalt, Wiesbaden‘, 19 March 
1990. 
382 ACDP, 03-051-146 Landesverband Thüringen  Generalsekretäre, Korrespondenz (alte Bundesländer) 
1990-1993, ‘Brief von Landesvorsitzender CDU Thüringen an Herrn Rechtsanwalt, Marburg‘, Erfurt, 30 
March 1990; ‘Brief von Landesvorsitzender CDU Thüringen an Herrn Rechtsanwalt, Wiesbaden‘, 19 March 
1990. 
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February 1990, every town in Thuringia had been matched with a CDU partner 
organisation from West Germany to support their local CDU groups.383 
Colleagues from Erfurt’s twin town of Mainz also came to speak at the 
smaller Alliance for Germany campaign events, such as the presentation of 
parliamentary candidates on Erfurt’s Fischmarkt square on the seventeenth of 
February, alongside CDU politicians from Rhineland-Palatinate and Hesse.384 In 
advance of his visit to the Fischmarkt event, the district secretary of the CDU in 
Mainz wrote to his colleagues in Thuringia to inform them of his plans for yet 
another large CDU event on Erfurt’s cathedral square. The East German CDU 
had originally reserved the site for the seventeenth of March to pre-empt the 
planned SPD campaign event two days later, but the date had gained greater 
significance since the parliamentary election had been moved forward to the 
eighteenth of March.385 The politician from Mainz was trying to gain prominent 
West German speakers for this date, which he intended to be a ‘Closing event 
for the Alliance for Germany’.386  
The East German Social Democrats also received notable backing from 
West Germany, although this was kept as quiet as possible. In November 1989, 
letters were sent out from the SPD department for former party secretaries in 
 
383 StA Eisenach, 40.7/95 Sammlung Wende, ‘Kreisgeschäftsstellen CDU Hessen Partnerverband‘, 10 
February 1990. 
384 StA Erfurt, 5/5 Parteien, ‘Wir stellen uns vor. 17.02.1990, 15 Uhr am Fischmarkt‘, CDU Erfurt. 
385 ACDP, 03-051-147 Landesverband Thüringen Generalsekretäre, Korrespondenz (alte Bundesländer) 
1990-1994, ‘Brief von MdL Kreisvorsitzender der CDU Kreisverband Mainz-Stadt, an die Christlich-
Demokratische Union z.H. d Landesvorsitzenden in Erfurt‘, 12 February 1990. 
386 ‘Abschlußveranstaltung der „Allianz für Deutschland“‘, ibid. 
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Bonn to retired SPD politicians across West Germany.387 These began by 
explaining that the Social Democratic Party had been re-established in the GDR 
and intended to stand in the upcoming elections ‘with their own candidates’.388 
As organisational structures still needed to be put in place, the SDP would need 
substantial support for the upcoming elections. However, ‘the SDP does not 
want the Social Democratic Party of Germany publicly to act as election 
helpers’.389 Consequently, this department had been tasked with recruiting 
helpers to go to the GDR for a significant period of time because  
the members of our working group are no longer in full-time employment but 
are rather retired or approaching retirement. This means that the SPD would 
not officially be appearing in public.390 
 
Whether this campaign succeeded remains unclear, as responses from retired 
members suggest that the placement of retired SPD politicians in East Germany, 
which was first to be managed by the association in Berlin, had been passed on 
to the overburdened groups in the East German districts, and that many were 
left waiting.391  Nevertheless, the deliberate intentions of the West German SPD 
to bypass GDR election regulations is evident from this communication. 
 
387 Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (henceforth AdsD), 2/PVBK000744 SDP/SPD-Parteivorstand Referat 
Organisation; Sozialdemokraten helfen Sozialdemokraten. Unterstützung des Unterbezirk Kassel-Land für 
SPD-Eisenach u. Erfurt (1990), ‘Sozialdemokraten helfen Sozialdemokraten. Unterstützung des 
Unterbezirk Kassel-Land für SPD-Eisenach u. Erfurt‘, SPD-Parteivorstand Referat Organisation, 1990. 
388 ‘mit eigenen Kandidaten’, AdsD, 2/PVBK000744 SDP/SPD-Parteivorstand Referat Organisation; 
Sozialdemokraten helfen Sozialdemokraten. Unterstützung des Unterbezirk Kassel-Land für SPD-
Eisenach u. Erfurt (1990), ‘Brief von SPD Parteivorstand Abt I. Arbeitskreis ehemalige Parteisekretäre an 
H.G.‘, Bonn, 29 November 1990. 
389 ‘Die SDP möchte aber nicht, daß die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands offiziell als Wahlhelfer in 
Erscheinung tritt‘, ibid. 
390 ‘Die Mitglieder unseres Arbeitskreises sind nicht mehr hauptamtlich Beschäftigte, sondern Rentner 
resp.  Vorruheständler. Dies bedeutet, daß damit die SPD nicht offiziell in Erscheinung tritt‘, ibid. 
391 AdsD, 2/PVBK000744 SDP/SPD-Parteivorstand Referat Organisation; Sozialdemokraten helfen 
Sozialdemokraten. Unterstützung des Unterbezirk Kassel-Land für SPD-Eisenach u. Erfurt (1990), ’Brief 
von H.G. an SPD Bonn, Betr: „SPD in der DDR vor Ort“‘, 05 April 1990. 
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The SPD planning for the political election campaign trail also took place 
under West German leadership, and in secret, during the night. The head of the 
Social Democratic Party in Eisenach was lying in bed in late December 1989 
when a car pulled up outside the house at around eleven in the evening.392 A 
few weeks before, he had been over to visit the SPD in Eisenach’s partner town 
in Marburg after having just founded the local branch of the party. Convinced 
that the Stasi had come to visit him as a consequence of his trip to West 
Germany, the father of two sent his dog out first as he answered the door. The 
night-time visitor explained that he had been sent by Willy Brandt’s minister of 
the chancellery to make contact with East German SDP/SPD members and 
organise an election campaign tour in the GDR; members of the SPD branch in 
Gotha, where he had just been, had passed on the address of the representative 
in Eisenach. Only on presenting his identification card, did the Eisenach SPD-
man finally believe his visitor from the Federal Republic.393 
The first visit of the former SPD chancellor in 1990 took place in Gotha 
and Eisenach at the end of January, to kick-start the SPD election campaign. 
Accompanied by ‘droves of Hessian comrades’, Willy Brandt spoke before large 
crowds before retiring to the restaurant on the Wartburg castle for a traditional 
meal with the families of local SPD politicians.394 Even the later CDU mayor 
remembers being impressed by Brandt’s speech on the market square in 
Eisenach, arguing that ‘Willy Brandt was highly regarded by almost all GDR 
 
392 Interview with Matthias Doht, Eisenach, 18 December 2017. 
393 Ibid. 
394 ‘Scharen hessischer Genossen‘, StA Eisenach, 40.7/93 Sammlung Wende, ‘Exklusiv Willy Brandt in 
Eisenach und Gotha‘, Die Andere Zeitung, February 1990. 
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citizens’, including himself.395 Assuming that the SPD would win the upcoming 
elections anyway, the CDU member agreed to stand in the elections. ‘Okay’, he 
told his wife, ‘but I won’t be elected anyway, because Willy Brandt was on the 
market square in Eisenach’.396 
A few weeks later, on the third of March, Brandt finally returned to 
Erfurt to appease the crowds that had flocked to see him twenty years earlier as 
he had met with GDR representatives to discuss Ostpolitik.397 Information 
stands lined the cathedral square and entertainment was provided by musicians 
from Hesse.398 If Brandt should have come on the actual anniversary of his 
famous Erfurt visit on the nineteenth of March, then he would have been too 
late for the GDR elections, he joked.399 This time, on the main square, the 
atmosphere was calmer than at his last visit at the train station square, but also 
considerably calmer than at the Alliance for Germany campaign event a few 
weeks before. The audience listened attentively and clapped politely as Brandt 
discussed what had changed since his last visit in 1970. ‘Back then we couldn’t 
change much’, he admitted, ‘but we did not give up’.400 
 
395 ‘Willy Brandt war bei so gut wie allen DDR-Bürgern positiv besetzt‘, Interview with Hans-Peter 
Brodhun, Eisenach, 11 October 2018. 
396 ‘Okay. Aber ich werde sowieso nicht gewählt werden, weil im März war Willy Brandt in Eisenach auf 
dem Marktplatz‘, ibid. 
397 AdsD, 3/THLV000086 SPD-Landesverband Thüringen, Presse-Spiegel DDR; Sozialdemokratische 
Entwicklungskommission Hessen Thüringen (1990), ‘Kundgebung mit Willy Brandt auf dem Erfurter 
Domplatz. „Der Zug zur deutschen Einheit ist auf dem Weg“‘, Thüringer Neueste Nachrichten, 05 March 
1990. 
398 AdsD, 2/PVBK000744 SDP/SPD-Parteivorstand Referat Organisation; Sozialdemokraten helfen 
Sozialdemokraten. Unterstützung des Unterbezirk Kassel-Land für SPD-Eisenach u. Erfurt (1990), 
‘Dokumentation über die Unterstützungsmaßnahmen für Oppositionsgruppen in Eisenach und die SPD in 
Erfurt Stadt und Land‘, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland Unterbezirk Kassel-Land, May 1990. 
399 StA Erfurt, 6-7, ‘Die Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger. CD 
Reihe 1-22‘. 
400 ‘Damals haben wir wenig bewegen können, aber wir haben nicht losgelassen‘, ibid. 
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Would it be enough to counter the critique that he had received from 
Helmut Kohl weeks before, summoning loud boos from the crowds? Kohl had 
warned the citizens of Erfurt not to trust Brandt’s position on German 
reunification, arguing that the turnaround of the Socialist Democratic Party 
meant that they had clearly earned themselves the derogatory nickname 
‘Wendehälse’ (political opportunists).401  Alliance for Germany campaign 
materials argued that voting for the Social Democrats would lead to a left-wing 
block government, and that many former Socialist Unity Party members were 
finding their new home with the East German SDP, making it the ‘rubbish bin 
for the Party of Democratic Socialism’.402  
As well as communicating their own policies, CDU campaign materials 
were produced to expressly discredit the SPD or SDP by equating them with 
the Socialist Unity Party. Although the heading of one such a flyer reads 
‘Arguments for the election on the 18 March’, these consisted chiefly of 
comparisons between the SPD and SED, who were said to have ‘reached joint 
agreements’ and to both be ‘dreaming (…) of democratic socialism’.403 Other 
materials combined the acronyms of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) 
and their predecessor the Socialist Unity Party (SED) with the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany (SPD) to form ‘PDSPDSEDSPDPDS’.404 By lumping the 
political parties together and warning, ‘Never again Socialism!’, Alliance for 
 
401 Ibid. 
402 ‘SPD – Müllkübel der PDS’, StA Erfurt, 5/5 Parteien, ‘Einheit Bald. Allianz für Deutschland. Zeitung 
der Allianz für Deutschland zur Volkskammerwahl am 18. März 1990‘. 
403 ‘Argumente zur Wahl am 18. März’, ‘gemeinsame Vereinbarungen geschlossen‘, ‘träumen gemeinsam 
vom demokratischen Sozialismus‘, StA Eisenach, 40.7/95 Sammlung Wende, ‘Argumente zur Wahl am 18. 
März 1990‘, CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bonn. 
404 StA Erfurt, 5/5 Parteien, ‘Mit dem Teufel marschiert‘, Der Spiegel, 05 March 1990. 
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Germany materials used ideological argumentation to position their campaign 
against the other parties.405  
The Social Democratic Party in East Germany had reformed with the 
name SDP and was therefore technically a new party on the political landscape. 
As such, the West German CDU used comparisons to the West German SPD to 
denounce the new political rivals in the East and explained to GDR citizens 
who this new party was and how they functioned based on the history of the 
West German SPD.406 The campaign materials themselves were not produced in 
East Germany, however, but were designed and printed by the CDU head 
office in Bonn for the Alliance for Germany CDU-DSU-DA.407 A feature in the 
Spiegel magazine in early March uncovered the ‘dirty tricks of the Konrad-
Adenauer-House’, arguing that the many campaign materials equating SPD 
and SED were clearly West-German in origin and identifiable by the premium 
paper quality.408  
The East German Social Democratic Party, on the other hand, highlighted 
the role of the Christian Democratic Union in the GDR in propping up the 
Socialist Unity Party as one of their ‘old block party’ allies during the ‘CDU-
SED era’.409 In retaliation against the allegations from the CDU, such as that 
‘Social democrats and Stalinists are one and the same’ or that ‘the head of the 
SPD (…) was in the Socialist Unity Party’, the East German SPD tried to clarify 
 
405 ‘Nie wieder Sozialismus!‘, StA Eisenach, 40.7/95 Sammlung Wende, ‘Argumente zur Wahl am 18. März 
1990‘, CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bonn. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid. 
408 ‘Schmutzige Tricks aus dem Konrad-Adenauer-Haus‘, StA Erfurt, 5/5 Parteien, 'Mit dem Teufel 
marschiert‘, Der Spiegel, 05 March 1990.  
409 ‘alten Blockpartei’, ‘Ära von SED und CDU‘, StA Eisenach, 40.7/110 Sammlung Wende, ‘SPD Wir 
informieren: Die neuen Lügen einer alten Blockpartei’.  
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‘the truth’ with bullet points.410 Furthermore, they countered the criticism by 
questioning the integrity and political alliances of leading CDU politicians, 
arguing that ‘CDU and DSU are running a smear campaign under the 
instruction of their mud-slingers in Bonn. They are lying in order to cover up 
their own past’.411 
 In the meantime, former members of the Socialist Unity Party had 
formed the new Party for Democratic Socialism, with others joining the United 
Left. Ironically, the PDS held their campaign event in Erfurt’s Thüringenhalle, 
the space in which the discussion event was held that had contributed to the 
downfall of the local SED in October 1989.412 While the PDS restyled themselves 
as the formal ‘strong left-wing opposition’ by targeting voters to give them their 
second vote,413 the United Left also adopted the defamatory tactics of the other 
parties with caricatures of capitalists and anti-Kohl slogans.414 Their campaign 
materials took a clear stance against German Reunification and grouped the 
CDU and SPD politicians together as ‘annexation politicians’.415  
A former Socialist Unity Party member who continued in the Party for 
Democratic Socialism recalled that their campaigning for the parliamentary 
 
410 ‘Sozialdemokraten und Stalinisten in einen Topf‘, ‘SPD Vorsitzender (…) sei Mitglied der SED 
gewesen‘, ‘die Wahrheit‘, ibid. 
411 ‘CDU und DSU diffamieren unter Anleitung ihrer Bonner Schlammwerfer. Sie lügen, um ihre eigenen 
Vergangenheit zu verwischen‘, ibid. 
412 Schließt Euch an, p. 297. 
413 ‘eine starke linke Opposition‘, StA Erfurt, 5/5 Parteien, ‘In ihrem eigenen Interesse‘, PDS, 1990. 
414 StA Eisenach, 40.7/94 Sammlung Wende, ‘Lieber rote Rüben als Kohl von drüben!‘, Vereinigte Linke 
Erfurt, 1990. 
415 ‘Anschlusspolitikern‘, StA Eisenach, 40.7/94 Sammlung Wende, ‘Wer 66% in der Volkskammer hat, 
kann mit uns machen was er will !!!‘, Aktionsbündnis Vereinigte Linke, 1990. 
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election in Erfurt mainly took place in the night-time, as they received too much 
verbal abuse if they campaigned during the day.416  
Quietly and secretly we set off through the new housing developments to put 
up posters in the corridors and fill letterboxes, but we would also remove 
stickers from right-wing parties (…). So, as well as doing our local election 
campaign, we would of course also get rid of the things, that didn’t suit us 
politically, so to say.417  
 
These election campaign tactics did not go unnoticed, however, with the CDU 
in Erfurt applying for the PDS to be issued with a warning for bad campaign 
practice in the town’s interim parliament on the seventh of March.418 The 
motion was however withdrawn during the meeting, after the PDS faction 
apologised for having covered up Alliance for Germany election posters. After 
doing some research into the circumstances, the PDS faction later explained to 
the local newspaper that their helpers had stuck PDS posters on advertising 
pillars on the sixth of March, only for these to be covered up by CDU posters, 
and consequently recovered with PDS materials. ‘If you want a fair election 
campaign’, they concluded, ‘then you should run a fair campaign yourself!’.419  
 Similar controversies in Eisenach had led to a public debate on ‘Decency 
and Honesty in the Election Campaign 1990’, organised by the local SPD branch 
on the twenty-third of February 1990 in the Old Post Office.420 The worded 
agreement produced afterwards asserted that: statements about others in 
 
416 Interview with Karola Stange, Erfurt, 14 September 2018. 
417 ‘Also sind wir still und heimlich losgezogen durch die Neubaugebiete und haben Plakate in Hausflure 
geklebt, haben Briefkästen vollgemacht, haben aber auch Aufkleber entfernt von rechten Parteien, die auch 
unterwegs waren, ja. Also wir haben sowohl Wahlkampf aktiv vor Ort gemacht, aber auch sozusagen 
natürlich die Dinge weggemacht, die uns politisch nicht in den Kram passten‘, ibid. 
418 StA Erfurt, 1-5/10-9196 Unterlagen zu den Beratungen der Stadtverordnetenversammlung, ‘PDS und 
Plakate‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 16 March 1990. 
419 ‘Wer fairen Wahlkampf einfordert, sollte auch selbst fairen Wahlkampf führen!‘, ibid. 
420 StA Eisenach, 40.7/95 Sammlung Wende, ‘Fairnessvereinbarung zum Wahlkampf 1990‘, Eisenach, 26 
February 1990. 
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political publicity materials should be based on verifiable sources; 
representatives of other political parties should not be insulted; political parties 
and groups are responsible for the content and mounting of their election 
posters; posters of other parties or groups should not be removed or covered 
up; poster boards are marked with ownership details and should not be used 
by other parties and groups; public poster spaces are available to everyone; any 
disagreements should be negotiated between the political parties and groups, 
or in the presence of all parties if necessary.421 
 Looking back on the campaign, a West-German SPD politician who came 
to Erfurt in December 1990 to support the local political organisation, 
concluded that  
the parliamentary election campaign was in no way a GDR election campaign. 
Rather, it was an FRG election campaign on GDR territory. That applies to all 
political parties, some more and some less.422 
 
Although he had been welcomed with open arms and had felt sure that he was 
doing the right thing on arriving in Thuringia in 1989, this had changed from 
February 1990 when the political campaign had gotten underway. He argued 
that it was the slanderous political campaign that had divided the spirit of 
solidarity amongst the opposition and the general public in the GDR. 
 What remains clear, is that the political campaign for the parliamentary 
election in the GDR in 1990 was not only supported by West German political 
 
421 Ibid. 
422 ‘Der Wahlkampf zur Volkskammerwahl war auch nicht in Ansätzen ein Wahlkampf der DDR. Es war 
vielmehr ein bundesdeutscher Wahlkampf auf DDR-Gebiet. Das gilt für alle Parteien, wenn auch für die 
einen etwas mehr und die anderen etwas weniger‘, AdsD, 3/THLV000091 SPD-Landesverband 
Thüringen, Korrespondenz und Materialien (1990), 'DDR und Bundesrepublik. Politische und 
wirtschaftliche Strukturen einer neuen Gemeinschaft‘, n.d. est. April 1990. 
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partner organisations in terms of providing advice, but that there was also 
significant financial, material, organisational and strategic backing that 
determined the shape and style of the election campaign, despite clear 
instructions from the round table of the GDR that there should be no West 
German involvement. Campaign materials were largely produced in West 
Germany and speakers from the Federal Republic toured the market squares in 
the run up to the election. If there is any question when the East German 
government lost control or at what point the GDR state ended, it is worth 
noting that even before the general election, the state, its structures and 
regulations were no longer recognised by vast swathes of the population. 
In January 1990, an alternative newspaper in Eisenach had published an 
article on ‘Equal opportunities’ on its front page, arguing that more than 
anything else, elections rely on fairness and a level-playing field for all political 
groups and parties.423 At the time, the article, penned by the local SPD leader, 
criticised the unfair advantage of the ‘SED-PDS’, who benefitted from structural 
support and connections from former times.424 Albeit that the West German 
support in the weeks that followed may have been intended to counteract the 
advantage of the PDS, the result was a highly-pressured election campaign in 
which inexperienced parties were highly dependent on links with West German 
political partners in order to stay in the running against their competitors.  
 
 
423 PCCW, ‘Chancengleichheit?’, Die andere Zeitung, January 1990. 
424 Ibid. 
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Party Time: Election Day in Practice 
In Arnstadt, a few miles south of Erfurt, a group of friends had gathered to 
celebrate a birthday in early March 1990.425 With the first free elections only 
weeks away, the gathering provided an apt opportunity to practice for the big 
day, and so a trial parliamentary election was included in the programme of 
party games. Here too, there was a polling booth shortage, but the birthday 
guests had come up with an easy alternative. As they took it in turns to vote, a 
large towel was passed around the table, under which they would each write 
down the name of their preferred political party on scraps of paper. A 
refunctioned chocolate box with a slit in the top was the official ballot box, and 
the guests proudly posed for the camera as they posted their votes.426  
 Once every guest had cast their vote, the counting began, with individual 
votes being opened together and recorded. Surprise filled the room, as it turned 
out that one guest had voted for the PDS, formerly the Socialist Unity Party, so 
soon after the events of the autumn.427 At the time, it remained unclear who had 
chosen to vote this way, causing great uncertainty amongst the friends. A few 
weeks later, after the real election, they would realise that the distribution of 
their votes was statistically almost identical to the official result of the 
parliamentary elections. In so far, the trial election was not just an opportunity 
to practise voting in private and under new conditions, but to also learn to 
accept the outcome and the plurality of political opinions.  
 
425 Interview with D.D., Arnstadt, 24 February 2019. 
426 Private collection D.D. 
427 Interview with D.D., Arnstadt, 24 February 2019. 
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 The birthday party election demonstrates, first and foremost, the cultural 
and ritual significance of the act of voting. After years of Zettelfalten, as the 
practice of publicly folding and handing in the ballot papers in the GDR was 
ironically called, GDR citizens enthusiastically prepared to vote in secret for the 
first time. And yet, even in GDR times, elections had a symbolic and cultural 
function that was central to East German citizenship.  For ‘taking part in the 
elections of pretence’ in the GDR was a way of performing loyalty to the state 
and a central aspect of the so-called social contract between the state and the 
citizens.428 This foresaw that in exchange for and conforming outwardly to the 
political ideals, the state would provide citizens with social welfare, guaranteed 
employment, subsidised foodstuffs and a degree of privacy.429 As such, the 
excitement around the act of voting can therefore also be seen as an expression 
of a new form of citizenship and a celebration of the democratised political 
system. The parliamentary election should therefore bring the country together 
as a public performance of citizenship.  Would this succeed, or would the event 
simply deepen the existing rifts in society? 
 Election organisers and helpers had been warned that there would be 
plenty of election watchdogs present to observe the procedures, including 
observers from the European Parliament and the European Council.430 These 
observers should however identify themselves and were not to disturb the 
election procedure.431 Similarly, members of the press would need to carry 
 
428 Grix, The Role of the Masses, p. 25. 
429 Ibid. 
430 StA Eisenach, 12-2386 Städtische Akten bis 1990; Volkskammerwahl 1990, ‘Bekanntmachung der 
Schulung der Wahlvorstände‘, Stützpunkt Eisenach der Wahlkommission, n.d. 
431 Ibid. 
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identification and were not to use the telephone or to conduct any interviews 
within one hundred metres of the polling stations.432 ‘Nobody here will be 
approached or questioned’, asserted a firm committee member in Erfurt who 
swiftly showed the visiting journalists to the door with a wave of his hand.433  
The district election organiser in Erfurt had warned all election 
organisers at a local meeting: ‘The press knows very well that they will not get 
any information’.434 Nevertheless, there would still be journalists willing to try 
their luck. The district election organiser for Eisenach recalls his shock at being 
offered eighty to one-hundred West German Mark in exchange for advance 
notice of the election result.435 ‘I was flabbergasted’, he recalls.436 ‘I was rocked 
to the core and thought, (…) we want to establish a democracy and get rid of 
corruption. And then I get this dubious offer from the alleged good side’.437 
Although the offer was consequently turned down, it had left a lasting memory. 
‘I have not forgotten it. I have not forgotten that’, he repeats.438 
 The election committee for Erfurt had decided that there was to be no 
election propaganda within one hundred metres of the planned polling stations 
 
432 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Protokoll über die Beratung mit den 
Stützpunktbeauftragten des Wahlbüros am 1.3.1990‘, Wahlbüro der Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises 
Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 14 March 1990. 
433 ‘Hier wird keiner angesprochen und keiner ausgefragt‘, Private Collection Christian Herbst (henceforth 
PCCH), ‘Die ersten freien Wahlen sollten durch nichts behindert werden‘, Erfurter Tagespost, 19 March 
1990. 
434 ‘die Presse weiß, daß sie nichts erfahren können‘, LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und 
Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 
1990), ‘Protokoll über die Beratung mit den Stützpunktbeauftragten des Wahlbüros am 1.3.1990‘, 
Wahlbüro der Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 14 March 1990. 
435 Interview with Johannes Wallbrecht, Berlin, 09 February 2018. 
436 ‘Ich fiel da aus ALLEN WOLKEN‘, ibid. 
437 ‘Ich war also in meiner Grundfeste so erschüttert und ich dachte, ja, ich will nicht sagen die Bösen, aber 
wir wollen ja nun grade Demokratie und die Manipulation überwinden. Und dann kriege ich von der 
vermeintlich guten Seite so ein unseriöses Angebot‘, ibid. 
438 ‘Ich habe es mir gut gemerkt. Ich habe mir das gut gemerkt‘, ibid. 
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in advance of the election.439 One day before the election, the local paper had 
also warned that any endorsement or criticism of a political party or group, 
whether that be ‘spoken, said, pictorial or textual’ within the same perimeter 
was strictly forbidden.440 Other election office guidelines had included how to 
furnish the polling stations.441 While the electoral law, rules and procedures 
were to be clearly displayed, the decision on how to decorate the stations, for 
example with or without a GDR flag, was left to the individual election 
boards.442 Nevertheless, official advice was to use neutral colours for table 
cloths.443 In Eisenach, one local activist come election helper had other ideas.  
First of all, the polling station was decorated with flowers and secondly with 
Thuringian flags.444 At the door, she had placed GDR money and a ‘border 
fence’ to create a symbolic entrance space.445 ‘I wanted to place a candle, but I 
wasn’t allowed’, she explained remorsefully.446 The candle, which was intended 
‘as a symbol of the peaceful revolution’ with a green ribbon from the 
demonstration to protect the old town of Eisenach, was not to be lit, the local 
paper confirmed, due to fire safety.447  
 
439 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Niederschrift über die Sitzung der 
Wahlkommission am 27.2.1990‘, Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 05 March 1990. 
440 ‘Wort, Ton, Bild oder Schrift‘, PCCH, ‘Laß uns Dir zum Guten wählen‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 17 
March 1990. 
441 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), 'Protokoll über die Beratung mit den 
Stützpunktbeauftragten des Wahlbüros am 1.3.1990‘, Wahlbüro der Wahlkommission des Wahlkreises 
Bezirk Erfurt, Erfurt, 14 March 1990. 
442 Ibid. 
443 Ibid. 
444 Interview with Brigitte Korndörfer, Eisenach, 19 December 2017. 
445 Ibid. 
446 ‘Und dann wollte ich die Kerze hinstellen, das durfte ich nicht‘, ibid. 
447 ‘als Symbol unserer friedlichen Revolution’, PCCH, ‘Selbst viele Renter sind doch Erstwähler. Kerzen 
im Lokal verboten: „Offenes Feuer“‘, Oberhessische Presse, 19 March 1990, p. 7. See also Interview with 
Brigitte Korndörfer, Eisenach, 19 December 2017. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 138 
The efforts of the election helpers to not only volunteer for the elections 
but to also decorate their polling stations demonstrates the emotional, political 
and ritual significance of the election event. Not only the result was of 
importance, but the very act of going to vote under fair conditions and rigorous 
procedures seemed ‘unbelievable’ to those who had grown up in the GDR.448 
One of the election helpers in Eisenach recalls that the people entering the 
polling station were ‘beaming’ at the opportunity to finally be able to vote 
freely.449 Nevertheless, some still struggled to shake off old habits, with election 
helpers recalling having to repeatedly ask voters to use the polling booths and 
to mark their ballot cards in private. ‘I had a funny phrase’, explains one helper: 
‘Even if you’ve been married for thirty years, I need you to separate for these 
three minutes’.450 Voters argued back that they had no secrets from one another, 
or that they were short of time and wanted to fill it out very quickly here and 
now.451 
The high overall voter turnout of 94.15 percent in the region of Erfurt, 
despite the lack of pressure to vote, reflects a strong will amongst East Germans 
to vote and to have played their part.452 The local paper gathered motives from 
local citizens who argued that ‘not voting was not an option (…) after such a 
long break’, and that the experience was ‘different, (…) somehow free and 
unforced’, ‘uplifting’, and ‘glorious’, emphasising the emotional attachment to 
 
448 ‘unglaublich‘, ‘unfassbar‘, Interview with Carola and Christian Herbst, Eisenach, 04 July 2018. 
449 ‘strahlend‘, ibid. 
450 ‘so einen lustigen Spruch’, ‘Wenn Sie schon 30 Jahre verheiratet sind, für diese drei Minuten müssen Sie 
sich mal trennen‘, Interview with Ulrike Quentel, Eisenach, 17 January 2018. 
451 Ibid. 
452 ‘Vorläufiges Ergebnis der Wahl zur Volkskammer am 18. März‘, Thüringische Landeszeitung, 21 March 
1990, in 'Schaukosten Folge 19‘, Bettina Fischer, Landesarchiv Thüringen, 
<https://www.thueringen.de/mam/th1/staatsarchive/sk/folge_19.pdf> (accessed 01 March 1990). 
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the event.453 Nevertheless, a familiar feeling of distrust was also still present, 
giving even more reason to ensure that the procedure was transparent .454 The 
election organiser in Eisenach explains that  
I don’t want to suggest that the result was irrelevant, (...) but what mattered to 
me was that the procedure was correct (…) and that the people really had the 
opportunity (..) to vote.455  
 
Despite great caution, voters reported that they trusted the election helpers, 
who appeared ‘friendly’, and were often recognisable as church-goers.456 In the 
evening, these helpers would begin to count the votes in the presence of the 
general public.457 
 The great emotional significance of the act of voting was however 
accompanied by hopes and expectations for the outcome.458 Looking back, local 
citizens recalled their surprise at the result of the event. The largest surprise 
was not however, as in Arnstadt, that certain citizens would vote for the former 
SED, but rather the extent of the success of the Christian Democratic Union. A 
former vicar from near Eisenach explained that some still believed there was a 
possibility ‘that the SED-PDS could get the reins back, albeit with democratic 
 
453 ‘Nicht wählen kam für mich nicht in Frage (…) nach so langer Ruhepause‘, 'ein erhebendes Gefühl‘, 'ein 
herrliches Gefühl‘, PCCH, ‘Die ersten freien Wahlen sollten durch nichts behindert werden‘, Erfurter 
Tagespost, 19 March 1990; ‘ein ganz anderes Gefühl, (…) irgendwie frei und ungezwungen‘, PCCH, ‘Selbst 
viele Renter sind doch Erstwähler. Kerzen im Lokal verboten: „Offenes Feuer“‘, Oberhessische Presse, 19 
March 1990, p. 7. 
454 PCCH, ‘Die ersten freien Wahlen sollten durch nichts behindert werden‘, Erfurter Tagespost, 19 March 
1990. 
455 ‘Ich will nicht sagen, dass mir das Ergebnis egal war (…) aber mir war so wichtig, dass das Verfahren 
stimmt (…), dass die Menschen wirklich die Möglichkeit haben (…) mal wirklich zu wählen‘, Interview 
with Johannes Wallbrecht, Berlin, 09 February 2018. 
456 ‘nett und freundlich‘, PCCH, ‘Selbst viele Renter sind doch Erstwähler. Kerzen im Lokal verboten: 
„Offenes Feuer“‘, Oberhessische Presse, 19 March 1990, p. 7. 
457 PCCH, ‘Die ersten freien Wahlen sollten durch nichts behindert werden‘, Erfurter Tagespost, 19 March 
1990. 
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backing and playing by different rules’.459 Others expected the SPD to win, or at 
least to gain a much larger percentage of the vote.460 In particular, it was the 
overwhelming and ‘clear’ majority by which the CDU won the vote that 
surprised citizens.461 Many spoke of ‘shock’ at the CDU’s ‘clean sweep’, while a 
former PDS politician called it a ‘misjudgement’, which consequently brought 
his party ‘back down to earth’.462  
Others describe being ‘stunned’ at the distribution of votes in general,463 
not only because of the success of the CDU but also due to the negative and 
‘disappointing’ turnout for the new East German movements and the Green 
Party, which had been considered the leaders of the autumn revolution.464 Even 
members of the CDU admitted ‘feeling sorry’ for the members of the Neues 
Forum, whom they had admired for their bravery during the autumn.465 For 
those counting themselves to the new movements, on the other hand, the bad 
outcome felt ‘personally insulting’.466 Reports from Erfurt describe a young 
couple who had come to observe the counting of the votes in tears and clearly 
distressed at the result, whilst others celebrated alongside them.467 ‘It scares 
me’, said the young man, ‘what is going to happen next?’.468  
 
459 ‘dass die SED-PDS gegebenenfalls das Zügel noch mal in die Hand kriegt, sei es dann auch 
demokratisch gewählt und mit vielleicht anderen Spielregeln‘, Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 
05 October 2018. 
460 Interview with Carola and Christian Herbst, Eisenach, 04 July 2018; Interview with Johannes 
Wallbrecht, Berlin, 09 February 2018. 
461 ‘so eindeutig‘. Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
462 ‘Schock‘, ‘abräumen‘, ‘eine Fehleinschätzung‘, ‘auf den Boden der Realität geholt‘, Interview with 
Wolfgang Mühle, Erfurt, 13 August 2018. 
463 ‘Verblüffung‘, Interview with Christhard Wagner, Erfurt, 12 October 2018. 
464 ‘enttäuschend‘, Interview with Carola and Christian Herbst, Eisenach, 04 July 2018. 
465 ‘leidgetan‘, Interview with Hans-Peter Brodhun, Eisenach, 11 October 2018. 
466 ‘persönlich beleidigt‘, Interview with Christhard Wagner, Erfurt, 12 October 2018. 
467 PCCH, ‘Sensation der DDR-Wahl: CDU siegt klar, SPD abgeschlagen‘, Oberhessische Presse Eisenacher 
Presse, 19 March 1990. 
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The local press, on the other hand, emphasised the ‘sensational victory’ 
of the Alliance for Germany, describing it as a ‘victory for Germany’ or ‘for the 
whole of Germany’, not just the GDR.469 The overwhelming success of the 
centre-right parties was not taken solely as a vote for the party to run the East 
German government, but also interpreted as ‘a rejection of each and every 
variety of socialism’ and as a clear vote ‘for a swift German unification’.470 The 
especially high election result for the Alliance for Germany in Thuringia, where 
the CDU had reached 53.6 percent on its own and 60.5 percent together with its 
alliance partners,471 led the head of the CDU in Eisenach to state in the local 
paper that ‘Thuringia should set an example to the rest of the republic and join 
the Federal Republic of its own accord’.472  
The parliamentary election was therefore imbued with great emotional 
value and numerous layers of significance. Talk of a ‘victory for Germany’ 
indicated that the result would affect not only the future of East Germany but 
also that of the citizens of the Federal Republic. A mark for the Alliance for 
Germany, it was reported, was not just a vote for a political party but also for 
the future economic model, for a currency union, for the reunion of the two 
German states, and for quick progress.473 What this would look like, how and 
when it would take place, was however not yet clear. Newspapers talked of 
‘interpreting’ the vote, suggesting that the vote for the political alliance 
 
469 ‘sensationellen Wahlsieg‘, ‘für ganz Deutschland‘, 'Die „Allianz“ siegte für Deutschland‘, PCCH, 
'Allianz siegte für ganz Deutschland‘, Erfurter Tagespost EXTRABLATT, 19 March 1990. 
470 ‘Absage an jedwede Spielart des Sozialismus‘, ‘Abstimmung zugunsten der raschen deutschen Einheit‘, 
ibid. 
471 PCCH, ‘Wahlergebnisse aus den Regionen – Porträts der Sieger‘, Erfurter Tagespost, 19 March 1990. 
472 ‘Thüringen sollte ein Zeichen für die ganze Republik setzen und alleine in die BRD eintreten‘, PCCH, 
‘Die ersten freien Wahlen sollten durch nichts behindert werden‘, Erfurter Tagespost, 19 March 1990. 
473 PCCH, ‘Votum für kurzen Prozeß‘, Thüringische Landeszeitung, 20 March 1990. 
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encompassed various demands and expectations that were nevertheless fluid, 
and that the analysis was furthermore influenced by the unbalanced 
distribution of votes amongst the various parties. 
Equally disparate, however, were the reactions of the voters to the result. 
As described in the local paper, ‘Thuringia’s constituents’ had ‘voted with their 
head and their heart’, with both the act of voting and the result of the election 
being highly emotional.474 For some citizens, the elections had changed nothing 
at all, for they were once again ‘living in a system that [they did] not like’.475 For 
others, the election marked a new set of living conditions, as one former GDR 
citizen recalled no longer feeling the need to hoard the daily newspapers that 
he nevertheless still read but no longer kept.476 The parliamentary election was 
clearly a turning-point, marking the culmination of a long process and the 
establishment of a new democratic order and trust in its structures. 
Nevertheless, the result of the election had come as a great surprise, with 
the reports on the ‘victory’ dividing the country into winners and losers. The 
power in society had shifted once again, with both the former elites that had 
ruled the GDR and the new political groups that had led the autumn 
demonstrations and transitionary committees being voted out by the silent 
majority. How the losers would respond to the political loss would become 
evident in the weeks that followed, as citizens prepared for yet another election 
in early May.     
 
474 PCCH, ‘Thüringens Wähler entschieden mit Verstand und Herz‘, Thüringische Landeszeitung, 19 
March 1990. 
475 PCCH, ‘TLZ-Umfrage nach den ersten demokratischen Wahlen in der Geschichte der DDR. „Was 
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The New Establishment 
In it to win it? The SED mutiny 
Two days before the parliamentary election, the citizens committee in Erfurt 
had announced in the local press that their research in the files of the Ministry 
for Security had indicated that former secret informants were amongst those 
being voted into the East German parliament. The reason for the announcement 
so close to the day of the election was reportedly due to having found a relevant 
file on the Friday before, and not intended to destabilise the election process. 
Nevertheless, the announcement was a blow to the political parties and election 
organisers who were desperately trying to re-establish trust in political 
structures and representatives.  
 In the weeks that followed, senior politicians from the East German CDU 
and SPD would step down from their positions to allow for investigations into 
their alleged Stasi past.477 Many politicians, including those that had shared a 
stage with West German politicians on the squares of Erfurt and Eisenach, were 
publicly suspected of collaboration.478 In some cases, party members were 
asked to step down as a precaution, to avoid bad press in the run up to the 
communal election. It was then reported that the politicians had stepped down 
'for personal reasons‘.479 In other cases, the parties issued statements in support 
of their politicians, arguing that the accusations were simply an attempt by 
Stasi-workers to discredit their politicians, ‘spread uncertainty (…) and 
 
477 ‘Es muß alles raus‘, Der Spiegel, 16 March 1990 <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-
13499332.html> (accessed 29 March 2019). 
478 Ibid. 
479 AdsD, 3/THLV000086 SPD-Landesverband Thüringen, Presse-Spiegel DDR; Sozialdemokratische 
Entwicklungskommission Hessen Thüringen (1990), ‘Nach Rücktritt des Thüringer SPD-Chefs 
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destabilise the country’.480 Intended or not, the changes in the top ranks of their 
parties ‘caused great confusion’ for new political actors at the communal level, 
leading local political groups to write to their superiors to demand better 
communication on the subject.481 
Politics at the top and bottom of GDR society was in disarray on how to 
proceed regarding previous involvement with the former Ministry for State 
Security. In the monthly interim parliament meeting in Erfurt on the fourth of 
April, a Neues Forum representative informed those present that five members 
of the citizen’s guard, who had occupied the MfS headquarters in December, 
had gone on a hunger strike on the twenty-eighth of March after the East 
German government had deemed background checks on election candidates 
unlawful.482 Their demands, which had been published in an open letter to the 
East German parliament on the second of April, demanded that all 
parliamentary candidates agree to be screened by an independent panel for 
Stasi collaboration.483   
A few days later, the investigation committee would write again to the 
East German parliament, ‘out of deep concern for our young democracy’.484 The 
letter, which claimed that secret informants had been instructed to infiltrate the 
 
480 ‘daß (…) Unsicherheit in die Bevölkerung getragen und damit das Land destabilisiert werden soll‘, 
AdsD, 3/THLV000086 SPD-Landesverband Thüringen, Presse-Spiegel DDR; Sozialdemokratische 
Entwicklungskommission Hessen Thüringen (1990), 'Pressemitteilung der SPD vom 26.03.1990‘, 26 March 
1990. 
481 ‘Große Verwirrung (…) hervorgerufen‘, AdsD, 2/SDPA000172 SDP/SPD-Parteivorstand; Bezirke 
Erfurt, Frankfurt/Oder und Gera – Korrespondenzen und Materialien (11.1989-09.1990), ‘Brief 
Sozialdemokratie Partei in der DDR Ortsgruppe Eisenach-West, an Parteifreunde‘, Eisenach, 18 April 1990. 
482 StA Erfurt, 1-5/1000/70 Stadtverordnetenversammlung und Rat der Stadt 1945-1990, ‘Protokoll der 4. 
Sitzung des Interimparlaments vom 04.04.1990 in Erfurt‘, April 1990. 
483 Ibid. 
484 ‘in tiefer Besorgnis um unsere junge Demokratie‘, StA Erfurt, 5/783/G-7 Bürgerbewegung Sammlung, 
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political parties, argued that in was in the interest of the politicians to agree to 
the checks in order to regain the trust of their voters, and that their protest was 
based not on suspicions but on hard evidence from their research in the Stasi 
documents.485 On having informed the East German government of their 
findings in advance of the Parliamentary Election, the government had 
responded by imposing a ban on the investigation committee, which they 
demanded be lifted immediately.486  
 The public protest of the citizen’s guard in Erfurt ‘against the OLD and 
NEW crooks’ managed to attract attention to their cause, with outpourings of 
solidarity from groups and individuals across the country.487 The mayor of 
Berlin consequently visited the protesters to discuss the modalities and planned 
procedure for the background checks of elected representatives.488 The interim 
parliament in Erfurt also passed a motion on the fourth of April, agreeing that 
candidates from all political parties and groups were to sign a personal 
agreement in advance of the communal election, allowing for their background 
to be checked for Stasi collaboration.489 The decision, which was made ‘on the 
basis of the experience gathered during the parliamentary election’, was to 
protect communal representatives from suspicions, accusations and blackmail 




487 ‘gegen die ALTEN und NEUEN Betrüger‘, ‘Flugblatt des Bürgerkomitees mit Aufruf zur Unterstützung 
des Hungerstreiks am 5.4.1990‘ in Schließt Euch an, p. 306; StA Eisenach, 40.7/100 Sammlung Wende, ‘Das 
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Forderungen an‘, Bürgerkomitee Eisenach, n.d. 
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On the twenty-fourth of April 1990, the regional election committee came 
together to discuss the latest developments regarding Stasi informants and the 
upcoming communal election.491 In Arnstadt, the district election office had 
announced at the start of the month that they would not continue their work 
unless all election candidates were cross-checked for MfS collaboration.492 The 
deputy leader of the election office in Arnstadt, who was present at the 
meeting, explained that his team had acted on a moral duty to ensure that their 
parliaments would ‘not again’ be infiltrated by spies, and reiterated that they 
were only planning to strike if the candidates refused to agree to the 
screening.493 This statement had been picked up by the citizen’s committee in 
Erfurt, who had forwarded it onto all local election committees.494  
The regional election office secretary explained that this ‘problem’ of the 
original protest and its ‘misuse’ by the citizen’s committee had been reported to 
the central election committee and the district lawyer, as it ‘posed a real threat 
to the elections’.495 The secretary asserted that the election office was a 
nonpartisan body, whose job it was to adhere to electoral law in organising the 
elections, and that screening for MfS collaboration was the business of election 
candidates only.496 As the public appeal to other election teams to also give up 
 
491 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Protokoll über die Sitzung der 
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492 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-62-0001-302 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Erfurt; Wahlkommission des 
Wahlkreises 4 - Bezirk Erfurt (Volkskammerwahl: 18. März 1990), ‘Protokoll über die Sitzung der 
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Bezirkswahlkommission, Erfurt, 05 April 1990. 
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their work had been publicised in the press and on the radio, this amounted to 
an attempted boycott of the elections.497 The regional secretary was therefore 
willing to take legal action against the protesting election office and the citizen’s 
committee, arguing that their behaviour put the upcoming elections at risk and 
that there was no legal basis for a strike.498 As a result of the ensuing discussion, 
the regional election team eventually decided not to take legal action, but to 
instead publish an official response in the press, asserting that Stasi checks did 
not fall within the remit of the work of the election organisers, and summoning 
all election teams to continue their work responsibly.499  
Nevertheless, election offices faced great difficulties in preparing for the 
upcoming communal elections on the sixth of May. The secretary for the district 
election office in the city of Erfurt reported that it was much harder to form 
election committees this time around, with many volunteers withdrawing their 
support at short notice.500 Appeals for helpers, which had been published in the 
press in early April, had received little response.501 The election secretary for 
Erfurt had called on the political parties to help recruit the one-thousand-two-
hundred election helpers needed for the local committees, for ‘otherwise, the 
democratic realisation of the elections was in danger’.502 In the end, it was the 
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around one hundred town officials that ensured that the election committees 
were complete on time.503 
Reports from the regional election team suggest that this was once again 
a wide-spread problem, with many districts across the region failing to recruit 
enough helpers to the election committees, despite there being considerably 
fewer polling stations than for the parliamentary election.504 In Eisenach, where 
there were fourteen fewer polling stations needed this time around, support for 
the elections was particularly low.505 An announcement in the press on the 
twenty-seventh of April, just nine days before the election, called for urgent 
support from local citizens.506 But interest from citizens for the upcoming 
elections was waning altogether, with only around thirty people having 
attended a discussion event with communal candidates in the local cinema in 
Eisenach.507 
As the month of the communal elections approached, the leader of the 
election team in Eisenach made one last attempt to recruit the helpers needed 
for the election committees. Knowing that there would be a large rally on the 
market square in Eisenach for the Labour Day celebrations on the first of May, 
he approached a colleague from the election team who was also active in the 
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local PDS group that was organising the event. ‘I need a ten-minute slot. I want 
to be there. We need helpers for the election’, he told his colleague.508 Although 
the election team leader took his non-partisan role very seriously, attending 
events to publicise the election procedure but staying largely out of the political 
campaign, the motivation behind this appearance was a different one. ‘I was 
convinced’, he explained, ‘that in the follow-up to the GDR, democracy should 
include everyone (…). Even those, who felt side-lined’.509  
‘It was exciting’, he recalls, stepping out onto the stage in front of the 
crowds and asking them for their help. 510 There was no need to introduce 
himself this time, as he was already well-known in the town. The election 
organiser asked those gathered for the PDS event to help in the election 
committees, arguing along the lines of ‘those who take part, are in the know 
(…) [and] can see for themselves’.511 Afterwards, his colleague would tell him 
that he had talked for much too long. 'That might be so‘, he admitted, 'but I had 
made the decision on my own and it worked’.512 In the nick of time, and with 
the support of the crowds gathered for the rally on the first of May, all 
remaining positions in the election committees in Eisenach were filled. 
His decision to reach out to potential PDS voters can be read in a number 
of ways. Overall, however, it demonstrates an attempt to reunite different parts 
of society around a common cause, and to mediate between those trying to 
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build a new order and those who may have felt they were being blamed for the 
failure of the last one. By taking the decision to attend an event that was so 
significant in GDR times, the election organiser had already met these citizens 
half-way. Whereas announcements in the press had failed to drum-up the 
necessary support, this personal yet public approach succeeded in convincing 
these citizens to engage with the new structures whilst also valuing their 
contribution. 
It was not the first time, however, that the election organiser in Eisenach 
had been made aware of feelings of rejection amongst former state actors. In 
April 1990, a group of local mayors in the district of Eisenach had threatened to 
withdraw their support for the communal elections out of fear that they were 
about to lose their jobs.513 ‘If you want to do everything differently, then do it 
yourself’, they had told the election organiser at the routine briefing event.514 
Unsure of what to do, the election organiser had simply continued explaining 
the procedure for the upcoming communal election, in which local mayors 
would be expected to stand for re-election. These, however, were no longer 
willing to do so, threatening the stability of the local elections, as the mayors 
were not only needed as candidates but were also instrumental in the 
organisation of local election committees and venues due to their local 
knowledge. 
In the end, it was the reassuring words of the head of the district council 
that convinced the mayors to take the risk of standing in the local elections. 
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Speaking second, after the election organiser, the head of the district council 
urged the local mayors to take part and to await the result of the election before 
jumping to any premature conclusions. After all, they knew their constituents 
better than anyone else, and they could build on their accomplishments in the 
years before. In the end, he would be right, for although some would lose their 
jobs, many of the mayors in the smaller communities would indeed be re-
elected and keep their positions. 
The mayoral strike in Eisenach did not last longer than half an hour, but 
it succeeded in highlighting the reliance of the new actors on the cooperation of 
former state actors, and of the subtleties of mediating such conflicts. ‘I dread to 
think what would have happened, if it had been picked up by the press’, says 
the former election organiser, as he retells the story of the mutiny.515  He argues 
that it was in part the tone of the head of the district council, who was very 
firm, and on personal terms with the mayors in question, but in part also the 
‘good argumentation’ that managed to save the day.516 In any case, the example 
shows how important personal relations, arguments and tone were in helping 
disheartened actors to engage with and accept the new structures and the 
personal consequences.  
While the election organisers fought the clock to overcome numerous 
logistical und personal hurdles, the political parties gathered all their strengths 
for yet another election campaign. Whereas the centre-right parties had 
received ample support from political colleagues in the Federal Republic for the 
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parliamentary election, calls for support from CDU members in Erfurt to their 
partners in Wiesbaden had gone unanswered this time around.517 Although the 
Christian Democrats in Erfurt had wanted to run the election campaign on their 
own on this occasion, time pressure led them to recycle left-over election 
materials from the parliamentary election.518  
Similar measures were reported amongst the local SPD groups, who also 
redistributed the materials previously printed for them in Hesse.519 The SPD 
and Green Party events for the communal elections were well-supported by 
Hessian partners, however. In some cases, Hessians were even reported to 
make up fifty percent of the event attendees, whereas locals showed growing 
disinterest in the political campaign.520 In Eisenach, a friendly letter from the 
SPD mayor of the partner town of Marburg, printed on pink paper, was posted 
to local constituents, encouraging them to vote for their local SPD politicians.521 
Although the election campaign had by all means been professionalised, with 
all party manifestos now printed on glossy paper, the endorsement from West 
Germany still played a large role, and eastern political groups struggled, even 
by May 1990, to independently organise their campaigns amid other pressures.   
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wieder mit‘, Hessische Landeszeitung, 03 May 1990. 
518 Ibid. 
519 Ibid. 
520 AdsD, 3/THLV000091 SPD-Landesverband Thüringen, Korrespondenz und Materialien (1990), ‘Müder 
Kommunalwahlkampf in Thüringen. Parteien in Lauerstellung vor dem Endspurt‘, Hessische 
Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 03 May 1990. 
521 StA Eisenach, 40.7/110 Sammlung Wende, ‘Brief von Oberbürgermeister der Universitätsstadt Marburg 
und Landrat des Landkreises Marburg-Biedenkopf an liebe Bürgerinnen und Bürger in Stadt und Kreis 
Eisenach‘, SPD Marburg Biedenkopf, Marburg, 29 April 1990.  
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Rewriting History  
On the twenty-eighth of June 1990, the newly elected town council in Eisenach 
met for their monthly assembly. A fresh communal government had been 
elected, and structures were being established, with advice from colleagues 
from their West-German partner town. The SPD faction put forward a proposal, 
calling for the removal of the acting town chronicler from his position.522 The 
meeting protocol claimed that his ‘role in the distortion of the history of the 
town of Eisenach is no longer tenable’.523 The reasoning behind the proposal 
was presented verbally by the SPD delegate, leading to a decision by the town 
assembly to remove the town chronicler from his role and re-advertise the 
position. 
 In a written public defence, the former chronicler responded to the 
accusations made against him, stating that he was given no other opportunity 
to do so.524 He explained that he had first learnt of his dismissal in the 
newspaper, despite having been present at the town assembly meeting up until 
the first break.525 The proposal for him to be removed from his role was made 
afterwards, and without any former consultation.526 Not even the mayor had 
addressed the issue with him, leading him to think that he too must also have 
 
522 StA Eisenach, 21.2-247 Protokollbücher; Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1989-1990, ‘Niederschrift über 
die 2. Sitzung der Stadtverordenetenversammlung am 28. 6. 1990’, Büro des Stadtverordnetenvorstehers, 
Eisenach, 03 July 1990. 
523 ‘(sein) Anteil an einer Verfälschung der Geschichte der Stadt Eisenach ist nicht mehr tragbar‘, StA 
Eisenach, 21.2-247 Protokollbücher; Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1989-1990, ‘Niederschrift über die 2. 
Sitzung der Stadtverordenetenversammlung am 28. 6. 1990’, Büro des Stadtverordnetenvorstehers, 
Eisenach, 03 July 1990. 
524 StA Eisenach, 40.7/97 Sammlung Wende, ‘Öffentliche Erklärung zu Form und Inhalt meiner 
Abberufung als Stadtchronist‘, Stadtchronist s. D., Eisenach, 11 July 1990. 
525 Ibid. 
526 Ibid. 
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been unaware of the plans until the point that the proposal was heard.527 
During the debate, one local representative had proposed holding a small 
meeting with the town chronicler first, in which he was prepared to act as a 
mediator, but this too was rejected in favour of going straight to a vote.528  
 The Hessian newspaper, which covered the story on the thirtieth of June 
1990, gave it the headline: ‘SED-past costs town chronicler his job’.529 ‘That’s 
true!’, writes the chronicler, pointing out that the allegations made against him 
related to his previous position as a civics teacher at the local secondary school, 
and not to his ability to work as a town chronicler.530  Having now left the party 
and shown ‘willingness to learn from past mistakes and to apply these new 
insights to my personal life and in dealing with history’, he argued, ‘my 
competence as a Heimat-historian has surely not been diminished’.531  
Furthermore, he claimed that the arguments put forward against his 
continuation were not backed up by sufficient proof; regarding the claim that 
he penalised Christian students while working as a teacher, the SPD delegate 
had presented her daughter’s school report, in which he had simply given her 
the mark ‘good’.532 Regarding a referenced publication on the worker’s 
movement, he pointed out that he was not among the listed authors.533 His 




529 ‘SED-Vergangenheit kostet Stadtchronisten den Job‘, ibid. 
530 Ibid. 
531 ‘Mit meiner nachgewiesenen Bereitschaft, aus den Fehlern der Vergangenheit zu lernen und die neuen 
Erkenntnisse im persönlichen Leben wie im Umgang mit der Geschichte anzuwenden, hat sich meine 
Kompetenz als Heimathistoriker sicher nicht verringert‘, ibid. 
532 ‘gut‘, ibid. 
533 Ibid. 
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documents.534 The resulting collection on Eisenach’s town history, ‘his life’s 
work’, and the largest collection of its kind in the GDR, was a valuable resource 
that had been made available to the public for historical analysis.535  
 The case made by the SPD delegate to the town assembly was clearly 
based largely on emotive language and subjective argumentation. Nevertheless, 
it managed to convince an assembly of elected representatives to remove a 
person from his position and re-advertise the role without any former 
consultation.  The town chronicler contended that he was not speaking out for 
the sake of being right, but in order to insist on 
truth, humane treatment of affected citizens, respect for human dignity, a right 
to a fair trial, recognition of professional competence without political 
vilification, and last but not least, real parliamentary democracy and the rule of 
law; all human rights promised under our new political system, but which have 
been violated during my dismissal.536  
 
In any case, he argued that the town assembly had no right to dismiss him.537 
As the role of the town chronicler was created by the district council, the right 
to employ and therefore also dismiss a member of staff remained the task of the 
district administrator, and not that of the town assembly.538  
 The failure to discuss concerns with the accused in advance of the public 
debate speaks for a time during which former procedures and structures had 
been rejected, but new ones had not yet been fully consolidated. Instead of 
 
534 Ibid. 
535 ‘mein Lebenswerk’, ibid. 
536 ‘Wahrheit, menschenlichen Umgang mit betroffenen Bürgern, Achtung vor der Würde des Menschen, 
sein Recht auf Anhörung und Verteidigung, um Anerkennung der fachlichen Kompetenz ohne politische 
Verumglimpfung und nicht zuletzt um echte parlamentarische Demokratie mit ihrer Rechtsstaatlichkeit, 
alles versprochene Menschenrechte unserer neuen Ordnung, die in Zusammenhang mit meiner 
Abberufung mißachtet wurden,‘ ibid. 
537 Ibid. 
538 Ibid. 
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questioning or cross-checking evidence, personal testimonies were accepted 
and decisions were taken on the basis of group consensus. According to the 
town chronicler, this misconduct and disrespect for protocol led to severe 
public pressure and had negative repercussions for his career, his health and his 
family.539 The decision of how to deal with the former party members is an 
intricate one, and of great importance when trying to establish a new political 
order. Nevertheless, even after new representatives had been elected at the local 
and national level, the practices through which the new order was being 
implemented were not yet in keeping with the proposed values. 
 
Formal Loyalty and Own Goals  
In late August 1990, the new mayor of Erfurt began preparing for the upcoming 
elections in October and December, by writing to previous election helpers to 
ask for their support. The autumn would see yet another two rounds of political 
campaigning, firstly for the Thuringian State elections on the fourteenth of 
October, and then again for the first joint federal elections after German 
Reunification, on the second of December. After the troubles of communal 
elections and adding to the voter fatigue of the past months, it was crucial to 
ensure that election committees and helpers were on hand well in advance. 
 Unfortunately, the first response to come back on the second of 
September was negative. The former election helper had attached the mayor’s 
original letter to his response, on the assumption that he clearly must have 
 
539 Ibid. 
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forgotten to read the badly phrased communication before signing it off.540 The 
mayor’s letter, which began by thanking the citizen for his help with the 
parliamentary and communal elections in 1990, had continued by confirming 
that the council was relying on his help for the upcoming election on the 
fourteenth of October. ‘As per state law’, it stated, ‘the work on the election 
board is voluntary’.541 Quoting paragraph 10 of electoral law, the letter then 
explained ‘It may therefore only be turned down for important reasons’.542 ‘It is 
not tactful’, the citizen replied, ‘that especially election helpers like myself, who 
have volunteered for the past two elections, should now be pressured in this 
way’.543 
 One week later, the next rejection arrived in the mayoral office. ‘I found 
your ultimatum-like demand incredibly disconcerting’, explains the former 
helper.544 The phrasing of the letter, with the reference to electoral law, was 
‘incapacitating’ and ‘fatally reminiscent of the practices of the past forty years’, 
which the citizen argues the mayor’s government had supposedly wanted to 
put an end to.545 Although the citizen was indeed without work, she explained 
that ‘having legally investigated the above-mentioned §’, she would be unable 
to help due to family commitments.546 The next letter, to arrive the very same 
 
540 StA Erfurt, A16883 Oberbürgermeister Schriftverkehr 1990-1992, ‘Brief an den Herrn 
Oberbürgermeister‘, Erfurt, 02 September 1990. 
541 ‘Die Tätigkeit im Wahlvorstand ist im Ländergesetz vom 22.07.1990 als Ehrenamt (…) definiert‘, 
StA Erfurt, A16883 Oberbürgermeister Schriftverkehr 1990-1992, ‘Brief vom Oberbürgermeister der Stadt 
Erfurt an C.H.‘, n.d. 
542 ‘Es darf daher nur aus wichtigen Gründen abgelehnt werden (§10 der Wahlordnung)‘, ibid. 
543 ‘Ich finde es nicht taktvoll, daß gerade Wahlhelfer die, wir ich, die beiden letzten Wahlen mit bestritten 
haben, so vergattert werden‘, StA Erfurt, A16883 Oberbürgermeister Schriftverkehr 1990-1992, ‘Brief an 
den Herrn Oberbürgermeister‘, Erfurt, 02 September 1990. 
544 ‘Ich habe Ihre ultimative Aufforderung (…) mit äußerster Befremdung zur Kenntnis genommen‘, 
StA Erfurt, A16883 Oberbürgermeister Schriftverkehr 1990-1992, ‘Brief an Werter Herr R.‘, Erfurt, 11 
September 1990. 
545 ‘entmündigend‘, ‘erinnert mich fatal an Verfahrensweisen einer 40-jährigen Vergangenheit‘, ibid. 
546 ‘Nach juristischer Prüfung des o.g. §‘, ibid. 
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day, concurred with the first letter, although the explanation for turning down 
the work spanned two densely handwritten pages and was justified by the 
disappointment the citizen had experienced over the course of the year.547 
Whereas the former volunteer had been happy to support ‘the young 
progressive powers’ in March and May, this feeling had soured on finding that 
‘the same old comrades’ were still in all the high offices.548 
 Earlier that day, the district election committee for Erfurt had discussed 
the first letter during their meeting.549 Having agreed that they would not take 
legal action against the election helper this time, another member of staff was 
given the task of drafting a reply to the citizen who had felt pressurised by the 
city mayor.550 The template, which was eventually sent out to all those that 
turned down the request for help, was only a few lines long, and simply 
acknowledged their refusal to help. 551 The unfortunate phrasing, and the 
various reasons given by the citizens were not responded to, nor was any sign 
given that the mayor regretted the wording of his letter.552 
 The final letter in the collection, dated the eighteenth of September 1990, 
described ‘the threat with the state and electoral law, nonetheless spanning two 
paragraphs of your letter’ as ‘tactless, to put it mildly’.553 Although the two 
 
547 StA Erfurt, A16883 Oberbürgermeister Schriftverkehr 1990-1992, ‘Brief an den Herrn Bürgermeister‘, 
Erfurt, 11 September 1990. 
548 ‘den jungen progressiven Kräften‘, ‘die alten Genossen‘, ibid. 
549 StA Erfurt, A31721 Stadtentwicklungsamt Bereich Statistik und Wahlen, ‘Niederschrift über die Sitzung 
des Kreiswahlausschusses Erfurt-Stadt vom 11. September 1990‘, Kreiswahlausschuss Erfurt-Stadt, Erfurt, 
17 September 1990. 
550 Ibid. 
551 StA Erfurt, A16883 Oberbürgermeister Schriftverkehr 1990-1992, ‘Brief an Wahlhelfer‘, Erfurt, 24 
September 1990. 
552 Ibid. 
553 ‘Die Drohung mit dem Ländergesetz und der Wahlordnung, die immerhin über zwei Absätze Ihres 
Schreibens geht, ist gelinde gesagt taktlos‘, StA Erfurt, A16883 Oberbürgermeister Schriftverkehr 1990-
1992, ‘Brief an den Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Erfurt‘, Erfurt, 18 September 1990. 
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former election volunteers would have considered such approaches 
democratically legitimate if they had been chosen at random, they accused the 
mayor of ‘sheer complacency’ and warned that such practices would lead to 
citizens’ duties ‘once again’ becoming that of election officials.554  Across the top 
of the letter, the reader had scribbled ‘! One own goal after another!’.555 
 The written exchange with local citizens on behalf of Erfurt’s new mayor 
reflects the general mood after a long year of political work. The hopes and 
expectations that had inspired citizens in the first half of the year had given 
way to disenchantment amongst those who felt that the political changes had 
left them feeling ‘on the one hand liberated and on the other hand 
dispossessed’.556 The communal representatives had begun to work with new 
structures and regulations, but still faced the same problem of mediating 
between different groups of the electorate to gain backing for the new political 
system. The citizens however looked closely at political language and practices, 
accepting the new structures in principal but rejecting a culture that did not 
respect their right to autonomy and their personal and intrinsic value. 
 
Conclusion 
On the first page of her book on political reconciliation, Anne Sa’adah asserts 
that 
A democratizing regime may execute or imprison or temporarily disenfranchise 
some figures from the preceding dictatorship, but it will not be able to exclude 
 
554 ‘großer Bequemlichkeit‘, ‘wieder‘, ibid. 
555 ‘!Ein Eigentor nach dem Anderen!‘, ibid. 
556 ‘zwar einerseits befreit aber andererseits auch enteignet fühle‘, StA Erfurt, A16883 Oberbürgermeister 
Schriftverkehr 1990-1992, ‘Brief an den Herrn Oberbürgermeister‘, Erfurt, 02 September 1990. 
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all individuals who supported the fallen regime.557  
 
On examining the first year of free elections in the GDR, this statement rings 
true. For while citizens set about establishing new structures, it would take the 
cooperation of all members of society and mutual trust for those new structures 
to succeed. In particular, the elections, which were to take place under intense 
conditions and a tight time frame, depended on the knowledge and expertise of 
the former state administration. These actors, although willing in principal to 
support the implementation of new structures and procedures, nevertheless 
had the opportunity to reassert themselves in instances where they felt their 
own contribution was being devalued. As such, the organisation of the elections 
became a delicate negotiation between new actors, who came in with good 
intentions but little experience, and the former state administration that already 
suspected that they would soon be replaced. 
   Although different groups were therefore reliant on one another, their 
means were not equally weighted. In the political campaign, citizens feared that 
the successor groups to the Socialist Unity Party would use their political 
capital to regain control of the country. In support of the eastern ‘opposition’, 
western politicians blatantly ignored the rules set by the East German 
parliament for the upcoming election and supplied their political counterparts 
with financial, material, strategical and personnel support throughout the 
election campaign. Consequently, the power balance shifted, but this time it 
was the wealth of the western backers that would greatly determine the chances 
 
557 Sa’adah, Germany’s Second Chance, p. 1. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 161 
of the eastern political groups in the parliamentary elections. Genuine fears that 
old networks were still active and influencing the new elections were played 
out and politicised as part of the election campaign, with the Stasi past being 
appropriated to influence voting behaviour. Nationalistic identity concepts and 
promises of financial opportunities were used to win voters during times of 
great instability. 
 All the while, citizens navigated a new political culture and new formal 
rules and regulations. As well as being faced with an array of information and 
having to decipher new campaign tactics, citizens prepared to vote under new 
conditions, in many cases, for the very first time. This experience was a 
significant landmark in the lives of GDR citizens and was therefore 
accompanied by strong feelings of joy, excitement and expectation. The result of 
the election, on the other hand, would counter this feeling of progress and 
accomplishment by demonstrating how divergent the views of the electorate 
were, and by essentially dividing the country into winners and losers.  
  In the communal elections, the focus on Stasi structures was intended to 
create transparency but instead reaped further distrust amongst citizens and 
towards the newly elected representatives. Although this investigation 
presented an opportunity to re-establish trust in society, the way it was 
negotiated between national and local groups and politicised as part of the 
election campaigns only helped to spread suspicions. As such, the polity 
became increasingly disengaged and communal actors feared personal 
repercussions if they were to continue in politics.  
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The repercussions for former elites continued, with the focus shifting to 
former party members. Even when new parliamentary structures had been 
introduced to facilitate discussion and decision-making, the peer pressure that 
had evolved through the season of demonstrations still had the power to 
convince groups of elected officials. The practices of exclusion that were 
undermined in the autumn were turned around, and citizens with former links 
to the Ministry for Security or Socialist Unity Party were ousted from their 
positions and banished from public life using the new political procedures. 
Strong emotions stoked the divisions in society, despite the urgent need to 
work together over the transformation process. 
By the end of 1990, new structures and practices had been established 
and consolidated, but the communicative culture had not grown with it. A new 
political party was in power and accordingly, there were new political rituals to 
adhere to. But to some, the tone of communication and the need to conform was 
reminiscent of former times and showed little change. By silently withdrawing 
their support, citizens staged a kind of mute-iny, by refusing to obey and 
execute orders from above. In this sense, this chapter has demonstrated how 
purposeful silence can be implemented to express feelings of bitterness and 
dissatisfaction, but also to reassert the importance of respectful communication 
and appreciation of others. As political participation and freedom of expression 
was channelled from the streets into new structures, the next chapter will look 
more closely at how new styles of political communication were negotiated in 
public. 
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3. The Tone of Voice 
 Print the truth! 
On the eighteenth of January 1990, the new chief editor of the district newspaper 
took to the podium outside the cathedral in Erfurt to address the crowds. The 
masses continued to gather on the square every Thursday, as they had done 
during the autumn, but the gatherings had changed from political 
demonstrations to information events about the state of the country and the 
work of the local representatives and the new political groups. Although the 
events would wane in the weeks to come and would be replaced by political 
campaigns for the upcoming elections, they were the culmination of a process in 
which information had been taken from the closed rooms and state-approved 
publications to the streets and open spaces, where they could be heard and 
responded to by all, in public. 
As the editor announced that he was from ‘the new Thüringer Allgemeine’, 
the paper that was formerly named Das Volk and officially the mouthpiece of the 
Socialist Unity Party in the region, he was greeted by rapturous applause.558 ‘I’m 
grateful for the applause’, he said, ‘because I assume it means we will receive the 
solidarity we need to go down the new path that the paper has recently 
chosen.’559 The crowd confirmed his interpretation with more applause and 
shouts of agreement. He must have been slightly relieved, for speakers from state 
organisations had received a very different welcome to the stage in the weeks 
 
558 ‘Ich komme von der neuen Thüringer Allgemeinen‘, StA Erfurt, 6/7 Tonbandaufnahmen, ‘Die Wende 
in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger‘, Studio B, 2000 
559 ‘Ich freue mich über das Klatschen, weil ich vermute, wir bekommen die nötige Solidarität um den Weg 
zu gehen, den wir diese Tage mit dieser Zeitung eingeschlagen haben‘, ibid. 
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before. In October, demonstrators in Erfurt had marched past the newspaper’s 
headquarters shouting ‘Print the truth!’.560 At that time, two thirds of the 
editorial team still saw no reason to distance themselves from the Socialist Unity 
Party, and it would take another two months and significant pressure from local 
activists before they would eventually change their minds.561  
The editor’s next message, self-proclaimed as being of utmost importance 
to his listeners, was: ‘I am independent (not in a political party), and I was before 
October too!’562 Again, the crowds approved and encouraged him to continue. 
Crucially, it was the newspaper itself that had decided to cut ties with the 
Socialist Unity Party a few days beforehand, leading the way for other papers in 
the country.563 The ‘independent’ badge would soon adorn the cover pages of all 
papers in the region, to draw the line between the previous affiliations of the 
press in the GDR and its new secular role in society. Although the new editor 
had been working for the paper since 1971, his lack of party membership was 
enough to gain the support of the people. 
He went on to explain the developments of the preceding weeks, as 
members of the organisation had tried to reach a compromise with the Socialist 
Unity Party to buy the newspaper’s freedom. The symbolic transaction, 
originally set at one Mark – ‘East or West’ – had angered the party leaders, who 
 
560 ‘Schreibt die Wahrheit!‘, Christiane Baumann, 'Die Geschichte einer Parteizeitung: Die 
Unabhängigkeitserklärung‘, Thüringer Allgemeine (02 January 2016) <https://www.thueringer-
allgemeine.de/leben/vermischtes/die-geschichte-einer-parteizeitung-10 -die-unabhaengigkeits 
erklaerung-id221428113.html> (accessed 10 July 2019). 
561 Baumann, ‘Die Geschichte einer Parteizeitung’. 
562 ‘Ich bin parteilos und das nicht erst seit dem Oktober‘, StA Erfurt, 6/7 Tonbandaufnahmen, ‘Die Wende 
in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger‘, Studio B, 2000 
563 Baumann, ‘Die Geschichte einer Parteizeitung’. 
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had been hoping to use the paper to campaign for the planned elections in 
March.564  
Right until the end, they tried to blackmail us. We weren’t to get any paper. Like 
everyone else in this country, you all know that you can’t have a newspaper 
without paper.565  
 
Through his detailed descriptions of the negotiations around paper supplies and 
finances, the editor offered the audience insights into the complexities of 
renegotiating independence for the press, and the intricate links and 
dependencies between different state organisations and suppliers.  
  All this, he said, was worth it to ensure that the press would serve the 
people as ‘a critical companion on political events’.566 This statement was met by 
the greatest applause of the evening, although he was quick to rein it in. ‘I think 
you are clapping too soon. It’s not that easy, and it won’t change through 
clapping. It’s going to take a lot of hard work’.567 He argued that the change 
would require a change on behalf of the people as well. ‘Not overnight’, he said, 
for it would take time.568 Nevertheless, it would be necessary for the journalists 
to find new topics and approaches, and for the citizens to recognise and honour 
this by continuing to read the paper.  In so saying, the editor stressed the 
 
564 ‘eine Mark, Ost oder West‘, ‘Der Thüringen Talk mit Sergej Lochthofen: Die Presse nach der Wende‘, 
Podcast, Antenne Thüringen, 28 August 2018 <https://www.antennethueringen.de/blog/hashtag/ 
antenne-thUeringen-podcasts-368226> (accessed 16 November2018). 
565 ‘Bis zuletzt hat man versucht, uns zu erpressen. Wir sollten kein Papier kriegen. Sie wissen wie alle in 
diesem Lande, kann keine Zeitung ohne (…) Papier (…) erscheinen‘, StA Erfurt, 6/7 Tonbandaufnahmen, 
‘Die Wende in Erfurt 1989/90, Eine Tonbanddokumentation von Manfred Boettger‘, Studio B, 2000. 
566 ‘als kritischer Begleiter der politischen Ereignisse‘, ibid. 
567 ‘Ich glaube Sie klatschen zu früh – das ist nicht so leicht, das lässt sich nicht hier mit Klatschen machen. 
Wir werden viel daran arbeiten müssen‘, ibid. 
568 ‘nicht (…) über Nacht‘, ibid. 
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interdependence of the citizens and their institutions and called for greater 
patience and compassion.  
  In the last part of the recording, the editor thanked the staff at the paper’s 
printing house Fortschritt for providing the new editorial team with the support 
and solidarity that they needed to continue with the paper, and for thereby 
countering attempts to blackmail the new committee. The message was clear: 
change will only come by working together and supporting one another through 
the hurdles. The printing houses had played a vital role in reforming the GDR 
press landscape, leading the way for new public discussions. The former SED 
agitprop secretary remembers attending an extremely ‘stinging and contrary’ 
workplace debate with staff at Fortschritt in September 1989 that left such a 
marked impression that it forced the SED secretaries in Erfurt to begin talks 
amongst their own ranks.569 Later, it was the printing houses that first challenged 
the continued affiliation of the papers with the SED, with the print staff in nearby 
Suhl going on strike on the sixth of January 1990.570 On Saturday, thirteenth of 
January, two hundred members of the Fortschritt staff in Erfurt gathered for a six-
hour debate, voting against their district manager to cut ties with the Socialist 
Unity Party, and not ‘to go down with them’, as he had suggested.571  
  As demonstrated by the editor’s speech, the media, the state and citizens 
were all connected and interdependent on one another. The citizens were now 
demanding that the press function by a different set of values to before, but it 
 
569 ‘scharf und konträr‘, Interview with Wolfgang Mühle, Erfurt, 13 August 2018. 
570 Baumann, 'Die Geschichte einer Parteizeitung’. 
571 ‘mit der Partei in Ehren unterzugehen‘, ibid. 
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would take patience and commitment from all to succeed. What role would these 
connections play in the following months, as the East German press attempted to 
enact the democratic transformation requested by the citizens? How would the 
different actors react to the new forms and styles of communication, the new 
tone of voice and the inherent set of values? To what extent would free 
journalism encourage the use of voice? 
Bernd Weisbrod argues that in order to analyse medialisation 
historically, it is important to focus not just on the institutions and actors, but 
precisely on the space in between.572 Political medialisation is ‘a process of 
configuration and valuation of political publics’.573 These public discourses can 
be channelled, but they are in no way fixed.574 Rather, medialisation takes place 
when these discourses enter the public space to be negotiated. Through this 
ongoing renegotiation, a ‘communicative consciousness’ develops, which in turn 
‘strengthens and opens’ the political public sphere.575 By focussing on 
communication conflicts in detail, it becomes possible to examine how political 
norms and values are asserted and negotiated in public. Especially during times 
of transformation, when former norms are rejected as they were in the autumn of 
1989, new possibilities emerge. Nonetheless, a new communicative culture still 
needs to be negotiated in what becomes an ongoing process of practising voice. 
The citizens gathered on the cathedral square in Erfurt in January 1990 called for 
an independent press, but how would they react to the new style of reporting 
 
572 Bernd Weisbrod (Ed.), Die Politik der Öffentlichkeit – Die Öffentlichkeit der Politik. Politische Medialisierung 
in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), p. 19. 
573 ‘Prozeß der Konfiguration und Inwertsetzung politischer Öffentlichkeiten‘, ibid., p. 20. 
574 Ibid. 
575 ‘des kommunikativen Bewusstseins‘, 'zusammenhält und gleichzeitig potentiell öffnet‘, ibid. 
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that would develop over the years to come? What effect would these new forms 
of communication and information sharing have on the other interdependent 
actors?  
Although the Socialist Unity Party had instructed the regional 
newspapers to continue reporting for the party until June 1990, Das Volk in Erfurt 
was one of the first papers to take the decision to change its name and profess 
independent reporting.576 Internally, many eastern papers elected new editors 
from within their ranks, and Stasi-informers were made to leave, but the majority 
of journalists continued in their roles.577 From early 1990, daily and monthly local 
newspapers proliferated in the region, as demand for new journalism and up-to-
date information rocketed. These were accompanied by the arrival of various 
West German formats, from Bild to taz, and new papers from the eastern political 
parties.578  
For a brief period, these new startups were able to break the monopoly of 
the SED-papers, but this was shortlived. Due to widely practised ‘price-
dumping’ by western papers, smaller eastern startups soon died out again, 
unable to keep up, financially, with the competition.579 At this point, there were 
no official guidelines for the press from the East German government under 
 
576 Ulrich Erzigkeit, Selbstbefreiung. Wie aus dem SED-Blatt „Volkswacht“ die unabhängige Regionalzeitung 
„Ostthüringer Zeitung“ (OTZ) wurde (Essen: Klartext, 2015), p. 22. 
577 Ilona Wuschig, Anspruch ohne Wirklichkeit. 15 Jahre Medien in Ostdeutschland (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005), 
p. 164. 
578 Ibid., pp. 159-160. 
579 ‘Dumpingpreise‘, a term referring to the practice of western papers selling their newspapers at the same 
price in the East, but in GDR Mark, before the currency union; ibid., p. 162.  
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Hans Modrow, and with the Thuringian state government not yet being in place, 
it would take longer for the federal rules on the media to be implemented.580 
Just a few years later, from 1993 to 1996, all Thuringian papers – aside 
from the Freies Wort newspaper in Suhl – would be bought up by the Thüringer 
Allgemeine, formerly the Socialist Unity Party paper Das Volk, and eventually sold 
to the umbrella company WAZ (Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung), now Funke 
Mediengruppe,581 by the Treuhand trust.582 Although researchers with private 
contracts have been given access to write the history of the regional paper,583 I 
was told by the editorial board that the archive no longer exists.584 This chapter 
therefore relies on sources from town and city council records, newspaper 
articles and oral history interviews. It looks at communication conflicts in the 
space between the media, the state and the citizens in Erfurt and Eisenach to 
understand how the press was used as a form of voice in the public sphere from 
1990 onwards. In so doing, it looks at the press, not in isolation, but rather as a 
central actor in the creation of a new, open public sphere, and asks how print 




580 Ibid., p. 161. 
581 Christiane Baumann, 'Die Geschichte einer Parteizeitung: Die Unabhängigkeitserklärung‘. 
582 Wuschig, Anspruch ohne Wirklichkeit, p. 159. 
583 See the ten-part series by Christiane Baumann, ‘Die Geschichte einer Parteizeitung’. 
584 Email reply from the chief secretary of the Thüringer Landeszeitung on 07 August 2018, in response to a 
request sent on 13 March 2018 for access to documents relating to the Thüringer Allgemeine, the 
Eisenacher Presse, the Thüringer Tagesblatt, the Mitteldeutsche Allgemeine and the Thüringer Tagespost 
from 1990 onwards. 
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Freedom of Expression 
Journalism in Limbo 
Looking back at his first few months as chief editor of the Thüringer Allgemeine, 
the editor admitted that it proved difficult to introduce the desired reforms at the 
local paper.585  Many of his colleagues were unwilling to make the transition 
from partisan journalism to independent reporting and trying to recruit fresh 
faces to their newspaper brought mixed experiences. Furthermore, the technical 
structures at the paper were outdated, with delivery via the East German postal 
service failing to reach their customers on time. ‘Trying to regain trust and 
credibility under these circumstances was the biggest challenge’, he added.586 
And then there was the competition.  
In 1990, the demand for news and information in Thuringia was so great, 
that a disproportionate total of seven local papers had been established in the 
town of Eisenach by the end of the year.587 Newspaper outlets wanting to stock 
the full range of available newspapers were so short of space that papers and 
magazines started piling up on the shop floors.588 In Erfurt, two sales people 
from the newly founded Thüringer Anzeiger, ‘Newspaper for Business, Politics 
and Culture’ sold two-thousand copies of their new paper within two hours 
outside of the main train station in January 1990.589 A further five-hundred 
 
585 Interview with Sergej Lochthofen in Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Unter Druck!: Medien und Politik (Bielefeld: Kerber, 2014), pp. 156. 
586 ‘In dieser Situation für Vertrauen zu werben und Glaubwürdigkeit zurückzugewinnen war die größte 
Herausforderung‘, ibid. 
587 Interview with Klaus Wuggazer, 10 February 2018. 
588 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Seit Wochen unüberschaubare Zeitungsflut in den Kiosken – DDR-
Blätter nicht mehr so gefragt bei den Kunden‘, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, Tagespost, 129, 09 August 1990. 
589 StA Erfurt, 3800 50.3/39 Zeitungen, ‘Bevölkerung freut sich rieisig über „Thüringer Anzeiger“‘, 
Wilfried Schnitker, Thüringer Anzeiger. 2/1, 9 February 1990. 
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copies, which had been delivered to the local book shop Peterknecht, were also 
gone within minutes.590 
In Eisenach, a local tradesman had organised for the Oberhessische Presse 
to be sold in his home town, complete with a special section on local news from 
Eisenach. He had met the managing director of the daily newspaper in the West 
German partner town, Marburg, through the town twinning programme and 
arranged with his boss at the GDR Trading Organisation HO 
(Handelsorganisation) for their shops to stock the Eisenach offshoot of the paper 
in exchange for a thirty percent share in revenue.591 On the eighteenth of 
January 1990, he collected thirty-thousand copies of the Oberhessische Presse in 
person from Marburg, totalling twice the amount usually sold in West 
Germany.592  As he turned onto the market square in Eisenach with his 
delivery, he caught sight of the thousands of citizens that had gathered there in 
anticipation. The demand for the first cross-border-newspaper was so great, 
that the first copies would never make it to the shop; they were sold directly 
from the van.593 
  Although the interest in non-partisan news was great, new papers 
starting out faced significant infrastructural challenges that shaped their day-to-
day business. The lack of telephone lines meant that journalists would have to 
go out and speak to people in person in order to gain information and advice 
 
590 Ibid. 
591 Klaus Wuggazer, ‘Zeuchner und die erste deutsch-deutsche Zeitung‘, Thüringer Allgemeine, 06 February 
2015 <https://www.thueringerallgemeine.de/leben/land-und-leute/25-jahre-thueringen-zeuchner-und-
die-erste-deutsch-deutsche-zeitung-id220688753.html> (accessed 05 January 2020). 
592 Wuggazer, ‘Zeuchner und die erste deutsch-deutsche Zeitung‘, p. 3. 
593 Ibid. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 172 
on possible news stories. This cultivated a style of journalism that a journalist, 
formerly of the Eisenacher Presse, describes as ‘going out, looking, smelling, 
tasting, feeling, listening, speaking with people, digging deep down into topics 
and then writing it up. ’594 ‘It’s an ideal world’, he said.595 ‘Hard work 
though’.596  
Fortunately for this journalist, citizens and state workers alike were open 
and willing to talk to him and provide him with information and insider know-
how. In advance of a meeting with a village mayor, for example, the Swabian 
journalist would ask local contacts for background information on the person.597 
Similarly, conversations with locals as part of his investigative journalism 
allowed him to familiarise himself with aspects of GDR culture, as contacts 
readily explained linguistic terms and the former structures around communal 
life.598 This allowed him to ‘feel at home’ very quickly, as he ‘inhaled’ the local 
way of life.599 It also demonstrates, however, how different the culture and 
structures in the GDR were, and how important such insights were in order to 
understand the issues determining the every day. 
These insights also informed his journalism, leading him to discover 
interesting stories, as interviewees readily ‘recounted a load of stuff’.600 In some 
cases, however, the locals’ willingness to talk and openly share information 
 
594 ‘Das war rausgehen, gucken, riechen, schmecken, fühlen, hören, mit Leuten reden und sich dann 
wirklich tief reinarbeiten in die Themen und dann schreiben’, Interview with Klaus Wuggazer, 10 
February 2018. 
595 ‘Das ist der Idealfall halt‘, ibid. 
596 ‘Anstrengend, aber (…)’, ibid. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid. 
599 ‘Und drum bin ich sehr schnell hier heimisch geworden auch, weil ich am Anfang das alles so inhaliert 
habe, also in mich reingesogen hab, wie man hier gelebt hat’, ibid. 
600 ‘Dann ist man zu dem, dann hat der ein Haufen Zeug erzählt’, ibid. 
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startled the West German journalist. Especially new members of the local town 
administration, who were not used to working with a free press, would not 
hesitate to speak to him.  
I thought, ‘oh wow, I really am a lucky journalist (…)  
he does not think before he speaks, he is telling me everything’.601  
 
As formal structures for dealing with the press had not yet been established, 
journalists would simply walk into a company or office and demand to be 
shown around.602  
Although he was quite aware that such practices would not have been 
possible in West Germany, the journalist readily made use of the informal 
structures. 
I thought it was great, that you could go up to anyone and have a chat. Or with 
many people, at least, that many recounted information that would be very 
hard to come by in West Germany.603 
 
Nevertheless, the journalist explained that he would ‘protect’ lower-ranking 
individuals who had passed on information by not printing their names in the 
article, for fear that it could cause them trouble at work.604 
 When structures were introduced in the second half of 1990, the 
journalist protested by writing articles about the ‘censure’ of free speech in the 
communal and regional structures, and the ‘undemocratic obstruction of a free 
 
601 ‘wo ich gedacht habe "Ohohoh, ich habe richtig Glück als Journalist (…) der denkt nicht nach, der 
erzählt mir alles"’, ibid. 
602 Ibid. 
603 ‘Ich fand das toll, dass man zu jedem hingehen konnte und einfach mit dem quatschen konnte. Oder 
mit vielen jedenfalls, dass viele Sachen erzählt haben, die man im Westen nur ganz schwer und mit sehr 
viel Umwegen erfahren hat‘, ibid. 
604 ‘geschützt‘, ibid. 
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press’.605  Even though he knew that such structures were commonplace in 
West Germany, he had relished the opportunities that the lack of regulations 
had brought for journalism. He noted that people made particularly good use of 
political debates around this time, and that there was a great deal of ‘freedom of 
speech, freedom of opinion’.606 He would publish thoroughly on these debates, 
recounting who had said what or presented which arguments. Not everyone, 
however, shared his passion for political debates, with some colleagues 
apparently referring to them instead as ‘political quarrels’.607 The perception of 
these new forms of political communication were therefore not wholly positive, 
with some journalists not seeing it within their remit or in the interest of the 
readers to report on divergent opinions, or at least not in this format.  
 While the western journalist considered the role of the press to be ‘to 
explain democracy’ and provide ‘critical reports’, the readers demanded other 
information.608  In response to growing unemployment, the newspapers turned 
to giving regular legal advice, offering ‘clear and easy to understand’ printed 
materials on employment law in the Federal Republic of Germany.609  Another 
important issue in 1990 was consumer information, as readers asked for help on 
what to do with unnecessary insurances and other products that had been 
bought under false marketing.610  Next, they began requesting price 
comparisons for produce, as prices soared. On the third of August 1990, for 
 
605 ‘Zensur‘, 'und quasi undemokratisch hier versucht, die freie Presse zu behindern‘, ibid. 
606 ‘Redefreiheit, Gedankenfreiheit‘, ibid. 
607 ‘Politische Streitereien‘, ibid. 
608 ‘Demokratie erklären‘, 'kritisch berichten‘, ibid. 
609 ‘klar und verständlich‘. StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Aktuelles Arbeitsrecht der BRD‘, Oberhessische 
Presse / Eisenacher Presse (27-28 Juli 1990). 
610 Interview with Klaus Wuggazer, 10 February 2018. 
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example, the Eisenacher Presse printed a full-page article entitled ‘What’s the 
cost of bread and butter?’, comparing the price of groceries in the West and East 
German partner towns.611 This was a first, the journalist explained. ‘Never 
before, and never again did I see anything like it’.612 
 Whereas readers readily served up information and stories that 
journalists could use for investigative journalism, the demand from customers 
in 1990 was for advice and information on how to deal with the many new 
aspects of political, social and economic life.  The newspapers were to serve the 
main function of providing reliable information, and the journalists found 
themselves unable to avoid succumbing to these demands. Nevertheless, 
critical articles on communal issues would continue to be printed in the local 
press, leading to conflicts with the town council.  
 
Bad Press  
In some cases, the pressure from the press and the general public impacted 
heavily on the work of the local council. In January 1990, a member of the 
citizens’ group Neues Forum in Eisenach published an article in Das Volk, 
criticising the decision of the mayor to employ the former director of the 
Handelsorganisation on an honorary basis.613 Suggesting that the mayor could be 
acting on personal interests, he questioned why money had been found for 
 
611 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Was kosten Butter und Brot? OP/Eisenacher Presse vergleicht die Preise 
in Eisenach und Marburg‘, Oberhessische Presse / Eisenacher Presse (03 August 1990), p. 11.  
612 ‘das habe ich noch nie erlebt, nie vorher und nie hinterher‘, Interview with Klaus Wuggazer, 10 
February 2018. 
613 StA Eisenach, 12-2298 Städtische Akten bis 1990; Neuverteilung von Gebäuden, ‘Gegen einen 
Ausverkauf. Fragen zu zweifelhaften Verhandlungspraktiken des Rates der Wartburgstadt mit Firmen aus 
der Bundesrepublik‘, Das Volk, 4 January 1990. 
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‘non-transparent manipulation’, but not for the opening of the local museum 
and the tourist information.614 The article concluded ‘We are against the sell-out 
of the GDR and our home town Eisenach. This sell-out must be stopped 
immediately through the governance of the mayor and the town council. Even 
the town council must seek approval from the Round Table before taking any 
decisions that go against the interests of the citizens of Eisenach’.615 
Four days later, the mayor responded with a letter to the press, asking for 
unedited publication.616 In response to the article, he asked what exactly he 
believed was being sold off; the ‘disfunctional sewerage system’, the 
‘insufficiently’ sized gas pipelines, the ‘delapidated’ hospitals, industry with its 
‘decades-old technology’, or the ‘veteran public transport buses’?617 By giving 
details of the condition of much of the town’s infrastructure, the mayor argued 
against the concept of a sell-out and asserted that the town was in need of all 
the help it could get.  
Describing how the council had been inundated with offers from companies 
in the Federal Republic, the mayor explained that the town was in need of 
someone with knowledge of economics and business, in order to manage these 
contacts and determine which offers would best benefit the town.618 He 
 
614 ‘undurchsichtige Manipulationen’, ibid. 
615 ‘Wir sind gegen einen Ausverkauf der DDR und unserer Heimatstadt Eisenach. Dieser Ausverkauf 
muß sofort durch die Kontrolle des Bürgermeisters und den Rat der Stadt gestoppt werden. Auch ein Rat 
der Stadt hat ohne Zustimmung des Runden Tisch keine Entscheidungen, die gegen die Interessen der 
Bürger Eisenachs sind, zu treffen‘, ibid.  
616 StA Eisenach, 12-2298 Städtische Akten bis 1990; Neuverteilung von Gebäuden, ‘Brief vom 
Bürgermeister an den Kreisredakteur, DAS VOLK Kreisredaktion Eisenach‘, 08 January 1990. 
617 ‘das nicht mehr funktionstüchtige Abwasserungssystem’, ‘nicht ausreichender Leitungsquerschnitte’, 
‘schlechten baulichen Zustand’, ‘jahrzehntealter Technik’, ‘die Busse des Kraftverkehrs, die Veteranenalter 
erreicht haben’, ibid. 
618 Ibid. 
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explained that the new member of staff was not given free reign over these 
decisions, but had to run every step past the mayor.619 As a result of the 
accusations against him and the bad press, the member of staff had however 
decided to step down, meaning that this project was now at a standstill.620 In a 
press statement, which the Thüringer Landeszeitung gave the headline ‘Sensitive 
reactions in sensitive times’, the former HO worker explained that he was not 
the ‘Coordinator for Cooperation with the FRG’, as the paper had claimed, and 
called for journalists to avoid propagating misconceptions.621 As a result of the 
media reaction, he had decided only to work in areas where he could be judged 
on his professional competency, and not on biased speculations.622 
The exchange presents two important issues influencing the transformation 
process at this point in time; namely, a distrust of new officials and fear of 
exploitation, and ever closer scrutiny of democratic procedures, communicated 
in the press through the provocative narrative of a sell-out of the GDR. 
Although this in no doubt complicated the work of the town officials and led 
people to step down to escape the unwanted attention, these disputes were 
nevertheless crucial to the creation of more transparency by sparking further 
clarification. The members of the Round Table in Eisenach, whose role was to 




621 ‘Koordinator für die Zusammenarbeit mit der BRD’, StA Eisenach, 12-2298 Städtische Akten bis 1990; 
Neuverteilung von Gebäuden, ‘Sensible Reaktion in sensiblen Zeiten‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 09 
January 1990. 
622 Ibid. 
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insist on their own authority, but in so doing reminded the new political leaders 
of the need for democratic scrutiny.  
The misunderstandings arising around the work of the town council 
therefore pointed towards areas where procedures still needed to be made more 
transparent. With growing economic problems and business pressures, the 
town council however had little time to devote to such causes. As such, instead 
of aiding transparency, the public conflicts and the reactions to them obstructed 
and delayed the work of the council, as members of staff struggled to cope with 
the public criticism and scrutiny.  
 
The National Summit of East German Council Leaders 
On Friday, the fourteenth of September 1990, a few weeks before the official 
reunification of East and West Germany, the city council in Erfurt held a 
summit to discuss the new communal constitution, which was due to come into 
effect from October.  Invitations had gone out across East Germany, with 
positive replies from councils in Suhl, Gera, Magdeburg, Rostock, Frankfurt an 
der Oder, Cottbus, Potsdam, Chemnitz, Leipzig and Dresden. All thirteen 
confirmed participants – all of them council leaders or deputies, save for one 
press secretary - turned up to meet with their peers from Erfurt.   
The mobilisation of eastern council leaders was in part a response to the 
establishment of new state parliaments across the regions, and a ‘political 
advisory panel’ in Thuringia. The fear that these new structures would limit the 
powers of the local councils, or that the eastern experience of democratisation 
would be dismissed as western influences gained hold, was at the forefront of 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 179 
discussions. Furthermore, suggestions that the role of council leader would be 
removed under the new structures meant that their own positions were at risk. 
Speakers stressed the importance of ‘shaping public opinion’.623 
For the times when things are rushed, from above, and then it’s confirmed and 
then it’s over, these times should be over.  Everyone should be involved in the 
process of developing the state and communal constitutions.624 
 
However, the meeting was also to serve as a chance to share experiences from 
the past hundred days of council leadership, and to consider how the newly 
developed good practice could be protected and used to shape the future 
constitution. Aspects of their work such as ‘closeness to citizens’ and ‘non-
partisanship’ were considered particular strengths of the eastern councils.625 In 
order to ensure that the voices and practices of eastern colleagues would be 
safeguarded in future, it was decided early on to document the meeting. The 
surviving audio record now gives insight into the issues, ideas and mood in 
East German communal politics in the run up to Reunification.  
 On the second day, after introductions and reports from all the delegates 
about the names and structures of their councils, lengthy discussions on how to 
influence legislation made at state level, and the cooperation of the various 
political factions, the topic turned to the much-awaited subject: public relations. 
‘How do the councils in the various towns reach the public?’, asked the speaker 
 
623 ‘dass wir auf den Meinungsbildungsprozess Einfluss nehmen‘, StA Erfurt, 6-7/A11, 'Versammlung des 
Rates der Stadt am 14./15. September 1990 -Tagung bzw. Informationsveranstaltung des Rates der Stadt 
Erfurt zur Kommunalverfassung‘, 14-15 September 1990. 
624 ‘Denn, die Zeiten wo also, so schnell gekocht, von oben und so, dann wird das bestätigt und dann ist 
Schluss. Die sollten vorbei sein. Es sollte wirklich über die Länderverfassung und über die 
Kommunalverfassung wirklich gründlich mit allen beraten werden‘, ibid. 
625 ‘Bürgernähe‘, 'Überparteilichkeit‘, ibid. 
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from Erfurt.626 He began by detailing the lengths the council in Erfurt had gone 
to to publish their decisions, including by issuing an ‘official gazette’ for every 
household that cost the council twenty-thousand marks a month, soon to 
double in price.627  
 Astonishment filled the room, as delegates questioned where the city 
council in Erfurt got the money from. The president of the city council of 
Magdeburg said he requested the discussion on public relations because he had 
also considered issuing an official gazette, ‘but there’s simply no money. We 
knew we should do it, but we don’t have the money for it, and so the council 
can’t do it’.628 Consequently, the council in Magdeburg kept the wording of 
their municipal charter as vague as possible: ‘the citizens are to be informed 
about important issues in an appropriate manner’.629 ‘In an appropriate 
manner’, he repeated.630 ‘A piece of paper on a noticeboard in the town hall is 
not appropriate for a city, though, is it?’.631 
 Whilst other delegates agreed that the cost was keeping them from 
publishing an own paper, the President of Rostock Parliament doubted the 
efficiency of printing a paper in such large numbers. ‘Is it really worth it?’ he 
asked the representatives from Erfurt.632 He pointed out that not everyone 
would be interested, and citizens were already being overwhelmed by the flood 
 
626 ‘Wie (…) kommt die Ratsversammlung an die Öffentlichkeit, in den einzelnen Städten?‘, ibid. 
627 ‘Amtsblatt‘, ibid. 
628 ‘es ist einfach kein Geld da. Wir wussten, dass wir es eigentlich machen müssten, wir haben aber kein 
Geld dafür, das zu machen, und deswegen hat es das Magistrat auch nicht machen können‘, ibid. 
629 ‘auf geeigneter Weise ist die Bevölkerung von wichtigen Dingen zu berichten durch den Magistrat‘, 
ibid. 
630 ‘(…) auf geeigneter Weise‘, ibid. 
631 ‘Ein Blatt im Rathaus ist ja keine geeignete Weise für eine Großstadt‘, ibid. 
632 ‘Ob sich das denn lohnt?‘, ibid. 
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of daily papers. Although he admitted that he would like to produce an official 
gazette, he argued that there would only be enough copies for those who 
wished to pick up a copy themselves from the town hall. ‘I like the idea’, he 
said, ‘that people who want to be informed have to take the steps themselves. 
That they come and collect it’.633   
 ‘Well we think it’s a price we should be willing to pay’, argued the 
speaker from Erfurt early on during the discussion.634 ‘After all, we desperately 
want to make our work transparent’.635 Only a few sentences later, he went on 
to explain the real reason the paper was brought out, and the city’s qualms with 
the local press.  
Unfortunately, if I’m honest, the cooperation with the general press in Erfurt is 
not particularly good. They hardly report on the work of the council, and if they 
do, then in a rather very biased and contrary way that we don’t like at all. For 
this reason, we said, well, if the press doesn’t want to do it, then we’ll do it 
ourselves. And so, that’s how the official gazette came about, fortnightly.636  
As an example, he explained that the city council in Erfurt had recently changed 
the name of their parliament from Rat der Stadt to Magistrat, as well as renaming 
its leading positions, but the press had neglected to report this important detail 
in the papers. ‘Not one mention. Nothing’.637 
A chuckle went around the room as the representative from Magdeburg 
described an article in their local tabloid, labelling one of his councillors as 
 
633 ‘Und mir gefällt diese Idee, (…) wenn Leute Informationen haben wollen, dass sie selber einen Schritt 
machen dabei. Dass sie sich das holen dann‘, ibid. 
634 ‘Aber wir sind der Meinung, das muss es uns wert sein‘, ibid. 
635 ‘Wir wollen ja unbedingt unsere Arbeit transparent machen‘, ibid. 
636 ‘Leider, und das muss ich ehrlich sagen, klappt es mit der Allgemeinpresse in Erfurt nicht besonders 
gut. Es wird sehr wenig über das Parlament berichtet und dann meistens auch ein bisschen sehr 
tendenziös und in eine Gegenrichtung, die uns gar nicht gefällt. Und aus diesem Grunde heraus haben wir 
eben dann gesagt, also wenn die Presse nicht will, dann machen wir das selber, und so ist letzten Endes 
dieses Amtsblatt erschienen, oder erscheint. 14-tägig‘, ibid. 
637 ‘davon hat die Presse überhaupt keinen Text verfasst. Gar nichts‘, ibid. 
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‘THE LAZIEST COUNCILLOR!’ for taking a two-week break.638 ‘If that’s the 
case’, he laughed, ‘then we’re all lazy, because the laziest can only be one of 
many’.639 The delegate from Chemnitz seconded his story:  
‘We have a lot of tabloid-like press too. I have a shock every time I open the 
paper in the evening. They’re pretty good at twisting things, aren’t they!’.640  
Other delegates confirmed that their local press had the same tendency to write 
in a way that was ‘not necessarily pro-council’, although they admitted that it 
varied from paper to paper.641 ‘But we can’t control it, after all, there is this 
freedom of the press now’.642  
A heated discussion on problems with the press ensued, as councillors 
shared their methods for dealing with issues and misunderstandings. One of 
the more common conflicts centred around the publication of false or 
misleading statements in the local papers. Town and city councils across East 
Germany tried to counter this by providing the press with timely information, 
copies of documents, and by holding regular press conferences to discuss 
developments. Many councils agreed that they were requesting daily 
newspaper roundups from their staff to allow them to correct any 
misinformation as and when it was printed. 
One delegate explained that they were unsure at what point council 
decisions should be made available to the public. Their charter stated that key 
decisions should be on display in the town hall for two weeks before being 
 
638 ‘DER FAULSTE STADTRAT‘, ibid. 
639 ‘Da haben wir gesagt, da sind wir ja alle faul, denn der faulste ist nur einer von faulen.‘ Ibid. 
640 ‘Wir haben zwar auch so ein Bildabklatsch mit dabei, das ist dann wunderbar, da trifft mich jeden 
Abend der Schlag wenn ich das aufschlage. Die verdrehen die Vorlagen auch sehr schön, ne’, ibid. 
641 ‘das jetzt nicht unbedingt Stadtverordnetenfreundlich berichtet wird‘, ibid. 
642 ‘Man kann’s ja jetzt nicht in der Hand haben, es ist ja diese Pressefreiheit gegeben‘, ibid. 
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confirmed at the next council meeting, so long as there are no objections. Until 
that point, however, it remained unclear whether the motion would be passed. 
Even then, due to numerous amendments, the council often needed the help of 
lawyers to determine the exact wording of the document. The resulting 
resolution was then written in such technical language, that it was not 
comprehensible for the general public. ‘We need to find someone who can 
rephrase the main content in a way that people will understand’.643 
Although there were ten to twelve journalists present during the 
meetings, their summaries were ‘individually’ very different, or they were 
passed on by telephone to the head office.644 In the worst case, journalists left 
before the end of a meeting or simply reported what was written on the 
programme without realising that the motion had been delayed or changed. 
This often resulted in ‘illogical’ and ‘silly things’ being published in the local 
press.645  
This turned out to be a common concern, as other delegates shared their 
own experiences with the discrepancy between the working hours of the press 
and the council. The local press in Magdeburg, for example, had also published 
draft proposals as supposed legislation, despite numerous press conferences to 
ensure that the journalists were kept up-to-date. ‘I have to keep telling them’, 
said the president of the council of Magdeburg, ‘what we gave you was just a 
proposal. In the olden days it would go through’, he laughed, ‘but not anymore. 
 
643 ‘Dass wir jetzt noch einen Partner finden, der das, ja den wesentlichen Inhalt dann aber 
allgemeinverständlich formuliert‘, ibid. 
644 ‘so ganz individuell‘, ibid. 
645 ‘ungereimt’, ‘ganz dumme Sachen’, ibid. 
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Not with us.’.646 In response, the journalists asked the city council to provide 
them with written copies of all proposals in advance, so they could be better 
informed, but the council refused, on the grounds that it caused constant 
confusion for the citizens, if ongoing motions were published in the press. This 
resulted in hefty arguments between the town and people; as the president 
explained, ‘I told them, if you can’t keep up during the council meeting, then 
you’re not a journalist’.647 
The councillors from Chemnitz voiced similar issues but explained that 
they had reached a good understanding with their colleagues from the press. 
‘We don’t send them the drafts, because there are newspapers that simply 
aren’t interested. They don’t come [to the town hall]’.648 For those that did, the 
city council provided copies of motions, but only if they were not longer than a 
few pages. In the case of a fifty-page pamphlet on town development that drew 
a lot of attention, the town refused to copy it due to the cost. ‘The press is quite 
understanding in those situations’,649 she explained. After considering whether 
or not to send information to all the papers, the town reached the decision that 
it was not financially viable, as they could not be sure that the information 
would be published. Instead, they took the approach that those papers that 
wanted information to sell their papers and boost sales would have to work for 
 
646 ‘Und ich muss ihnen dauernd sagen, das was wir Ihnen nun vorgeben, das war der Vorschlag. Das war 
früher so, dass das auch so durchging. (Lacht) Bei uns geht das nicht mehr so durch, ne’, ibid. 
647 ‘ich habe dann gesagt, wer nicht in der Lage ist nachkommen in der Sitzung selber, der ist für mich 
nicht Journalist‘, ibid. 
648 ‘dass wir ihnen nicht die Vorlagen zugeschickt haben, weil es Pressen gibt, die interessiert das ganz 
einfach nicht. Die kommen nicht,‘ ibid. 
649 ‘(…) die haben durchaus auch Verständnis für solche Situationen,‘ ibid. 
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it by coming to the town hall themselves. ‘After all, it is a free market’, she 
added.650 
Another delegate explained that he asked his staff to hand out copies of 
motions to the press at the start of the council meeting, ‘so they can’t distort 
it’.651 If the press were to publish something that was not confirmed then they 
would be simply be making a fool of themselves, he said. Nevertheless, he also 
raised the issue of equal treatment of all papers, and the need to counteract the 
‘hierarchy’ amongst the press.652 Handing out information directly to the 
journalists was a matter of ‘equality’, he argued.653 
Regulating what information reached the press, and when, was not 
simple to manage. The president of the town council in Potsdam spoke of 
complaints he received from councillors who had first heard of important 
information through the press. As a result, he considered changing the charter 
to include a pledge that information should not be passed onto the public in 
advance of the council meeting. Consequently, he was approached by a 
councillor whose son worked for the local press. Now he faced a dilemma of 
how to manage the circulation of information amongst family members.  
Towards the end of the discussion, a delegate from Erfurt jumped in to 
make an announcement: ‘By the way, on the topic of the press, we have agreed 
to give a statement at eleven o’clock. (…) Is anyone willing to go along?’.654 A 
 
650 'Ist ja auch eine Marktwirtschaft‘, ibid. 
651 '(…) da können sie sie nicht entstellen‘, ibid. 
652 ‘Stufenordnung‘, ibid. 
653 ‘Parität und Gleichberechtigung‘, ibid. 
654 ‘Ich muss mal hier unterbrechen, wir haben, wir sind beim Stichwort Presse, wir haben zumindest die 
Presse informiert und um 11 Uhr, ob jemand kommt, weiß ich nicht, aber davon ist auszugehen. (…) Wer 
wäre denn bereit, mal mitzugehen?‘, ibid. 
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new debate began about what to tell the press and how to present it, with 
requests for a written summary of the key meeting points. The suggestion was 
made to use the opportunity to emphasise the importance of the council leader 
role and to express the commitment of all participating councils to maintaining 
these positions under the new communal constitution. Arguments gathered 
included the importance of the council leader role for strengthening democracy, 
for scrutinising the work of the mayor and councillors, and for its special non-
partisan role. A final suggestion from another member was not to formalise it 
with a written statement, but to simply emphasise the importance of the role in 
a positive way: ‘there’s no need to be defensive’.655  
The record of the council leaders’ discussion on how to deal with a free 
press and ensure transparency gives insight into the ways in which both parties 
shaped the work of the other.  For example, conflicts around misinformation in 
the local press put pressure on the councils to change their meeting times, to 
hold press conferences, to appoint press secretaries and to start producing 
information materials. Equally, the individual choices of the town and city 
councils across East Germany regarding how they disseminated information to 
the press, meant that journalists had to adapt to the local practices when trying 
to collect information. This also brought about a cultural shift, as reporting 
mistakes shone a light on the new decision-making practices in communal 
politics.  
 
655 ‘nicht auf defensiver Art‘, ibid. 
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However, the meeting also reflects the varying attitudes of council 
leaders to working with a free press. While all agreed that the reporting style of 
some papers was unpleasant and, in some cases, frustrating, some were willing 
to simply laugh it off, whilst others looked to speak openly and constructively 
with the press to find solutions. For some councils, however, it was hard to 
accept that the papers should present their work in such individual, critical and 
contrary ways. There was a clearly an expectation for the press to disseminate 
news from the city council in ways that supported the work of the councillors 
and their staff. Eventually, recognition of the fact that the press was not obliged 
to report what the town told them to, or in the same manner, led the city 
councillors in certain towns to develop their own platforms for disseminating 
information to the press and the general public.  
 
No Room for Discussion 
Draht zum Staat? Rewiring the role of the press 
One month before the summit in Erfurt, the city mayor had given an interview 
for the newest local paper. The Allgemeiner Anzeiger, which appeared on the first 
of August 1990, was not that new, however.656 A newspaper with the same 
name was first founded in Erfurt on the first of May 1849, in association with 
the ratification of the Frankfurt Constitution.657 After changing hands a number 
of times, it became the Thüringer Allgemeine and Allgemeiner Anzeiger in 
February 1919, with the Anzeiger covering the names and addresses of local 
 
656 StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, ‘AA Allgemeiner Anzeiger Erfurt‘, (01 August 1990). 
657 StA Erfurt, 3-800/10, Erfurter Allgemeiner Anzeiger / Thüringer Allgemeine Zeitung 1849-1944, 
collection description. 
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businesses in the region of Thuringia until 1944.658 Forty-six years later, after the 
East German government stepped down in 1989, the local SED paper Das Volk 
changed its named to that of its regional predecessor Thüringer Allgemeine as 
part of its internal reform. With the re-establishment of the sister paper 
Allgemeiner Anzeiger half a year later, two familiar names from former times, 
reminiscent of previous attempts to create a federal German state, were back on 
the regional press landscape.  
Under the subtitle ‘Making the work of the city council transparent’, the 
mayor set out his plans for the paper and its cooperation with the city council. 
The council was to have its own dedicated section, ‘offering us the possibility of 
1:1 information, unedited, quick and direct’.659 The interview asks why the 
mayor had stressed the word unedited, to which he responded; 
I used to have issues with the press, because of the non-existent freedom of the 
press. But I still do today, too. Some people mistake freedom for generosity, 
only publishing parts of a story, which means it turns out skewed, and they 
don’t do enough research.660 
 
The Allgemeiner Anzeiger was to put an end to ‘skewed’ press reports, and to 
provide a direct link between the citizens and their communal representatives. 
The mayor explained that he received visits from one hundred citizens a week; 
a number that was simply not manageable.661 For the future, the citizens would 
 
658 Ibid. 
659 ‘die Möglichkeit der 1:1-Information (…), ohne journalistische Bearbeitung, schnell und direkt.‘ 
StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, ‘Exklusiv: OB-Interview zum Start des Allgemeinen Anzeigers‘, Allgemeiner 
Anzeiger (01 August 1990). 
660 ‘Ja, ich hatte früher meine Probleme mit der Presse. Hervorgerufen durch die nicht gegebene 
Pressefreiheit. Aber auch heute. Manche verwechseln Freiheit mit Großzügigkeit, veröffentlichen nur Teile 
einer Information, die dann verzerrt erscheint, recherchieren nicht genügend‘, ibid. 
661 Ibid. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 189 
have to develop trust in their elected officials, and the press should help in this 
respect.662 
Within half a year, the paper had doubled from eight to sixteen pages, 
including interviews with various councillors, pages with council 
announcements, and a section of readers’ letters.663 The letters to the editor give 
some insight into the kind of enquiries the council was dealing with on a 
weekly basis, but also into the misunderstandings that arose as citizens found 
their way within the new system. For example, in August 1990, a citizen 
complained about the local variation in prices for 500g of frozen chicken: ‘This 
is extreme, and not what is meant by free market, surely?’.664 The editor 
responded: ‘Maybe it is; certainly, in its infancy’.665 Citizens also wrote in to ask 
for help with their telephone provider, for the address of a local society, to 
report a missing dog, to look for work, or to request advice on dealing with 
sales of faulty products or incorrect bills. The letters were printed with 
commentaries from the editor, formerly a lecturer in Journalism at the 
University of Leipzig. In some cases, the newspaper would put the citizens in 
touch with the right contact point, but in other cases, it would simply print 
advice.  As such, the paper became a redirection service for communal 
enquiries and a signpost for the new political, social and economic structures. 
However, in publishing the letters with commentaries, the readers were 
also made to look foolish for turning to the paper for help, or for failing to 
 
662 Ibid. 
663 StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, Allgemeiner Anzeiger (15 August 1990). 
664 ‘Ich finde, das ist Wucher und hat mit Marktwirtschaft nichts mehr zu tun. Oder?‘, StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, 
'Betr. AA Nr. 1 1.8.90‘, Allgemeiner Anzeiger (15 August 1990). 
665 ‘Vielleicht doch; vor allem mit den Anfängen‘, ibid. 
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understand the new system. For example, a complaint from a reader that ‘the 
last collection of bulky waste did not take scrap’,666 despite the local housing 
organisation having been informed about rubbish piling up, was countered 
with the explanation:  
Scrap was not collected for good reason, because, unlike washing machines and 
refrigerators, it does not count as bulky waste, but as scrap or special waste. 
Unfortunately, there are no pills to cure stupidity.667  
The junk discussion continued, as another reader suggested the city council 
issue a recycling guide for special waste, to which the editor replied:  
A special waste collection lorry was recently parked in your area for two hours. 
As displayed in the town hall, special waste collection is to become a regular 
service. The collection points will be announced in advance in the press.668 
 
Whereas GDR citizens frequently wrote letters to their communal 
representatives to complain or petition for changes, the onus was now placed 
on the individual to organise their own lives and to seek the correct information 
before contacting the local press and council. Those who failed to adapt to the 
new system and continued to rely on others were humiliated publicly for all to 
see. Although the press utilised the old tradition of letter-writing in order to 
redirect citizens to the new channels, they chose to do so in a way that deterred 
readers from asking again in future. Attempts to use letters to the editor to put 
pressure on companies and to gain special treatment were struck down 
immediately:  
 
666 ‘Bei der letzten Sperrmüllaktion wurde kein Schrott mitgenommen‘, StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, 
‘Lesermeinung: Unschöne Ansicht‘, Allgemeiner Anzeiger (08 January 1992). 
667 ‘Schrott wurde zurecht nicht abgeholt, weil er wie Waschmaschinen und Kühlschränke kein Sperrmüll 
ist, sondern als Schrott bzw. Sondermüll zählt. Leider gibt es gegen Unvernunft noch keine Pillen‘, ibid. 
668 ‘Umlängst hat ein Sondermüllabnahmeauto für zwei Stunden ganz in Ihrer Nähe gestanden. Wie im 
Rathaus zu vernehmen war, soll die Sondermüllerfassung zu einer regelmäßigen Einrichtung werden. 
Über die Standplätze wird rechtzeitig in der Presse informiert‘, StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, ‘Lesermeinung: 
Sondermüll‘, Allgemeiner Anzeiger (11 March 1992). 
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We have passed on these letters to the right address, namely the customer 
relations department. (…) But we don’t want to raise any false hopes that a 
letter to the ‘AA’ will speed up the process of getting a telephone connection. 
Telekom has the last say.669 
 
 Similarly, a central aspect of this re-education campaign was the topic of 
anonymity. An angry postcard from ‘retail staff’ was countered with a sarcastic 
commentary and the regretful sentence: ‘unfortunately the postcard did not say 
who the retail staff are’.670 Other anonymous letters were not printed at all, 
because ‘we should be able to call ourselves and everything else by its right 
name’.671 When readers explicitly requested that their names and addresses 
were not to be published, the paper was particularly unforgiving, printing them 
anyway and arguing, ‘We have a problem with anonymity. If you do not want 
your name to be printed in the paper, then don’t write to us.’672 One year later, 
the paper explained that they would only publish letters that were submitted 
with the full name and address of the sender, although they were indeed 
entitled to ask for their name to be anonymised.673  
 As much as reporting on the work of the council and ensuring the 
citizens were provided with information, the Allgemeiner Anzeiger was therefore 
also a medium for renegotiating the role of the citizens, the council and the 
press within the new structures. Old practices and dependencies amongst 
 
669 ‘Wir haben diese Post an uns an die richtige Adresse, nämlich an den Privatkundenvertrieb von 
Telekom, weitergegeben. (…) Damit möchten wir jedoch bei niemand die falsche Hoffnung wecken, durch 
einen Brief an den „AA“ kommt der ersehnte Telefonanschluß schneller. Das letzte Wort hat Telekom‘, 
StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, 'Lesermeinung: Wieder Telekom‘, Allgemeiner Anzeiger (08 January 1992). 
670 ‘Leider sagte die Postkarte nicht, wer sich da als „die Mitarbeiter des Handels“ erklärt‘, StA Erfurt, 3-
800/34, 'Der Leser hat das erste Wort (und wir das letzte)‘, Allgemeiner Anzeiger (15 August 1990). 
671 ‘Wir sollten uns und alles beim Namen nennen‘, StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, ‚‘Lesermeinung: P. S.‘, 
Allgemeiner Anzeiger (15 August 1990). 
672 ‘Wir haben was gegen Anonymität. Wer seinen Namen in der Zeitung nicht lesen will, sollte uns gar 
nicht erst schreiben‘, StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, ‘Lesermeinung: VS reaktiviert‘, Allgemeiner Anzeiger (08 
January 1992). 
673 StA Erfurt, 3-800/34, ‘Lesermeinung‘, Allgemeiner Anzeiger (06 January 1993). 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 192 
citizens were subverted by derisive responses from the papers, relieving the 
press and the council of their parenting responsibilities, as the citizens were 
forced to take charge of situations and navigate the new structures 
independently.  This discourse is therefore not simply about learning where to 
turn to for help, but also brings about a cultural shift in the perceived role of 
common institutions.  
 
Streamlining critique 
Although the new town council paper could serve to bypass other media 
outlets and renegotiate the relationship with the citizens, it would not be 
enough to prevent the press from writing critical pieces on the work of the town 
council. As such, the council started introducing various measures to streamline 
the amount and type of information that was able to reach the press. As well as 
appointing press secretaries to manage communication with the press and 
holding regular press conferences in which the mayors would update the local 
journalists on their work, the structures of the town council meetings would 
also have to change. 
 These monthly meetings, which regularly ran into the night and were 
complemented by additional meetings if agenda items were not covered in 
time, were open to the public. As this proved more and more problematic, non-
public meetings were introduced to discuss topics such as property ownership 
and sales in private. This was necessary for data protection, but also meant that 
the town magistrates were able to handle these cases without objections from 
the public and political parties. In certain cases, however, news of conflicts 
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would still reach the press, mounting pressure on the council to comment on 
the meetings that had been held in secret. 
 In October 1990, for example, councillors from the Neues Forum and SPD 
raised the issue of housing evictions in the monthly council meeting. The SPD 
delegate requested an emergency motion:  
I ask you to check whether the press reports on the Operation Oststraße, for 
example in the Thüringer Allgemeine, match that which the parliament agreed 
last week in the secret hearing and secret ballot.674 
 
The buildings in the north of Erfurt, which had been occupied by local citizens’ 
initiatives for communal, social and cultural projects, had been cleared in a 
supposedly forceful police operation. A representative of the Neues Forum and 
Green Party asked for the magistrate for Order and Safety to give a detailed 
account to justify the money and resources spent on the evacuation efforts. He 
explained that even if there was no time to discuss the issue in the current 
meeting, certain statements in the press needed to be corrected and clarified. 
‘For example, this eviction was never ordered by the town council’, he 
announced to loud applause.675 The SPD councillor further asked for the full 
text and exact wording of the CDU councillor to be printed in the local paper, to 
give context to the published quotations.676  
 Although all meetings were recorded and then transcribed and 
summarised, the written minutes would often omit debates and discussions, or 
simply refer to the tape recording for information, meaning that there was no 
 
674 ‘Ich bitte darum zu prüfen, ob die Darstellungen der Aktion Oststraße in der Presse, zum Beispiel die in 
der Thüringer Allgemeinen, dem entsprechen, was das Parlament letzte Woche in geheimer Debatte und 
Abstimmung beschlossen hat‘, StA Erfurt, 6-7/A14, ‘Versammlung des Rates der Stadt‘, 24 October 1990. 
675 ‘Zum Beispiel hat nie der Rat der Stadt diese Räumung beschlossen‘, ibid. 
676 Ibid. 
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remaining written record of these communal conflicts. With time, the council 
meeting presidents also stopped vocalising the results of the votes, choosing not 
to state the number of votes for and against a motion, but simply the result; 
‘accepted’ or ‘rejected’. Consequently, dissenting behaviour or matters of 
controversy became much harder to identify.  
 As the structures in the council meetings were formalised, debates and 
discussions moved from the monthly public meetings into the various subject-
specific committees. The town council meetings were reserved simply for 
casting votes on motions, which were submitted in writing in advance. The 
person submitting the motion was then able to give a short statement, and a 
representative from the local party factions could comment briefly on the 
motion, although time limits applied to all speakers and were rigorously 
adhered to. Any further requests or motions were generally passed back to the 
committees. 
 Although this approach streamlined the work of the town council and 
enabled the council and the committees to be much more efficient in tackling 
large numbers of motions, open discussions and debates disappeared from the 
council meetings. Elected councillors were still able to cast a vote and suggest 
motions but were far less likely to discuss these in the public arena. 
Increasingly, the political parties began publishing their own communal papers, 
giving their own take on the important issues and their own efforts to influence 
the work of the town magistrates.  
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 In November 1990, the PDS faction in Erfurt, unable to rely on the 
Thüringer Allgemeine, issued the first issue of their local paper in Erfurt, 
symbolically named ‘Transparent Town Hall’.677 It began with the statement:  
Communal politics must be transparent. Only those who are well informed can 
take responsible decisions and form expert opinions.  Unfortunately, it keeps 
happening that motions passed by the freely elected parliament are not realised 
as agreed, or that motions are implemented on a Monday, in advance of a vote 
on Wednesday.678 
 
Their paper, they argued, would ensure that the public would be informed of 
any cases in which the interests of business were placed over those of the 
citizens, if social matters were neglected or election promises were broken.679  
Although the town council was focussed on trying to make their work 
transparent and thereby trying to promote trust in the communal 
representatives and structures, statements like these would counter these 
attempts by questioning the motives of the town’s decision makers and their 
adherence to structures. As such, the increasing publication of alternative 
newspapers was not primarily a sign of plurality of opinion, but rather a 
symptom of an ever-growing and outwardly mediated distrust in the existing 
structures, be that the local press or the town council. 
 
Breach of confidentiality 
On the tenth of July 1991, the by now very orderly and structured council 
meeting in Erfurt turned loud and passionate once again, as old emotions were 
 
677 ‘Gläsernes Rathaus‘. StA Erfurt, 5/5 Parteien, 'Gläsernes Rathaus‘, 1, 27 November 1990. 
678 ‘Kommunalpolitik muß durchschaubar sein. Nur wer informiert ist, kann verantwortlich 
mitentscheiden, kann sich sachkundig eine Meinung bilden. Leider kommt es schon wieder vor, daß die 
Entscheidungen des frei gewählten Parlamentes nicht so umgesetzt werden, wie sie beschlossen worden 
sind, daß Montag realisiert wird, was Mittwoch erst beraten werden soll‘, ibid. 
679 Ibid. 
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reawakened.  As part of his monthly report, the mayor explained that he 
wanted to ask a question, in a deviation from general protocol.680 It had come to 
his attention that a letter detailing possible breaches of duty amongst 
councillors had been delivered to the Neues Forum and Green Party office. The 
subsequent uproar was not due to this letter, however, but because the letter 
had come to the attention of a member of the PDS faction, who had 
consequently passed the information onto persons named in the document.  
I want to know: (…) why did you pass this information on to people, whose 
names I will read out in a minute, instead of contacting me as head of the 
administration?.681  
As the names of former high-functioning SED secretaries were read out, the 
room erupted in outrage. 
 The astonished councillor took defence, explaining that he had simply 
contacted one colleague to ask whether the accusations against him, that he had 
supposedly used vehicles belonging to the environment agency for personal 
use, were true or not.  
So that I, as party representative, can comment on the issue, should it come up 
in the main committee meeting, as other personal matters have in the past. Our 
faction is not trying to protect former SED-officials if they are guilty of an 
offense, but we also see no reason not to protect them, if these anonymous 
accusations are found to have no basis in truth.682 
 
 
680 StA Erfurt, 6-7/A24, ‘Versammlung des Rates der Stadt am 10. Juli 1991‘, 10 July 1991. 
681 ‘Für mich die Frage: (…), warum haben Sie diese Information an Personen, deren Namen ich nachher 
noch nenne, gegeben und nicht an mich als Chef der Verwaltung?‘, StA Erfurt, 6-7/A24, ‘Versammlung 
des Rates der Stadt am 10. Juli 1991‘, 10 July 1991. 
682 ‘Für den Fall, daß das Ganze später einmal so wie andere Personalangelegenheiten im Hauptausschuß 
behandelt werden ich zu diesem Punkt bzw. der Vertreter meiner Fraktion zu diesem Punkt Stellung 
nehmen kann und dazu was sagen kann. Es ist nicht Sinn unserer Fraktion hier ehemalige SED-
Funktionäre zu schützen, wenn sie sich solcher Verfehlungen schuldig gemacht haben aber wir sehen 
auch keinen Grund sie nicht zu schützen, wenn solche anonymen Beschuldigungen ihrer Grundlage 
entbehren sollten‘, StA Erfurt, 1-7/7 Stadtverwaltung Erfurt ab 1990, ‘Problematik Ratsmitglied (…), 
Ratsversammlung 10.7.91‘, 10 July 1991. 
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The assembly was not interested in his justification, however, as it only 
confirmed that he had indeed passed on information.  
The mayor was also ‘not interested in determining whether or not the 
letter had purposely been brought to (his) attention’.683 Calls from the room 
however asked how he had gotten hold of this information.684 The 
representative of the Neues Forum explained that the letter had arrived that very 
morning, for which reason it had still been lying on the desk.685 The PDS 
delegate had asked to use their telephone, because his office was closed. The 
said information about the vehicles was towards the end of the three-page 
letter, however, meaning that he must have actively turned the pages. The PDS 
member refuted this claim, arguing that the letter was laid out in front of him, ‘I 
didn’t have to move a finger’, and that he simply skimmed the letter while 
another member of staff was sat opposite.686 
Pressure mounted for a vote on the situation, with vocal support from 
the room. The mayor insisted that the council member, in discussing the content 
of the letter with the named persons, had not acted according to his communal 
responsibilities. As he was also member of several committees, namely the 
central committee, the financial committee, the property committee and the 
board of management for the local bank, this behaviour also put his ability to 
keep his obligation to non-disclosure into question and was therefore to be seen 
 
683 'Dieses Schreiben kam nun beabsichtigt oder unbeabsichtigt, das möchte ich nicht prüfen, Herrn (…) 
von der PDS zur Kenntnis‘, ibid. 
684 StA Erfurt, 6-7/A24, ‘Versammlung des Rates der Stadt am 10. Juli 1991‘, 10 July 1991. 
685 StA Erfurt, 1-7/7 Stadtverwaltung Erfurt ab 1990, ‘Problematik Ratsmitglied (…), Ratsversammlung 
10.7.91‘, 10 July 1991. 
686 ‘daß ich keinen Finger rühren mußte‘, ibid. 
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as a breach of conduct. ‘Especially, as (the contacted person) is not a member of 
the PDS’, he added.687 ‘I think this proves that old networks still exist’.688   
 Consequently, the mayor proposed a vote of no-confidence, and that the 
PDS member was to be removed from all previously held committee 
positions.689 The accused asked to take another look at the letter, but the 
president went straight to planning the vote, which was to take place after the 
break. An objection from the room insisted that ‘the motion should be dealt 
with immediately’, as the issue needed to be sorted, or ‘cleansed’, as soon as 
possible.690 As this was now a motion regarding the procedure of the meeting, it 
was treated as urgent and votes were placed whether to deal with the mayor’s 
motion immediately. It went straight onto the vote on whether to remove him 
from all committees, with council members raising cards. The president 
counted the votes and announced: ‘I think, the result is very clear’.691 
 Within just ten minutes, the atmosphere in the otherwise orderly 
assembly had become raucous, with loud remarks of disgust interjecting the 
speakers.692 The transcript fails to include all interruptions, but the uproar in the 
room is clearly audible on the tape recording.  As the heated meeting 
continued, more motions were introduced to remove not only the PDS member 
in question, but the entire faction from their committee duties.  The head of the 
PDS faction asked for concrete examples of misconduct by other members of 
 
687 ‘zumal Herr (…) kein Mitglied der PDS ist‘, ibid. 
688 ‘Ich glaube, das ist der Beweiß alter Seilschaften‘, ibid. 
689 Ibid. 
690 ‘Ich stelle den Antrag, daß dieser Antrag sofort behandelt wird … und unbedingt diese Situation 
bereinigt werden muß‘, ibid. 
691 ‘Ich glaube, das ist eindeutig‘, ibid. 
692 StA Erfurt, 6-7/A24, 'Versammlung des Rates der Stadt am 10. Juli 1991‘, 10 July 1991. 
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the party, that would justify disqualification from these committees. The head 
of the CDU faction responded that ‘it’s not a personal issue’, but a general one, 
‘because we see a danger’ that issues will not be handled confidentially.693 ‘For 
security reasons, I want things that are being discussed to stay within these four 
walls. So that these people are not placed in danger’.694   
 After the assembly voted to consider this motion immediately, the Neues 
Forum member and church youth worker addressed the room. ‘Well you really 
cannot possibly accuse me of wanting to support the PDS’, he said,  
but I feel very uncomfortable about finalising a vote on this issue in such an 
emotionally loaded situation. I don’t think that this is in the interest of our still 
very young democracy, with which we do not yet have a lot of practice, and I 
would like to urgently request that we at least wait until after the break, so that 
the council of elders can have a chance to discuss how to proceed.695 
Although the president argued that the decision to vote on the issue 
immediately had already been taken, he nevertheless agreed to allow a show of 
hands on postponing the motion, and the vote was delayed until after the 
break. He too was quite aware of the emotions in the room, as he suggested 
they ‘try to keep our emotions in bay and focus on the next agenda items’.696 
Nevertheless, the accused PDS member was given the opportunity to speak 
 
693 ‘es geht hier nicht um die Person sondern es ist eine generelle Frage, da wir hier eine Gefahr sehen‘, 
StA Erfurt, 1-7/7 Stadtverwaltung Erfurt ab 1990, ‘Ausschluß der PDS aus der Kommission zur 
Überprüfung der Fragebögen der Mitarbeiter des Magistrats‘, 10 July 1991. 
694 ‘ich möchte das ganz einfach aus Sicherheitsgründen, daß den Leuten, die dort gemeinsam beraten, daß 
das auch in diesem Kreis bleibt. Und damit sie nicht irgendeiner Gefahr ausgesetzt sind‘, ibid. 
695 ‘Also ich stehe nun wahrlich nicht in dem Verdacht, der PDS was Gutes tun zu wollen oder alte 
Seilschaften zu retten. Ich habe trotzdem meine ganz großen Bauchschmerzen in einer so emotionalisierten 
Situation eine Sache so zu verhandeln und gar noch abschließend zu beraten. Ich halte das im Interesse 
unserer noch jungen Demokratie, wo wir alle noch nicht sehr viel Übung haben, nicht für gut und ich 
möchte dringend darum bitten, das mindestens bis zur Pause zu verschieben, in der Pause den Ältestenrat 
zu der Sache nochmal zusammenkommen zu lassen, daß der einen Vorschlag macht, wie nach der Pause 
damit verfahren werden soll‘, ibid. 
696 ‘Können uns nun bei allem versuchen, die Emotionen raus zu nehmen, und nun den 
Tagesordnungspunkten die folgen zuwenden‘, StA Erfurt, 6-7/A24, ‘Versammlung des Rates der Stadt am 
10. Juli 1991‘ (10 July 1991). 
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before the break, stating that, on reflection, he would like to apologise for his 
actions.697 
 After the break, the head of the PDS faction used the allotted space for 
political factions to speak on the motion to distance himself and his party from 
the actions of his colleague. ‘However’, he says, ‘this is not generally a 
problem’.698 He explained that he and his colleagues were all very aware of 
their responsibilities as councillors, more so, he argued, because of the lessons 
of the past.  
Just like everyone else, we have all kept our duty of confidentiality in keeping 
with the communal constitution. So why are we suddenly putting into question, 
in advance, whether a member of our faction, or any other faction in this high 
house, can keep their duty of confidentiality or deal responsibly with the (…) 
information?699 
Arguing that the PDS had a mandate from the citizens to represent them in the 
committees, he asked the head of the CDU faction directly, ‘on what legal basis 
do you have the right to exclude us from these committees?’.700 He also 
appealed to all other councillors to consider, when casting their vote, what 
impact it would have if a democratically elected party were to be suspended 
from all committees. 
 The CDU faction head answered the question with another question: ‘On 
what legal basis should you have the right to be on this committee?’.701 A shout 
 
697 StA Erfurt, 1-7/7 Stadtverwaltung Erfurt ab 1990, ‘Ausschluß der PDS aus der Kommission zur 
Überprüfung der Fragebögen der Mitarbeiter des Magistrats‘, 10 July 1991. 
698 ‘Aber das ist eigentlich nicht das Problem‘, ibid. 
699 ‘Woher kommt dann also diese Frage, von vornherein in Zweifel zu stellen, daß eine (sic) Angehöriger 
dieser Fraktion oder ein anderer Angehöriger dieses hohen Hauses von vornherein in den Verdacht gerät, 
er würde nicht schweigen können, er würde nicht verantwortungsbewußt mit dem ihm zur Kenntnis 
Gelangten Verhalten umgehen‘, ibid. 
700 ‘welche rechtlichen Grundlagen für den Ausschluß einer Fraktion aus der Mitarbeit in einer 
Kommission können Sie aufführen?‘, ibid. 
701 ‘Welche rechtlichen Grundlagen gibt es, daß Sie sich an dieser Kommission beteiligen dürfen?‘, ibid. 
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from within the room answered with: ‘the communal constitution’.702 The 
president jumped in to say that the PDS had made their point clear, that they 
want to have this procedure legally checked. ‘Nevertheless’, he said, ‘it is still 
possible to go to a vote’.703  
 Although the anger at the possible breach of conduct is understandable, 
especially given the historical context, the reaction of the town council to the 
event and the subsequent suspension of the PDS from all committees appears 
sudden and impulsive to the outsider. As acknowledged by others in the room, 
the procedure was emotionally driven, and councillors were given little time to 
consider the case or collect extra evidence before casting their votes. The PDS 
was guilty until proven innocent, demonstrating that even after more than a 
year of business in the democratically elected town council, trust in the party 
and its representatives was low, and previous tensions from GDR-times 
persisted. Although the town council meetings were now neatly structured 
with clear rules to ensure efficient business, these could also be used to quickly 
push through a series of motions under the pretext of needing to reach a quick 
decision. 
Two months later, a new PDS candidate was put forward to replace the 
one expelled from his position on the management board of the local savings 
bank, ‘as it was stressed that this decision was made in relation to his person, 
and not the entire party faction’.704 His suggested replacement had studied 
 
702 ‘Kommunalverfassung‘, ibid. 
703 ‘ungeachtet dessen ist es möglich abzustimmen‘, ibid. 
704 ‘im Zusammenhang mit dieser Abstimmung wurde betont, dass es sich um eine Person und nicht um 
eine Entscheidung für die Fraktion handelt‘. StA Erfurt, 6-7/A24, ‘Versammlung des Rates der Stadt am 
10. Juli 1991‘, 10 July 1991. 
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business management in Moscow, before writing a thesis on finance and 
eventually lecturing in business management in Ilmenau. ‘Socialist business 
management, not business management!’ shouted a CDU councillor.705 
 The Neues Forum and Green Party faction argued that the management 
board positions were not allocated per party, and that they should therefore 
also be able to put forward a candidate for this position. Their candidate was a 
mechanical engineer and on the audit committee, although he had no 
professional work experience in finance. Nevertheless, he managed to gain 
ninety-two votes from the councillors in the secret vote, winning a majority, 
while the PDS candidate received just twenty-five votes. From here on, the PDS 
were no longer represented on the management board of the local Sparkasse.  
On comparison, the exclusion of the PDS in Erfurt appears very similar 
to the story explored in the previous chapter of the removal of the town 
chronicler in Eisenach. In both cases, groups of elected representatives were 
moved to rash collective action on the basis of little or conflicting evidence. 
Despite different political leadership traditions in the two case study towns, 
examples have shown us how citizens in different communities were still 
subject to similar emotional outbursts that affected their political practices. 
These individual local examples therefore speak for a much greater and general 
behavioural pattern that is likely to have been found across the GDR during this 
period. For almost one year after the upheaval in the GDR, associations with 
 
705 ‘sozialistische Betriebswirtschaft, nicht Betriebswirtschaft’, ibid. 
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former elites and accusations of Stasi collaboration still elicited a strong 
emotional response and could therefore be used as a tool for political action. 
 
Conclusion 
When the newspaper editor addressed the crowds in Erfurt in Januar 1990, it 
was the calls for critical reporting that received the greatest support. As old and 
new papers in the region tried to introduce a new style of journalism, the need 
for clear information on how to deal with the many new aspects of political, 
social and communal life nevertheless took priority and newspapers were 
forced to respond to the needs and wishes of their readers. 
By publishing critical letters or contrasting opinions, the press was able 
to pressurise the representatives of the new town and city councils to make 
their work more transparent by responding to articles and clarifying their 
actions and decisions. These critical pieces addressed gaps in communication 
and pushed for more dialogue between the town and its citizens. However, 
with staff under increasing pressure to solve communal problems, this further 
scrutiny could have negative effects, with some town employees reacting 
strongly to defamatory opinion pieces and withdrawing from the public sphere 
in protest.  
The city council, frustrated by the new style of journalism that would not 
print all statements word for word or report on every new change in the 
council, began issuing their own publications. These costly new projects were to 
ensure that the council fulfilled its pledge to inform the citizenry, but also 
bypassed the critical commentaries of the local press. In comparison with their 
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East German counterparts, the council representatives in Erfurt were 
particularly unwilling to accept contrary attitudes from the local press or to 
deal with false or misleading statements. 
The new council paper, which was to provide the citizens with 
information on the most important aspects of communal decision-making, also 
served another purpose. By publishing readers’ letters with sarcastic and 
unforgiving commentaries, citizens were shamed for writing in with ill-
informed criticisms or questions. The public humiliation was to serve as a 
lesson not just for those writing-in, but also other readers who would learn that 
they could no longer turn to the council for every problem but would have to 
become more independent in navigating the new communal structures. 
This alone, however, would not suffice, and the council set about also 
streamlining their meetings and the amount and type of information that was 
able to reach the public. By limiting the amount of time for speakers during 
council assemblies and moving the majority of the work into subject-specific 
committees, business was swifter, but public discussions were moved out of the 
public meetings and behind closed doors. Eventually, even the language used 
within the meetings meant that written records would no longer indicate issues 
of controversy. 
These new structures for efficient decision-making and limited public 
discussions could also be used to push through motions without much 
deliberation. When a PDS member was found to have breached conduct, 
councillors were not willing to give the situation much consideration, and went 
straight to a vote on his future, suspending him and his party from all positions 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 205 
of influence. While the work of the council was now formalised, the old 
divisions had not healed, and new procedures were used to limit the influence 
of former elites.   
As other everyday pressures mounted, the open debates and discussions 
that had characterised the autumn of 1989 quickly disappeared. However, more 
than just streamlining practices, citizens and state appear to have struggled to 
agree on a common tone of communication. As in the written communication 
around the election events, it is not so much what is said but how it is said and 
communicated that forces many actors to withdraw or to develop their own 
platforms. The immediate need to solve everyday economic problems cost too 
much time to continue the indepth discussions that had begun in the autumn, 
however the divisions that had emerged continued nonetheless, only to be 
fought out through the new structures. The next chapter examines how actors 
in the local political and public sphere would deal with the next big rupture, as 
new economic and social regulations were introduced.      
  
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 206 
4. Devaluing the East 
 
The Currency Unification 
On the evening of the first of July 1990, a nurse in Eisenach sat down to 
summarise the event in her diary. ‘The Day of the Currency Union’, she wrote, 
next to the date.706 That this day was of historical significance was clear from 
the subtitle, but also from the descriptions of the atmosphere in town. She had 
spent the night before sitting outside with her husband and old friends, 
listening to the celebrations and watching the fireworks as the clock struck 
midnight.707 The pyrotechnic display, which was usually reserved for New 
Year’s Eve, marked a turning point, as East Germans in their streets and 
gardens welcomed in a new era. 
 ‘As of today, from midnight’, she had written, ‘the DM is the only valid 
currency in the whole of Germany. A strange feeling’.708 The introduction of the 
West German mark to replace the DDR-Mark was to set the path for a speedy 
transition from planned economy to a social market economy. For East German 
citizens, the conversion rate of 1:1 was symbolic of their demand for the same 
standard of living as their western neighbours, and for their savings and 
accomplishments to be given equal value and recognition to those of Germans 
on the other side of the former border. It had been one of the demands voiced 
during the autumn demonstrations in Leipzig, and an election promise from 
Helmut Kohl.  
 
706 ‘1. Juli, Tag der Währungsunion‘, Interview with Carola and Christian Herbst, Eisenach, 04 July 2018. 
707 Ibid. 
708 ‘Ab heute null Uhr gilt die D-Mark als einzige Währung im gesamten Deutschland. Ein eigenartiges 
Gefühl‘, ibid. 
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 As if by magic, the nurse describes how the town of Eisenach had 
transformed overnight and taken on a ‘western feeling’.709 Repeated use of the 
word ‘sudden’ in the diary entry underlines the speed of the changes taking 
place in everyday life.710 Squares that were once empty now hosted stands from 
the commerce bank and a Mazda car exhibition; others piled up with 
abandoned or used cars that were no longer wanted. Shop windows that had 
long been boarded up were now sparkling clean, bursting with colour and full 
of products from the Federal Republic. A large sign outside the department 
store, reading ‘After forty years, we’re back!’, signalled that the former owners 
had taken over the business again.711 There was a new pace about the place, as 
shop staff busied themselves by stocking up the shelves and repricing goods, 
and the streets were filled with people, even in the evenings, as locals walked 
through the town centres window shopping.  
  The focus and interest in the shop windows is a key detail in the nurse’s 
description of the historic day. For while the introduction of the Deutsche Mark 
was to ease trade between East and West Germany and rebalance relations, for 
citizens, the desired immediate effect was to have a better supply and range of 
affordable convenience goods.712 Much like advertisements, shopfronts are 
symbolic texts, representing a changing material culture and shaping 
impressions of economic progress and prosperity.713 As GDR citizens gathered 
 
709 ‘westliches Fluidum‘, ibid. 
710 ‘urplötzlich‘, ‘plötzlich‘, ibid. 
711 ‘Nach 40 Jahren sind wir wieder da', ibid. 
712 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Währungsunion mit DDR vollzogen/Kohl in Fernsehansprache: „Großer 
Tag“ für Deutschland‘, Mitteldeutsche Allgemeine, 02 July 1990.  
713 Katherine Pence, ‘Schaufenster des sozialistischen Konsums: Texte der ostdeutschen „consumer 
culture“‘ in Alf Lüdtke & Peter Becker (Ed.), Akten. Eingaben. Schaufenster. Die DDR und ihre Texte (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1997), pp. 91-92.  
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to inspect the new range of products, assessments of the country’s wealth and 
expectations for the coming months were created and formed by the goods on 
offer.  
Following the Second World War, shop windows had quickly become 
interpretive spaces for creating comparisons between the two halves of 
Germany, showcasing economic strength and lifestyle improvements, which in 
turn shaped perceptions of political success.714 After the currency reform of 
1948, shop windows in the West were filled with new products to represent the 
economic boom, whilst eastern storefronts struggled to keep pace with western 
standards.715 The constant competition in consumer products undermined 
eastern politics, as citizens quickly saw the difference between the prosperity 
suggested in the shop windows, especially in the capital city, and the reality of 
living with continued material shortages. 
As the Deutsche Mark arrived in the East in 1990, the shop windows 
once again presented a vision of prosperity reminiscent of the Wirtschaftswunder 
of the West thirty to forty years earlier. This again had a political function, 
fostering support for the new system and promising a brighter future.  The 
monetary union was just one part of the state treaty, however, signed off in 
May 1990, which united the economic and social systems of East and West 
Germany and came into effect from July.716 Aside from the currency union, the 
agreement would also see the implementation of West German standards in 
 
714 Pence, ‘Schaufenster des sozialistischen Konsums‘, p. 92. 
715 Ibid., p. 94. 
716 ‘Die Währungs- Wirtschaft- und Sozialunion 1990, 1. Juli 1990‘, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 
online, <http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/deutschland-chronik/132256/1-juli-1990> 
(accessed 21 March 2019). 
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environmental protection, as well as West German rules on pensions, 
employment law and social care.717 How, however, would these changes play 
out in the border region? How would citizens’ experiences with supply in the 
GDR influence consumer behaviour in the free market and what knock-on 
effect would this have for the East German economy?  
This chapter looks at conflicts that emerged around the introduction of 
the new structures on the local level and tries to understand how these 
impacted everyday lives. Historical studies of this period have largely focussed 
on the privatisation of East German businesses from an economic or 
institutional perspective, often arguing for the necessity and inevitability of the 
measures.718 Although these studies recognise the resulting repercussions for 
citizens, their experiences during these changes are mentioned only as an 
aside.719 Sociological studies, on the other hand, argue that markets are social 
constructions, created through interactions and practices.720 In this sense, the 
introduction of the free market and the privatisation of the East German 
economy was primarily ‘a psychological challenge’.721 How did citizens deal 
with the sudden changes in society and the admittedly speedy transfer of 
systems? How did they cope with the loss of familiar structures and the 
 
717 ‘Die Währungs- Wirtschaft- und Sozialunion 1990‘, BpB Online. 
718 See Franz Schuster, Thüringens Weg in die Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Privatisierung, Aufbau. Eine Bilanz nach 
25 Jahren (Weimar: Böhlau, 2015); Marcus Böick, Die Treuhand: Idee – Praxis – Erfahrung 1990-1994 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018). 
719 Schuster, Thüringens Weg in die Soziale Marktwirtschaft, p. 26. 
720 See Jens Beckert, Rainer Diaz-Bohne & Heiner Ganßmann (Eds.), Märkte als soziale Strukturen (Frankfurt: 
Campus, 2007), p. 197, 255. 
721 ‘eine(r) psychologischen Herausforderung‘. Dirk Laabs, Der deutsche Goldrausch. Die wahre Geschichte der 
Treuhand (München: Pantheon, 2012), p. 342. 
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difficulties of navigating the new ones? How would their experience of the free 
market live up to their expectations? 
Whilst narratives on this period diverge between depictions of a top-
down takeover of East Germany that wiped out its industry, or the unfortunate 
result of years of socialist economic policy, history shows us that such processes 
are generally much more complicated. By looking at the actions of East 
Germans in their communities, this chapter explores the possibilities available 
to them during the privatisation efforts and considers to what extent they were 
able to simply respond or indeed take control of the situation. In so doing, it 
highlights the power structures at play during the transformation and the 
agency of the citizens living amidst the changes. 
 
The Customer is King 
Two weeks before the currency union, the nurse’s diary entry described a 
markedly different atmosphere. At this time, the town was ‘in complete 
chaos’.722 As the country readied itself for the changes ahead, the shops were 
‘almost empty’, with goods having been sold off with price cuts of up to ninety 
percent, leaving only the bare essentials for sale.723 Meat, cheese and other local 
produce was no longer to be found and washing powder was in short supply. 
Instead, shops had begun selling long-life milk in cartons and other western 
goods. Huge queues of people gathered outside the banks, as everyone hurried 
to transfer their savings across accounts and apply for their money to be 
 
722 ‘In der Stadt Chaos‘, Interview with Carola and Christian Herbst, Eisenach, 04 July 2018 
723 ‘wie leer gefegt‘, ibid. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 211 
converted into Deutsche Mark. Everything was ‘incredibly hectic’, the diary 
reads.724 Most noticeably, this was reflected in the family’s evening routine, as 
the nurse laments that they had ‘sat outside on the terrace twice at most’ that 
summer.725 ‘We used to do that every evening’, she noted.726 
 The local newspapers reported on the ‘dramatic situation’ regarding the 
supply of goods in the district, and of ‘growing unrest amongst citizens’.727 
Photos of empty supermarkets demonstrated that the only reminder of the 
goods that had once been on offer were the product signs hanging from the 
ceiling.728 An appeal from the head of the district authority urged citizens to 
remain calm in the last week before the currency union.729 Special powers had 
reportedly been assigned to district officials by the GDR government to ensure 
continued supplies, and the papers promised additional meat deliveries.730 The 
country was essentially in a state of emergency. 
The supply of goods in the district of Erfurt had been an issue of 
contention since the unexpected new travel regulations in November 1989. In 
January 1990, the mayor of Eisenach had written to the Minister-President of 
the GDR to ask for assistance in supplying citizens in the border region.731 The 
 
724 ‘Irgendwie ist alles furchtbar hektisch‘, ibid. 
725 ‘Wir saßen höchstens zweimal bisher abends auf der Terrasse‘, ibid. 
726 ‘Das haben wir früher jeden Abend gemacht‘, ibid. 
727 ‘dramatische Versorgungslage‘, ‘Die Unruhe unter den Bürgern wächst‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, 
‘Dramatische Versorgungslage im Kreis Eisenach‘, Eisenacher Presse, 22 July 1990. 
728 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Gähnende Leere in der Kaufhalle an der Stedtfelder Straße‘, Eisenacher 
Presse, 22 July 1990. 
729 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Dramatische Versorgungslage im Kreis Eisenach‘, Eisenacher Presse, 22 
July 1990. 
730 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Dramatische Versorgungslage im Kreis Eisenach‘, Eisenacher Presse, 22 
July 1990. 
StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Landrat greift hart durch. Chaos vor 1. Juli verhindern‘, Eisenacher Presse, 
22 July 1990. 
731 StA Eisenach, 12-2203 Städtische Akten bis 1990; Allgemeiner Schriftverkehr des Bürgermeister 1989-
1990, ‘Brief vom Bürgermeister an den Ministerpräsident‘, Eisenach, 11 January 1990. 
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town’s geographical location, only a few kilometres from the border to West 
Germany, had brought about particular challenges. The mayor explained that 
the daily influx of around eight thousand citizens from the Federal Republic, 
who were able to pay in D-Mark at good rates, had led to essential goods such 
as bread being in short supply for locals.732 Moreover, the movement of GDR 
citizens westward had created a precarious staffing situation in the key 
industries, which was in turn influencing production.733 Having been 
summoned to action by his constituents, the mayor appealed to the government 
for assistance in regulating sales and supplies.734 
As the eastern councils tried to satisfy their citizens and keep people 
from moving westward, agreements were reached with western firms to start 
selling their products in the East. As the presence of companies from the 
Federal Republic grew, however, fears that public GDR property was being 
sold off started making the headlines in the local press. In March 1990, the 
arrival of the western coffee and household chain Tchibo in Eisenach caused a 
press scandal that stoked divisions but also pointed to the ways in which legal 
procedures were disregarded and the political situation was potentially being 
exploited. The branch in Eisenach was the first of its kind in the East and was 
welcomed by crowds of interested shoppers.735 The firm, which had opened up 





735 StA Eisenach, 40.7/101 Sammlung Wende, ‘Hin und her um Tchibo. Unkommentiert gibt der 
WARTBURG KURIER zwei Erklärungen an Sie, lieber Leser, weiter’, Wartburg Kurier, 12, 1990. 
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the listed building in order to mount its shop logo, but without the correct 
authorisation to do so. 
The newspaper reported that although the company’s lease contract 
declared that the company was permitted to make alterations to the shopfront, 
it also clearly stated that it was responsible for getting the necessary permits.736 
The required permit for building work was however only requested once the 
work had already begun, and the company had failed to request permission 
from the building owner until one day before opening to the public.737 
Although this was indeed approved, the modification of the listed building had 
been started without authorisation. Furthermore, the local HO trade 
organisation, which had permitted Tchibo to rent the shop, had signed a 
contract with the housing administration that owned the building in which it 
was named as the tenant. This did not, however, give the trade organisation the 
right to sublet the building to other companies.738 As a result, the lease contract 
between Tchibo and the Handelsorganisation was in fact invalid from the start.739  
In the news report, the branch sales manager at Tchibo argued that the 
new façade design, which had caused uproar because of its large sign, had been 
discussed and authorised in a meeting with a town representative, ‘who gave 
us reason to believe she had decision-making powers’.740  The responsibility for 
the unauthorised modification was therefore given to the local council, even 






740 ‘die uns gegenüber Entscheidungskompetenz zu besitzen vorgab’, ibid. 
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Republic. The representative of the West German chain insisted they had acted 
in good faith, and that the problems had arisen due to the ‘present loose legal 
and contractual relationships between the trade organisation and the town of 
Eisenach’.741 The company finished by stating that their customers were always 
their highest authority and that it would be up to them to judge the situation.742 
The citizens’ consumer choices were therefore given precedence over the 
existing GDR regulations.  
The news coverage included a statement from the local mayor, who 
detailed the areas in which Tchibo had disregarded official procedure, and 
insisted that whilst the town was interested in attracting good business 
partners, these must always abide by the rules and regulations.743 Furthermore, 
he reaffirmed that the town would favour GDR citizens in the allocation of 
business and shop space.744 By ending with a pledge to give priority to small 
business owners in the GDR, the mayor referenced the underlying discourse in 
which town officials were seen to be cooperating with firms from West 
Germany and fears that they were planning to buy out the GDR. Shop premises 
officially still counted as public property, and yet these were being allocated to 
foreign investors without a clear and transparent process. The public outcry 
around the Tchibo chain highlighted the need for all businesses to adhere to the 
same rules and procedures.  
 
741 ‘in den derzeit ungenauen Rechts- und Vertagsverhältnissen zwischen der HO und der Stadt Eisenach’, 
ibid. 
742 ‘Maßstab für unser Handeln ist immer der Kunde. Diesem möchten wir das Urteil überlassen’, ibid. 
743 Ibid. 
744 Ibid. 
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The statements from the Tchibo branch manager and the mayor of 
Eisenach were published side-by-side in the local paper without commentary.745 
The report, which invites the reader to critique the two statements by refraining 
from providing a press commentary, presented the branch manager of Tchibo 
and the mayor of Eisenach as opposing forces, even though the mayor claimed 
to agree in principle with the statement made by the store manager.746 
Nevertheless, it also highlighted the complicated legal situation in the town, 
and the grounds on which the concerns were based. GDR regulations were 
technically still applicable, and yet the unprecedented developments and the 
new circumstances meant that these were being ignored or disregarded in order 
to please consumers and attract businesses to the town. As the disrespect of 
existing legal regulations undermined public trust in the local council, there 
was a growing need for new and clear regulations that would structure 
business relations and protect eastern actors. 
 
The Voices on the Streets  
In July 1990, shortly after the currency union, a journalist in Eisenach received a 
call urging him to come quickly to the dairy factory in the east of the town. 
‘Everything is being destroyed’, the caller had told him.747 On arrival, he found 
the workers throwing glass milk bottles into a truck and smashing them with 
metal poles.748 On questioning, the staff refused to answer and instead fetched 




747 ‘Die schlagen hier alles kaputt‘, Interview with Klaus Wuggazer, Eisenach, 10 February 2018. 
748 Ibid. 
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anymore. They think it’s unhygienic. The people don’t want to buy it”’.749 
Aware of the need to renew their machinery and switch to different packaging 
in order to continue their business, staff had taken it onto themselves to dispose 
of the glass, which they felt had been rendered useless.  
 Similar issues faced the beer brewing industry, although their problem 
was not the glass bottles themselves. Although customers were still buying beer 
in bottles, they preferred the beer in the brown bottles, often shipped in from 
West Germany, over the beer in the green bottles.750 Green bottles, which let in 
more light, were seen as lower quality, as the contents would not keep as long 
as in the darker bottles. After the local supply crisis in June, customer habits 
had switched to choosing longer lasting produce. Consequently, over three 
hundred thousand empty bottles piled up in a ‘bottle graveyard’ at the local 
brewery in Eisenach, as the green bottles simply could not be sold, and western 
bottles that had been returned to the GDR firms were harder to clean and 
recycle.751  
The fresh competition from western suppliers presented the local 
farming and food industry with a growing problem. Many local industries now 
struggled to sell their goods because citizens were choosing newly-imported 
western goods over GDR produce. As supermarkets consequently ceased to 
trade with the local industry, businesses took to selling their produce 
 
749 ‘”Kein Mensch kauft mehr unsere Milch. Das ist unhygienisch, gilt als unhygienisch, diese Aludeckel. 
Die Leute kaufen das nicht mehr”‘, Interview with Klaus Wuggazer, Eisenach, 10 February 2018. 
750 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Dank neuer Hefe sind Hopf und Malz noch nicht verloren’, Eisenacher 
Stadtanzeiger, 27 July 1990. 
751 ‘Flaschenfriedhof‘, ibid. 
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themselves outside of the said supermarkets,752 on their own premises or 
directly from delivery lorries.753 In south Thuringia, dairy farmers staged 
protests outside supermarkets, where they proceeded to empty bottles of milk 
into the gutter to draw attention to the decision of their customers to invest in 
West German milk over East German dairy, and the effects this was having on 
business and jobs.754  
Producers also appealed to local citizens to support their cause and to 
recognise the long-term consequences of buying from their competitors. Self-
made signs, reading  
we are fighting for our jobs.  
FOR THAT REASON!  
WE ARE SELLING OUR PRODUCE   
O U R S E L V E S  
 
hung above the stacked cases of bottles.755 However, unable to match the prices 
and packaging of western goods, and with supermarkets gradually choosing 
other suppliers, the East German industry was at a severe disadvantage.  
Although the glass bottles and milk surely still had a certain value, the 
workers’ act of destroying their property and tipping away their produce was 
symbolic of the industry’s perceived loss of worth. The newspapers blamed the 
 
752 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Vernichtung von DDR-Landwirtschaftsprodukten ist keine Lösung. 
Thüringer Milch ohne Chance?‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 21 July 1990. 
753 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Brauerei-Chef (…): Billiger als „Westbier“‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 18 
July 1990. 
754 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Vernichtung von DDR-Landwirtschaftsprodukten ist keine Lösung. 
Thüringer Milch ohne Chance?‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 21 July 1990. 
755 ‘Wir kämpfen um unsere arbeitsplätze. DESHALB! VERKAUFEN WIR UNSERE PRODUKTE S E L B S 
T‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Recht zufrieden sind die Brauereimitarbeiter mit den Ergebnissen ihrer 
Selbsthilfeaktion. Der Verkauf eigener Produkte geht weiter‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 25 July 1990. 
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customers for not choosing local produce, even though this was more 
expensive.756 In many cases, the press and the East German trade organisation 
had had their part to play in reducing public trust in East German products. In 
regards to the beer from the local brewery, the head of the former 
Handelsorganisation in Eisenach had argued in the newspaper that it was 
impossible to put ‘unclean bottles, with wonky or missing labels, and a short 
shelf life’ out for sale, and that these products would therefore be returned to 
the manufacturer.757 In so doing, the western products were stylised as superior 
products due to their packaging, their seals that suggested better hygiene, and 
the longer use-by dates; criteria that were easily applicable to a large range of 
products. The trade organisation representative added that it was unfathomable 
to expect the customer ‘to choose (…) a worse and dearer product, simply 
because it is regional’.758 
Furthermore, the Handelsorganisation defended their decision to switch to 
using western suppliers as a necessary step to ‘satisfying our customers’.759 On 
ideological terms, it was now ‘the customer, and not the planning committee’, 
that would determine which products would succeed.760 The customer was 
presented as the holy grail of the new society, whose needs would come first, 
 
756 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, 'Brot, Butter, Blumenkohl – Eisenacher eßt eisenachisch! 
Lebensmittelbranche: Lage dramatisch. Stadt fördert Direktverkauf‘, Oberhessische Presse, 27 July 1990. 
757 ‘unsauberen Flaschen, schiefen oder gar keinen Etiketten sowie der geringen Haltbarkeitsdauer‘, StA 
Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘HO Pläne / Schwierigkeiten bei Start in die Marktwirtschaft’, Hessisch-
Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 05 July 1990. 
758 ‘Daß dieser ein schlechteres und teures Produkt konsumiert, nur weil es aus der Heimat stammt, wird 
man kaum verlangen können‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Harte Konkurrenz im Kaufhallenregal. HO 
aufgelöst – Thüringer Handelsgesellschaft mbH Eisenach’, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, 07/08 July 1990. 
759 '“Wir suchen uns Partner von drüben, um unsere Kunden zufrieden zu stellen“‘. 
StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘HO Pläne / Schwierigkeiten bei Start in die Marktwirtschaft’, Hessisch-
Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 05 July 1990. 
760 ‘Fortan wird nicht die Plankommission, sondern der Kunde entscheiden, welches Erzeugnis sich 
durchsetzt’, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Harte Konkurrenz im Kaufhallenregal. HO aufgelöst – 
Thüringer Handelsgesellschaft mbH Eisenach’, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, 07/08 July 1990. 
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above those of the suppliers. As such, the trade representative explained that 
‘the customer has first priority, not the industry, even if that means 
endangering jobs’.761 And yet, the citizens of East Germany were both 
customers and workers in one. By separating the shopper from the citizen, it 
became possible to argue on market terms without considering the 
repercussions for the businesses that paid the wages. At the same time, the 
customers were held responsible for the failing local industry due to their 
choices as consumers.  
After the supply crisis in late June, where grocery shops had faced 
shortages across the board, it is understandable that citizens would thereafter 
reach for products with a longer sell-by date in order to be fully prepared for 
other emergency scenarios. Although the fresh GDR products were by no 
means worse quality simply for being fresh, producers were forced to reduce 
their prices to compete with the longer-lasting products now on the market. 
After their sales had dropped by sixty percent, the brewery in Eisenach, for 
example, was forced to reduce their prices from ninety cents per bottle to 
seventy-five, below that of the western beers.762 Only then, did the local shops 
begin selling their products again.763 As this, however, would no longer suffice 
to keep the brewery going, it continued direct sales as well.764 
 
761 ‘Für ihn habe der Kunde Vorrang und nicht die Industrie, auch wenn das zum Teil die Arbeitsplätze 
gefährde‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘HO Pläne / Schwierigkeiten bei Start in die Marktwirtschaft’, 
Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 05 July 1990. 
762 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Dank neuer Hefe sind Hopf und Malz noch nicht verloren’, Eisenacher 
Stadtanzeiger, 27 July 1990. 
763 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Brauerei-Chef (…): Billiger als „Westbiere“‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 
18 July 1990. 
764 Ibid. 
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A letter from one of the readers of the Thüringer Landeszeitung, printed on 
the eighteenth of July, had countered the arguments presented in the press by 
the trade organisations. The problem, as he saw it, was not that the regional 
firms were demanding too high a price, as butter from the local creamery was 
available to the supermarkets for just fifty cents apiece.765 Rather, he argued that 
the issue was that the supermarket chain REWE, which had bought up a group 
of shops across Eisenach, was working to order forms which did not list GDR 
firms.766 The expansion of the chain across the town meant that the western firm 
was now ‘dictating the prices’, not allowing for healthy competition, and 
‘overriding the mechanisms of the free market’.767  The reader called upon the 
town and district council to take immediate action.768 
In the district capital of Erfurt, the city council had done just that, calling 
an extraordinary session on the eighth of July; the end of the first week after the 
currency union.769  All local producers, distribution firms and wholesalers in 
the city had been invited to the meeting, which gave an opportunity to discuss 
the topic of pricing levels for food and drink.770  The very next day, the 
delegations met again, and decided to reduce prices by fifty percent and set flat 
rates for certain goods.771  In his report to the council on the eighteenth of July, 
 
765 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘REWE und seine ‚Sprößlinge‘. Kritische Lesermeinung zum TLZ-Bericht 
über die Eröffnung des KONTRA-Marktes – Furcht vor Preisdiktaten‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 18 July 
1990. 
766 Ibid. 
767 ‘Preisdiktat‘, ‘Die Mechanismen der freien Marktwirtschaft sind dadurch außer Kraft gesetzt‘. 
StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘REWE und seine ‚Sprößlinge‘. Kritische Lesermeinung zum TLZ-Bericht 
über die Eröffnung des KONTRA-Marktes – Furcht vor Preisdiktaten‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 18 July 
1990. 
768 Ibid. 
769 StA Erfurt, 1-7 Stadtverwaltung Erfurt ab 1990, ‘Protokoll der 4. Sitzung der 
Stadtverordnetenversammlung am 18.07.1990‘, 18 July 1990. 
770 Ibid. 
771 Ibid. 
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the mayor of Erfurt confirmed that the prices had indeed gone down.772 The 
East German trade organisation had been instructed to keep their prices low, as 
the city was planning to bring discounter chains onto the market. Although this 
measure was intended to ensure competitive prices for consumers, the mayor 
admitted that it was not necessarily beneficial to local production firms:  
Aldi will not buy from the meat combine, and they won’t buy their baked 
goods in Erfurt. They will of course use low-cost suppliers, and so we will be 
putting these jobs at risk. For that reason, this is really our last resort.773 
 
As the mayor of Erfurt had anticipated, the new supermarket chains in 
the region did not choose to use East German suppliers. At the end of July, the 
head of the district authority also brought representatives from the local 
agricultural food production and trade groups together around a table for 
talks.774 Press coverage suggests that the discussion was ‘animated’, and 
especially ‘informative for the factory managers’.775 What points to a heated and 
yet unbalanced debate, is confirmed in the outcome of the negotiations; for 
while the members of the West German supermarket chain REWE and the 
successor to the East German trade organisation THE are to have agreed to start 
selling local produce, they stated that they would only do so on the condition 
that the produce matched their set standards of price and quality.776 The 
machinery and packaging used in GDR food production was, however, 
 
772 Ibid. 
773 ‘Sie haben den Nachteil, das muß ich hier ganz deutlich sagen, Aldi kauft dann nicht im 
Fleischkombinat, sie kaufen auch keine Backwaren in Erfurt ein. Sie kriegen das von Billiganbietern 
natürlich mit und damit gefährden wir natürlich auch wieder diese Arbeitsplätze. Deshalb wird das das 
letzte Mittel sein, um hier irgendwo gegenanzugehen‘, ibid. 
774 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Brot, Butter, Blumenkohl – Eisenacher eßt eisenachisch! 
Lebensmittelbranche: Lage dramatisch. Stadt fördert Direktverkauf‘, Oberhessische Presse, 27 July 1990. 
775 ‘angeregt und für die Betriebsdirektoren wohl auch recht lehrreich‘, ibid. 
776 Ibid. 
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considered inferior to the modern West German production and therefore 
deemed below standard.  As the supermarkets now set the standards and were 
permitted to import western goods, local firms were expected to face the 
competition despite their disadvantage. 
The only suggested ‘solutions’ during the discussion were for East 
German firms to reduce their range of goods, improve their quality and find 
ways of reducing costs.777 The head of the district authority simply appealed to 
the local factories to, if they were to cut jobs, look at reducing office jobs over 
jobs in the production line.778 On the communal level, the mayor of Eisenach 
issued permits to bakers and farmers to sell their produce directly to the 
customers on the town’s streets and marketplaces, with flexible standpoints.779 
These permits, which would be issued to local business only, would need to be 
collected from the town council and be clearly visible on the stands.780 East 
Germans had taken to the streets again, but this time, because they were 
excluded from the supermarkets. As well as facing tougher competition and a 
different playing field, local businesses were now expected not only to produce 
and deliver the goods, but to take responsibility for sales as well.  
In the dairy industry, one local firm chose to remain with their original 
packaging, choosing instead to design a new lid for their glass bottles that was 





780 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Bauern und Bäcker können jetzt auf den Straßen verkaufen‘, Eisenacher 
Bürgerblatt, 02 August 1990. 
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to the customers’ preferences.781 Many firms, however, entered contracts with 
western companies. Farmers in the south of the region decided instead to ship 
their milk to Bavaria to be processed in modern plants before being sold back 
into Thuringia with a regional label via the West German dairy industry.782 The 
milk would be packaged in the desired cartons, even though these were non-
recyclable.783 Similarly, creameries in Eisenach, Gotha and Mühlhausen formed 
a joint corporation with the dairy company in Kassel, allowing them to ‘ensure 
quality’.784 In this case, quark, yoghurt, cheese and cream was sent to West 
Germany to be filled into plastic pots and sold back into East Germany under a 
different brand name.785 Each of the three eastern creameries would specialise 
in a different type of product.786 Although the papers reported ‘300 new jobs’,787 
the cooperative in Eisenach reduced their administrative staff by installing a 
computer to manage purchase orders and accounts in the future.788 This was 
linked to the dairy headquarters in Hesse, which had provided the software.789 
A dairy farm in Berka/Werra received the support of a Danish firm, which 
agreed to supply new machinery to improve cheese production.790 Similar 
 
781 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Vernichtung von DDR-Landwirtschaftsprodukten ist keine Lösung. 
Thüringer Milch ohne Chance?‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 21 July 1990. 
782 Ibid. 
783 Ibid. 
784 ‘die Qualität (…) abgesichert’, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘DDR-Produkte / Zusagen des Handels. 
Abnahme, wenn Qualität stimmt‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 31 July 1990. 
785 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Aktiengesellschaft zwischen Molkereien in Hessen und Thüringen 
wurde gegründet. Es geht weiter: 300 Arbeitsplätze und neue Produkte‘, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, 26 July 
1990. 
786 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Molkerei-Chef (…): “Getarnter” DDR-Joghurt’, Thüringer 
Landeszeitung, 18 July 1990. 
787 ‘300 neue Arbeitsplätze’, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Aktiengesellschaft zwischen Molkereien in 
Hessen und Thüringen wurde gegründet. Es geht weiter: 300 Arbeitsplätze und neue Produkte‘, 
Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, 26 July 1990. 
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decisions faced the beer brewing industry, where a cooperation with ‘potential 
partners from the Federal Republic’ was presented as ‘the only chance of 
survival’.791 
After announcing at the regional CDU party conference that the western 
chain REWE ‘has complete control over Eisenach’, the head of the district 
authority made an effort to support local businesses and break up the 
monopoly of chains in the region; a number of business premises, formerly 
belonging to the local trade organisation, were now offered to local business 
people to run.792 In particular, the call, which also went out in the local press, 
was aimed at former shop managers who had worked in the premises over the 
past years and were now willing to take it over independently. They were to be 
given priority over other applicants, with business spaces being allocated by a 
committee. The local trade organisation also agreed to hand over some of their 
shops, offering up the smaller premises. ‘This’, however, would ‘not be 
enough’, the head of the district authority asserted.793 His aim was to ensure 
that the town allowed a range of businesses to compete against one another, 
which, in turn, should guarantee a broad range of goods and fair prices for 
consumers.794 
These developments had all taken place within a month of the currency 
union. The experience of food and money shortages during the transition and 
 
791 ‘Nur so die Chance zum Überleben‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Betrieb, Stadt und Kreis sind sich 
einig: Brauerei Eisenach wird aufgeteilt‘, Oberhessische Presse, 27/28 July 1990. 
792 ‘habe Eisenach hundertprozentig im Griff’, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Entflechtung von HO und 
Konsum / Kreis sucht Bewerber. Handelsobjekte sollen “unters Volk!”’, Hessisch-Niedersächsische 
Allgemeine, 24 July 1990. 
793 ‘das wird uns aber nicht reichen‘, ibid. 
794 Ibid. 
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the arrival of long-desired western goods had influenced the shopping habits of 
locals, but the effect of their choices for local businesses had soon become 
visible. To raise awareness of their situation, but also to express the levels of 
personal devaluation that these workers felt, staff took to destroying their assets 
and publicly tipping away their produce. Nonetheless, the fate of the food and 
drink industry in East Germany was not just in the hands of their customers. 
Bad press and strong competition from large western firms, that undercut 
eastern goods by offering longer use-by dates, had made it difficult for eastern 
businesses, as these would need time and investment in order to update their 
production and packaging processes. By this time, western chains and products 
had already established themselves and local companies were forced to reduce 
costs by cutting jobs.  
The East German trade organisation and the district authority allocated 
the blame for the failing sales to the citizens themselves for choosing to buy 
western products, or to the workers for failing to produce goods that would 
meet the market demands, despite the uneven playing field. And yet, eastern 
businesses had demonstrated clear initiative and strong efforts, as confirmed 
during a review by the district authority, to ensure ongoing trade by taking up 
direct sales on the streets and looking for ways to adapt their product. 
However, due to the need to adapt quickly, firms were pushed to enter co-
operations with businesses from across the border in order to stay afloat. The 
next section will look at knock-on effects in different sectors of communal life 
and how local citizens responded to the crises in their companies. 
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The By-products of the Currency Union 
The introduction of western goods in July 1990 had another consequence, which 
would make a visible impact on the towns and communities across the region. 
Within days, the rise in household waste, due to the ‘unaccustomed variety’ of 
packaging materials had reached ‘almost catastrophic’ levels.795 Rubbish bins 
across the town of Eisenach were overflowing, the streets were strewn with 
drinks cans and house entrances were blocked by towering piles of boxes.796 
Glass jars, cardboard and newspapers started heaping up around the town and 
its surrounding villages.797 As these failed to be collected, dissatisfied citizens 
started raising concerns.798 
The local public utilities organisation admitted that it was struggling to 
keep on top of collecting household waste and emptying stationary bins across 
the town.799 Whereas bins had needed emptying three times a day in June,800 the 
company director reported that this had risen to every two hours in July.801 
Although the public utilities company would have liked to simply erect more 
bins, it did not have the funds to do so.802 Furthermore, as the company was in 
public ownership, such decisions would first have to be debated and signed off 
 
795 ‘bisher unbekannter Vielfalt‘, ‘fast katastrophal‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Sorgen mit der 
Müllentsorgung‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 09 August 1990. 
796 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Papierkörbe quellen über – Verpackungsflut hat Folgen‘, Eisenacher 
Stadtanzeiger, 11 July 1990. 
797 Interview with Eckhard Lindner, Eisenach, 3 March 2017. 
798 Ibid. 
799 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Papierkörbe quellen über – Verpackungsflut hat Folgen‘, Eisenacher 
Stadtanzeiger, 11 July 1990. 
800 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Betriebsjubiläum – Grund zu Feiern?‘, Eisenacher Allgemeine, 21 June 
1990. 
801 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Sorgen mit der Müllentsorgung‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 09 August 
1990. 
802 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Papierkörbe quellen über – Verpackungsflut hat Folgen‘, Eisenacher 
Stadtanzeiger, 11 July 1990. 
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by the town council, leading to further delays.803 Overall, newspapers reported 
that rubbish in the district had doubled since the currency union.804 Although 
the rise in tourism was considered a likely contributor to the growing rubbish, 
the district authority estimated that a twenty to thirty percent rise in rubbish 
had come from new forms of packaging alone.805 Consequently, the council 
began urging local citizens to take preventative measures by considering these 
by-products when buying goods.806 
According to the press, the sight of the market square after hours was 
particularly ‘disgraceful’, as cartons and rubbish were left behind after the stalls 
had been packed away.807 Tradesmen argued that the town council was 
responsible for collecting the rubbish, whilst the local newspapers reported that 
this was not the case.808 ‘Normally, the removal of rubbish is the responsibility 
of the market traders’, explained the director of the public utilities company.809 
The town council was still covering the costs of removing leftover rubbish, but 
in future this service would have to be included in the trader’s stall fees. Until 
these new market rules were to be introduced later in the year, however, 
individual salespeople were technically still responsible for collecting, recycling 
or disposing of their boxes and packaging.810  
 
803 Ibid. 
804 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Versuche der Stadtwirtschaft. Hausmülleerung (sic) zweimal und 
Altpapiersammlung‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine West-Thüringen, 7 August 1990. 
805 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Müllabfuhr: Nulltarif für Bürger ist passé‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische 
Allgemeine, 30 July 1990. 
806 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Betriebsjubiläum – Grund zu Feiern?‘, Eisenacher Allgemeine, 21 June 
1990. 
807 ‘ein erbärmliches Bild‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Papierkörbe quellen über – Verpackungsflut hat 
Folgen‘, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, 11 July 1990. 
808 Ibid. 
809 ‘Normalerweise sind die Gewerbetreibenden für die Entsorgung des Mülls selbst verantwortlich‘, ibid. 
810 Ibid. 
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Previously, waste removal and recycling in the GDR had been paid for 
and heavily subsidised by the state, with waste management managed at the 
communal level, and recycling at a district level. Now, however, the 
organisations, which were still under state ownership but in the process of 
adapting to the free market, were unable to cover the rising costs. In future, 
taxes would have to be introduced to pay for the services, but these structures 
were not yet in place. In July, the publicly-owned utilities company in Eisenach 
had turned into a limited company, named Stadtwirtschaft Eisenach GmbH in 
Aufbau (Public Utilities Ltd under construction).811 The addendum to its name 
was meant to demonstrate that the limited company had been formed solely as 
an ‘interim solution’, as its staff expected that, ‘sooner or later’, the company 
would be returned into public ownership. 812 Workers were confident that the 
company’s future was safe, as there was ‘well-founded hope’, due to the rise in 
waste, that they would be able to keep all existing jobs whilst also creating new 
ones.813  
Similarly, the former SERO (secondary raw materials) organisation in the 
district had reformed as Thüringen Recycling GmbH, with a branch in Eisenach. 
Just a few weeks on, however, this company was struggling not only to manage 
the recycling, but also to pay its staff’s wages.814 The district council had 
announced that it was unable to continue covering their costs, as the value of 
 
811 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Stadtwirtschaft vor dem zweiten Frühling‘, Eisenacher Tagespost, 30 
June / 01 July 1990. 
812 ‘Übergangslösung‘, ‘über kurz oder lang‘, ibid. 
813 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Betriebsjubiläum – Grund zu Feiern?‘, Eisenacher Allgemeine, 21 June 
1990. 
814 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Dosen, Plasteflaschen, Altpaper … Wohin mit den Sekundärrohstoffen? 
– Lösung in Sicht‘, Thüringer Tageblatt, 28 July 1990. 
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paper and glass had fallen, and the company was therefore failing to make any 
profit.815 Recycling these materials alone was no longer a financially viable 
business model.816 Although the company had tried to negotiate with glass and 
paper companies, which were willing to accept the materials in principle, these 
were not prepared to pay for the transport, and so the recycling company 
continued to work at a loss.817  
Although local industry was no longer willing to accept returned 
materials, with many shops also turning down recyclables and refusing to pay 
the refundable deposit, there was still the option of transporting these to 
recycling plants. First however, the recycling organisation would need to install 
recycling containers to collect tins and bottles.818 Due to its growing losses 
however, the recycling company was unable to finance this investment.819 
Instead, materials that would otherwise have been recycled, ended up piling up 
or being disposed of as normal household waste, thereby creating more work 
for the local public utilities company.820  
Although waste management was indeed profitable, the Stadtwirtschaft 
company equally did not have the technology and facilities to cope with the 
new quantities of household waste. This, again, would require significant 
 
815 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Recycling GmbH ist zu teuer: West-Entsorger soll aushelfen‘, Eisenacher 
Stadtanzeiger, 14/15 July 1990. 
816 Ibid. 
817 Ibid. 
818 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Kein Geld mehr für Altstoffe. Recycling GmbH in schwerer finanzieller 
Krise – Baldiger Zusammenbruch droht‘, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, 24 July 1990. 
819 Ibid. 
820 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Dosen, Plasteflaschen, Altpaper … Wohin mit den Sekundärrohstoffen? 
– Lösung in Sicht‘, Thüringer Tageblatt, 28 July 1990. StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Versuche der 
Stadtwirtschaft. Hausmülleerung (sic) zweimal und Altpapiersammlung‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische 
Allgemeine West-Thüringen, 7 August 1990. 
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financial investment in order to buy new lorries to transport the waste or install 
new facilities to manage the waste. The landfill sites in Eisenach-Moseberg and 
nearby Ruhla were already nearing capacity, and so the company would soon 
need to pay higher costs to have the rubbish transported sixty kilometres 
further to the next site across the former border, in the Hessian town of 
Buchenau.821 
Ironically, the Federal Republic of Germany had been disposing of their 
waste in GDR landfill sites since 1978.822  By transporting their rubbish abroad, 
western firms were able to save money by circumventing federal regulations on 
proper disposal. The East German state, on the other hand, was keen to make 
money from the transaction and accepted to take the waste materials, without 
consideration for the ensuing risks for the local population. Now that the state 
had collapsed, citizens’ groups and independent journalists started unearthing 
the truth of the ‘rubbish colony’ in eastern Germany.823 However, as the country 
faced new levels of rubbish, it was more preoccupied with finding a solution to 
its own waste management.  
As it was only the Thuringian recycling company, which had 
‘collapsed’,824 the local business magistrate set about trying to find a western 
firm that could handle the ever-growing heaps of recycling in the district.825 In 
theory, recycling was the responsibility of the state, but this did not yet exist, 
 
821 Ibid. 
822 Matthias Baerens & Ulrich von Arnswald, Die Müll-Connection. Entsorger und ihre Geschäfte (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 1993), p. 20. 
823 Baerens & von Arnswald, Die Müll-Connection, p. 131. 
824 ‘zusammengebrochen‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Müllabfuhr: Nulltarif für Bürger ist passé‘, 
Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 30 July 1990. 
825 Interview with Eckhard Lindner, Eisenach, 3 March 2017. 
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and ministries for the environment were also still being established. At the end 
of July 1990, the local environment office in Eisenach had just one member of 
staff - a former social studies teacher, - but not its own financial budget.826 
Consequently, old cars that had been left at the side of the road could not be 
removed and scrapped by the town, and simply stayed where they were, 
rusting away.827 The head of the district office for the environment argued that 
cooperating with a western partner was ‘the only means to survival’ for the 
local recycling company.828  
Much to the surprise of the magistrate in Eisenach, western firms were 
not at all interested in taking over the recycling industry, with its limited 
opportunity for profit-making, on its own.829 In the Federal Republic, waste 
management and recycling were not separated into two separate organisations, 
and so the town was unable to find a buyer for the recycling firm as a stand-
alone entity. The western firms were only interested in taking on the profitable 
sides of the waste management business, and so it would mean selling all or 
nothing. The head storeman of the recycling facilities in Eisenach announced in 
July that he assumed a western enterprise would soon take over all of the waste 
management services in Eisenach.830 
By the time the eastern delegates had understood the reasons for the 
disinterest, the company Edelhoff-Münster from Bad Hersfeld had already fully 
 
826 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Dosen, Plasteflaschen, Altpaper … Wohin mit den Sekundärrohstoffen? 
– Lösung in Sicht‘, Thüringer Tageblatt, 28 July 1990. 
827 Ibid. 
828 ‘Als einzige Überlebenschance‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Recycling GmbH ist zu teuer: West-
Entsorger soll aushelfen‘, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, 14/15 July 1990. 
829 Interview with Eckhard Lindner, Eisenach, 3 March 2017. 
830 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Recycling GmbH ist zu teuer: West-Entsorger soll aushelfen‘, Eisenacher 
Stadtanzeiger, 14/15 July 1990. 
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taken over services in one local community.831 Whereas eastern towns were 
reliant on the investment of western firms in upgrading their facilities, the town 
Eisenach was wary of handing over all waste management services to 
companies from the Federal Republic, as had already taken place in the nearby 
districts Bad Salzungen and Bad Langensalza.832 In these cases, where the town 
administration had failed to maintain stakes in the sector, it was to be expected 
that the ‘West German contractors (…) would gradually drive out the 
municipal businesses’, leading to the collapse of a ‘largely well-functioning but 
technically outdated municipal enterprise’.833 
As an interim solution, the Stadtwirtschaft GmbH in Aufbau began 
cooperating with the company Münster from Bad Hersfeld in West Germany.834 
Münster would send larger vehicles that could collect more waste and flatten it 
during transportation as well. ‘This allows us to save time’, explained the 
director of the waste firm in Eisenach.835 The western company would also 
collect cardboard and paper, which would be sent to the pressing plant in Bad 
Hersfeld.836 During its first week, the company collected over three hundred 
 
831 Interview with Eckhard Lindner, Eisenach, 3 March 2017. 
832 StA Eisenach, 21.2-361 Protokollbücher; Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1990, ‘Beschluß über die 
Zustimmung zur Gründung einer Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH für die Entsorgung 49% Beteiligung der 
Stadt Eisenach 51% Beteiligung der Firma Edelhoff-Münster, Bad Hersfeld‘, Stadtverordnetenversamm-
lung der Stadt Eisenach, 05 September 1990. 
833 ‘daß die (…) westdeutschen Entsorger (…) nach und nach die Stadtwirtschaft verdrängen würden. Dies 
würde den Niedergang des an sich gesunden, aber technisch überalterten städtischen Stadtwirtschafts-
betrieben bedeuten‘, ibid. 
834 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Sorgen mit der Müllentsorgung‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 9 August 
1990. 
835 ‘So sparen wir Zeit’, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Versuche der Stadtwirtschaft. Hausmülleerung (sic) 
zweimal und Altpapiersammlung‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine West-Thüringen, 7 August 
1990. 
836 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Sorgen mit der Müllentsorgung‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 9 August 
1990. 
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tonnes of paper from the district of Eisenach.837 Despite this cooperation, which 
started in mid-August 1990, the company director played down the long-term 
chances of success: ‘To think that we can radically update our technology 
within two years is an illusion, even with the help of a strong partner from the 
Federal Republic’.838 
At the end of August, the director of the public utilities company in 
Eisenach put forward a written statement on the future of the business to the 
town council.839 Although there would inevitably be job cuts in certain areas, he 
was confident they could be replaced by bringing in new services, such as 
organic composting or hazardous waste disposal.840 What remained certain 
however, was that the company, as it was at the time, was ‘not able to provide 
the required new services independently’.841 The management board 
consequently worried that their dependence on financial support would 
gradually drive the business back, forcing it to hand over services in the 
surrounding area.842  
As such, they argued that uniform rules should be brought in across the 
district, to make it easier for the public utilities company to work across the 
 
837 StA Eisenach, 21.2-361 Protokollbücher; Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1990, ‘Niederschrift über die 4. 
Sitzung der Stadtverordnetenversammlung am 5. 9. 1990‘, Büro des Stadtverordnetenvorstehers, Eisenach, 
6 September 1990. 
838 ‘Es ist eine Illusion zu glauben, daß wir in zwei Jahren unsere Technik grundlegend erneuern könnten, 
auch nicht mit einem starken Partner aus der Bundesrepublik‘. StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Versuche 
der Stadtwirtschaft. Hausmülleerung (sic) zweimal und Altpapiersammlung‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische 
Allgemeine West-Thüringen, 7 August 1990. 
839 StA Eisenach, 21.2-361 Protokollbücher; Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1990, ‘Stellungnahme zum 
Beschlußentwurf der künftigen Wirtschaftsform der Stadtwirtschaft Eisenach GmbH i.A.‘, Eisenach, 24 
August 1990. 
840 Ibid. 
841 ‘kann die derzeitige Stadtwirtschaft Eisenach GmbH i.A. die geforderten neuen Leistungen im Bereich 
der Abfallwirtschaft nicht selbstständig erbringen‘, ibid. 
842 Ibid. 
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area.843 Their first choice would be for all waste management services to be 
brought together as a district business, with subsidiaries for the individual 
towns.844 Failing that, the management would consider offering shares to a 
West German company.845 The staff committee had already voted with a large 
majority for a cooperation with a western firm on the fourth of July 1990, and 
again on the twentieth of August 1990.846 In any case, however, management 
stressed to the town council that it was of utmost importance to ensure the 
town council maintained a large stake in the business.847 
In September 1990, the town council struck a deal with Edelhoff-Münster, 
in which they would manage the recycling and waste disposal for the whole 
district together as a joint venture.848  First, however, the Thüringer Recycling 
GmbH branch in Eisenach would need to become independent, in order to 
merge with the communal waste management company.849 As demanded by 
the public utilities company, the negotiators had ensured that the town of 
Eisenach maintained a forty-nine percent stake in the company.850 The former 
business magistrate for the town looked back on this move as one of the best 
 
843 Ibid; StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Versuche der Stadtwirtschaft. Hausmülleerung (sic) zweimal und 
Altpapiersammlung‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine West-Thüringen, 7 August 1990. 
844 StA Eisenach, 21.2-361 Protokollbücher; Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1990, ‘Stellungnahme zum 





848 StA Eisenach, 21.2-361 Protokollbücher; Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1990, ‘Beschluß über die 
Zustimmung zur Gründung einer Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH für die Entsorgung 49% Beteiligung der 
Stadt Eisenach 51% Beteiligung der Firma Edelhoff-Münster, Bad Hersfeld‘, Stadtverordnetenversamm-
lung der Stadt Eisenach, 05 September 1990. 
849 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Recycling GmbH ist zu teuer: West-Entsorger soll aushelfen‘, Eisenacher 
Stadtanzeiger, 14/15 July 1990. 
850 StA Eisenach, 21.2-361 Protokollbücher; Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1990, ‘Beschluß über die 
Zustimmung zur Gründung einer Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH für die Entsorgung 49% Beteiligung der 
Stadt Eisenach 51% Beteiligung der Firma Edelhoff-Münster, Bad Hersfeld‘, Stadtverordnetenversamm-
lung der Stadt Eisenach, 05 September 1990. 
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achievements of the period, as by founding an associated company, Eisenach 
was able to solve its waste management and recycling problems whilst keeping 
a large stake in the business and securing jobs.851 The cooperation between the 
town of Eisenach and Edelhoff-Münster was said to have worked well due to a 
good mutual understanding, and also provided an opportunity to learn how to 
set up a GmbH, as a model for future projects.852  
The success of the project was not, however, a given. In June 1990, the 
business magistrate had stressed to fellow councillors the importance of 
ensuring that communal businesses complied to the new legal system after the 
first of July, to secure the seamless running of accounts.853 Councillors had gone 
to great efforts to make sure they were well-informed on the new regulations 
and possibilities, having exchanged ideas and experiences with other towns in 
the GDR and the Federal Republic.854 Nevertheless, despite considerable 
preparation, the new councillors were barely managing to keep on top of 
things. At the end of his report to the town council in June 1990, the business 
magistrate had planned to explain that,  
work in progress predominates at the moment, leaving little time to work on 
the future. We have taken over the department and taken up office. At the same 
time, we have quickly come to realise that the tasks at hand require new staff 




852 Interview with Eckhard Lindner, Eisenach, 3 March 2017. 
853 StA Eisenach, 21.2-361 Protokollbücher; Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1990, ‘Bericht über die Arbeit 
im Dezernat VI im Monat Juni 1990‘, Magistrat der Stadt Eisenach, Dezernat für Wirtschaftsverwaltung, 
Eisenach, 26 June 1990. 
854 Ibid. 
855 ‘Abschließend kann man zur Tätigkeit im Monat Juni sagen, daß die laufenden Arbeiten derzeit 
überwiegen und wenig Zeit für Zukunftsaufgaben lassen. Das Dezernat wurde übernommen, die 
Amtstätigkeit aufgenommen. Gleichzeitig reifte jedoch die Erkenntnis, daß die anstehenden Aufgaben 
neues Personal und neue Arbeitsmethoden erfordern‘, ibid. 
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Although the paragraph was crossed out and removed from the speech, it 
demonstrates just how overstretched the local councillors were. On one 
occasion, the business magistrate’s wife had even called the police, as he had 
failed to come home at night.856  
 The town council and local businesses found themselves in a highly 
pressurised and fast-paced situation, with new challenges emerging where old 
rules and structures no longer applied, but new ones were not yet in place. At 
the end of July 1990, the local paper in Eisenach had noted, ‘The old disposal 
system no longer exists, a new one is still in the planning process’.857 Tasks that 
would otherwise be managed by larger regional bodies, were left to newly 
appointed magistrates. In the meantime, experienced firms from West Germany 
had the upper hand, with the discontinuity working to their advantage. 
Constrained by the need to solve pressing issues and respond to western 
influences, councillors and companies in Eisenach nevertheless managed to 
navigate the new legal system whilst ensuring, as best they could, that the 
interests of local people were protected. 
 The city of Erfurt followed a similar course, also founding a limited 
company to manage public utilities and secure ‘the independence of the city in 
ecological, social, administrative, financial and economic terms’ in July 1990.858 
In particular, the council in Erfurt had argued for the importance of including 
 
856 Interview with Eckhard Lindner, Eisenach, 3 March 2017. 
857 ‘Das alte Entsorgungssystem gibt es nicht mehr, ein neues ist erst geplant‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 
Zeitungen, ‘Dosen, Plasteflaschen, Altpaper … Wohin mit den Sekundärrohstoffen? – Lösung in Sicht‘, 
Thüringer Tageblatt, 28 July 1990. 
858 ‘die kommunale Selbstständigkeit unter stadtökologischem, sozialem, verwaltungs- und 
finanztechnischem und wirtschaftlichem Aspekt‘, StA Erfurt, 1-7 Stadtverwaltung Erfurt ab 1990, 
‘Gründung eines wirtschaftlichen Gesamtunternehmens Stadtwerke Erfurt‘, Erfurt, 4 July 1990, in 
'Protokoll der 4. Sitzung der Stadtverordnetenversammlung am 18.07.1990‘, 18 July 1990. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 237 
energy as part of the business, as this area provided good profit-making 
opportunities and could support weaker services.859 Nevertheless, the topic of 
waste management had also caused hefty debates in Erfurt, even within 
political factions, as communal actors argued for the cheaper providers in order 
to save money.860 Economic arguments had taken the upper hand and were 
rated as essential for securing survival and therefore more valuable than voice. 
As financial pressures increased, and councillors tried to find quick solutions to 
pressing issues, it was not self-evident that they would choose options that 
secured the city’s long-term interests.  
 
Conclusion 
Historically, the fall of the Wall on the ninth of November 1989 and the 
reunification of Germany on the third of October 1990 are often presented as 
turning points in the rapid transformation of East Germany, enacted within the 
short space of a year. And yet, on closer inspection, the introduction of the new 
market system on the first of July, just three and a half months after the first free 
elections in the GDR, brought about changes that affected the most crucial parts 
of the eastern everyday experience; work and social life. As such, the 
transformation of the economic, political and social system was even swifter 
than it at first appears, with local citizens having to adapt quickly to the new 
structures before the old ones had even been fully dismantled. In social terms, 
 
859 Ibid. 
860 Interview with Wolfgang Mühle, Erfurt, 13 August 2018. 
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this made the currency union and the transition to the free market the central 
experience of the transformation period. 
 The collapse of the state in 1989 had created an unprecedented situation 
in which the former rules were no longer respected or adhered to, and yet new 
ones were not yet in place. Up until the summer of 1990, this ambiguous 
political situation provided opportunities for businesses that wanted to set 
themselves up quickly to do so at a time when there were few bureaucratic 
hurdles holding them back, but disregard for the existing rules and regulations 
also questioned the ownership and decision-making rights of citizens in their 
own communities.  
Local councils faced the tough task of attracting new businesses and 
establishing some form of stability whilst at the same time ensuring that the 
public did not lose trust in their authority. Mistakes made in legal affairs were 
blamed on the political situation, resulting in a widespread lack of 
accountability. As collective laws fell away, it was left to individuals as 
customers to decide what was acceptable or not. As such, market choices now 
ruled society and the political and social system was restructured around 
citizens’ consumer preferences. The strong demand amongst eastern citizens for 
a new range of products and a consumer voice needed to be met whilst at the 
same time protecting local businesses and livelihoods. 
 As consumer-citizens, East Germans had the opportunity to take political 
action through their choice of products. And yet, consumer preferences were 
strongly shaped by the same instability and the lived experience of the 
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preceding months. The problems around the supply of basic goods in the run 
up to the currency union led citizens to subsequently opt overwhelmingly for 
long-lasting products hailing from West Germany. The knock-on effect was felt 
by local businesses, but their losses were presented publicly as the result of 
inefficient and outdated production methods. Firms suddenly needed to 
compete with western businesses without prior preparation or time to adapt to 
the new system. On a district and communal level, preferential conditions were 
given to western firms on the basis that their businesses were more viable and 
that their products were of a higher standard.  
For eastern citizens, whose place of work formed the core of all social 
interactions, the economic changes were felt not only at the bureaucratic level, 
but also personally, affecting interactions, cultural practices and understanding 
of self-worth. This comes to light through the symbolic actions that citizens 
used to express personal feelings in the face of systematic changes. Starting 
with the emptying and smashing of milk bottles in July 1990, workers 
demonstrated the perceived devaluation of their own produce and goods, but 
inherently also of their own self-worth.  
The direct competition with western goods and the public discourse on 
quality differences between East and West cemented the hierarchy between the 
two halves of Germany. The lower status of the East became clearly visible, as 
eastern produce was reduced in price and forced out of the supermarkets and 
onto the streets. Press coverage heightened feelings of shame at the quality of 
East German work and produce. The new pecking order was then further 
reinforced by the financial conditions of the system change, which meant that 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 240 
eastern companies relied on the investment and cooperation of western firms in 
order to transform their businesses, giving the wealthier partners the upper 
hand in all negotiations.  
The examples show up the geographic distribution of power during this 
political, social and economic union. Representatives from higher state and 
national structures appear to have been paralysed in the face of the new 
competition, unable to withstand or counter the wishes of larger western chains 
or to enact general policies to support eastern businesses through the transition. 
Rather, local mayors, politicians and citizens were left to their own devices, 
forced to come up with own, local solutions to the growing sea of problems. It 
confirms what Landolf Scherzer described in his novel Der Zweite, a tale of the 
scope of the head of the district authority in nearby Bad Salzungen after 1990, 
demonstrating that his microhistorical insights do indeed speak for a larger 
development.861   
Nevertheless, local actors navigated the new system and reacted to the 
changes going on around them, using contacts and good judgment to protect 
their own interests where possible. All the same, the original expectations of 
higher living standards and economic prosperity associated with the currency 
union were met by the reality of business closures and the social and financial 
devaluation of local production. Whilst the majority of citizens enjoyed their 
new consumer rights, another part of society soon realised that consumption 
 
861 See Landolf Scherzer, Der Zweite (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1997). 
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comes at a considerable cost. The next chapter looks at what happened when 
these structures were rolled out to larger businesses across the East. 
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5. The Sad State of the Unemployed 
Ossi or Assi?  
When the new deputy director of the job centre in Eisenach took up office in 
June 1990, one of his first training sessions would be on how to complete the 
new forms for registering as unemployed. Just a few days later, he and his staff 
would be standing in sports and congregation halls, explaining the procedure 
and enrolling long queues of former workers for unemployment benefits. ‘It 
was backbreaking work’, he recalls.862 ‘High volume and incredibly demanding, 
emotionally’.863 The time of the mass redundancies had begun.  
 As scores of GDR citizens awaited instruction on how to apply for social 
support for the first time in their lives, it was important that everyone kept a 
cool head and stuck to the protocol. The deputy director of the job centre 
explains, ‘There was no time for animosities. It was essential that staff 
functioned, that you functioned, that it ran smoothly, and that there were no 
verbal blunders.’864 And yet, tensions were also high amongst the staff 
themselves, with the team having called a strike on the deputy director’s first 
day of work to protest his appointment to the role.865 The recruit was well-
known in the region for having overseen the parliamentary elections earlier that 
year, and job centre staff feared that his appointment now spelled greater 
scrutiny and further restructuring in their own field of work. As the team 
 
862 ‘Das war Knochenarbeit‘, Interview with Johannes Wallbrecht, Jena, 09 November 2018. 
863 ‘Massenarbeit, emotional sehr, sehr anstrengend‘, ibid. 
864 ‘Da bleibt für Animositäten überhaupt nichts mehr übrig. Da kommt es drauf an, dass die Mitarbeiter 
funktionieren, dass man selber funktioniert, dass das gut abläuft, dass es keine verbalen Entgleisungen 
gibt‘, ibid. 
865 Ibid. 
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prepared to manage unforeseen levels of unemployment in society, existential 
fears and interpersonal conflicts extended to their own daily lives. 
 However, the Ministry for Work and Wages in the GDR had already seen 
significant changes in the last few months. As the country switched systems 
from planned economy to free market, redundancies were taking place in 
greater numbers, as firms desperately tried to reduce their outgoing 
expenses.866 With the currency union on the first of July, the number of people 
seeking work instantly doubled.867 Anticipating that the existing structures 
would no longer be sufficient, the GDR government had founded the Central 
Agency for Work Administration on the eighth of March 1990 to oversee the 
national restructuring of the job centres in cooperation with the Federal Labour 
Office, and to manage the introduction of the new Employment Promotion Act 
from the first of July 1990.868  
 The scale of the operation and the speed with which the job centre staff 
were expected to learn and enact the new processes for managing 
unemployment highlight how monumental the changes were across the 
country. Not only were there new rules and forms to complete; the whole 
concept of unemployment was unfamiliar to the citizens as well as to the 
members of staff. East German citizens, who had always been guaranteed a 
place of work and regular income now faced the uncertainty of unemployment, 
short-term contracts and therewith the loss of routines and networks that had 
 
866 Bundesarchiv (henceforth BArch), DQ 3/1885 Staatssekretariat für Arbeitund Löhne (SAL), 
‘Arbeitsmarktbericht der Zentralen Arbeitsmarktverwaltung der DDR’, July 1990. 
867 Ibid. 
868 BArch, DC 20/I-3/2953 6. Sitzung des Ministerrates vom 16. Mai 1990, ‘Bericht des Ministerrates zur 
Strukturreform der Arbeitsämter‘, 16 May 1990. 
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structured their daily lives for decades. Just as the fears for the future had 
unsettled the job centre staff, the structural changes now threatened 
interpersonal disputes on a massive scale, as citizens were reclassified by 
income and employment status. 
 The social function of work and employment in the former Workers’ and 
Peasants’ State is not to be underestimated. As described by Alf Lüdtke, the 
concept of ‘quality work’ developed out of a long tradition of independent 
problem-solving to become a strong identity marker in communities in both 
East and West Germany, but also a socially valuable form of honour.869 In 1989, 
the term was used again by the GDR head of state to appeal to workers and 
stabilise political tensions, demonstrating that the idea of quality work still held 
great sway.870 Despite the development of a new cultural norms of work under 
socialism, where employment status was no longer dependent on quality work, 
the identification with high work performance had persisted.871  
 In a similar vein, Dorothee Wierling identifies Tüchtigkeit as a 
fundamental East German value that structured social practices in the GDR.872 
The term, which encompasses characteristics such as efficiency, resourcefulness, 
and a hardworking, diligent attitude to work, is presented as particularly 
female trait, as women in the GDR were expected to manage both work and 
family life amid supply shortages.873 The wide-spread uptake of work amongst 
 
869 Alf Lüdtke, ‘The World of Men’s Work, East and West‘, in Katherine Pence & Paul Betts (Ed.), Socialist 
Modern. East German Everyday Culture and Politics (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 
p. 234. 
870 Lüdtke, ‘The World of Men’s Work’, pp. 234-252. 
871 Ibid., p. 236. 
872 Dorothee Wierling, ‘Das weiblich-proletarische Tüchtigkeitsideal der DDR‘ in Peter Hübner & Klaus 
Tenfelde (Ed.), Arbeiter in der SBZ - DDR (Essen: Klartext, 1999), p. 843. 
873 Wierling, ‘Das weiblich-proletarische Tüchtigkeitsideal‘, p. 843. 
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women in the GDR is further understood by the sociologist Wolfgang Engler as 
having undermined common understandings of masculinity, leading to a 
stronger focus on the male body and masculine body language in East 
Germany, as men tried to compensate for their perceived diminished role in 
society.874 Work was therefore a medium through which social power and 
gender roles were negotiated. 
Engler argues that work, or jobs in particular, were the ‘foundation of 
social property’ in the GDR; a public and personal good, owned by the workers 
and thereby enhancing their own value in a similar way to honour.875 For 
example, as jobs were secure per se, workers ‘let themselves be asked to come 
to work’, especially at peak times, thereby heightening the recognition of their 
own contribution.876 By managing tasks and supply within the collective, 
workers were able to increase general respect for the role of the worker and 
therewith their own power and agency. Work in the GDR was therefore greatly 
influenced by the state structures, but in turn shaped the cultural values, social 
norms and interactions of citizens. 
And yet, the strong value of work and good workmanship also had a 
flip-side, for as well as promoting state-endorsed attitudes to work, the GDR 
state actively discouraged its citizens from choosing to work outside of 
common forms of employment. After discussions reaching back to the 
beginning of the decade, the criminal code book of 1968 defined ‘withdrawal 
 
874 Wolfgang Engler, Die Ostdeutschen. Kunde von einem verlorenen Land (Berlin: Aufbau, 1999), p. 201. 
875 ‘die Grundlage des Sozialeigentums’, Wolfgang Engler, ‘Notizen zur Arbeitswelt der DDR. Arbeit als 
Grundlage des Sozialeigentums‘ in Andreas H. Apelt, Robert Grünbaum & Jens Schöne (Eds.), 
Erinnerungsort DDR. Alltag – Herrschaft – Gesellschaft (Berlin: Metropol, 2016), p. 45. 
876 ‘so ließ man sich zur Arbeit bitten‘, Engler, ‘Notizen zur Arbeitswelt der DDR‘, p. 49. 
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from regular employment’ as the prime example of antisocial behaviour and 
deemed it punishable by law with a two-year prison term and the possibility of 
stronger sentences.877 Not only was unemployment therefore criminalised in 
East Germany, but ‘bad work behaviour’ such as the avoidance of ‘honest and 
steady work’, was presented as an immoral lifestyle that would ultimately lead 
to criminality.878 Furthermore, rehabilitation through industrial work was 
implemented as a corrective measure, reinforcing the association of irregular 
work with its negative connotations and regular work with strong positive 
values and reformative effects.  
The change from guaranteed work to unemployment in East Germany 
from 1990 onwards would therefore cut much deeper than simple economics, as 
concepts of work and unemployment structured social interactions, gender 
roles, self-understandings and moral values. How would citizens process this 
change on a personal and cultural level and what would it do with their own 
sense of self-worth? Would the fear of and arrival of mass unemployment 
restructure gender relations and social hierarchies? How would the very real 
threat of unemployment be perceived and handled by communal actors and to 
what extent would they be able to take control of the situation to regain a sense 
of agency? 
Whereas historical research has recently begun to focus more closely on 
the process of privatisation in the companies and communities in East Germany 
 
877 ‘sich einer geregelten Arbeit hartnäckig entzieht’, Sven Korzilius, “Asoziale” und “Parasiten” im Recht der 
SBZ/DDR (Köln: Böhlau, 2005), p. 378. 
878 ‘Schlechtes Arbeitsverhalten‘, ‘ehrliche Arbeit und dauerhafte Arbeitsbeziehungen‘, Korzilius, 
“Asoziale” und “Parasiten”, p. 323. 
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during the transformation period, it still favours the institutional perspective of 
‘managers, civil servants and cadres’ in charge of restructuring from above.879 
The work of the Treuhand trust tasked with managing public property during 
the transformation has been identified as an extremely ‘problematic’ aspect of 
transformation politics that continues to shape and polarise collective memory 
in unified Germany.880 Despite ‘critical perceptions of the Treuhand’ across the 
East, the experience of citizens and communities that cultivated these meanings 
have not yet been sufficiently analysed and contextualised by historians.881 By 
looking at the interactions between workers, employers, communal actors and 
politicians in Eisenach, this chapter tries to shed light on the citizens’ experience 
of privatisation, unemployment and a changing work landscape in East 
Germany from 1990 onwards, and how these experiences were expressed 
through political activism.  
 
From VEB to RIP – The Automobilwerk Eisenach  
Waiting for the Green Light 
That the currency union and the switch to a free market economy would carry 
the consequence of new levels of unemployment was no surprise to the people 
of Eisenach. In March 1990, the local paper had already begun reporting on 
efforts to counter the effects, with the local job centre planning further training 
 
879 ‘Manager, Beamten und Kader‘, Böick, Die Treuhand. Idee – Praxis – Erfahrung, p. 17. 
880 ‘problematisch’, Constantin Goschler & Marcus Böick, Studie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung der 
Treuhandanstalt (Bochum: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017), <https://omp. 
ub.rub.de/ 
index.php/RUB/catalog/book/103> (accessed 25 February 2020), p. 13. 
881 ‘kritischen Treuhand-Deutungen‘, Goschler & Böick, Studie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung der 
Treuhandanstalt, p. 32. 
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programmes to ensure workers had the skills needed to meet the demands of 
the new industry.882 Alongside foreign languages and business management, 
courses on offer through the job centre included electronics and automobile 
engineering, giving hope to the continuation of a long tradition of automobile 
manufacturing in the region.883 Of the fifty-nine-thousand workers in the 
district of Eisenach, one in seven worked in the local car production plant that 
made the iconic Wartburg car, with others employed by suppliers: factories 
providing car parts, components, couplings and electronics.884 As the country 
prepared to enter the free market, all hopes were therefore pinned to the 
successful transition of this one large local employer. 
Towards the end of 1989, the Automobilwerk had started exploring 
possible partnerships with the big car companies in West Germany; 
Volkswagen, BMW and Opel.885 As Eisenach was the home of BMW production 
from 1928 to 1945, the Bavarian car manufacturers had the right to reclaim the 
production plant as their own, but had just opened new sites in the West.886 
Similarly, Volkswagen chose Zwickau as their main production base in the East, 
meaning that a substantial investment from them in Eisenach was unlikely. 
Although VW had signed a joint-venture contract with the automobile combine 
in the GDR, to which the VEB Automobilwerk Eisenach also belonged, the 
director of the local car plant remained unconvinced that the VW-partnership 
 
882 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Enorme Belastung für das Eisenacher Arbeitsamt. Drohender 
Arbeitslosigkeit bereits im Vorfeld begegnen‘, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, 24/25 March 1990. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Archiv der Stiftung Automobile Welt Eisenach (henceforth AdSAWE), 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, 
‘Schreiben an Bundeskanzler Kohl‘, Automobilwerk Eisenach GmbH, Eisenach, 27 September 1990. 
885 AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Textentwurf zur Entwicklung der Joint-Venture AWE-Opel‘. 
886 Ibid. 
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could secure the long-term future of the factory.887 Consequently, he applied for 
the AWE to leave the automobile combine, as the first large GDR factory to do 
so, although his request was originally declined and met by a ban on foreign 
travel and discussions with other investors.888 Nevertheless, the director 
persisted, hosting both Opel and VW at the plant in March 1990. The higher 
offer from Opel, to produce up to two-hundred-thousand cars in a brand-new 
factory, led the factory staff to vote overwhelmingly for a cooperation with 
Opel.889 
Although this was widely considered a success for the town, the AWE 
staff newspaper argued that essentially, ‘the company has no choice. Either 
Opel takes over, or it means the end to car production in Eisenach’.890 Opel was 
known for its bad employment terms in West Germany and was therefore by no 
means a first choice. However, the lack of serious interest from the other two 
West German car manufacturers meant that the Automobilwerk Eisenach had 
little choice but to try to woo the Opel giants to invest in their region. Realising 
how important it was to attract strong investors to the region, the town mayor 
and the head of the district council quickly offered their full support to the 
western firm. ‘We more or less said, “please come, we’re waiting for you. We’ll 
do whatever we can so that you can settle here quickly and create jobs”’, the 
 
887 ‘keine Klarheit zum Produkt, zur Stückzahl und zur Komponentenfertigung‘. AdSAWE, No ref., 
'Report des Betriebsdirektors‘, Der neue Motor, 26 February 1990. 
888 AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Textentwurf zur Entwicklung der Joint-Venture AWE-Opel‘. 
889 AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Chronologischer Überblick zu OPEL in Eisenach‘, 1992. 
890 ‘Der Betrieb hat keine Alternative. Entweder Opel zieht ein oder das Ende des Eisenacher 
Automobilbaus ist absehbar‘, AdSAWE, No ref., ‘Springt Opel bei uns ein?‘, Der neue Motor, 12 March 
1990. 
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mayor recalls, as securing jobs was their top priority.891 At the time, before the 
State of Thuringia had formally been established, it had been easier for local 
politicians to take such decisions, in what they had jokingly called ‘The Head-
of-the-District-Council and Mayors’ Republic’.892 
 Whether Opel would definitely decide to invest in the hometown of the 
Wartburg car, would remain to be seen, however, as the company kept its 
options open. The wording of the agreement for the founding of the joint 
company Opel AWE GmbH, signed in March 1990, was particularly vague, 
stating that Opel ‘intends’ to build a new factory in Eisenach and would take on 
the existing AWE staff ‘if possible’.893 Even the land on which the new factory 
for body framework, paint and final assembly was to be built was ‘still to be 
acquired’ and not yet in the ownership of the AWE or Opel.894 Although the 
agreement was meant to deter local workers from increasingly heading 
westward in search of work, the vague wording did little to offer them a sense 
of security.895 Three months later, the boss of the West German firm hinted in 
the press that he was considering other possible locations for a new production 
plant, based primarily on cost.896  He argued that the project would ‘not be 
worth the investment’ if the workers’ unions in the GDR were to demand the 
 
891 ‘Wir haben den Unternehmen quasi gesagt, „Kommt, wir warten auf euch. Kommt. Wir machen, was 
wir machen können und was wir machen sollen, damit ihr möglichst schnell hier ansiedelt und 
Arbeitsplätze schafft“‘, Interview with Hans-Peter Brodhun, Eisenach, 11 October 2018. 
892 ‘die Landräte-Bürgermeister-Republik‘, ibid. 
893 ‘Opel beabsichtigt‘, ‘möglichst‘. AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, 'Entwurfsfassung zum Joint 
Venture Vertrag zwischen OPEL und AWE, als Kopie der notariellen Ausfertigung‘, March 1990. 
894 ‘auf einem noch zu erwerbenden Werksgelände‘, ibid. 
895 Jessica Elsner, ‘Soziale Ungleichheit auf betrieblicher Ebene in der Transformationszeit 1989/1990 am 
Beispiel des Automobilwerkes Eisenach (AWE)‘, Geschichte der Arbeitswelten und der Gewerkschaften, 
10. Kolloquium, Augsburg, 22 February 2019, p. 5. 
896 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Opel-Werk in Eisenach noch unklar‘, Thüringer Tagespost, 18 June 1990. 
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same levels of pay as in the Federal Republic, and a 35-hour week.897 
Ultimately, Opel would choose ‘what is best for us’ at the end of the day.898   
 The executive director’s statement demonstrates the power of Opel in 
these negotiations. Although the currency and social union had seen the 
introduction of the same workers’ rights as in West Germany, the eastern 
workers were in this instance being told to willingly settle for less pay and 
longer hours. The direct competition with western firms, linked with the 
necessity to attract strong investors in order to fund the company’s 
redevelopment, had created an unlevel playing field, in which East Germans 
were dependent on the cooperation of western companies, who consequently 
set their own terms.  From a social perspective, however, it was not only the 
firms and factories that were now worth next-to-nothing, but also the workers 
in East Germany who had been symbolically devalued. This new form of 
dependency had put East and West Germans in direct but unequal relation to 
one another and heightened collective and individual feelings of loss of self-
worth in the East. 
Opel’s approach and the ensuing uncertainty around the future of the 
company was causing severe stress for the local community, as statistically, 
every family included or was connected to someone affected by the changes at 
the Automobilwerk Eisenach. At the end of May 1990, union members working in 
car assembly in Eisenach had written to the Prime Minister of the GDR, Lothar 
 
897 ‘rechnet sich das Projekt nicht‘, ibid. 
898 ‘Am Ende würde aber „die für uns günstigste Lösung” gewählt.‘ Ibid. 
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de Maizière, to ask for his assistance in bridging the transformation period. ‘The 
situation in our factory is depressing’, they explained.899  
Our older colleagues’ world will fall apart if the car factory dies.  
Mothers and fathers are plagued by constant existential worries.  
Students and apprentices, who will not be kept on, have begun to give up.900 
 
For the employees, their place of work was much more than just that. As the 
sociologist Wolfgang Engler points out, the huge GDR enterprises, with their 
children’s nurseries, surgeries and orchestras were ‘no normal workplaces, but 
rather complete copies of the larger structure in miniature’; microcosms of 
society that ‘brought public and private life together’; the hubs of the East 
German social networks.901 The Automobilwerk Eisenach was no exception, with 
sport and cultural groups, youth and social clubs, restaurants, holiday homes 
and medical practices all under the umbrella of the firm.902 As articulated in the 
letter, if this structure were to break away, it would mean the end to the world 
as they knew it for the members of staff, as the place of work, or habitus, was 
like a vital organ that integrated the material, cultural and social aspects of a 
person’s life and shaped their perceptions and actions.903  In this sense, the 
changes at work were of much greater significance on a personal level than the 
 
899 ‘Die Situation im Betrieb ist deprimierend‘, AdSAWE, 30.8.1/RO9-1.1 Technisches Archiv, 'Brief an den 
Ministerpräsidenten der DDR‘, Eisenach, 22 May 1990, in ‘IG-Metall Sitzungsprotokolle 1990‘. 
900 ‘den älteren Kolleginnen und Kollegen bricht eine Welt zusammen, wenn das Automobilwerk stirbt. 
Mütter und Väter läßt die Exiswtenzangst nicht mehr zur Ruhe kommen. Die Studenten und Lehrlinge, 
die nicht übernommen werden, fangen an zu resignieren‘, ibid. 
901 ‘Die ostdeutschen Betriebe waren keine gewöhnlichen Arbeitsstätten, sondern vollständige 
Abbildungen des Großen im Kleinen (…), sie setzten die Menschen in den Stand, Beruf und Familienleben 
miteinander zu verknüpfen, regten ihre kulturellen Interessen an und trugen den sozialen Austausch weit 
über die engen Grenzen der Arbeitswelt hinaus‘, Wolfgang Engler, Die Ostdeutschen als Avantgarde (Berlin: 
Aufbau, 2004), p. 117. 
902 AdSAWE, 30.8.2/1244 Werksarchiv, 'Entflechtungskonzeption der AWE GmbH‘, 1990. 
903 Rainer Diaz-Bone, ‘Habitusformierung und Theorieeffekte: Zur sozialen Konstruktion von Märkten‘, in 
Jens Beckert, Rainer Diaz-Bone & Heiner Ganßmann (Ed.), Märkte als soziale Strukturen (Frankfurt: 
Campus, 2007), p. 225.  
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changes at the top of society and are therefore ‘a central part of the 
transformation experience’.904 
 The developments as part of the privatisation in eastern Germany also 
give insight into the ways in which social roles and power structures were 
renegotiated within the context of the social and economic transformation.905 
The state enterprise in Eisenach officially belonged to the workers, but as their 
property, it also functioned symbolically to mediate relationships between the 
company and the people.906 The focus on the company gives insights into the 
ways in which relationships were renegotiated between eastern Germans and 
towards western Germans as part of unification process. It also reveals, 
however, to what extent longstanding structures persisted or changed during 
the transformation.    
For example, the letter detailed how all ages and social groups were 
affected by the situation, but it also described how the uncertainty had started 
dividing the community, as ‘foreign workers’ were now ‘seen as competition, 
fuelling even more tensions in the company’.907 Indeed, in July, the papers had 
reported that AWE-workers from Cuba and Mozambique had been made 
redundant and would ‘soon be going home’.908 Foreign workers were the first 
 
904 ‘das zentrale Feld der Transformationserfahrung‘, Werner Schmidt & Klaus Schönberger, „Jeder hat jetzt 
mit sich selbst zu tun“. Arbeit, Freizeit und politische Orientierungen in Ostdeutschland (Konstanz: UVK, 1999), 
p. 24.  
905 Birgit Müller, Die Entzauberung der Marktwirtschaft. Ethnologische Erkundungen in ostdeutschen Betrieben 
(Frankfurt: Campus, 2002), p. 116. 
906 Müller, Die Entzauberung der Marktwirtschaft, p. 116. 
907 ‘Ausländische Arbeitskräfte werden als Konkurrenten um Arbeitsplätze gesehen, dies heizt die 
Stimmung im Betrieb noch mehr an‘, AdSAWE, 30.8.1/RO9-1.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Brief an den 
Ministerpräsidenten der DDR‘, Eisenach, 22 May 1990, in ‘IG-Metall Sitzungsprotokolle 1990‘. 
908 ‘werden bald die Heimreise antreten‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Arbeit geht in der DDR nicht aus‘, 
Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 25 July 1990. 
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to be hit by the unemployment measures, with all being forced to leave the 
company by the end of the year.909 Second, older workers were pushed into 
early retirement in what was termed a ‘social offer’.910 The changes, which took 
place in stages, divided workers into social categories and turned them against 
one another, as opposed to uniting them around the same cause. 
Nevertheless, determined individuals got together to try to counter the 
trend and alert the authorities to the problems on the ground. In their letter, the 
members of the Industrial Union of Metalworkers had questioned how 
factories, that were ‘worthy of redevelopment’, could be left in ruins, when the 
Socialist Unity Party had reportedly been sitting on an estimated wealth of one 
billion Deutsche Mark.911 Their request to the government was not to be given 
‘never-ending subsidies’, but to receive just enough funding to tide them over, 
tied to a specific business plan, which they had ready.912 Although they 
approached the Minister ‘with hope and trust’, they also warned that calls for a 
workers’ strike were getting louder.913 
 Sigrid Meuschel argues that although the GDR was officially a classless 
society, socio-structural differences did exist.914 Nevertheless, key conflicts did 
not develop between technocrats and ideologists, but rather along the lines of 
social imbalances in society.915  In the responses of the workers in Eisenach to 
 
909 Elsner, ‘Soziale Ungleichheit auf betrieblicher Ebene‘, p. 5. 
910 ‘Sozialangebot‘, ibid. 
911 ‘sanierungswürdige Betriebe‘, AdSAWE, 30.8.1/RO9-1.1 Technisches Archiv, 'Brief an den 
Ministerpräsidenten der DDR‘, Eisenach, 22 May 1990, in 'IG-Metall Sitzungsprotokolle 1990‘. 
912 ‘keine endlosen Subventionen‘, ibid. 
913 ‘Mit Hoffnung und Vertrauen‘, ibid. 
914 Sigrid Meuschel, ‘Revolution in der DDR. Versuch einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Interpretation‘, in 
Hans Joas & Martin Kohli (Eds.), Der Zusammenbruch der DDR. Soziologische Analysen (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1993), p. 96. 
915 Meuschel, ‘Revolution in der DDR‘, p. 98. 
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the changes in society and in the workplace, it was precisely these social 
injustices that caused the most anger and upset, as staff were quick to recognise 
the differing conditions for management and staff, political elites and ordinary 
workers, or eastern and western Germans.  By using their own initiative to 
develop ideas and by approaching the top level of authority, the workers at the 
Automobilwerk Eisenach used familiar processes to draw attention to their cause 
and to try to enact change. However, as the value of their labour within the new 
system had fallen, the tried and tested methods of writing complaints or 
threatening to strike no longer had the same impact, rendering the democratic 
structures available to them meaningless and contributing to feelings of 
hopelessness. 
In particular, the fear of losing their jobs negatively influenced workers’ 
willingness to take action, as ‘feelings of powerlessness’ spread amongst the 
affected staff and complicated the decision of choosing between economically 
and socially viable solutions for their firm.916 On the twelfth of July 1990, 
hundreds of citizens gathered on the market square in Eisenach to support the 
metalworkers’ union and their demands for a shorter week, higher wages, 
employment guarantees, and a social policy based on retraining instead of 
redundancies.917 Although the demonstration was well-attended, the union 
chief reported that ‘the situation in the workplaces is so uncertain that many 
workers are too scared to demonstrate. Employers are playing with their 
 
916 ‘Ohnmachtserfahrung‘, Schmidt & Schönberger, „Jeder hat jetzt mit sich selbst zu tun“, p. 50. 
917 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Weiterbildung oberstes Ziel. Kundgebung der IG Metall‘, Eisenacher 
Stadtanzeiger, 14/15 July 1990. 
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fears’.918 The unionist argued that this needed addressing quickly, for ‘those 
who don’t fight, have already lost’.919 A few days later, the unions reached an 
agreement with local companies in the region to guarantee employment until 
June 1991 in order to allow companies time for restructuring.920 For members of 
staff that would need to have their hours reduced, the state would cover the 
remaining pay, with effect from the twenty-third of July.921 
On that very day, less than four weeks after the currency union, the 
Automobilwerk announced the introduction of short-term contracts from August 
1990 onwards.922  As the AWE-worker and later head of the staff council 
explained, ‘eventually, it was cheaper to pay the people not to produce a single 
car’.923 The new measure, which meant that two-thousand-five-hundred 
members of staff, who were no longer needed, would remain employed but 
would not need to turn up to work, was intended as an alternative to 
registering as unemployed, and a way to keep the staff within the company 
until more jobs could be created.924 The move was in line with the AWE’s 
business development plan, which had been submitted to the government in 
Berlin in May, and again in June 1990, and relied on an investment of 156.3 
 
918 ‘in vielen Betrieben sei die Unsicherheit in Sachen Arbeitsplätze so groß, daß Beschäftigten nicht 
wagten, zu demonstrieren. Die Arbeitgeber betrieben ein Spiel mit der Angst‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 
Zeitungen, 'Metaller-Massen auch auf Eisenachs Straßen‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 14 July 
1990.  
919 ‘wer nicht kämpft, hat schon verloren‘, ibid. 
920 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Die IG Metall ist zufrieden‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 18 
July 1990. 
921 Ibid. 
922 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Ab August müssen 2500 bei AWE kurzarbeiten. Eisenach: Warten auf 
Millionen-Hilfe‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 25 July 1990. 
923 ‘Irgendwann war es billiger, die Leute zu bezahlen, ohne dass auch nur ein Auto das Band verließ‘, 
Dietmar Grosser, Hanno Müller & Paul-Josef Raue (Eds.), Treuhand in Thüringen. Wie Thüringen nach der 
Wende ausverkauft wurde (Essen: Klartext, 2013), p. 84. 
924 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Ab August müssen 2500 bei AWE kurzarbeiten. Eisenach: Warten auf 
Millionen-Hilfe‘, Hessisch-Niedersächsische Allgemeine, 25 July 1990. 
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million Deutsche Mark.925 To date, the company was, however, still waiting on 
the funding and approval from Berlin.  
The announcement coincided with a visit from federal business minister 
Helmut Hausmann, who promised to put in a word with the top executives at 
General Motors in the USA, to ensure that the Automobilwerk Eisenach would 
still be around to see its centenary celebrations in 1996.926 Hausmann’s visit in 
Eisenach was his first visit to a GDR firm since the currency union and therefore 
considered as a positive sign.927 Not everyone at the plant, however, was 
impressed with the speech of the business minister, who reportedly ended 
almost every sentence with ‘but’, ‘only’, or ‘unfortunately’.928  ‘God help us!’, 
exclaimed one frustrated woman in the audience, as the West-German VIP 
reminisced about having drawn a Wartburg car as a child.929 Empty promises 
and childhood anecdotes were neither comforting nor appropriate as the staff 
came to terms with their new working conditions and desperately awaited 
good news about the future of their firm. 
As he continued, Hausmann’s speech took an even more patronising 
turn, as the business minister explained that he was not ‘Father Christmas with 




927 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Bonn unterstützt den Automobilbau in Eisenach‘, Thüringer Allgemeine, 
24 July 1990. 
928 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘TLZ-Kommentar zum Haussmann-Besuch im Gries „Arbeiten möchten 
alle hier“‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 26 July 1990. 
929 ‘Es ist zum Gotterbarmen!‘, ibid. 
Jenny Price                                    University of Warwick PhD Thesis 
Page 258 
planned economy’ into a ‘dynamic market economy’ overnight.930 ‘We all want 
to work’, retorted the welder, who had been at the car production plant for 
thirty-two years, after the minister lectured the staff that ‘if you want good 
money, you have to work hard for it’.931 As the AWE staff were forced once 
again to wait for subsidies or investments from above, whilst being told that 
they needed to work harder, wits and patience were beginning to run dry. ‘We 
don’t want to beg for work’, explained the unionist, ‘but rather show what 
we’re capable of’.932 The rhetoric adopted by the western minister towards the 
eastern workers not only ignored the situation they were facing but also 
inversely suggested that easterners were undeserving of equal or fair pay. This 
public discourse also spread abroad, as top staff in the automobile industry 
repeatedly had to reassure foreign investors that the technical capabilities of 
eastern workers were no lower than those of their western counterparts.933  
Three months later, on the fifth of October, the chancellor of the Federal 
Republic, Helmut Kohl, would be the next to visit the site to celebrate the 
production of the first Opel Vectra in Eisenach.934 This initial investment in 
Eisenach from Opel, was an important ‘first step’ in continuing the town’s 
 
930 ‘Von einem Bundeswirtschaftsminister kann niemand hier erwarten, daß er der Weihnachtsmann mit 
den Milliarden im Sacke ist, der über Nacht aus der lahmen Planwirtschaft eine dynamische 
Marktwirtschaft macht‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Spruch des Tages‘, Thüringer Allgemeine, 24. Juli 
1990. 
931 ‘Arbeiten möchten alle hier‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘TLZ-Kommentar zum Haussmann-Besuch 
im Gries „Arbeiten möchten alle hier“‘, Thüringer Landeszeitung, 26 July 1990; ‘wer gutes Geld will, muß 
gut dafür arbeiten‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Opel-Chef Hughes und Minister Haussmann: Auto-Ehe 
soll ein Erfolg werden‘, Thüringer Allgemeine, 24 July 1990. 
932 ‘Wir wollen nicht um Arbeit betteln, sondern zeigen, was wir können‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, 
‘TLZ-Kommentar zum Haussmann-Besuch im Gries „Arbeiten möchten alle hier“‘, Thüringer 
Landeszeitung, 26 July 1990. 
933 Peter Kirchberg, Plaste, Blech und Planwirtschaft. Die Geschichte des Automobilbaus in der DDR (Berlin: 
Nicolai, 2000), p. 704. 
934 AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Schreiben an Bundeskanzler Kohl‘, Automobilwerk Eisenach 
GmbH, Eisenach, 27 September 1990. 
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tradition of automobile engineering, said Kohl during his speech.935 The AWE 
company director emphasised that this development was particularly 
important to protect jobs in the area, even though the substantial larger 
investment in the new plant had still not been confirmed.936 For the local 
photographer, who had been called in to document the historical event, it was 
not only the first-hand meeting with the German chancellor, but the smugness 
of the western television reporter that would make a lasting impression. ‘The 
mayor has requested I pronounce his name correctly‘, the presenter quipped to 
the cameras, as he went on to spell out the many possible variations.937 ‘That 
was below the line’, the local photographer recalls.938 Although he admits that 
he was maybe a bit sensitive, it was humiliating moments like these, with ‘a 
whiff of arrogance’, that gave easterners the feeling of being degraded.939   
One week before Kohl’s visit, the managing director of the Automobilwerk 
had written to the chancellor, to make him aware of the pressing situation. 
Together with the district council, the AWE had taken various measures to 
adapt to the free market; shifting their focus to exporting their cars to Eastern 
Europe, reducing staff costs through early-retirement and retraining 
programmes and attracting other electronics  companies to the region to take 
over staff from the plant’s former suppliers.940 ‘Of vital importance’, however, 
 
935 ‘den ersten Schritt‘, AdSAWE, No ref., '1. Vectra Made in Eisenach‘, Der neue Motor, 15 October 1990, 
p. 3. 
936 Ibid. 
937 ‘“Der Bürgermeister bittet darum, dass ich seinen Namen richtig ausspreche“‘, Interview with Joachim 
Thurau, Eisenach, 22 August 2018. 
938 ‘Unter der Gürtellinie‘, ibid. 
939 ‘so ein Hauch der Überheblichkeit‘, ibid. 
940 AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Schreiben an Bundeskanzler Kohl‘, Automobilwerk Eisenach 
GmbH, Eisenach, 27 September 1990. 
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was the arrival of Opel in the town and its decision to build a new car 
production plant, as this ‘would determine the overall structure’.941  The 
managing director appealed to the chancellor to ensure the GDR government 
approved the erection of a new Opel plant, and the funding to support the 
region in the meantime.  This funding would be especially important to keep 
the skilled workers for the new plant and to prevent them from moving 
westward in search of work.942 However, two months later, in December 1990, 
the funding and support from the Treuhandanstalt had still not been confirmed, 
even though a decision paper produced by the trust had found it to be cheaper 
to continue financing the production of Wartburg cars than to cover the costs 
arising from mass unemployment.943  
On the tenth of January 1991, the mayors of the district of Eisenach 
published an open letter to the chancellor Helmut Kohl, claiming that the 
government did not understand the problems facing local mayors and town 
representatives in the East, and that a lack of rules and regulations from above 
was making it impossible for them to implement changes.944 Problems that they 
were unable to tackle at present due to the lack of clear rules and various 
bureaucratic hurdles included the sale of property to attract new investors, the 
privatisation of residential buildings for redevelopment, self-management of 
public utilities, the annual budget, and the establishment of a new 
 
941 ‘Von entscheidender Bedeutung‘, ‘die Gesamtstruktur bestimmen wird‘, ibid. 
942 AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Entscheidungsvorlage für den Vorstand der Treuhandanstalt‘, 
Berlin, 05 December 1990. 
943 AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Entscheidungsvorlage für den Vorstand der Treuhandanstalt‘, 
Berlin, 05 December 1990. 
944 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Kommunen sind nahe der Ohnmacht. Offener Brief an Bundeskanzler’, 
Eisenacher Allgemeine, 11 January 1991. 
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administration. Much like the local car plant, which had been waiting for six 
months for an answer regarding its future funding, the mayors were also 
stalling due to a lack of clarity from above. ‘Out of great concern for the 
development of the young democracy’ and the effect these restrictions would 
have on public trust in the new councillors, the mayors now appealed to the 
highest level of authority for new laws to be passed and financial support to be 
provided as soon as possible.945  
As the uncertainty continued, the local newspaper summoned all those 
who shared the ‘sorrow’ at the developments in eastern Germany to wear a 
green ribbon.946 The initiative was to raise awareness of the problems eastern 
citizens had faced since reunification and to express solidarity with one 
another, especially with those facing unemployment or struggling to get by. 
Just a couple of years earlier, GDR citizens that had applied to leave the country 
had worn white ribbons to state their intentions, whilst those that had their 
applications declined consequently switched to black ribbons.947  In December 
1989, the people of Eisenach had held onto purple ribbons as they demonstrated 
to save the old town centre. The subtle action had previously been enough to 
gain the attention of their government and now presented a familiar ritual to 
unite the community and provide a sense of hope. Whilst the six locals featured 
in the newspaper in 1991 all expressed their support for the new initiative and 
the importance of drawing attention to the rising levels of unemployment and 
 
945 ‘In großer Sorge um die Entwicklung der jungen Demokratie‘, ibid. 
946 ‘Trauer‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Grüne Bänder tragen – Was erhoffen sich die Bürger von dieser 
Initiative?‘, Eisenacher Stadtanzeiger, 11 January 1991. 
947 Ibid. 
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the growing disappointment, the project failed to catch on. ‘Can you blame 
them?’ asked another journalist.948 As citizens focussed on keeping their jobs for 
as long as possible and supporting their families, few were still willing to make 
political statements in public.949  
 
Time of Mourning 
To mark the day of German Reunification in October 1990, a local couple, who 
had been active in the citizen’s committee in the autumn of 1989 and 
volunteered as election helpers in March 1990, organised a symbolic funeral 
and wake for the German Democratic Republic, with no expenses spared. A 
black coffin was commissioned especially and filled with keepsakes, ranging 
from an application for a car and a GDR number plate to a map and telephone 
book, the national flag, ribbons from the autumn demonstrations, a customs 
declaration and a postcard of the Wartburg castle, signed with condolences.950 
Even the details had been carefully thought out; the coffin of a country so 
opposed to religion was not to have a cross but instead bore a hammer and 
sickle, taken from an army cap. 951 ‘Well, today is the day the GDR dies!’, the 
activist explained to anyone who asked.952 The satirical episode was no sad 
event, however. Rather, family and friends from East and West were invited to 
celebrate the death of the GDR and to take part in the burial ritual, with a 
 
948 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Kommentiert‘, Thüringer Tageblatt, 12 January 1991. 
949 Ibid. 
950 Private Collection Brigitte Korndörfer (henceforth PCBK), ‘Die DDR war nicht in der Kirche. Brigitte 
Korndörfer spricht über die Beerdigung der DDR und die Besetzung der Stasi-Zentrale‘, Thüringische 
Landeszeitung, 06 September 2014. 
951 Ibid. 
952 ‘Na (…), heute stirbt doch die DDR!‘, Interview with Brigitte Korndörfer, Eisenach, 19 December 2017. 
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special plot designated in the couple’s garden. As western reporters, who had 
been lodging with the family, heard of their plans, they asked to film the 
interment for their documentary and were told to come at three thirty in the 
afternoon, for the routine time of coffee and cake.953 When they eventually 
appeared at dusk, the GDR was already in the ground. ‘It had to be dug up 
again’, the organiser recalls with glee, taking great pleasure in the symbolism.954 
‘Altogether the GDR was buried three times’, she says, laughing.955  
On retelling the event, the activist says little of the meaning, other than 
that it was ‘simply symbolic’, instead recounting the individual steps in great 
detail.956 It is the staging of the funeral and the recounting that appears to 
provide the greatest sense of comfort, as a way of speaking about that which 
cannot be said. Significantly, one condition for the filming was that the scene 
was to be aired without commentary, once again suggesting that the symbolic 
act of burying the GDR could express that which words could not.957 On 
watching the show, however, the activist realised that the crew had not 
followed her orders, as the voice over announced that ‘the family (…) has 
buried the GDR in their garden’.958 The next remark, however, would send a 
shiver down her spine. ‘Be careful’, they announced, ‘for the corpse is still 
warm’.959 The comment was clearly meant to suggest that the GDR could still be 
resurrected, although this was harshly dismissed by the activist. ‘But it was not 
 
953 Ibid. 
954 ‘Also haben wir (…) die DDR ausgegraben‘, ibid. 
955 ‘Also praktisch ist die DDR dreimal beerdigt worden‘, ibid. 
956 Ibid. 
957 ‘Das war nur symbolisch‘, ibid. 
958 ‘die Familie (…) hat in ihrem Garten die DDR beerdigt‘, ibid. 
959 ‘Vorsicht, der Leichnam ist noch warm‘, ibid. 
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possible, after all, the (state) treaty and all that was already there. So, it was not 
possible anymore’, she reasserts.960 The funeral for the GDR on the third of 
October 1990 was intended to be final, and ‘now it must be left in peace’.961 
The fake funeral was not to be the last of its kind in Eisenach, as feelings 
of loss and powerlessness increased. On the eighth of January 1991, the 
Treuhandanstalt announced that it was unwilling to fund the transition period at 
the Automobilwerk, dismissing the bid first put forward by the plant in May 1990 
as ‘no longer viable’, and instructed the company directors to end the 
production of the Wartburg car ‘immediately’.962 Just a few weeks earlier, the 
president of the Treuhandanstalt, the managing director of the Automobilwerk 
Eisenach and the executive director of the Adam Opel AG had signed a basic 
agreement for the AWE to sell its land to Opel by the thirtieth of June 1991, with 
the Treuhand trust acting to manage the transaction.963 This contract was 
considered the basis for Opel’s investment of over one billion Deutsche Mark in 
a new automobile assembly plant in the West of Eisenach, as it guaranteed 
them the necessary plots of land.964 At this time, the development plan for the 
car plant had still received vocal support from the director of the 
Treuhandanstalt.965  
 
960 ‘Aber das ging ja nicht mehr, war ja der Vertrag und das war ja alles schon da. Also das ging ja alles gar 
nicht mehr‘, ibid. 
961 ‘Aber jetzt muss sie in Ruhe gelassen werden‘, ibid. 
962 ‘nicht mehr tragfähig‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Hans-Werner Manegold: Hinter den Zahlen 
stehen Menschen‘, Eisenacher Presse, 11 January 1991.  
‘die sofortige Einstellung der Wartburg-Produktion‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘AWE: Treuhand will 
nicht mehr zahlen. Liedke muß Konzept überarbeiten‘, Eisenacher Presse, 11 January 1991. 
963 LATh – HstA Weimar, 6-82-3001-256 Thüringer Wirtschaftsministerium; Treuhandangelegenheiten, 
Gemeinden E (ohne Erfurt), ‘Telefax-Brief von Adam Opel AG für Opel Eisenach GmbH an den 
Bürgermeister der Gemeinde Stedtfeld‘, 20 June 1991. 
964 StA Eisenach, 40.6-114, ‘Chronik der Eisenacher „Wende“, 1989-1991‘.  
965 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Hans-Werner Manegold: Hinter den Zahlen stehen Menschen‘, 
Eisenacher Presse, 11 January 1991. 
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Although Opel’s investment seemed certain to go ahead regardless, the 
hopes for funding to tide the company over until the end of the year had been 
destroyed, leaving over three-thousand local workers now facing imminent 
unemployment.966 In regard to the plant’s many suppliers, the overall number 
of consequent job losses were likely to rise to around forty-thousand.967 The 
chair of the staff council feared that this development would have a knock-on 
effect, putting off investments from other companies in the automobile industry 
that had been looking to take over the remaining staff, as it could no longer be 
guaranteed that the workers would stay in the region. The manager of the local 
handball team also warned that this news had ruined their chances of joining 
the national league.968 Although the AWE-funded club had tried to find other 
sponsors, western firms such as Opel were only interested in funding larger 
sports clubs, leaving the eastern teams at a severe disadvantage.969  
As grief struck, the announcement about the plant closure was met with 
disbelief by the local mayor, who could ‘not imagine that the Treuhand would 
risk closing down the plant half a year before Opel was to take hold’.970 
Similarly, the company directors refused to accept the ultimatum from above, 
asking instead for extra time to submit a revised development plan by the end 
of June 1991.971 As the announcement was communicated to the metal workers’ 
 
966 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Trauer und Wut: „Die machen uns unser Leben kaputt“. Unter den 
AWE-Arbeitern grassiert die Angst vorm Stempeln‘, Eisenacher Presse, 12 January 1991. 
967 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Telegramm an die Treuhand Berlin: „Wir lassen uns nicht platt 
machen“‘, Thüringer Tageblatt, 12 January 1991.  
968 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Schließung wäre eine Katastrophe‘, Eisenacher Presse, 11 January 1991. 
969 Ibid. 
970 ‘nicht vorstellen, daß die Treuhand es riskiert, das Werk ein halbes Jahr vor dem Opel-Einstieg 
dichtzumachen‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Hans-Werner Manegold: Hinter den Zahlen stehen 
Menschen‘, Eisenacher Presse, 11 January 1991. 
971 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Entscheidung der Treuhand schockierend‘, Thüringer Tagespost, 12/13 
January 1991. 
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union, it was said to be met by silence at first, followed by the response; ‘we 
refuse to accept this decision’.972 Together with the metal workers’ union and 
the staff committee, the Automobilwerk Eisenach wrote to the head of the 
Treuhand trust to question the decision and warn again of the consequences.973 
Further talks between the Treuhandanstalt and the AWE were subsequently 
arranged for the end of the month.974 
The disbelief amongst the leading figures quickly turned to action 
amongst those directly hit by the planned closure. Just a few days later, the 
unions called on plant workers to take part in a company-wide strike on the 
seventeenth of January 1991, to try to force a delay in the end of production.975 
Around six-thousand workers gathered at the factory gate at half past twelve in 
the afternoon and walked down to the square outside the main train station, 
where they were joined by metal workers from the car plant in Gotha.976 
Banners urged politicians to keep their election promises and spoke of the death 
of the plant and of the whole region.977 Puns on the names of the Federal 
chancellor and the head of the Treuhandanstalt expressed a lack of trust in the 
top political figures and suggested they were not acting in the people’s 
interest.978  
 
972 ‘Diese Entscheidung nehmen wir so nicht hin‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘IG Metall will „Aus“ 
nicht hinnehmen‘, Zeitung für Eisenach, 22 January 1991. 
973 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Telegramm an die Treuhand Berlin: „Wir lassen uns nicht platt 
machen“‘, Thüringer Tageblatt, 12 January 1991. 
974 Ibid. 
975 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Streik: Am Donnerstag stehen in dem Wartburg-Werk alle Räder still‘, 
Eisenacher Presse, 15 January 1991. 
976 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Über 6000 forderten den Weiterbau des Wartburg 1.3 bis Jahresende‘, 
Eisenacher Presse, 18 January 1991. 
977 StA Eisenach 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Eisenacher Autobau darf nicht sterben‘, Thüringer Allgemeine, 18 
January 1991. StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Über 6000 forderten den Weiterbau des Wartburg 1.3 bis 
Jahresende‘, Eisenacher Presse, 18 January 1991. 
978 AdSAWE, 30.8.2, ‘A11278 (Tasche 1)’. 
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As the demonstrators gathered, local representatives took to the stage to 
address the crowds.979 ‘No matter what we said’, the former mayor explains, 
looking back, ‘we were always booed, even if we said, “Opel is coming”!’.980 
The citizens of Eisenach in January 1991 were not interested in assurances for 
the future or comparisons with other regions that were less well-placed to 
manage the transition to the free market. Instead, they demanded answers to 
more immediate questions regarding the coming days and weeks. Standing 
there, on the stage in front of the AWE and metal workers, who were scared for 
their jobs and futures, was the first time that the newly elected mayor ‘suddenly 
felt the weight of the responsibility’ he now held.981 And yet, the mayor felt 
there was ‘nothing at all we could do’ other than taking part in the negotiations 
with the Treuhand and Opel and working closely with the workers’ union and 
staff committee.982 On the very same day, the head of the district authority had 
travelled to Bonn to discuss possibilities for the plant with the Hessian and 
Thuringian business ministers.983 Criticism from workers and speakers was also 
aimed at the state government, whose representative was however not 
present.984  
On the twelfth of January 1991, a psychologist from the car plant’s 
polyclinic had written to the federal chancellor, the head of the Treuhandanstalt, 
 
979 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘6000 AWE-Arbeiter demonstrierten gestern in Eisenach gegen Treuhand-
Pläne‘, Eisenacher Presse, 18 January 1991.  
980 ‘Egal, was wir sagten, wir wurden immer ausgepfiffen und ausgebuht, auch wenn wir dann gesagt 
haben, “Opel wird kommen“‘, Interview with Hans-Peter Brodhun, Eisenach, 11 October 2018. 
981 ‘wo ich Verantwortung plötzlich gespürt habe‘, ibid. 
982 ‘wir konnten ja gar nichts tun‘, ibid. 
983 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Pfiffe gegen Bürgermeister‘, Zeitung für Eisenach, 18 January 1991. 
StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Über 6000 forderten den Weiterbau des Wartburg 1.3 bis Jahresende‘, 
Eisenacher Presse, 18 January 1991. 
984 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Pfiffe gegen Bürgermeister‘, Zeitung für Eisenach, 18 January 1991. 
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and the head of the Thuringian state, to make them aware of the situation in the 
border town since the Treuhand’s decision to end production of the Wartburg.985 
Having praised how transparent and ‘exemplary’ the efforts of the managing 
committee had been in attracting investors and communicating developments 
to staff, she explained that the decision to close the plant had been met by ‘a 
complete lack of understanding and heavy resistance’, not only by its staff but 
by their fellow citizens as well.986 The behaviour of the Treuhand decision-
makers was considered ‘disappointing, two-faced, patronising’.987 According to 
the psychologist, the citizens were under the impression that the Treuhand was 
incompetent and had failed to consider the details and the long-term structural 
ramifications for the whole region. Most of all, however, people felt that the 
decision demonstrated ‘West German ignorance and (…) arrogance’ towards 
East Germany.988 Citizens had expressed feelings of ‘powerlessness, (…) 
humiliation, “occupation” (like after a war, but under the cover of “aid”) and of 
feeling dispensable’.989 The growing uncertainty was leading many, who had 
firmly chosen to stay in the region during the upheaval of 1989, to now move 
away. The psychologist warned not only of the ‘resignation and lethargy’ that 
these developments had brought about, but also of the ‘significant potential for 
protest and aggression’.990 The decision to close the plant was ‘fuel for conflict’ 
 
985 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-1001-1402 Thüringer Staatskanzlei; Arbeitsmarktsituation, Schaffung und 
Abwicklung von Arbeitsplätzen und Einrichtung von Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen (ABM): 
Programme, Eingaben, Beschwerden, Statistiken und Stellungnahmen, ‘Brief an H. Kohl - Betr: 
Strukturanpassungskonzept Automobilwerk Eisenach GmbH‘, 12 January 1991. 
986 ‘beispielhaft‘, ‘auf massives Unverständnis, auf Widerstand‘, ibid. 
987 ‘enttäuschend, wortbrechend, verhöhnend‘, ibid. 
988 ‘west-deutsche Ignoranz, gepaart mit Überheblichkeit gegenüber der ehemaligen DDR‘, ibid. 
989 ‘Inzwischen wird von vielen Menschen und immer öfter ein Gefühl der Ohnmacht artikuliert, auch von 
Erniedrigung, von „Vereinnahmung des Gebietes“ (wie nach einem Krieg, aber unter dem Schutzmantel 
der „Hilfeleistung“), vom Gefühl des „Überflüssigseins“ gesprochen‘, ibid. 
990 ‘Resignation und Lethargie‘, 'ein erhebliches Protest- und Aggressionspotenzial‘, ibid. 
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and could lead to an ‘avalanche’ of anger across the East.991 In light of the 
growing unrest, she strongly criticised the actions of the Treuhand trust and 
called on the chancellor, the state minister and the head of the trust to approve 
the bid put forward by the company in order to preserve peace and protect the 
region.992 
Although her letter received a reply from the regional bishop, who 
expressed his support, and from the state minister, who argued that ‘with all 
respect (…) economic arguments are of utmost importance’, it was left 
unanswered by Kohl himself, and failed to convince the Treuhand decision-
makers.993 At the discussions with the Treuhand on the twenty-first of January 
1991, the trust confirmed that production was to be stopped from the end of the 
month, giving the plant exactly ten days to wrap the company up. 994 Instead of 
funding the continuation of car production until Opel were to start up, the 
Treuhand proposed to invest in retraining for the tens of thousands of staff, even 
though this had been proven to be more costly.995 However, the suggested 
redundancy and retraining programmes were not yet available and would need 
 
991 ‘Zündstoff‘, 'Lawine‘, ibid. 
992 Ibid. 
993 ‘Bei der Bestandsaufnahme wie auch der Zukunftsprognose der Existenzfähigkeit eines Betriebes 
müssen – in aller Offenheit (…) – betriebswirtschaftliche Grundlagen die entscheidende Rolle spielen‘, 
LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-1001-1402 Thüringer Staatskanzlei; Arbeitsmarktsituation, Schaffung und 
Abwicklung von Arbeitsplätzen und Einrichtung von Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen (ABM): 
Programme, Eingaben, Beschwerden, Statistiken und Stellungnahmen, ‘Brief an H. Kohl - Betr: 
Strukturanpassungskonzept Automobilwerk Eisenach GmbH‘, 12 January 1991. AdSAWE, No ref., ‘Brief 
an Bundeskanzler‘, Der neue Motor, 14 February 1991; LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-1001-1402 Thüringer 
Staatskanzlei; Arbeitsmarktsituation, Schaffung und Abwicklung von Arbeitsplätzen und Einrichtung von 
Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen (ABM): Programme, Eingaben, Beschwerden, Statistiken und 
Stellungnahmen, 'Briefentwurf‘, 24 January 1991. 
994 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Nächste Woche kommt Aus für den Wartburg‘, Eisenacher Presse, 22 
January 1991. 
995 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Umschulung für alle. Damit will Treuhand AWE-Facharbeiter halten‘, 
Eisenacher Presse, 22 January 1991. 
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to be developed in the nick of time.996 The local job centre reported that it was 
completely unprepared for the supposed closure of such a large firm. The AWE 
company director and head of the staff committee criticised the decision, 
accusing the trust of ‘arrogance and pretentiousness’, as they had clearly 
already made their decision before the director was due to present his latest 
development plan in Berlin.997 
As the news broke in Eisenach, workers started a car procession using 
private and company cars, driving through the town at the end of the working 
day before ending on the market square, where the drivers beeped their horns 
and called on locals from all industries to support the car plant.998 Three days 
later, workers from the Automobilwerk Eisenach together with the metal workers’ 
union and supporters from other local firms forced a complete closure of the 
nearby motorway in both directions for a full hour at midday.999 Beginning at 
the symbolic time of five to twelve, citizens stood along the motorway itself, 
filling the slip roads and looking down from the bridge that crossed the six 
lanes of traffic.1000 A banner reading ‘The disaster area starts here!’ was strung 
across the western side of the bridge, where all visitors driving into the eastern 
states would be able to read it.1001 As such, the metal workers in Eisenach used 
their specific location at the border to western Germany to raise awareness and 
 
996 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Keine geordnete Schließung. Dr. Liedtke beklagt fehlenden Sozialplan 
für die Wartburg-Arbeiter‘, Eisenacher Presse, 23 January 1991. 
997 ‘Arroganz und Überheblichkeit‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘AWE baut, bis die Lager leer sind. 
Liedtke wirft Treuhand „Arroganz“ vor‘, Eisenacher Presse, 23 January 1991.  
998 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘AWE muß leben!‘, Süd-Thüringer Zeitung, 23 January 1991. 
StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Keine geordnete Schließung. Dr. Liedtke beklagt fehlenden Sozialplan für 
die Wartburg-Arbeiter‘, Eisenacher Presse, 23 January 1991. 
999 AdSAWE, ‘AWE-Arbeitnehmer starteten Autobahnblockade‘, Der neue Motor, 31 January 1991. 
1000 AdSAWE, 30.8.3 Bildarchiv, 'A11298‘.   
1001 ‘Hier beginnt das Notstandsgebiet‘, ibid. 
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attract media attention not only for their own situation but for that of all the 
other communities across the East. Further demonstrations followed, where 
factory workers were joined by workers from other local firms, who had 
gathered to show their support and solidarity.1002 The unions hoped that as well 
as bringing people together, the large demonstrations would put pressure on 
politicians to take action in order to appease their disappointed electorate, in 
the hope that their staff at the very least still held political power as potential 
voters.1003  
At the end of January, the managing committee of the Automobilwerk 
Eisenach put forward a proposal to use up all the remaining materials, which 
was approved by the Treuhandanstalt. This last-minute measure meant that 
production would not have to stop on the thirty-first of January and provided 
enough work to keep the company going for a further two months.1004 In the 
meantime, the boss of Opel and the minister president of Thuringia 
ceremoniously laid the foundation stone for the new plant that was to be built 
in West-Eisenach.1005 Still, production of the Wartburg car was due to end at the 
end of March 1991, and with the Treuhand unwilling to approve the bid for 




1002 AdSAWE, No ref., ‘Bilder, die die Region bewegten‘, Der neue Motor, 14 February 1991. 
1003 Ibid. 
1004 StA Eisenach, 40.6-114, ‘Chronik der Eisenacher „Wende“, 1989-1991‘. 
1005 AdSAWE, No ref., ‘Bericht von der Grundsteinlegung. Das gesprochene Wort gilt‘, Der neue Motor, 14 
February 1991. 
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Figure 4: Archiv der Stiftung Automobile Welt Eisenach, 'Cartoon Treuhand‘, Der neue Motor, 31 January 1991. 
 
The January issue of the car plant’s staff newspaper featured an 
anonymous cartoon that clearly reflected the mood amongst its workers but 
also acknowledged that the plant had no chance of survival (see Figure 4). 
Crowds of sombre men wearing black ribbons on their arms as a symbol of 
mourning are depicted carrying a coffin bearing the letters AWE to a freshly-
dug grave.1006 From above, an arm, labelled ‘Treuhand’, extends out of a black 
cloud to push a wooden cross into the ground.1007 Perched on top, the German 
eagle symbolises the involvement of the federal state.1008 The cartoon was a 
 
1006 AdSAWE, No ref., ‘AWE-Arbeitnehmer starteten Autobahnblockade‘, Der neue Motor, 31 January 
1991. 
1007 AdSAWE, No ref., ‘Cartoon Treuhand‘, Der neue Motor, 31 January 1991.  
1008 Ibid. 
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direct response to the announcement to end production at the car plant. For the 
people of Eisenach, this was perceived as a ‘death blow’, dealt by the Treuhand 
and the new federal government, and calling for ‘an hour of mourning’.1009 
On the twenty-seventh of March 1991, the head of the Treuhandanstalt, 
Detlev Rohwedder, wrote to the Automobilwerk with a written warning 
regarding the submission of ‘unsatisfactory’ documentation.1010 The director 
argued that the trust was in fact willing to fund the company on its way to the 
free market, ‘on the condition that there is a viable business plan’.1011 Although 
the plant had submitted various plans, Rohwedder claimed that these had 
either not contained enough documentation or had failed to sufficiently answer 
the relevant questions.1012 The details of how the AWE had failed to satisfy his 
expectations are unclear, however, and point towards longstanding 
misunderstandings regarding the business aims of the trust and the car plant. 
Whilst the Automobilwerk had accepted that the Wartburg-car had no future, 
their focus had been on continuing sales to eastern Europe until the plant was 
able to begin producing Opel cars. As negotiations with western firms were 
well underway, the funding requested was solely to bridge this gap.  The 
Treuhand, however, appeared to base their assessments on the economic 
viability of the car plant as it was, and the future production of Wartburg cars. 
The director asked the committee of the car plant in Eisenach to engage more 
proactively with the trust, in order to allow them to take the necessary 
 
1009 ‘Todesstoß‘, 'Trauerstunde‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Der letzte Wartburg rollt heute vom Band. 
Gedrückte Stimmung bei AWE‘, Eisenacher Presse, 10 April 1991. 
1010 ‘nicht befriedigend‘, AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Mahnschreiben zur Abgabe der 
angeforderten Unterlagen‘, Berlin, 27 March 1991. 
1011 ‘unter der Voraussetzung eines tragfähigen Unternehmenskonzepts‘, ibid. 
1012 Ibid. 
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decisions, suggesting that the Treuhand was as dependent on the car plant as it 
was on them.1013 The letter would be one of his last, however, as the director of 
the Treuhandanstalt was killed in his apartment in Düsseldorf just four days 
later.  
 
Figure 5: Stadtarchiv Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, 'Automobil MUSEUM Eisenach‘, O. Damm, Thüringer 
Allgemeine, 11 April 1991. 
On the tenth of April 1991, the last Wartburg car finally left production, only to 
be driven directly into the newly established car museum. A cartoon in the 
regional newspaper by one of the most renowned caricaturists in the GDR 
depicted the car being locked away inside the museum, along with the factory 
workers (see Figure 5).1014 The sketch demonstrates that the final Wartburg car 
symbolised much more than the material object itself, and that the end of 
 
1013 Ibid. 
1014 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Automobil MUSEUM Eisenach‘, O. Damm, Thüringer Allgemeine, 11 
April 1991. 
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production also spelled the end to a whole community and its way of life in the 
town of Eisenach. It was a reminder of the people behind the numbers, and the 
personal fates that many citizens felt had been disregarded during the Treuhand 
negotiations. From one day to the next, the factory had become history, but the 
people that had built it over generations still had no clear future. The car itself 
and the plant may have ceased to exist, but the people were still there. They 
appear to be waiting, unable to move forward, and slightly forgotten. 
Originally, the plan had been for the new mayor of Eisenach to drive the 
car into the museum, of which the town council now had ownership. 1015 On the 
day, however, he chose not to, arguing that it would be more suitable for one of 
the members of staff that had built the Wartburg to drive the car away.1016 The 
workers themselves decided, however, to push the car for its first few metres, 
out of respect. The event, which had been planned as a celebration of the 
Wartburg, and featured various older models as well, was more solemn than 
festive. Newspapers reported of the ‘funeral service for the AWE’, complete 
with memorial speeches and black suits.1017  
Suitably, on the tenth of April, the bright red final Wartburg had been 
decorated like a coffin, with reefs and ribbons bearing the words ‘A final 
farewell (from) the workers of the VEB Automobilwerk Eisenach’.1018  Two 
workers in aprons walked ahead carrying a black sign with a cross and the date 
 
1015 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘”Trauerfeier“ in der Wartburgstadt: Das letzte Auto in der 
Fertigmacherei‘, Eisenacher Presse, 11 April 1991. 
1016 Ibid. 
1017 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Eklat bei der “Trauerfeier für AWE“‘, Zeitung für Eisenach, 11 April 
1991. 
1018 ‘Letzter Gruß - Die Werktätigen des VEB Automobilwerk Eisenach‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, 
‘”Trauerfeier“ in der Wartburgstadt: Das letzte Auto in der Fertigmacherei‘, Eisenacher Presse, 11 April 
1991. 
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‘10.4.91’ etched in, before laying it down on the engine bonnet.1019 On the back 
of the car, a sign reading ‘No visit of condolence please, Kohl’ covered the rear 
windscreen.1020 The day was not to be a repeat of the grand event in October 
1990, when the German chancellor had travelled to Eisenach to celebrate the 
new cooperation with Opel. Coincidentally, both Kohl and the minister 
president of Thuringia, who had originally been scheduled to make an 
appearance, had chosen to instead attend the state memorial service for the 
director of the Treuhandanstalt in Berlin, which had fallen on the same day.1021 
As the AWE staff gathered to pay their final respects to the car that had 
provided them with over forty years of work, it was treated as a highly 
personal event, and the media and politicians, although present, were not 
wanted; their presence only served to exacerbate an otherwise already tense 
atmosphere.  
Nevertheless, almost all television channels arrived to broadcast the 
event, with speeches from the AWE company director, the head of the staff 
council and the Thuringian business minister.1022 One image of the event, which 
was plastered across all the papers the next day, was of a worker who had 
broken down in despair during the company director’s speech. The twenty-
nine-year-old, who had always been at the front of the demonstrations against 
the closure of the plant in January, was now inconsolable. ‘The GDR is the new 
poor house’, he screamed at the cameras, pleading for a chance to work and 
 
1019 AdSAWE, 30.8.3 Bildarchiv, 'A11304‘.  
1020 ‘Bitte keine Kondolenzbesuche, Kohl!‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Da rollt auch ein Stück Identität 
mit fort‘, Südthüringer Zeitung, 11 April 1991. 
1021 StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘”Trauerfeier“ in der Wartburgstadt: Das letzte Auto in der 
Fertigmacherei‘, Eisenacher Presse, 11 April 1991. 
1022 StA Eisenach, 40.6-114, ‘Chronik der Eisenacher „Wende“, 1989-1991‘. 
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provide for his family.1023 ‘Everyone is just standing around like lambs, waiting 
to be slaughtered’, he argued, summoning the other workers to say 
something.1024 As the emotions poured out and other workers began booing 
and whistling, the company director, who had previously received the full 
support of his staff, was forced to end his talk and step down from the podium.  
 The ceremony in the car production plant bore many similarities to the 
funeral for the GDR that had taken place locally just a few months earlier, and 
yet the workers took no joy in marking the closure of their factory. In both 
cases, however, the ritual provided the chance to say a final farewell and find a 
sense of closure from a country and a company that had markedly structured 
their lives up until that point. The fatalistic language used across the local press 
in early 1991 captured the overwhelming sense of loss and grief that 
accompanied the gigantic changes for citizens, and the feelings of 
powerlessness amongst the workers.1025 That the Wartburg car was not a viable 
business model for the future was clear to many, with the papers having 
labelled it the ‘no-chance car’ earlier that year.1026 Even the former mayor had 
noted at the time that continued export to eastern European countries was not 
 
1023 ‘Die DDR ist das Armenhaus – so sieht’s aus!‘, ‘Die Wartburg-Story‘, 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAnsHGsPsCg&t=1228s>, (accessed 20 May 2019). 
1024 ‘Alle stehen sie hier und lassen sich schlachten wie die Lämmer‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, 
‘Automobilwerk sucht nun nach neuer Identität‘, Thüringer Tagespost, 11 January 1991. 
1025 See StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Vorzeitiges “Aus“ für Wartburg‘, Zeitung für Eisenach, 11 January 
1991; StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Ein schwarzer Tag. Begräbnisstimmung beim AWE-Aus‘, Thüringer 
Allgemeine, 11 April 1991; StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Der Wartburg ist tot – es lebe der Opel‘, 
Südthüringer Zeitung, 10 April 1991; StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘“Trauerfeier“ in der Wartburgstadt: 
Das letzte Auto in der Fertigmacherei. Symbolische Abschiedsfeier für den Wartburg 1.3. Angespannte 
Stimmung bei Arbeitern‘, Eisenacher Presse, 11 April 1991. 
1026 ‘Auto ohne Chance‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Treuhand: Auto ohne Chance. Ende Januar Aus für 
“Wartburg“‘, Zeitung für Eisenach, 22 January 1991. 
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guaranteed, as the region was facing similar levels of upheaval and 
uncertainty.1027  
Nevertheless, the decision to send thousands of local people into early 
unemployment despite the promising developments with investors was 
incomprehensible to the workers in Thuringia. Neither the company nor the 
local politicians appeared to have any influence over the decisions of the 
Treuhand and Opel. The people had shown patience and determination in using 
the democratic avenues available to them, and yet it was not enough to counter 
the economic developments that had such a profound impact on their local 
community. Despite their efforts via the managing committee, the workers’ 
council and the union, they had been unable to change the outcome of the 
negotiations and now appeared to be at the mercy of the federal organisations.  
Much more than expressing positive or negative emotional attachments 
to the former, the staged funerals served as a way of marking the huge changes 
in the citizens’ daily lives and as a means of publicly addressing and processing 
the transition from one system to another. It presented a chance to take charge 
of a situation that was above and beyond their control; in the case of the GDR 
burial, the local citizens organised a funeral for a state that had determined all 
aspects of their daily lives, whilst at the car plant the workers took control of a 
development that had gone ahead against their wishes and despite all their 
efforts to change the course of events. In this respect, the symbolic acts 
 
1027 Interview with Hans-Peter Brodhun, Eisenach, 11 October 2018. 
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demonstrate the agency of local citizens to assert themselves and make meaning 
at a time when they had little power otherwise.   
The press spoke of the need to find ‘a new identity’ for ‘a factory in 
which thousands had earnt their bread and butter, and in which families had 
worked over many generations’.1028 And yet, the performance rituals speak of a 
strong collective identity and of a group of citizens that was determined to find 
a way to incorporate the ongoing changes into their joint narrative. 
Nevertheless, as the former car plant workers prepared for retraining, 
retirement or unemployment, all hopes were pinned to the success of Opel’s 
new factory as the town’s only feasible way of continuing the automobile 
tradition that was such an integral part of their sense of self. 
 
The Village of Stedtfeld vs. General Motors 
Fulfilling the Plan in the Market Economy 
On the twenty-eighth of May 1991, the private attorney for the Adam Opel AG 
wrote to the head of the district council of Eisenach to explain that he feared the 
long-term plans for the Opel site in Eisenach were ‘at severe risk’.1029 The 
company had chosen to build their new plant in Eisenach ‘because they had 
been assured (…) that all the necessary conditions for the erection and 
 
1028 ‘neuer Identität‘, ‘Ein Werk in dem Tausende Arbeit und Brot fanden, in dem Generationen von 
Familien tätig waren‘, StA Eisenach, 50.3 Zeitungen, ‘Automobilwerk sucht nun nach neuer Identität‘, 
Thüringer Tagespost, 11 April 1991. 
1029 ‘erheblich gefährdet‘, LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-1001-1402 Thüringer Staatskanzlei; 
Arbeitsmarktsituation, Schaffung und Abwicklung von Arbeitsplätzen und Einrichtung von 
Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen (ABM): Programme, Eingaben, Beschwerden, Statistiken und 
Stellungnahmen, ‘Brief vom Beauftragten der Adam Opel AG für die Opel Eisenach GmbH, an den 
Landrat des Kreises Eisenach‘, 28 May 1991. 
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expansion of the new plant would be met’.1030 Now, however, the Adam Opel 
AG was struggling to go ahead with its plans, as the village community of 
Stedtfeld, where the new plant just outside of Eisenach was to be built, refused 
to approve the westward expansion of the car production site.1031 ‘Everywhere 
in Europe, where Adam Opel AG has chosen to invest, we have always 
received unconditional support for our investment projects’, the attorney 
clarified.1032 ‘But unfortunately, this is not the case in Stedtfeld’.1033 A meeting 
had taken place two weeks earlier between the car giant and the community of 
Stedtfeld, but the negotiations had not satisfied the village representatives, who 
argued that ‘the Adam Opel AG had not yet managed to reach the point of 
constructive negotiation’.1034  
 The opposition to the development of the car industry in the village was 
not new; an expansion of the existing site had already been planned by the 
Socialist Unity Party in GDR times. Locals had heard of the plans, as a large 
wooden relief of the future factory had been mounted in the Automobilwerk 
offices, showing the plant expanding right into the neighbouring village.1035  
Due to ‘a lack of production space’ at the site in central Eisenach, which was 
restricted by the surrounding railway and roads, the state-owned company had 
 
1030 ‘weil ihr von politischer Seite die Erfüllung aller für die Errichtung und Erweiterung des geplanten 
Werkes notwendigen Rahmenbedingungen zugesichert worden sind‘, ibid. 
1031 Ibid. 
1032 ‘Überall in Europa, wo die Adam Opel AG investiert hat, haben wir volle Unterstützung unserer 
Investitionsprojekte erhalten‘, ibid. 
1033 ‘In der Gemarkung Stedtfeld ist das leider nicht der Fall‘, ibid. 
1034 ‘Es ist bedauerlich, daß die Adam Opel AG noch nicht am Punkt einer konstruktiven Abarbeitung der 
Problematik angelangt ist‘, LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-1001-1402 Thüringer Staatskanzlei; 
Arbeitsmarktsituation, Schaffung und Abwicklung von Arbeitsplätzen und Einrichtung von 
Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen (ABM): Programme, Eingaben, Beschwerden, Statistiken und 
Stellungnahmen, ‘Brief von der Gemeinde Stedtfeld Kreis Eisenach an den Beauftragten der Adam Opel 
AG‘, 07 June 1991. 
1035 Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
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planned to move the majority of its manufacturing to the new site in West 
Eisenach by the early nineties in order to increase production.1036 This would 
have to include a new press line, heating plant, and roads, as well as a four-shift 
work pattern that would ensure cars would be produced day and night.1037 
During the changes of 1989, the villagers of Stedtfeld rightly began to wonder 
what would happen to the planned site under new political leadership. 1038 
When the AWE director announced in the local paper that the local village 
would soon be a conveyor belt for new cars, the alarm bells started ringing.1039 
In early 1990, both the director of the car production plant in Eisenach 
and the citizens committee of Stedtfeld had been invited to the district round 
table to discuss plans for the land.1040  Whereas the automobile factory was 
instructed to discuss the building plans and environmental issues in detail with 
the citizens and farmers in Stedtfeld,1041 the village committee subsequently 
issued a written statement expressing their ‘surprise and displeasure’ at the 
AWE director’s suggestion that they had approved of his plans.1042 On the 
contrary, they pointed out that the land on which the Automobilwerk planned to 
erect the new site did not belong to the firm, and that environmental 
assessments were needed regarding air quality, sewage and the possibility of 
erecting an elevated water tank.1043 Furthermore, the company had failed to 
 
1036 ‘fehlende Produktionsfläche’, AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Konzeption zur Entwicklung des 
VEB Automobilwerk Eisenach für den Zeitraum 1989 bis 1995 und danach‘, 18 August 1988. 
1037 Ibid. 
1038 Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
1039 Ibid. 
1040 ‘Protokoll des Runden Tisches vom 27. Februar 1990‘ in Margot Friedrich, Eine Revolution nach 
Feierabend. Eisenacher Tagebuch der Revolution (Marburg: Eisenacher Presse, 1991), p. 86. 
1041 Ibid. 
1042 ‘Mit Befremden‘, StA Eisenach, 40.7 Sammlung Wende-98, 'Einige noch offene Probleme in Sachen 
AWE-Weiterbau auf dem Gries‘, Stedtfeld, 05 March 1990. 
1043 Ibid. 
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produce any clear plans on future traffic management for an expanded site.1044 
The citizens of Stedtfeld were ‘shocked’ at the thought of living directly next to 
such a large industrial estate.1045 Until the requested plans were provided, they 
explicitly refused to approve any expansion into their village.1046 
 Regardless, the Automobilwerk Eisenach signed an agreement with Opel 
and the Treuhand in December 1990 that stipulated that Opel would receive all 
of the land it needed, including land of which the AWE did not have 
ownership. 1047 In the meantime, however, the village of Stedtfeld had bought 
up almost all of the plots of land that surrounded their village and that had 
formerly been in private or public ownership by making good use of their 
personal connections.1048 This way, any future building work and expansion of 
the car plant on their land would first have to be checked with and approved by 
the villagers. Over the summer of 1990, the village committee had formed 
smaller working groups, developing possible plans for their village, addressing 
environmental issues and putting in a successful bid for regional funding for a 
new business park.1049 The head of the local district and member of the former 
Socialist Unity Party had provided connections to an urban planning firm in 
Kassel, which reliably advised the villagers on water and sewage management. 
The local forest ranger, who was also active in the village committee, was also 
 
1044 Ibid. 
1045 ‘erschrocken‘, Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
1046 StA Eisenach, 40.7/98 Sammlung Wende, 'Einige noch offene Probleme in Sachen AWE-Weiterbau auf 
dem Gries‘, Stedtfeld, 05 March 1990. 
1047 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-3001-256 Thüringer Wirtschaftsministerium; Treuhandangelegenheiten, 
Gemeinden E (ohne Erfurt), ‘Telefax-Brief von Adam Opel AG für Opel Eisenach GmbH an den 
Bürgermeister der Gemeinde Stedtfeld‘, 20 June 1991. 
1048 Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
1049 Ibid. 
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able to give sound advice on environmental considerations and land 
management. Most importantly, the wife of a committee member had a high 
position in the land registry office and provided the group with exact plans of 
the village and the plots of land it owned or would need to acquire. As such, the 
village was able to apply for the land which was being managed by the 
Treuhand to be returned to their ownership at a time when this was still 
relatively simple.  
Their ideas for the land around the existing car plant included the 
establishment of a new leisure and nature centre and new housing development 
projects.1050 As well as blocking a further expansion of the car production site, 
the alternative plans were to ensure that the village brought in revenue and 
remained financially independent and sustainable, whilst protecting the local 
environment and guaranteeing that the village remained a pleasant place to 
live. The regional funding for the business park, which was transferred in 
advance by the local ministry, provided financial security for the village council 




In March 1991, the local priest and acting head of the village committee 
travelled to the Treuhand branch in Erfurt to sign the contract to buy up the 
remaining plots of land. On arrival at eleven o’clock, the trust representative 
explained that she had received an urgent fax from the head office in Berlin that 
 
1050 Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
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very morning, instructing them to delay the sale. Although the negotiations had 
long been finalised, the sale would never go through, as Opel had caught wind 
of the actions of the Stedtfeld village committee and used their links to the top 
levels of the Treuhand organisation to block the sale. Nevertheless, the village 
had already acquired enough land to force the car company to engage with 
them directly. At this time, however, they still knew nothing of the agreement 
reached between Opel, the Treuhand and the Automobilwerk regarding the 
arrangements for plots of land in their village. 
 Following on from the correspondence in May, the Opel AG wrote to the 
vicar of Stedtfeld, who had since become the village mayor, on the twentieth of 
June 1991, instructing him to send over a draft contract for the sale of four plots 
of land.1051 As the agreement with the Treuhand stated that Opel should have 
received this land by the thirtieth of June 1990, and the company was keen to 
complete the transaction by that date, Opel promised ‘to discuss the details 
afterwards’.1052 As the mayor refused to comply without having first seen plans 
of the company’s expansion, the company turned to the state ministry for 
business to take urgent action against the village representatives.1053 
 In August 1991, Opel threatened to take legal action against the village 
mayor, arguing that this ‘presents a good way of finding a solution to the 
 
1051 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-3001-256 Thüringer Wirtschaftsministerium; Treuhandangelegenheiten, 
Gemeinden E (ohne Erfurt), ‘Brief vom Beauftragten der Adam Opel AG an die Gemeinde Stedtfeld‘, 20 
June 1991. 
1052 ‘einer anschließenden Besprechung‘, ibid.. 
1053 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-3001-256 Thüringer Wirtschaftsministerium; Treuhandangelegenheiten, 
Gemeinden E (ohne Erfurt), ‘TELEFAX OPEL Eilt sehr! Von Adam Opel AG an Minister für Wirtschaft 
und Technik des Landes Thüringen‘, 21 June 1991. 
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problem in the Stedtfeld area’.1054 As the mayor had ‘failed to realise his 
blatantly unlawful political intentions’, it would be necessary to ‘use all 
available means to bring (him) to his senses’.1055 According to Opel, the village 
mayor and former clergyman had ‘fraudulently and unlawfully’ obtained the 
plots of land, which he was now ‘unlawfully withholding’.1056 They argued that 
he had ‘exceeded his authority’ by issuing a suspension of building work in the 
village and was now ‘unlawfully trying to block one of the most important 
investments in the five new Bundesländer’.1057 By repeatedly insisting on the 
supposed illegality of the villager’s actions, the language used in the 
correspondence tries to paint the local mayor as a criminal who needed to be 
dealt with forcefully.  
Furthermore, the village of Stedtfeld was ‘refusing to give consent’ for 
groundwork on a two-hundred-metre strip of their land. Without their 
permission, Opel would be unable to obtain the necessary building permit. As 
the mayor was acting ‘extremely recklessly and irresponsibly’ towards his 
constituents, Opel justified the need to ‘put him under legal supervision’ and to 
use ‘executive powers from regulatory authorities’ to buy the land, calling upon 
the minister president of the state of Thuringia and the head of the district 
 
1054 ‘sieht hier eine gute Möglichkeit, die Problemsituation in der Gemarkung Stedtfeld zu klären‘, LATh - 
HStA Weimar, 6-82-3001-256 Thüringer Wirtschaftsministerium; Treuhandangelegenheiten, Gemeinden E 
(ohne Erfurt), ‘Brief vom Beauftragten der Opel AG an den Ministerpräsidenten des Landes Thüringen in 
Erfurt‘, 14 August 1991. 
1055 ‘sich nicht in der Lage sieht, seine Vorstellungen politisch durchzusetzen, die in eklatanter Weise 
gegen Recht und Gesetz verstoßen‘, ‘mit allen gebotenen Mitteln zur Vernunft bringen‘, LATh - HStA 
Weimar, 6-82-3001-256 Thüringer Wirtschaftsministerium; Treuhandangelegenheiten, Gemeinden E (ohne 
Erfurt), ‘Brief vom Beauftragten der Opel AG an den Landrat des Kreises Eisenach‘, 14 August 1991. 
1056 ‘in rechtswidriger Weise erschlichen‘, ‘rechtwidrig zurückhält‘, ibid. 
1057 ‘in Überschreitung seiner Kompetenzen‘, ‘in rechtswidriger Weise eine der wichtigsten Investitionen in 
den fünf neuen Bundesländern zu verhindern versucht‘, ibid. 
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council for political support.1058 As the mayor’s behaviour was supposedly 
‘breaking civil law’, he was ‘fully responsible for the damage’, and they 
intended to charge the village for the costs.1059  
 And yet, the village representatives had confirmed in writing on the 
nineteenth of April 1991 that they would approve the use of their land by the 
company, ‘on the condition of a notarially-certified sales contract’ and a clear 
urban development plan.1060 The villagers simply wanted to ensure that 
environmental considerations in their village had been accounted for, and 
ideally ensure that a ring road around the village would connect the car plant to 
the nearby motorway, to reduce traffic. According to the villagers, it was the car 
giant that was impeding the sale by not engaging with them. Should Opel not 
comply, the village had already stated it would ‘take necessary action to 
safeguard its interests’.1061  
 In September 1991, the ministry of internal affairs arranged a meeting 
with the Opel representatives to discuss the problems.1062 The car company, 
which brought along the former Senator for the Interior for Berlin as their 
lawyer, met with members of the ministry and a representative of the district 
 
1058 ‘im höchsten Maße rücksichtslos und verantwortungslos‘, ‘im Wege der Rechtsaufsicht auf (…) 
einwirken‘, ‘im Wege der Ersatzvornahme von der Rechtsaufsichtsbehörde‘, ibid. 
1059 ‘verstößt nicht nur gegen Zivilrecht‘, ‘für diesen Schaden verantwortlich‘, ibid. 
1060 ‘vorbehaltlich des Abschlusses eines notariellen Kaufvertrages‘, LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-3001-256 
Thüringer Wirtschaftsministerium; Treuhandangelegenheiten, Gemeinden E (ohne Erfurt), ‘Brief von der 
Gemeinde Stedtfeld an den Beauftragten der Adam Opel AG‘, Eisenach, 19 June 1991. AdSAWE, 30.8.1 
Technisches Archiv, ‘Hughes winkt mit Millionen‘, Mitteldeutsche Allgemeine, 23 September 1991. 
1061 ‘wird die Gemeinde alle Schritte in die Wege leiten, die erforderlich sind, ihre Interessen zu wahren‘, 
LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-3001-256 Thüringer Wirtschaftsministerium; Treuhandangelegenheiten, 
Gemeinden E (ohne Erfurt), ‘Brief von der Gemeinde Stedtfeld an den Beauftragten der Adam Opel AG‘, 
Eisenach, 19 June 1991. 
1062 LATh - HStA Weimar, 6-82-3001-1304 Thüringer Staatskanzlei; Standortfragen zur Ansiedlung der 
Industrie in Thüringen, ‘Produktionsanlagen der Firma Opel AG/Abstell- und Erweiterungsflächen‘, 
Erfurt, 11 September 1991. 
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council of Eisenach to debate how best to proceed.1063 The local urban 
development officer for Eisenach explained that ‘the community feels 
overlooked’ and that it would be ‘reasonable to ensure that the community is 
fully informed and to negotiate directly with them’.1064 Conversely, the car 
company’s decision to involve state institutions had only hindered the 
process.1065  
 
No Room at the Inn 
Nevertheless, the talks between Opel and the community of Stedtfeld failed to 
proceed during the month of September 1991. As Opel threatened to abandon 
their plans in Eisenach, criticism of the ‘stubbornness’ of the people of Stedtfeld 
filled the local press, and the district politicians called for a ‘Pro-Opel Strike’ on 
the theatre square on the twenty-fifth of September 1991.1066 Even in the village 
of Stedtfeld, opposition to the actions of the village committee was growing, 
especially as the village got a name for blocking the multimillion investment 
that was thought to solve the issue of the growing unemployment in the region. 
The local press compared the situation to the battle between David and Goliath, 
as ‘a small unimposing community with a handful of environmental activists’ 
took on ‘a cash-rich global corporation’.1067 Despite recognising that the village 
 
1063 Ibid. 
1064 ‘die Gemeinde sich überfahren fühle und es sinnvoll sei, diese umfassend zu informieren und mit ihr 
zu verhandeln‘, ibid. 
1065 Ibid. 
1066 ‘Stedtfelder Sturheit’, AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technische Archiv, ‘Bricht Opel Stedtfelder Sturheit?‘, 
Mitteldeutsche Allgemeine, 23 September 1991; AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Klarstellung nach 
dem Schock. Demonstration „pro Opel“: Der Standort ist nicht gefährdet‘, Eisenacher Tagespost, 25 
September 1991. 
1067 ‘eine kleine unscheinbare Gemeinde, die allenfalls ein paar Umweltschützer hinter sich vereinigt‘, ‘ein 
kapitalkräftiger Weltkonzern‘, AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Kommentare: Keine Chance für 
David‘, Mitteldeutsche Allgemeine, 25 September 1991. 
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was demonstrating that ‘the times in which economic motives crushed all 
opposition’ were over, they argued that the villagers should give in, to spare 
the rest of the population their worries.1068 
 The biblical metaphor of David’s conquest against the giant Goliath 
seems fitting on numerous levels, not least as that too had been a fight over 
land. In this Thuringian rendition, the part of the strong philistine giant is given 
to the cash-laden corporation boss, whilst the unlikely and unarmed challenger 
is the village mayor and former vicar. The parallels are not only found in the 
financial or physical strength of the contenders, but also in the language that 
shapes the conflict; in the book of Samuel, Goliath speaks down to David and 
holds him in contempt, much like the Opel representatives had not taken the 
villagers of Stedtfeld seriously, questioning their legitimacy and vilifying the 
mayor for opposing their plans. GDR citizens may also have been familiar with 
a comedy version of the age-old story, aired in 1962, in which a lowly bank 
worker wins the lottery and is hounded by the local brewery owner, who tries 
to beguile him to hand over his money with lavish displays of hospitality, free 
alcohol and entertainment.1069 Here too, finances and land ownership structure 
the conflict, although the main focus is on the character traits of the two rivals. 
Although the bank worker does not defeat the brewery owner in the biblical 
way, he eventually wins out by showing him up for his selfish motives and 
false generosity.   
 
1068 ‘die Zeiten, in denen ökonomische Motive alle Gegenargumente per se niederwalzten, scheinen (…) 
endgültig der Vergangenheit anzugehören‘, ibid. 
1069 ‘David und Goliath, 1962, Fernsehinszenierung einer Komödie von Georg Kaiser‘, Online Lexikon der 
DDR-Fernsehfilme, Fernsehspiele und TV-Inszenierungen <http://www.fernsehenderddr.de/ 
index.php?script=dokumentationsblatt-detail&id1=17227> (accessed 25 June 2019).  
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 Much like David in the Bible, the mayor of Stedtfeld not only faced an 
unequal rival, but was also challenged by his own townsmen, who discouraged 
him from taking action against Opel. Whereas the press had originally focussed 
its criticism on the village representatives for blocking developments, other 
villagers had soon found themselves stigmatised by people from the 
neighbouring area. Those that travelled to nearby towns for work were told 
they were ‘stealing jobs’ from locals and threatened with violence.1070 As the 
fears around unemployment grew and pressure mounted, local support for the 
self-asserting actions of the village council dropped significantly. 
On the twenty-sixth of September 1991, a citizen’s gathering in the inn in 
Stedtfeld was filled to bursting with locals, desperate to let their mayor know 
how they felt about his actions against Opel’s investment.1071  A local petition 
supporting the expansion of the Opel-site had been signed by two-hundred 
villagers, leading one citizen to argue that ‘the absolute majority’ was now for 
the development.1072 The debate, which lasted until well after midnight, gave an 
opportunity for the locals to express their opinions and release strong emotions. 
‘Let them build all the way to Herleshausen!’, exclaimed one citizen, in favour 
of ensuring that Opel would create as many jobs as possible.1073 The Senator for 
the Interior, who had also decided to attend the village meeting on behalf of 
Opel, stood up and gave a passionate speech about why it was unacceptable to 
treat Opel in this way.1074 Even the union representative, who usually argued 
 
1070 ‘Ihr klaut uns unsere Arbeitsplätze‘, Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
1071 AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Ganz Stedtfeld ist sich einig: “Wir stehen alle zu Opel“‘, 
Eisenacher Presse, 28 September 1991. 
1072 ‘die absolute Mehrheit’, ibid. 
1073 ‘Wenn es sein muß, sollen sie doch durchbauen bis Herleshausen‘, ibid. 
1074 Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
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against the employer, now supported the corporation. ‘Why don’t we let the 
people vote on it?’ she asked.1075 ‘Because we have a communal constitution’, 
replied the mayor.1076 
 All of a sudden, the boss of the West German corporation stood up from 
where he had been sitting behind one of the beams and delivered an emotional 
speech about the very first cold and wet winter morning in January 1990, on 
which he had first set eyes on Eisenach.1077 As they arrived all the way from 
Rüsselsheim, the Wartburg had been encased in a thick fog, and a dark smog 
lay over the town. Nevertheless, he had seen the potential beauty of the town 
and had told his colleagues ‘We have to do something!’.1078 After detailing their 
plans for the town and how this would be a blessing for the region, the 
company boss bought two rounds of beer for everyone in the room. The inn 
erupted in applause. 
At the end of the evening, the mayor of Stedtfeld thanked everyone for 
the debate and announced that they would discuss this at the next council 
meeting and possibly reconsider their stance.1079 ‘No, you have to decide here 
and now!’, argued the public.1080 Sticking to the democratic procedure, the 
mayor declined and left the citizens to enjoy the free beer. ‘That was living 
democracy’, remarked one attendee at the end of the event.1081 At the next 
 
1075 ‘Warum nicht das Volk abstimmen könne‘, AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Ganz Stedtfeld ist 
sich einig: „Wir stehen alle zu Opel“‘, Eisenacher Presse, 28 September 1991. 
1076 ‘Weil die Kommunalverfassung das nicht vorsieht‘, ibid. 
1077 Ibid; Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
1078 ‘Hier müssen wir etwas tun‘, ibid. 
1079 Ibid. 
1080 ‘NEIN, das müsst ihr jetzt hier‘, ibid. 
1081 ‘Das war gelebte Demokratie‘, AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Ganz Stedtfeld ist sich einig: „Wir 
stehen alle zu Opel“‘, Eisenacher Presse, 28 September 1991. 
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council meeting, the village representatives passed council orders regarding 
noise pollution, which ensured that Opel would need to conduct environmental 
assessments before building and would have to install noise protection along 
the main road.  
In the end, due to the opposition from the village of Stedtfeld, Opel 
changed their plans to use much less land than originally proposed and 
approved the ring road around the village.  In any case, the villagers had 
succeeded in forcing a large corporation to attend their village meeting before 
going ahead with their plans. ‘We just want them to talk to us and not to go 
above our heads’ the mayor had explained to the Thuringian minister during a 
mediation session.1082 ‘And we want to know what’s going on’.1083  In so doing, 
the village had questioned the power structures between the small East German 
communities and the large multinational corporations, using the democratic 
avenues available to them to demonstrate that developments are not always 
predetermined from above. 
 
Conclusion 
In comparison with the privatisation and liquidation of other state-owned 
factories in the GDR, such as the high-profile closure of the potassium mine in 
Bischofferode in 1993, the story of car production in Eisenach is often hailed as 
a success story of the transformation. The town even earnt itself the nickname 
 
1082 ‘Wir wollen doch nur, dass mit uns geredet wird und nicht über unsere Köpfe hinweg entschieden 
wird‘, Interview with Christian Köckert, Stedtfeld, 05 October 2018. 
1083 ‘Und wir wollen wissen, was hier passiert‘, ibid. 
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of ‘boom-town’ for having attracted Opel, making it the envy of the region.1084 
And yet, ‘the new Opel plant in West Eisenach was never thought out to be a 
continuation of the AWE, but simply presented a means of tapping into the 
tradition of car production in Eisenach’.1085 The original plant in the north of the 
town centre, with its various production halls, power plants and administration 
offices, was almost entirely demolished in the mid-1990s. Of the ten-thousand 
members of staff at the AWE in early 1991, only two-thousand-six-hundred 
would eventually find work in the new plant.1086 Although different arms of the 
company broke off to become independent companies, thousands of workers in 
the car plant and its many local suppliers were nevertheless plunged into 
sudden unemployment measures by the closure in 1991 of such a large firm.  
It is therefore worth putting into perspective that even those 
communities deemed a success were faced with great structural and social 
change. The uncertainty around the Automobilwerk Eisenach, brought about in 
great part by the lack of clarity from the government organisations, and the 
negotiating tactics of Adam Opel AG, took its toll on the local citizens, causing 
divisions amongst the workforce and forcing staff into submission. As the 
changes were rolled out, the worker collectives were forced to wait for 
decisions to be taken on their behalf. Only when the closure of the plant was 
 
1084 Interview with Hans-Peter Brodhun, Eisenach, 11 October 2018. 
1085 ‘Das neue Opel Werk sollte keine Weiterführung des AWE darstellen, sondern lediglich ein 
Anknüpfen an die Automobiltradition Eisenachs‘, AdSAWE, 30.8.2/R22-B1499-Ma01, ‘Diplomarbeit: Der 
wirtschaftliche Wandel nach der Wende, dargestellt am Beispiel des Automobilbaus in der Region 
Eisenach‘, Katharina Rimbach, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 
Lehrstuhl für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, 22 July 2008, p. 46. 
1086 AdSAWE, 30.8.2/1244 Werksarchiv, 'Konzept einer wirtschaftlich und sozial verträglichen Lösung des 
Auslaufes der Wartburgproduktion‘, Automobilwerk Eisenach GmbH, Eisenach, 21 January 1991. 
AdSAWE, 30.8.1 Technisches Archiv, ‘Bürgermeister von Eisenach bremst den Aufschwung. Tennis-statt 
Arbeitsplätze’, Bild Thüringen, 28 September 1991. 
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formally announced, did staff dare to take action again, using symbolic timings 
of demonstrations, for example at five to twelve, to express the perceived death 
of the company. The unwillingness of the staff committee and unions to accept 
the final verdict speaks of expectations so different to those of the trust tasked 
with privatising the business, in terms of decision making and moral priorities, 
once again bringing to light the stark cultural aspects of a seemingly 
bureaucratic process. 
The deeply engrained negative connotations of joblessness in the GDR 
made the prospect of losing one’s position even more daunting. The social 
stigma around being out of work was felt personally and was further 
heightened by the consequent closure of associated leisure organisations, 
resulting in an outright exclusion of former workers from the main structures of 
social life in Eastern Germany. The effects of the privatisation measures in the 
East are therefore not to be regarded simply as perceived disappointment with 
the outcome of the process or the unsustainability of the eastern companies, but 
should be recognised foremost as practices of social restructuring, devaluation 
and exclusion. The unwillingness of top-level representatives in politics and 
business to value the personal experiences of citizens above economic decisions 
gave citizens the feeling that they were not only being ignored, but that voice 
was ineffective. The further loss of fellow citizens who then moved westward in 
search of work heightened feelings of loneliness and segregation. 
Forced to come to terms with the closure of the plant, citizens used 
common rituals to express the magnitude of the changes and their personal 
experience of loss. These familiar practices provided structures for processing 
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loss and transition where words could not convey the intensity of their feelings 
and brought the citizens together in solidarity with one another. It also 
provided an opportunity to take charge of a development that was otherwise 
beyond their control and to thereby hold onto a sense of dignity. For of all the 
experiences of the early 1990s, the strongest appears to be the overwhelming 
sense of loss of self-worth, loss of agency and deep humiliation.  
This may sound unusual for a time when democratic rights such as the 
freedom of speech, assembly and travel had just been reinstated and free 
elections were being held. Nevertheless, the move from one political system to 
another also meant readjusting to different forms of political power. As 
demonstrated by the historical literature on Eigensinn in the GDR, East German 
citizens were able to use the restrictive social and economic structures and 
expectations of state loyalty to gain political agency within their daily lives. In 
switching to another system, citizens now had the right to express their 
opinions in public, but doing so no longer carried the same weight. Even 
protesting and striking did not have the desired effect when the companies 
paying the wages were essentially already bankrupt. 
Although the autumn of 1989 had given many citizens a strong sense of 
power and originally opened up an array of possibilities, as existing structures 
and regulations were taken down, it was followed by a prolonged period of 
instability and insecurity. Citizens were repeatedly required to navigate 
unchartered territory, to adapt to new practices and to be judged by new 
standards. The dawn of a new era had seen many citizens come forward to take 
on new responsibilities and work flat out to develop solutions for the 
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transformation period. For many citizens, however, these changes in everyday 
life and politics were existential ones, and resulted in widespread fear and 
disorientation that was divisive and politically debilitating. 
 And yet, in the small village of Stedtfeld, just outside of Eisenach, the 
local vicar-cum-mayor, who had spent years countering the plans and practices 
of the Socialist Unity Party, was not ready to submit to a large corporation. As a 
seasoned public speaker, he had the practice, confidence and will to take on 
larger players and to see through his plans, even against strong opposition. 
Unlike other local citizens in more precarious or political fields of work, his 
occupation provided a stable basis from which to take on this demanding 
project, even though this was not without risk. Although his role as vicar and 
mayor placed him at the heart of the community, his political boldness meant 
that he was not accepted in the party most closesly alligned to his 
environmental ideals.  This outsider perspective nevertheless allowed him to 
use the available structures and opportunities to act on his own terms. 
Once again, local contacts, quick planning and good judgment played an 
important part in ensuring that the villagers gained hold of the land that would 
protect their democratic rights and allow them a voice in determining the future 
of their community. In comparison with the outcome of the car plant 
demonstrations in Eisenach, it is clear that the financial capital of owning the 
land in their village proved to be more valuable and effective than the right to 
free speech or protest on its own. However, the fears around mass 
unemployment and social stigma, heightened by an intense media spectacle, 
caused the villagers themselves to withdraw their support for their 
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representatives. This showcases just how integral social and financial security is 
to political power and citizens’ voice, and how important the social and 
economic transformation in Eastern Germany is when looking at processes of 
democratisation.  
When Opel and the Treuhandanstalt realised that the village council was 
demanding a say in the development, they attempted to block their influence by 
order from above, only to be forced to eventually attend the village meeting and 
speak face to face with the villagers. In so doing, the mayor succeeded in 
rebalancing the relations between the larger and smaller actors, reasserting the 
democratic rights and voice of the villagers despite hefty local opposition, and 
ensuring a say in future urban developments. Most importantly, however, the 
endeavour was about resetting the tone of communication between the 
different parties and demanding respect where so much had already been lost.  
  




About ten kilometres from the border between Thuringia and Hesse, in the 
grounds of a former palace, lies the hotel Schloss Hohenhaus. In the early 
nineties, a pharmaceutical company had chosen to hold their monthly in-house 
training courses at the venue and contacted a nearby photographer, across the 
border in Eisenach, to ask for his services in capturing group photos at the end 
of every session. ‘Are you even able to produce a quality photograph?’, they 
began.1087 Despite their original doubts, the experienced eastern photographer 
was commissioned to produce the staff photographs at their regular events. 
 As a result, he would cross the former border at least twice a month, on 
his way to and from the hotel. Having grown up in the region, the frontier had 
long been a regular part of his everyday experience. During the GDR he had 
needed a permit to attend dance classes or run errands in the area close to the 
border. The streets directly next to the border strip had been cleared, however, 
and were overgrown after years of separation. Behind these were the 
watchtowers and border installations, and the area known as the death-strip, 
where those who crossed without permission were to be shot at. Even twenty, 
thirty years after the fall of the Wall, the memory of this border and the lengths 
the state had gone to in order to counter the citizens’ will for freedom was 
deeply engrained on his conscience.  
 
1087 ‘”Können Sie denn das in einer bestimmten Qualität überhaupt machen?" fing es an‘, Interview with 
Joachim Thurau, Eisenach, 22 August 2018. 
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 By the early nineties, the installations had been dismantled and the roads 
were reopened again, linking the two states and the former halves of the 
country to one another. All that remained of the segregation was the original 
border mark on the ground. Not the installations, and towers, and barriers, but 
the line drawn across the road in yellow paint. It was not a straight line, but 
rather zigzagged, following the exact route of the German-German border as it 
crossed the road. After just a few years, it was now the only visual reminder of 
the border in this area, but it too was fading with time. 
 As the photographer drove to and from his home to the nearby hotel to 
photograph the western colleagues, he would stop his car and pause at the 
former border, taking the time to remember and reflect on the significance of 
the line on the ground. The ‘minute of remembrance’, as he called it, was not a 
one-off, but gradually became routine, over the course of many years.1088 When 
he had finished his minute of silence, he would secretly get out a tub of yellow 
paint and repaint the line on the ground, as a way of holding on to the memory 
of what had been, and of that which had now gone. 
Years later, he admitted his actions to a local mayor from a town just 
across the border in Hesse. ‘I had the exact same idea!’ he exclaimed in 
response, ‘but I was not allowed!’.1089 Had the western mayor been caught 
repainting the border line, he would most certainly have been accused of 
wanting to reinstate the border between the two halves of Germany, and of 
attempting to re-separate from his eastern relatives. And yet, the act was not 
 
1088 ‘Gedenkminute‘, ibid. 
1089 ‘und da sagt er "Ich hatte auch den Gedanken. Nur ich DURFTE nicht“‘, ibid. 
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meant as a political symbol for the future, but rather one that was about the 
importance and relevance of the past in the present.  
The experience of the separation of East and West Germany was one that 
was deeply rooted in the conscience of those that had experienced it and that 
had lived with the border. Time and again, the photographer spoke of the ways 
in which the memory of the border still hit deep and had the power to unravel 
the soul, even after all these years. Comparable only to the death of a family 
member, the experience of living with the separation had been so profound, he 
explained, that it would take many years, if not decades, to come to terms with. 
And yet, the photographer argued that this experience was not unique to those 
directly at the border but was just as pertinent for GDR citizens who had grown 
up further East as well. Equally, the mayor from West Germany had reportedly 
shared the photographer’s desire to repaint the line and to hold onto the 
memory of what had been. Despite having lived on the western side of the line, 
with relative freedom of movement, the border and its ramifications for citizens 
of Germany had also determined his life. 
The story of the border line demonstrates not only how deeply rooted the 
experience of the separation was in the everyday lives of citizens in East and 
West, but also how experiences and emotions endure when material structures 
have long disappeared. During his regular visits, the photographer would 
collect remnants of the former border, such as metal sheeting, which was later 
used for local art and history exhibitions. Bit by bit, the bars and metal that had 
fortified the border were removed, but the memory of driving along the 
damaged road again for the first time after it was reopened, with its many 
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potholes, to visit friends and family in the next state, was still as vivid as it was 
then. Although the citizens were no doubt glad to be able to cross the border, 
there was a significant disparity between the visible remains of the border and 
the lasting effects of the lived experience. 
As I tried to understand the significance behind this clearly symbolic act, 
the photographer explained that repainting the border line was important for 
his personal remembrance: ‘So that I could stand there again and see that it was 
still yellow. For it was slowly fading - the yellow - wasn’t it’.1090 Being able to 
express your lived experience so that others will hear, recognise and consider it 
in making group decisions is essential for political participation. Alana Mann 
writes that ‘to deny the capacity to possess and share one’s narrative’ is 
therefore to deny citizens their potential for voice.1091 And yet, the story of the 
border line in eastern Germany and the photographer’s efforts to hold onto it 
suggests that voice needs not only language and status, but also objects and 
spaces that can hold or illustrate that narrative.  
 In the early 1990s, as factories began to close, these too would disappear 
from the ‘blossoming’ landscape. The workers that had spent their lives in these 
buildings faced a choice between redundancy, early retirement, zero-hour 
contracts, further training, and Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen (temporary work 
‘creation’ measures), essentially all forms of joblessness. Those who attended 
training in Erfurt were taught by the former secretary for Agitation und 
 
1090 ‘Das ist für mein Gedenken, einfach da wieder zu stehen, dass es immer noch gelb ist. Denn es lies ja 
langsam nach, das Gelb, nicht‘, ibid. 
1091 Alana Mann, Voice and Participation in Global Food Politics (New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 3. 
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Propaganda, who was offered work at the centre after ensuring all his other 
colleagues had found suitable employment.1092 In Eisenach, former AWE 
workers who had received temporary work placements were tasked with 
archiving the company documents, emptying the offices in which they had sat 
only a few days or weeks beforehand, and knocking down the structures to 
ideally make way for new developments.1093 
 As the factory halls and buildings disappeared, and documents were 
either archived or destroyed, citizens realised that the knowledge of what their 
factories had looked like, how they had lived and worked, would also soon be 
lost. In an attempt to ensure that the masses of technically skilled people that 
had worked in the car plant and in the nearby electronics and clock factories 
could practise their handiwork skills, staff at the newly established ‘Association 
for the Promotion of Work Creation, Employment and Structural Development’ 
(ABS) developed a project to build small scale models of the factory sites, 
documenting all the former offices, production halls and warehouses, and 
thereby the processes and infrastructure of the former centres of East German 
life.1094 ‘This is what the AWE looked like in 1990, when the last Wartburg left 
production’, they could say, demonstrating how GDR production had managed 
the whole ‘complicated’, sometimes ‘convoluted’ and ‘ecologically unfriendly’ 
process, from beginning to end.1095 
 
1092 Interview with Wolfgang Mühle, Erfurt, 13 August 2018. 
1093 Interview with Thomas Brohm, Ruhla, 15 February 2019. 
1094 ‘Gesellschaft für Arbeitsförderung, Beschäftigung und Strukturentwicklung‘, AdSAWE, 30.8.2 
Werksarchiv, ‘Gesellschaft zur Arbeitsförderung, Beschäftigung und Strukturentwicklung mbH Eisenach 
(ABS)‘, Eisenach, 19 July 1994. 
1095 ‘so sah das Automobilwerk 1990 aus, als der letzte Wartburg vom Band lief‘, ‘kompliziert‘, 
'verschachtelt‘, ‘ökologisch bedenklich‘, Interview with Thomas Brohm, Ruhla, 15 February 2019. 
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 Further larger projects followed, with the developers considering 
copying other model villages in Austria and Germany that showcased world 
wonders. Instead, they decided to build tiny replicas of historical buildings 
from across Thuringia in what would later be called Miniathür.1096 The small 
park nestled in the valley of Ruhla near Eisenach ‘was an attempt to counter 
(feelings of hopelessness), to bring history back to life for a while, so that the 
factory still exists, somehow, it is still sort of there’.1097 It was one of many 
community projects designed by local people during this time to do something 
for their area and their own sense of pride. And it worked; for at the end of the 
day, when everyone headed down to the local pub, it was clear who was doing 
an ABS placement; they would have kept their uniforms on.  
Even though some projects did indeed develop into limited companies, 
working independently or under management of the town, the name of the 
federal placement funding was greatly misleading. The work ‘created’ for local 
citizens in the East consisted heavily of boxing up, tearing down, disposing of, 
partly conserving and mostly historicising the companies and structures of the 
German Democratic Republic. The director of the ABS Association argues that 
this did not necessarily help local citizens to deal emotionally with the changes, 
but it certainly brought them home. While some would still try to ‘repress’ or 
deny what was happening, pulling down their old workplaces made one thing 
clear: ‘it’s over’.1098 
 
1096 Ibid. 
1097 ‘Und deswegen, es war so der Versuch, so einen kleinen Gegenpol zu machen, so die Geschichte noch 
mal zu sehen, aufleben zu lassen, das Werk, das gibt es noch irgendwie, es ist noch irgendwo was da, ja‘, 
ibid. 
1098 ‘verdrängen‘, ‘jetzt ist Schluss‘, ibid. 
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The story of ‘work creation’ in Eastern Germany is a whole chapter of 
post-1990 history that is yet to be written in detail,1099 but which again 
exemplifies the resilience and Eigensinn of eastern citizens in the face of 
extraordinary structural changes. Within just a couple of years, their society had 
changed beyond recognition. And yet, this thesis has demonstrated that, 
despite the odds, citizens would always find new ways to actively respond to 
the changes going on around them and to gain control of their lives. By 
describing the effects these changing dynamics had on everyday situations 
from rubbish collection to job security, this study has also shown just how 
intense and exceptional the speed was at which East Germans were required to 
adapt. 
The years from 1989 to 1991 constituted a period of radical changes 
affecting all spheres of public and private life and was accompanied for many 
by strong experiences of loss, dis- and re-orientation. As well as record levels of 
unemployment, the eastern states experienced an ‘exodus’ of citizens after 1990, 
with long-term repercussions for the social infrastructure and birth rates in the 
East.1100 Following how voice is negotiated during this period exemplifies how 
political agency is claimed, used and lost, but also highlights the integral social 
and emotional component.  Looking at the way in which these processes are 
 
1099 For an excellent overview written at the time, see Matthias Knuth & Ulrich Pekruhl, ‘Der Beitrag von 
ABS-Gesellschaften zur Bewältigung des Transformationsprozesses‘ in Wolfram Pfeiffer (Ed.), Regionen 
unter Anpassungsdruck. Zu den Schwerpunkten des regionalen Handlungsbedarfs (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 
1993), pp. 95-126. 
1100 Christian Bangel (et al.), ‘East-West Exodus. The Millions who left’, Zeit Online, 30 May 2019, 
<https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2019-05/east-west-exodus-migration-east-germany-
demography?print> (accessed 06 October 2019). 
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experienced and recounted brings to light the social and emotional dynamics of 
the transformation and system change.  
 In the GDR, citizens’ voice was limited because individual opinions 
were not given space to be expressed in the official sphere or were threatened 
with repercussions, forcing self-expression into other outlets such as literature, 
music and fashion and creating a unique kind of GDR double-speak.1101 
Pressure to conform to expectations of loyalty towards the state left citizens 
wrought with inner conflicts, disillusionment and despair.  Eventually, many 
saw no other way but to choose exit. For those who remained, their voices 
gained importance, as exit had suddenly become a realistic option. The 
recordings of the demonstrations and dialogue events in the autumn of 1989 
document nervous citizens, stumbling over their words as they begin to 
practise public speaking. And yet, the words they choose and the statements 
they make hold a lot of weight. It is the process of finding voice as individuals, 
and of becoming visible as a collective. The Neues Forum as a platform for 
discussion was conceived to foster exactly this.  
 However, the reintroduction of public platforms for debate also requires 
a social and political infrastructure to support it. Whilst this was clearly a very 
creative and liberating time, the difficulties of managing new expressive 
freedoms would soon become clear. For as much as the citizens were unversed 
in public speaking, the authorities and structures were equally unprepared to 
 
1101 See Patrick Major, Behind the Berlin Wall. East Germany and the Frontiers of Power (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) p. 157, or Alf Lüdtke, ‘Sprache und Herrschaft in der DDR. Einleitende 
Überlegungen’ in Alf Lüdtke & Peter Becker (Ed.), Akten. Eingaben. Schaufenster. Die DDR und ihre Texte 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), pp. 11-28. 
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deal with and structure the suggestions coming from the citizenry. The chaos 
that appears to ensue at a national level with the opening of the border is 
equally evident on a local level across all organisations, with communal events 
descending into disarray and overstretched authorities failing to communicate 
new procedure. As the government lost face, the churches and new political 
groups, with their better standing in society, were endowed with power and 
responsibilities, however the status this gave them was temporary and intended 
only for the time until new structures were put into place.   
Restructuring politics and rechannelling the exercise of voice is an 
incredibly difficult task. This would prove to be especially so whilst the country 
was in disarray, for the sudden and strong use of voice in the autumn had 
destabilised the government and the society, with many describing a new sense 
of fear, be it of the crowds on the market places, the work colleagues, or the 
possible personal repercussions of the changing political landscape. This in turn 
created an environment in which existing rules and regulations no longer 
applied, were disregarded or were left open to interpretation. For some, this 
period was therefore one of great power and opportunity, as decisions could be 
taken swiftly and with little resistance. On the flipside, however, the instability 
also fostered aggression and division amongst the population, as different 
actors used the uncertainty to discredit others or to gain influence. This period 
formally lasted until the introduction of new laws in July 1990 and the formal 
reunification in October 1990, but the practices and tactics developed during 
this time often persisted afterwards.    
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Over the course of just a few months, the power relations in the GDR 
shifted from members of the Socialist Unity Party to the citizens’ groups and 
churches, to the newly-formed Alliance for Germany, and on again to the 
federal Christian Democratic Union. Equally, in the workplaces and 
parliaments, the rule of the majority would favour those who spoke loudest and 
most passionately. In particular, the former GDR elites and party members 
were hit by pent-up anger from local citizens who had now gained powerful 
positions in their communities. For some former elites, the social stigma would 
lead to seclusion and even suicide, whilst for others, it would allow them to 
move into new positions in the business sector early on in the transformation 
process.  
However, the continual transferring of power and shifting hierarchies 
were both tiring and unsettling in the long run. As citizens penalised one 
another for past offences and the people in power changed, it was unclear who 
would indeed be targeted next. The instability within the government and 
society therefore increased the need for quick and clear new rules, structures 
and regulations. As such, the internal process of coming to terms with the past 
was not granted time to develop slowly and organically, because of prevailing 
pressures to create social and political stability. Similarly, there was little time 
to truly consider or develop all the new concepts or approaches that had been 
developed, leading political representatives to reach for ready models provided 
by their western neighbours.  
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And yet, implementing new structures would also prove difficult. Not 
only could western structures not be applied directly to GDR structures, 
causing more uncertainty as citizens sought interim solutions, but these 
mammoth tasks would require the cooperation of all citizens, including those 
that had been publicly named and shamed over the autumn. The elections of 
1990 would be significant in rebalancing these social dynamics within local 
politics and administration, as various actors withdrew their support and 
bartered with one another for social recognition. It demonstrates that voice is 
about making oneself heard and acknowledged, be that vocally or through 
silent protest. 
Even as citizens held democratic elections and set up a free press, the 
challenges of adapting to the new system and of managing the system change 
would again create further pressures on communal representatives. As such, 
the free debates and discussions that had defined the autumn but often lasted 
into the early hours were curbed in order to be able to implement new protocol. 
Overwhelmed by the scale of the tasks ahead of them and the difficulties of 
dealing with a free press, local councils redefined their own roles and 
responsibilities towards their constituents, who now needed to seek 
information independently. Freedom of speech was given, but with separate 
platforms and private committees, different opinions no longer needed to be 
exchanged or negotiated in order to pass political motions. 
As new market forces came into play, threatening the existence of East 
German firms and livelihoods, economic arguments were prioritised and 
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created further pressures and dynamics that quickly overtook the internal 
restructuring process. The financial insecurity and shame that accompanied the 
currency and social union had a clear influence on citizens’ readiness to use 
voice and protest to protect their interests. Without the certainty of a steady 
income, citizens were not as willing to take risks, express solidarity or to protest 
loudly and instead focused fully on their own existence and hopes of new 
investment. 
Those who did choose to counter developments in the name of self-
determination would face strong opposition from all around. Holding onto 
their democratic and, more importantly, ownership rights, allowed the citizens 
of a small village in Thuringia to determine their own future, but only because 
of the financial security they had achieved through business development 
funding prior to beginning negotiations, and the actions of certain individuals. 
The lengths that big business, politicians, the press and the Treuhand trust went 
to just to enable the investment in a new plant once again demonstrates how 
significantly financial means affect the effectiveness of voice.  
From March 1990, citizens in eastern Germany were able to use their 
votes to elect political representatives, they could use their buying-power to 
influence the choice of goods on the market, and they could express their 
opinion in public as and how they chose to. Why, then, did citizens still feel 
disempowered by the new system? As illustrated throughout this thesis, 
political agency needs some form of bargaining power with which to negotiate 
one’s own position. In the autumn, citizens’ political loyalty held enough 
weight to enforce far-reaching changes, and social stigma was used to gain new 
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powers or to oust people from political positions. In the spring, offering or 
withdrawing material and financial support could influence power hierarchies 
in the organisation of the elections. And in the summer, land ownership proved 
to be a valuable good in the transformation of eastern industry and the 
determination of smaller communities. In all cases, the use of Eigensinn and 
own initiative would be significant. These actions alone however would not 
suffice, for negotiation relies on social recognition by others.  
However, in losing their jobs and social networks, many citizens not only 
feared for their livelihoods, but also lost a lot of their own self-worth. What, 
then, is the value of their voice? As this thesis has demonstrated, the scope of 
voice fluctuates depending on the circumstances and can be severely influenced 
by the actions and emotions of others. The new rights accorded to East 
Germans in the Federal Republic are generally understood and appreciated, but 
they do not make good the experience of humiliation, loss and dispossession 
that accompanied the changes and affected large swathes of the population in 
eastern Germany. The popular discontent around the transformation process 
therefore has little to do with dissatisfaction at the outcome of the political 
process or disappointment at unfulfilled expectations but is rather symptomatic 
of the systematic and emotionally enforced exclusion and marginalisation of 
citizens from various realms of public life.   
As illustrated in the story of the photographer’s longstanding 
preoccupation with the border, the sudden changes that took place in 1989 and 
the extended period of financial and social insecurity that followed cannot be 
overcome simply by implementing new structures and procedures. Even when 
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these have been practised and accepted, the experience of the upheaval and the 
associated loss of familiar routines, spaces, behaviours and structures continues 
to shape the people it affected. Without the possibility of expressing, 
acknowledging or sharing the emotional side of the transformation, citizens are 
essentially prevented from reforming and consolidating their identity within 
the new society. Not having the narrative resources or space to build an own 
account of your life ‘represents a deep denial of voice’, forcing citizens to 
continuously look at themselves ‘through the eyes of others’.1102 Consequently, 
citizens feel othered and begin to present or understand themselves 
accordingly. 
And yet, ‘facing and naming those losses’ can provide a way of 
developing counter narratives that will, in time, generate new directions for 
politics, and in the short-term help to get through times of uncertainty and 
loss.1103 This is evident throughout this period, beginning with the activist’s 
burial of the GDR in her back garden as a way of defining her past and of 
closing a chapter of her life. Her insistence that the burial should not be 
commentated and that it would speak for itself, and her shock when this 
request is not respected, speaks for the strong need to be allowed to create an 
own narrative, an own account of her experience.  
Later, the car plant workers who felt that their voices had not been 
listened to and that their social contract had been broken also used funeral 
rituals to mark and process the loss of their social reality. The silence that 
 
1102 Nick Couldry, Why Voice Matters. Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism (London: Sage, 2010), p. 10. 
1103 Ibid., p. 18. 
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accompanies these ceremonies speaks volumes. Finally, as citizens were tasked 
with archiving their companies and ripping down the factories, they chose to 
use the financial resources for temporary work to document their workplaces 
and their own regional heritage so that future generations may be able to see 
what had been there before. It is not voice per se, but it provides a basis for 
those narratives to be voiced in the future, a kind of shared inner voice. 
Even amidst severe social and economic imbalances, citizens continue to 
find ways to negotiate their lives and create meaning. Unable to express their 
voices as they would have wished to, they appropriate a range of spaces 
outside of the strictly political sphere, using symbols, gestures and silence. And 
yet, these practices are not new. In 1988, citizens in Erfurt had staged a silent sit-
in in the cathedral, threatening to sound the loudest bell in the city. Unable to 
voice their demands through open structures in the GDR, they had sought other 
outlets as room for expression and negotiation. A couple of years later, activists 
whose calls for cross-checking of political candidates had been largely ignored 
by the government had held a hunger strike in the occupied Stasi building. The 
voicelessness of citizens in the GDR had briefly given way to open spaces for 
voice, only to be replaced again by alternative forms of voicelesness.  
What is sometimes referred to as a ‘democracy deficit’1104 in Eastern 
Germany could therefore be interpreted as exactly that – not on behalf of the 
citizens’ ability to grasp democratic structures and concepts, however, but 
 
1104 See Micha Brumlik, ‘Postkoloniale Gesellschaft oder posttotalitäre Kultur? Das Demokratiedefizit der 
ostdeutschen Länder‘, in Sabine Andresen (et al.), Vereintes Deutschland – geteilte Jugend. Ein politisches 
Handbuch (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2003), pp. 283-298. 
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rather regarding a deficit in the scope for citizens to be able to voice their 
opinions. By 1991, East Germans had the opportunity to express their voice in 
public, through a transparent voting system, in the free press or on the streets. 
And yet, this thesis has shown that this clearly did not suffice. The ability and 
willingness of citizens to use their voice is subject to a range of dynamics, from 
the exit of fellow citizens to existential fears and feelings of shame and 
inadequacy. Even where platforms and spaces were created to allow for 
discussions and freedom of expression, these feelings of inadequacy, alongside 
time pressures relating to the upcoming elections and pressing issues around 
the currency union, meant that East Germans’ voice was purely reactive, as 
opposed to having the time and space to be voiced actively. As the mayor of 
Eisenach announced to the town council in February 1990, ‘the situation is 
changing by the hour, and so we are also forced to react to the changes on an 
hourly basis’.1105 Local politicians and citizens alike were in overdrive simply 
trying to keep up with the pace of the changes. 
However, citizens’ ability to continually seek new realms of expression 
speaks for their strong sense of agency. As this thesis has shown, the people of 
Erfurt and Eisenach maintained agency throughout the transformation process, 
shaping the outcome through their actions and their own historical experiences. 
The ‘reunification’ process was in this sense by no means imposed, but rather 
an intricate process of negotiation in the everyday. And still, despite their 
 
1105 ‘Nur an dem Beispiel will ich sagen, daß sich die Situation stündlich ändert, und wir auch stündlich 
auch auf die neue Situation reagieren müssen‘, StA Eisenach, 21.2-247 Protokollbücher; 
Stadtverordnetenversammlung 1989-1990, ‘Niederschrift zur Stadtverordnetenversammlung Eisenach‘, 21 
February 1990. 
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incredible will and readiness to act, citizens’ agency was severely limited by 
their financial means, social marginalisation and competing dynamics that sped 
up the pace of the changes and undermined citizens’ ability to adapt.  
What do these divergent experiences in the early 1990s mean for the 
overarching German narrative? How long will it take for citizens in the East 
and those that have left to process these experiences? And, as eastern Germany 
continues to see lower rates of pay and social equality, to what extent does 
social and financial standing continue to determine citizens’ ability to actively 
participate in the political system? Academics speak of it being a matter of 
needing time for democratic practices to be consolidated in the East, arguing 
that the longstanding totalitarian regime in the GDR gave no opportunity for 
‘stable democratic approaches’ to take root.1106 And yet, as this thesis has 
shown, voice is determined by a range of socio-economic and cultural factors. 
What stands out in East Germany, however, is the unbeatable pace at which the 
new structures were implemented and the speed at which citizens were forced 
to adapt. 
The silent rituals and symbolic practices described throughout this study 
evidence a strong need to create and express own narratives. As demonstrated, 
the period from 1989 to 1991 was an incredibly emotive one, and these raw 
emotions provide easily exploitable resources to popular movements. So long 
as the perceived injustifices stemming from the transformation are not 
 
1106 ‘Woher sollen tiefverwurzelte und krisensichere demokratische Einstellungen kommen?’, Micha 
Brumlik, ‘Postkoloniale Gesellschaft oder posttotalitäre Kultur?‘, p. 296; see also Tytus Jaskułowski, ‘The 
Party System and Democratic Consolidation – Poland and East Germany in Comparison‘, in Uwe Backes, 
Tytus Jaskułowski & Abel Polese (Eds.), Totalitarismus und Transformation. Defizite der 
Demokratiekonsolidierung im Mittel- und Osteuropa (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), p. 220.  
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recognised and addressed by historians and official institutions, and are simply 
dismissed as Ostalgie, populists will likely continue to gain support, simply by 
recognising and naming these experiences, albeit often in equally slanderous, 
exclusionary, and historically inaccurate ways. By offering collective narratives 
and social networks to replace those that were quickly demolished in 1990 or 
not given due time to develop, these movements are essentially thriving on the 
common experiences of marginalisation amid system change. 
However, the political swing to the right and left in recent years is 
mirrored by developments in other eastern states.1107 To what extent is Eastern 
Germany therefore a unique story? We will not know the answer to this until 
historical research on this period also addresses the significant effect of 
emotions and pace on the political process, for it is highly likely that this is a 
unifying and telling feature. After all, case studies so far have demonstrated 
how unprepared virtually all of the governments in eastern Europe were for the 
sudden changes, resulting in power vacuums and instability as seen in East 
Germany, 1108  albeit with varying outcomes; in the Polish People’s Republic, 
demands for reforms created a ‘cacophony’ of voices, all searching for new – 
national – narratives, 1109  whilst former Yugoslavia descended into a bloody 
war of dissolution.1110 The significance of different social and cultural practices 
 
1107 Betts, ‘1989 at Thirty‘, p. 303. 
1108 Włodzimierz Borodziej (et al.), 'Introduction‘, in Joachim von Puttkammer, Włodzimierz Borodziej & 
Stanislaw Holubec (Eds.), From Revolution to Uncertainty. The Year 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe (New 
York: Routledge, 2020), p. 3. 
1109 Włodzimierz Borodziej, ’Poland and the Collapse of the Patron 1989-90. As seen from the Polish 
Embassy in Moscow‘, in Joachim von Puttkammer, Włodzimierz Borodziej & Stanislaw Holubec (Eds.), 
From Revolution to Uncertainty. The Year 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Routledge, 2020), p. 
49. 
1110 Marie-Janine Calic, ‘1990. Building Democracy in Yugoslavia and the Danger of War’, in Joachim von 
Puttkammer, Włodzimierz Borodziej & Stanislaw Holubec (Eds.), From Revolution to Uncertainty. The Year 
1990 in Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Routledge, 2020), p. 164.   
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on the use of voice could therefore help to better understand the various 
trajectories and ways of maintaining relatively peaceful and stable government 
during transitions.  
Whilst East Germany was surely unique due to its relationship with 
West Germany, which significantly affected the migration of citizens, the 
election campaigns and the restructuring of businesses, similarities nevertheless 
exist in the incongrous experiences of the years after 1989 and official memory 
regimes across eastern Europe. In Hungary, the ‘depressing aftermath’ of 1989 
is also at odds with the joyous memory of the original rupture,1111 and in 
Bulgaria, images of long supermarket queues that evoke associations with 
communist times, but were actually taken to capture the everyday of life in the 
new market system, highlight inconsistencies in historical narratives and lived 
experience.1112 There is therefore a desperate need to present more historical 
narratives regarding the interplay of state structures and society in the years 
after 1989, in order to identify how these different factors played out. 
Paulina Sekuła writes that ‘the impact of other variables on the political 
culture of post-communist societies’ is necessary to understand cultural aspects 
of democratic consolidation.1113 Whilst exit and loyalty have been shown to 
have had a clear impact on the transformation process,1114 this only sheds light 
on two variables of the dynamic. We still know relatively little about the 
 
1111 Borodziej (et al.), 'Introduction‘, p. 4. 
1112 Martina Baleva, ‘Menschen in der Reihe. Ein visueller Topos der bulgarischen Wende‘, Die 
revolutionären Umbrüche in Europa 1989/91: Deutungen und Repräsentationen. 18. Internationales 
Symposium der Stiftung Ettersberg, Weimar, 01 November 2019. 
1113 Paulina Sekuła, ‘The Role of Political Culture in the Consolidation of Eastern and  
1114 See, for example, Steven Pfaff, Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of 
Leninism and the Revolution of 1989 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 
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interaction of other social and cultural practices that structure our political 
everyday life. In order to truly understand the influence of 1989 on the current 
political situation in Thuringia and farther afield, and to examine how power is 
transferred in our society, historians should therefore look more closely at the 
symbolic actions of citizens in their communities, recognise the variety of ways 
in which voice can be exercised, and listen to the silences. 
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